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Science,  Technology,  and 
American  Diplomacy 

An  extended  study  of  the  interactions  of  science 
and  technology  with  United  States  foreign  policy 

Volume  I 


U.S.  House  of  Representatives 


Science,  Technology,  and 
American  Diplomacy 

An  extended  study  of  the  interactions  of  science 
and  technology  with  United  States  foreign  policy 

Volume  I 

1  tr 
!  m 

j  zr 


..  c.  l. 


U.S.  House  of  Representatives 

U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Washington:  1977 

For  sale  by  the  Superintendent  of  Documents,  U.S.   Government  Printing  Office 
Washington,  D.C.  20402  (3-Part  Set ;  Sold  in  Sets  Only) 
Stock  Number  052-070-04350-4 

CLEMENT  J.  ZABLOCKI,  Wisconsin,   Chairman 

L.  H.  FOUNTAIN,  North  Carolina 
DANTE  B.  FASCELL,  Florida 
CHARLES  C.  DIGGS,  Jr.,  Michigan 
ROBERT  N.  C.  NIX,  Pennsylvania 
DONALD  M.  FRASER,  Minnesota 
LEE  H.  HAMILTON,  Indiana 
LESTER  L.  WOLFF,  New  York 
GUS  YATRON,  Pennsylvania 
MICHAEL  HARRINGTON,  Massachusetts 
LEO  J.  RYAN,  California 
STEPHEN  J.  SOLARZ,  New  York 
HELEN  S.  MEYNER,  New  Jersey 
DON  BONKER,  Washington 
GERRY  E.  STUDDS,  Massachusetts 
ANDY  IRELAND,  Florida 
ANTHONY  C.  BEILENSON,  California 
WYCHE  FOWLER,  Jr.,  Georgia 
E  (KIKA)  DE  LA  GARZA,  Texas 
GEORGE  E.   DANIELSON,  California 
JOHN  J.  CAVANAUGH,  Nebraska 

PAUL  FINDLEY,  Illinois 
JOHN  H.  BUCHANAN,  Jr.,  Alabama 
J.  HERBERT  BURKE,  Florida 
CHARLES  W.  WHALEN,  Jr.,  Ohio 
LARRY  WINN,  Jr.,  Kansas 
WILLIAM  F.  GOODLING,  Pennsylvania 
SHIRLEY  N.  PETTIS,  California 

John  J.  Brady,  Jr.,  Chief  of  Staff 
George  R.  Berdes,  Staff  Consultant 

Subcommittee  on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs 
CLEMENT  J.  ZABLOCKI,  Wisconsin,   Chairman 

L.  H.  FOUNTAIN,  North  Carolina 
GERRY  E.  STUDDS,  Massachusetts 
ANTHONY  C.  BEILENSON,  California 

LARRY  WINN,  Jr.,  Kansas 

Ivo  J.  Spalatin,  Subcommittee  Staff  Director 

William  H.  Fite,  Minority  Staff  Consultant 

Forrest  R.  Frank,  Subcommittee  Staff  Associate 

La  Verne  Still,  Staff  Assistant 



This  publication  of  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy 
represents  the  culmination  of  7  years  of  research  and  brings  together, 
in  a  current  perspective,  results  previously  published  in  a  series  of  15 
committee  prints  of  this  committee  and  its  Subcommittee  on  Inter- 
national Security  and  Scientific  Affairs. 

In  the  foreword  to  the  first  of  the  15  committee  prints — an  anno- 
tated bibliography  published  in  March  1970  (superseded  by  an  exten- 
sive new  bibliography  in  the  present  collection) — I  noted  that  previ- 
ous work  by  the  subcommittee  had  revealed  many  instances  in  which 
U.S.  foreign  policy  had  lagged  behind  technological  innovations  of 
worldwide  importance.  In  asking  the  Congressional  Research  Service 
to  undertake  the  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy  re- 
search project,  the  subcommittee  sought  to  move  toward  improving 
xVmerica's  performance  in  this  vital  area. 

It  seems  appropriate  here  to  recapture  some  of  the  thoughts  ex- 
pressed in  presenting  other  committee  prints  of  the  series.  Collec- 
tively these  brief  excerpts  suggest  the  broad  sweep  of  the  study,  the 
depth  and  durability  of  the  committee's  concern,  and  why  the  subject 
is  one  of  compelling  urgency  and  significance  for  legislators,  officials 
throughout  the  executive  branch,  industrial  leaders,  scholars,  and  the 
American  people : 

With  the  detonation  of  the  first  atomic  bomb  at  Hiroshima,  Japan,  in  1945  the 
United  States  and  the  world  entered  the  nuclear  age.  The  development  of  the 
bomb  revolutionized  world  affairs  and  set  off  a  strategic  arms  race.  .  .  .  (The 
Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear  Age.) 

Put  to  destructive  ends  by  the  wrong  hands,  that  discovery  [nuclear  fission] 
represents  the  potential  unleashing  of  a  force  capable  of  destroying  civilization. 
However,  given  wise  and  prudent  management,  it  also  represents  the  release  and 
increase  of  human  energy  capable  of  opening  a  new  phase  in  human  history. 
(Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe:  The  Interaction  of  American  Diplomacy 
with  a  New  Technology.) 

As  our  consciousness  of  the  world  as  a  "global  village"  intensifies,  we  are  be- 
coming increasingly  aware  of  the  dangers  and  opportunities  involved  when  tradi- 
tional values  of  time  and  space  are  no  longer  relevant.  (The  Politics  of  Global 

Although  our  times  are  often  characterized  as  the  Space  Age  .  .  .,  they  might 
also  be  characterized  as  the  Sea  Age  because  for  the  first  time  human  beings 
have  begun  to  explore  below  the  waters  of  the  world.  .  .  .  the  seabed  has  become 
the  object  of  intense  economic,  legal,  and  political  interest.  This  interest  is  almost 



directly  the  result  of  the  increasing  capability  of  nations  to  exploit  the  natural 
resources  which  lie  beneath  the  sea.  (Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed.) 

Today,  in  many  parts-  of  the  earth,  there  is  a  food/people  imbalance  which 
causes  the  lives  of  millions  to  he  a  desperate  search  for  sustenance.  .  .  . 
In  the  helief  that  the  food/population  equation  can  he  and  should  he  brought 
into  balance,  modern  man  is  applying  scientific  knowledge  and  technical  skills. 
The  United  States,  through  its  foreign  aid  programs,  has  been  in  the  forefront.  .  .  . 
(Beyond  Malthus:  The  Food /People  Equation.) 

In  the  minds  of  many  today  the  idea  of  science  and  technology  as  oppressive 
and  uncontrollable  forces  in  society  is  becoming  increasingly  more  prevalent. 
They  see  in  the  power  of  science  and  technology  the  means  of  destruction  in  war- 
fare, the  source  of  environmental  violation,  and  the  stimulant  behind  man's  grow- 
ing alienation.  .  .  .  [Often  overlooked],  however,  is  the  corresponding  alterna- 
tive these  influences  present  for  man's  good — for  his  advancement,  for  the  enrich- 
ment of  his  life,  and  for  world  peace.  (The  Mekong  Project:  Opportunities  and 
Problems  of  Regionalism.) 

Science  and  technology  are  compelling  determinants  of  the  human  condition. 
In  September  1975  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  voted  to  convene  an 
international  conference  on  science  and  technology.  The  intent  of  this  move  was 
to  allow  the  technologically  sophisticated  and  dynamic  elements  of  the  U.N.  family 
to  focus  the  efforts  of  the  1979  General  Assembly  on  a  concerted  program  of 
global  advance.  The  agenda  of  this  program  would  include  economic,  social,  polit- 
ical, and  commercial  concerns,  but  its  backbone  would  be  technical  and  mana- 
gerial. .  .  .  Leaders  of  our  diplomatic,  technological,  and  national  security 
affairs  are  not  devoid  of  imagination  or  insensitive  to  the  oppressive  weight  of 
danger  and  insecurity  ahead.  However,  if  these  leaders  propose  to  meet  future 
threats  with  the  same  strength  of  purpose  and  creative  initiative  that  have  largely 
marked  the  first  two  centuries  of  American  independence,  they  must  seek  new 
forms  and  find  new  applications  in  a  world  of  growing  interdependence.  The  prob- 
lem of  how  to  manage  our  relationships  in  such  a  world  resolves  in  large  part  into 
the  problem  of  managing  technological  dynamism  and  directing  it  to  humane  ends. 
(Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Interdependence.) 

Our  purpose  was  not  just  to  describe  and  analyze  a  specialized  set 
of  diplomatic  problems  and  opportunities ;  it  was  also,  and  primarily, 
to  examine  America's  capability  for  dealing  with  these  problems  and 
opportunities  and  to  suggest  legislative  options  for  improving  that 
capability-  This  aim  was  the  particular  focus  of  the  last  two  studies 
of  the  project :  Science  and  Technology  in  the  Department  of  State, 
by  Dr.  Franklin  P.  Huddle,  the  project  director,  and  Science,  Tech- 
nology, and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Interdependence,  a  summary 
and  analysis  of  the  whole  series  co-authored  by  Dr.  Huddle  and  the 
associate  project  director,  Mr.  Warren  R.  Johnston. 

To  repeat  a  further  thought  expressed  in  presenting  the  summary 
report:  It  is  my  hope  and  expectation  that  these  analytical  contribu- 
tions of  the  Congressional  Research  Service  will  prove  in  a  practical 
way  to  have  yielded  three  separate  sets  of  products:  (1)  specific  legis- 
lative options  and  administrative  initiatives  to  strengthen  the  conduct 
of  ongoing  diplomacy,  with  its  increasingly  important  and  inseparable 

technical  component;  (2)  encouragement  of  a  consensus  toward 
stronger  and  longer-range  planning  of  technical  initiatives  in  sup- 
port of  U.S.  diplomacy,  involving  closer  cooperation  among  all  ele- 
ments of  the  Federal  Government;  and  (3)  a  more  far-reaching  par- 
ticipation in  the  foreign  policy  process  throughout  government  at  all 
levels  and  involving  also  the  academic  and  technical  communities, 
private  industry,  and  the  public  at  large. 

The  findings  contained  herein  are  the  responsibility  of  the  individual 
authors  and  of  the  Congressional  Research  Service  and  do  not  neces- 
sarily reflect  the  views  of  the  membership  of  the  Committee  on  Inter- 
national Relations. 

Clement  J.  Zablocki,  Chairman, 
Committee  on  International  Relations. 

January  1978. 


(These  documents  are  now  out  of  print.  They  are  incorporated,  with  some 
minor  revisions,  in  the  present  volume.  The  documents  are  listed  here  in  the 
order  of  their  publication.  An  explanation  of  the  different  order  followed  in  pre- 
senting them  all  together  in  this  volume  is  given  in  Chapter  Fifteen  under  the 
heading,  Methodology  of  the  Study.) 

A  Selected,  Annotated  Bibliography  of  Articles,  Books,  Documents,  Periodicals, 
and  Reference  Guides.  (Superseded  by  Ms.  Knezo's  bibliography  of  January 
1976/July  1977,  reproduced  at  end  of  volume  III.)  Compiled  by  Genevieve 
Knezo.  (69  pages.)  Issued  March  1970. 

Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age.  An  introduction  to  the  entire  study 
by  Franklin  P.  Huddle.  (28  pages.)  Issued  April  1970. 

The  Evolution  of  International  Technology.  A  review  of  the  emergence  of  tech- 
nology as  a  factor  of  change  in  international  relations  by  Franklin  P.  Huddle. 
(70  pages.)  Issued  December  1970. 

The  Politics  of  Global  Health.  A  study  of  worldwide  efforts  to  prevent  epidemic 
disease  by  Freeman  H.  Quimby.  (79  pages.)  Issued  May  1971. 

Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed.  A  survey  of  technical,  economic,  legal, 
and  political  considerations  involved  in  using  the  natural  wealth  of  land  below 
the  seas  by  George  A.  Doumani.  (86  pages,  plus  appendixes.)  Issued  July  1971. 

Beyond  Malthus:  The  Food/ People  Equation.  A  study  of  the  interrelation  of  food 
and  population  and  the  resulting  impact  on  international  affairs  by  Allan  S. 
Xanes.  (96 pages.)  Issued  October  1971. 

The  Mekong  Project:  Opportunities  and  Problems  of  Regionalism.  A  case  study 
of  the  accomplishments  and  failures  of  the  massive  Indochina  works  project 
by  Franklin  P.  Huddle.  (86  pages. )  Issued  May  1972. 

The  Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear  Age.  A  study  of  an  early, 
serious  attempt  to  bring  atomic  energy  and  weapons  under  international  control 
by  Leneice  N.  Wu.  (67  pages.)  Issued  August  1972. 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe,:  The  Interaction  of  American  Diplomacy 
With  a  New  Technology.  Analysis  of  the  interaction  during  last  30  years 
between  American  diplomacy  and  the  technological  development  of  nuclear 
power  in  Europe  by  Warren  H.  Donnelly.  (163  pages.)  Issued  December  1972. 

U.S.-Soviet  Commercial  Relations:  The  Interplay  of  Economics,  Technology 
Transfer,  and  Diplomacy.  An  assessment  of  the  linkages  in  U.S.-Soviet  relations 
among  diplomacy,  economics,  and  technology  transfer  by  John  P.  Hardt  and 
George  D.  Holliday.  (105  pages.)  Issued  June  1973. 

The  Political  Legacy  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year.  An  analysis  of  atti- 
tudes, behavior  patterns,  and  procedures  followed  in  the  IGY  as  a  step  toward 
detente  by  Harold  Bullis.  (64  pages.)  Issued  November  1973. 

U.S.  Scientists  Abroad:  An  Examination  of  Major  Programs  for  Nongovern- 
mental Scientific  Exchange.  A  study  of  major  Federal  programs  which  send 
nongovernment  U.S.  scientists  and  technical  personnel  abroad  by  Genevieve  J. 
Knezo.  (163  pages.)  Issued  April  1974. 



Brain  Drain:  A  Study  of  the  Persistent  Issue  of  International  Scientific  Mobility. 

Assessment  of  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the  migration  of  technically  trained 
persons,  especially  from  developing  to  developed  countries,  by  Joseph  G. 
Whelan.  (272  pages. )  Issued  September  1974. 

Science  and  Technology  in  the  Department  of  State:  Bringing  Technical  Content 
Into  Diplomatic  Policy  and  Operations.  This  concluding  study  of  the  series,  by 
Franklin  P.  Huddle,  analyzes  the  impact  of  science  and  technology  on  the 
Department  of  State,  and  describes  departmental  efforts  and  opportunities  to 
relate  science  and  technology  to  its  mission.  (180  pages.)  Issued  June  1975. 

Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy  in  the  Age  of  Interdependence.  A  review  of 
the  entire  series  by  Franklin  P.  Huddle  and  Warren  R.  Johnston,  with 
analysis  of  implications  for  improved  mechanisms  and  strengthened  procedures 
in  both  executive  and  legislative  branches.  (360  pages,  plus  132-page  bibli- 
ography prepared  by  Genevieve  J.  Knezo. )  Issued  June  1976. 

Contents — Volume  I 


Foreword ni 

Documents  in  the  Original  Series vii 

Organization  of  the  Study xi 

Letter  of  Submittal xin 

Acknowledgments xv 

Preface xvii 

Introduction  to  the  Study  as  a  Whole  : 

Chapter  1 — Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age  ■  1 

Chapter  2 — The  Global  Context  of  Science,  Technology, 

and  Diplomacy    .     • 37 

Part  1 — Six  Cases  : 

Chapter  3 — The  Baruch  Plan :  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the 
Nuclear  Age 53 

Chapter  4 — Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe:  The 
Interaction  of  American  Diplomacy  With  a  New  Tech- 
nology      123 

Chapter   5 — The   Political   Legacy   of  the   International 

Geophysical  Year 293 

Chapter  6 — The  Mekong  Project :  Opportunities  and  Prob- 
lems of  Regionalism    . 361 

Chapter  7 — Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed  .    .     .       435 
Chapter  8 — United  States-Soviet  Commercial  Relations: 
The  Interplay  of  Economics,  Technology  Transfer,  and 
Diplomacy 525 



Volume  I 
Introduction  to  the  Study  as  a  Whole 

Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age 

The  Global  Context  of  Science,  Technology,  and  Diplomacy 

Part  1 — Six  Cases 

The  Baruch  Plan 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe 

The  Political  Legacy  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year 

The  Mekong  Project 

Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed 

United  States-Soviet  Commercial  Relations 

Volume  II 
Part  2 — Six  Issues 

The  Evolution  of  International  Technology 

The  Politics  of  Global  Health 

Beyond  Malthus 

U.S.  Scientists  Abroad 

Brain  Drain 

Science  and  Technology  in  the  Department  of  State 

Volume  III 

Introduction  to  the  Analysis  and  Findings 

Recapitulation  of  Purpose,  Scope,  and  Methodology  of  the  Study 

Part  3 — Analysis  of  the  Cases  and  Issues 

Analysis  of  the  Cases 
Analysis  of  the  Issues 

Part  4 — Principal  Policy  Implications 

About  the  Essays  to  Follow 

Initiative  Versus  Reactive  Foreign  Policy 

Bilateral  Versus  Multilateral  Diplomatic  Relationships 

High-Technology  Diplomacy  Versus  Low-Technology  Diplomacy 

Roles  and  Interactions  of  Public  and  Private  Institutions  in  International 

Independence  Versus  Interdependence 

Long-Range  and  Short-Range  Planning 

Concluding  Observations 




October  28,  1977. 

Hon.  Clement  J.  Zablocki, 

Chairman,  Committee  on  International  Relations,  and  Chairman, 
Subcommittee  on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs, 
U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  Washington,  B.C. 

Dear  Mr.  Chairman  :  In  response  to  your  request  of  April  6,  1977, 
I  am  pleased  to  submit  in  edited  and  updated  form  the  entire  set  of 
reports  produced  for  your  subcommittee  in  the  Science,  Technology, 
and  American  Diplomacy  project  and  published  by  the  committee  be- 
tween March  1970  and  June  1976. 

These  reports,  as  originally  planned,  now  form  an  integrated  whole. 
Parts  1  and  2  present  the  12  individual  case  and  issue  studies  in  full. 
Parts  3  and  4  examine  the  cases  and  issues  from  a  mid-1977  perspective 
to  shed  light  on  the  capabilities  and  deficiencies  of  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment in  dealing  with  technology-based  diplomatic  issues. 

This  is  the  final  study  phase  of  the  research  project  that  you  initiated 
with  your  request  to  this  service  in  September  1969.  Since  then  the 
project  has  been  under  the  continuous  direction  of  Dr.  Franklin  P. 
Huddle,  senior  specialist  in  science  and  technology,  with  Mr.  Warren 
R.  Johnston  as  associate  project  director.  Mr.  Johnston,  who  served  as 
assistant  chief  of  the  Foreign  Affairs  Division  and  then  as  an  assistant 
director  of  CRS  before  his  recent  retirement,  has  been  responsible,  in 
consultation  with  Dr.  Huddle,  for  preparing  this  edited  and  updated 
version  of  the  study. 

The  study  includes  an  extensive  supplement  of  July  1977  to  the 
January  1976  annotated  bibliography.  Both  were  prepared  by 
Ms.  Genevieve  J.  Knezo,  Analyst  in  Science  and  Technology.  In  pre- 
paring the  supplement  Ms.  Knezo  was  aided  by  Mrs.  Elaine  Carlson, 
research  assistant  to  Dr.  Huddle. 

Let  me  convey  once  again  the  thanks  of  all  concerned  for  the  oppor- 
tunity of  taking  part  in  this  unique  research  undertaking. 

Gilbert  Gude,  Director. 



It  seems  fitting  on  the  completion  of  a  research  undertaking  of  the 
magnitude  of  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy  for  the 
project  director  and  associate  director  to  claim  the  privilege  of  giving 
recognition  to  the  significant  contributions  to  the  project. 

To  begin  at  the  beginning :  We  are  indebted  to  the  Honorable  Clem- 
ent J.  Zablocki,  chairman  of  the  Subcommittee  on  International  Se- 
curity and  Scientific  Affairs,  for  his  foresight  in  initiating  the  series 
and  his  dedicated  efforts  in  seeing  it  through  its  completion.  In  addi- 
tion, two  successive  staff  consultants  of  the  Subcommittee  on  Interna- 
tional Security  and  Scientific  Affairs,  Dr.  John  H.  Sullivan  and  Mr. 
George  R.  Berdes,  are  to  be  thanked  for  their  constructive  guidance 
during  the  past  7  years  and  for  the  unfailingly  sympathetic  support  of 
an  enterprise  that  proved  more  demanding,  and  extended  over  a  longer 
period  of  time,  than  was  originally  foreseen.  Mr.  Ivo  J.  Spalatin,  who 
has  now  succeeded  them  in  the  important  role  of  subcommittee  staff 
director,  and  his  associates,  are  also  due  our  thanks  for  their  encour- 
agement and  support  in  the  final  stages  of  this  enterprise. 

Apart  from  the  codirectors,  there  were  10  authors  of  studies,  as  iden- 
tified at  the  beginning  of  this  volume  under  the  heading  Documents 
in  the  Original  Study  Series.  They  deserve  recognition  and  gratitude, 
not  merely  for  superior  accomplishment  but  for  their  tolerance  of 
strenuous  conditions  of  competing  work  assignments,  their  thousands 
of  hours  of  volunteered  overtime,  and  their  assistance  in  the  review 
and  updating  of  material  in  the  final  study.  Genevieve  J.  Knezo  pre-- 
pared  both  the  original  annotated  bibliography  for  the  series  and 
the  current  bibliography  to  be  found  at  the  end  of  this  volume. 
Dr.  Huddle's  assistant,  Mrs.  Elaine  Carlson,  performed  many  essential 
editorial  and  research  support  tasks. 

Dozens  of  others  in  CRS,  over  the  years,  contributed  their  time  and 
skills  in  bibliographic,  research,  and  clerical  assistance,  and  in  the  re- 
view of  studies  in  draft.  CRS  Coordinator  of  Research  James  W. 
Robinson  reviewed  the  studies  in  their  entirety  and  made  many  helpful 

In  addition,  many  scholars  and  officials  outside  CRS  were  generous 
with  their  help  in  reviewing  draft  text  and  providing  constructive 
criticism.  Prof.  Edgar  S.  Robinson  of  American  University  submitted 
extensive  notes  in  review  of  Science  and  Technology  in  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  which  were  of  value  in  preparing  the  final  study ;  he 
also  served  as  consultant  in  the  preparation  of  the  latter.  To  him  and 
to  the  other  scholars,  too  numerous  to  cite  individually,  appreciation 
and  thanks  are  expressed  for  their  assistance  in  collecting  facts,  offer- 
ing suggestions,  and  encouraging  the  ultimate  completion  of  this 

A  final  important  acknowledgment :  gratitude  beyond  measure  is 
due  our  wives,  Clare  Scott  Huddle  and  Eunice  C.  Johnston,  for  years 
of  indispensable  support  and  forbearance. 

Franklin  P.  Huddle. 
Warren  R.  Johnston. 



The  finding  of  this  study  is  that  U.S.  diplomacy  is  neglecting  two 
powerful  instruments  of  policy  formation  and  policy  execution :  tech- 
nological expertise  and  management  skill.  Most  of  the  countries  of  the 
world  look  to  the  United  States  as  the  undoubted  leader  in  both  tech- 
nological achievement  and  in  the  skills  of  organization  and  administra- 
tion to  apply  technology  effectively.  But  during  the  rise  of  the  United 
States  to  technological  preeminence,  the  Department  of  State  has  given 
slight  attention  to  the  implications  of  technology  for  foreign  policy. 
Only  meager  resources  have  been  spared  to  search  for  ways  to  turn 
technology  to  achievement  of  diplomatic  goals. 

The  emerging  trend  toward  congressional  participation  in  the  diplo- 
matic process  plays  a  significant  role  in  this  context.  The  opportunity 
is  at  hand  for  the  Congress  to  examine  the  uses  of  technology  made  by 
the  executive  branch  toward  the  purposes  of  foreign  policy. 

More  than  that,  the  study  suggests  that  the  necessary  teamwork  of 
the  legislative  branch  with  the  executive  branch  in  the  field  of  foreign 
policy  requires  that  the  Congress  equip  itself  with  its  own  resources  of 
equal  diplomatic  expertise.  The  impressive  array  of  technological 
implications  for  U.S.  diplomacy  further  requires  that  these  congres- 
sional resources  of  diplomatic  expertise  contain  a  strong  technological 
element  for  both  current  oversight  and  long-range  planning  of  future 

Technology  has  made  intolerable  the  consequences  of  failure  to  at- 
tain the  primary  objectives  of  U.S.  foreign  policy.  But  technology 
also  offers  many  opportunities  for  the  attainment  of  these  objectives. 
No  element  of  national  policy  and  no  component  of  national  program 
warrants  more  respect  in  the  short-range  or  the  long-range  future  of 
the  United  States. 


96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1 




Chapter  1 — Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a 

Scientific  Age 



Introduction   5 

The  Congressional  Role 5 

Discussion  of  the  Problem 8 

1.  Purpose  of  the  Study 8 

2.  Description  of  the  Problem 9 

3.  Importance  of  the  Problem  for  the  Future 9 

4.  Growing  Recognition  of  the  Importance  of  Science  and  Technology 

for  American  Diplomacy 10 

5.  Impact  of  Nuclear  and  Rocket  Technologies  on  World  Outlook 12 

6.  Further    Contemporary    Evaluations 14 

Definitions  of  Terms : 

1.  Science  and  Technology 19 

2.  Diplomacy 20 

The  Context  of  the  Study  : 

1.  The  Structure  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Formulation 21 

2.  Goals  of  American  Foreign  Policy 21 

3.  The    Growing    Importance    of    Science    and    Technology    in    U.S. 

Culture 22 

4.  Policy  Formulation  in  Science  and  Technology 24 

5.  Scientific  and  Technological  Elements  in  International  Relations.  25 
Formal  Aspects  of  the  Study  : 

1.  Scope  and  Limitations 27 

2.  Methodology 27 

Plan  of  the  Study 28 

1.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Issues 29 

2.  Format  for  the  Exposition  of  Issues 29 

3.  Illustrative  Questions  Researched 29 

4.  Enumeration  of  the  Issues 30 

5.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Cases 31 

6.  Format  for  the  Presentation  of  Cases 31 

7.  Illustrative  Questions  To  Be  Researched 32 

8.  Enumeration  of  the  Cases  Researched 32 

9.  Organization  of  the  Total  Study 33 





This  study  addresses  the  interaction  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and 
diplomacy  with  modern  science  and  technology. 

The  hypothesis  of  the  study  was  that  detailed  examination  of  the 
dynamics  of  specific  instances  of  these  interactions  would  provide  the 
Congress  with  insights  into  present  arrangements  for  (a)  the  uses  of 
foreign  policy  to  support  U.S.  science  and  technology,  and  (b)  the 
uses  of  science  and  technology  to  develop  and  support  U.S.  foreign 

From  the  beginning  of  the  history  of  America  as  a  nation,  the 
Congress  has  had  a  shared  responsibility  for  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of  foreign  policy.  Congressional  concern  with  science 
and  technology  has  greatly  intensified  since  World  War  II.  Science 
and  technology,  exerting  an  ever-increasing  influence  on  domestic 
public  policy,  also  appear  to  have  a  growing  effect  on  the  content  and 
conduct  of  American  foreign  policy. 

Arts  of  peace  and  war  alike  rest  on  an  increasingly  technological 
base.  Science  and  technology  contribute  in  a  major  way  to  many  pro- 
grams of  Government  departments  and  agencies :  For  defense,  space 
exploration,  agriculture,  industry,  transportation,  communications, 
medicine,  meteorology,  natural  resource  development  and  use,  and 
management  of  information  itself.  Most  of  these  programs  have 
international  as  well  as  scientific  aspects.  The  purposeful  coordination 
of  the  international  aspects  of  science  and  technology  presents  unusual 
difficulties  because  of  their  range,  complexity,  and  specialized  nature. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States  has  many  reasons  for  devoting 
attention  to  the  problems  of  science,  technology,  and  American 
diplomacy.  Apart  from  the  special  constitutional  role  of  the  Senate  in 
giving  advice  and  consent  to  appointment  of  principal  presidential 
advisers  and  to  formal  agreements  with  foreign  governments,  the 
Congress  authorizes  programs  to  develop  and  use  technology  for  inter- 
national purposes,  funds  international  programs  of  the  Chief  Execu- 
tive, and  conducts  oversight  of  the  executive  branch  in  policy  imple- 
mentation, program  execution,  and  the  observance  of  law.  As  science 
and  technology  have  become  important  for  American  diplomacy,  they 
have  become  of  corresponding  importance  for  the  Congress. 

The  Congressional  Role 

The  congressional  response  to  the  need  for  public  action  generated 
by  such  major  innovations  as  atomic  energy  and  artificial  earth 
satellites  was  positive  and  vigorous.  Also  of  importance  has  been  the 


concurrent  effort  of  the  Congress  to  provide  itself  with  the  institutional 
means  for  examining  important  scientific  and  technological  develop- 
ments to  determine  the  needs  of  the  public  for  their  support,  exploita- 
tion, and  regulation. 

When  the  Congress  in  1946  created  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  it  also  brought  into  being  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  a  novel  and  uniquely  equipped  congressional  institution,  to 
oversee  and  guide  developments  in  the  emerging  field  of  atomic 
power,  nuclear  weaponry,  and  supporting  research  and  development. 
The  Joint  Committee  played  a  significant  role  in  atomic  energy  deci- 
sions: e.g.,  in  support  of  President  Eisenhower's  peaceful  atom 
initiative,  in  winning  congressional  approval  for  U.S.  participation 
in  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  It  also  participated  in  the 
joint  hearings  held  with  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee  on  the 
Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty.  However,  the  95th  Congress  abolished  the 
Joint  Committee  and  reassigned  its  functions  and  authorities  to  other 
appropriate  committees. 

The  Russian  Sputnik  evoked  a  corresponding  congressional  re- 
sponse. The  Senate  Special  Committee  on  Space  and  Astronautics  was 
created  on  February  6,  1958,  and  the  House  Select  Committee  on 
Astronautics  and  Space  Exploration  was  created  on  March  5.  These 
undertook  a  vigorous  program  of  policy  formulation.  One  important 
product  originated  by  the  House  committee  was  the  House  concurrent 
resolution  on  the  peaceful  uses  of  space,  on  which  hearings  were  then 
held  before  the  House  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  Another  was  the 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Act  (NASA)  of  1958,1  approved 
July  29,  which  not  only  established  the  basic  space  policy  of  the  Nation, 
but  blueprinted  the  organizational  form  for  its  implementation  as  well. 

An  important  feature  of  the  NASA  Act,  section  205,  provided  that : 

The  Administration,  under  the  foreign  policy  guidance  of  the  President,  may 
engage  in  a  program  of  international  cooperation  in  work  done  pursuant  to  agree- 
ments made  by  the  President  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 

On  the  executive  side,  the  President  instructed  Ambassador  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge,  U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations,  to  request 
the  inclusion  on  the  agenda  of  the  13th  General  Assembly  of  a  program 
for  international  cooperation  in  the  field  of  outer  space.  The  resolution 
initiated  by  the  United  States  was  introduced  November  13,  1958, 
and  was  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  December  13 ;  it  established 
a  Committee  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Outer  Space,  and  instructed 
the  committee  to  report  on  appropriate  forms  such  cooperation 
should  take. 

A  permanent  standing  Committee  on  Aeronautical  and  Space 
Sciences  was  established  under  an  amendment  to  the  Standing 
Rules  of  the  Senate.  January  14,  1959.  This  committee  was  abolished 
in  February  1977;  its  functions  were  transferred  to  the  Commerce, 
Science,  and  Transportation  Committee.  In  the  House,  action  had 
already  Ix-en  taken,  July  21,  1958,  to  establish  the  standing  Com- 
mittee'on  Science  and  Astronautics;  to  this  committee  was  assigned 
the  broader  jurisdiction  over  astronautical  research  and  development, 
the  Bureau  of  Standards.  NASA  and  the  National  Aeronaut  ics  and 
Space  Council,  the  National  Science  Foundation,  outer  space,  science 

1  72  Stat.  426  ;  42  U.S.C.  2451  et  seq.,  as  amended. 

scholarships,  and  scientific  research  and  development.2  (In  January 
1975,  the  committee  was  renamed  the  Committee  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology and  was  given  additional  jurisdiction  over  civil  aviation 
research  and  development,  environmental  research  and  development, 
all  energy  research  and  development  except  nuclear  research  and 
development,  and  the  National  Weather  Service.  At  this  time,  the 
committee  was  also  given  general  and  special  oversight  functions  of 
reviewing  and  studying,  on  a  continuing  basis,  all  laws,  programs, 
and  Government  activities  dealing  with  or  involving  nonmilitary  re- 
search and  development.) 

Apart  from  the  dramatic  impacts  of  atomic  energy  and  space  explo- 
ration, science  and  technology  subjects  have  been  incorporated  in  the 
jurisdictions  of  many  standing  committees  of  both  Houses  of  Congress. 
In  her  study  of  "Congressional  Organization  for  Science  and  Tech- 
nology, 95th  Congress,"  Mauree  W.  Ayton  lists  10  Senate  Committees, 
10  House  Committees,  and  2  Ad  Hoc  Committees  with  such  concerns.3 
Among  those  that  apparently  combine  the  concerns  of  science  and 
technology  with  foreign  affairs  are  the  following : 


Committee  on  Agriculture,  Nutrition,  and  Forestry 

Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Agricultural  Policy 
Committee  on  Appropriations 

Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Operations 
Committee  on  Armed  Services 

Subcommittee  on  Research  and  Development 
Committee  on  the  Budget 

Committee  on  Commerce,  Science  and  Transportation 
Committee  on  Energy  and  Natural  Resources 
Committee  on  Environment  and  Public  Works 
Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs 

Subcommittee  on  Energy,  Nuclear  Proliferation  and  Federal 
Committee  on  Human  Resources 

Subcommittee  on  Health  and  Scientific  Research 


Committee  on  Appropriations 

Subcommittee  on  Foreign  Operations 
Committee  on  Armed  Services 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance,  and  Urban  Affairs 

Subcommittee  on  International  Trade,  Investment  and  Monetary 

-  Taking  note  of  the  scope  given  to  the  House  committee,  Speaker  McCormack  later 
observed  that  "The  importance  attached  to  science  and  technology  by  the  House  leader- 
ship in  1958  was  signaled  by  the  fact  that  as  majority  leader  I  was  chairman  of  the  select 
committee  and  the  minority  leader  of  that  period  was  ranking  minority  member  of  this 
committee."  (Statement  of  Hon.  John  W.  McCormack,  Speaker,  U.S.  House  of  Representa- 
tives In  U.S.  Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics.  '  Applied 
Science  and  World  Economy  :  Panel  on  Science  and  Technology,  Ninth  Meeting."  Pro- 
ceedings before  the  *  *  *  Jannarv  23,  24.  and  25.  1968,  90th  Congress,  second  session 
(Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1968),  page  11.) 

3  Mauree  W.  Ayton,  "Congressional  Organization  for  Science  and  Technology,  95tn 
Congress  :  A  listing  of  congressional  committees  and  subcommittees  having  jurisdiction 
over  scientific  and  technological  activities."  (Scheduled  for  publication  in  November  1977.) 


Committee  on  the  Budget 
Committee  on  Government  Operations 
Committee  on  Interior  and  Insular  Affairs 
Committee  on  International  Relations 
Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce 
Committee  on  Merchant  Marine  and  Fisheries 

Subcommittee  on  Oceanography 
Committee  on  Science  and  Technology 


Ad  Hoc  Committee  on  Energy 

Ad  Hoc  Select  Committee  on  Outer  Continental  Shelf 

Advisory  services  on  science  and  technology  matters,  including 
those  of  an  international  nature,  are  provided  by  a  variety  of  institu- 
tional arrangements.  These  include  staff  assistants  to  individual  Mem- 
bers of  Congress;  staffs  of  Congressional  Committees;  the  National 
Security  and  International  Affairs  Section  of  the  Congressional 
Budget  Office;  the  Science  Policy  Research,  Environment  and  Natural 
Resources,  and  Foreign  Affaire  and  National  Defense  Divisions  of  the 
Congressional  Research  Service  of  the  Library  of  Congress;  the  Office 
of  Technology  Assessment;  the  International  Division  of  the  General 
Accounting  Office;  and  the  Commission  on  International  Relations 
of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences. 

Discussion  of  the  Problem 

1.  Purpose  of  the  Study 

This  study  is  intended  to  provide  Congress  with  background  mate- 
rial useful  in  strengthening  the  resources  that  support  the  conduct  of 
American  diplomacy.  The  plan  of  the  study  is  to  describe  and  analyze 
the  formulation  and  administration  of  American  diplomatic  policies 
having  significant  science  and  technology  components.  Specifically, 
the  study  examines  a  selected  set  of  particular  developments  and  events 
in  recent  diplomatic  history  in  order  to : 
— Characterize  processes  and  problems  involving  the  interaction  of 

science  and  technology  with  diplomacy ; 
— Define  organizational  requirements  for  the  effective  formulation 
of  important  policies  to  direct  and  control  activities  involving 
this  interaction; 
— Identify  ways  in  which  the  capabilities  of  agencies  serving  at  this 
interface  can  be  strengthened  legislatively  or  administratively; 
and  more  generally,  to 
—  Discover  ways  in  which  science  and  technology  can  better  support 

foreign  policy  objectives  of  the  United  States ;  and 
— Discover  ways  in  which  the  conduct  of  diplomatic  activities  can 
better  support  the  healthy  growth  of  national  and  international 
science  and  technology. 


2.  Description  of  the  Problem 

The  interaction  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy  has  wide 
ramifications  and  many  challenges.  Diplomacy  is  concerned  with 
carrying  out  American  foreign  policies:  The  formulation  of  U.S. 
political,  economic,  and  military  interests  and  their  representation 
in  other  nations  and  in  international  bodies.  Traditionally,  diplomacy 
has  been  recognized  as  requiring  superior  skills  and — in  the  best 
sense — sophisticated  attitudes  in  interpersonal  relations,  negotiation, 
persuasion,  forensics,  perception,  cultural  empathy,  and  adaptability 
to  unfamiliar  situations.  Science  represents  generally  a  somewhat 
different  environment,  a  cultural  activity  whose  disciplinary  walls  are 
not  easily  passed  over.  It  involves  systematic  understanding  of  the 
fundamentals  of  man  and  nature.  Technology  is  still  a  third  area  of 
human  activity,  with  its  own  special  characteristics  of  materialistic, 
sometimes  trial-and-error,  evolution  of  hardware  and  systems.  The 
impacts  on  society  of  the  uses  of  technology  are  profound  and  many- 
sided.  Accordingly,  a  study  of  the  interactions  of  science  and  tech- 
nology with  diplomacy  presents  three-dimensional  problems  of  large 
scope,  many  kinds  of  specialization,  and  difficult  analysis. 

Domestically,  science  policy  has  two  distinct  aspects :  (  1)  The  use  of 
science  and  technology  as  an  instrument  to  aid  in  the  formulation  and 
execution  of  public  policy  (called  "science  in  policy")  ;  and  (2)  the 
formulation  and  execution  of  Government  policy  to  aid  in  the  exploi- 
tation of  publicly  beneficial  science  and  technology  (called  "policy 
in  science"). 

Public  funds  have  to  satisfy  so  many  different  needs  that  support 
for  basic  science  encounters  budgetary  constraints ;  the  resultant  search 
for  criteria  to  assure  an  ordering  of  the  priorities  of  basic  science  is 
the  subject  of  considerable  and  unresolved  controversy.  Questions 
remain  open  as  to  the  priority  to  be  given  basic  research  in  fields 
with  a  high  probability  of  opening  up  new  opportunities  for  socially 
useful  technology  as  against  fields  in  which  the  scientific  interest  is 
high  but  the  results  offer  no  obvious  promise  of  application.  There  are 
also  unresolved  questions  as  to  the  comparative  economic  and  social 
costs  and  benefits  of  particular  technologies  (the  supersonic  transport, 
for  example)  and  of  competing  technologies  and  their  costs  and  bene- 
fits. Will  a  desalinization  plant  be  socially  more  cost-effective  than  an 
urban  rapid  transit  system,  or  a  novel  waste-disposal  system?  Clearly, 
the  formulation  of  policies  to  harness  science  and  technology  effec- 
tively to  national  need  presents  many  difficulties. 

Similar  problem  areas  exist  in  the  field  of  international  science  and 
technology.  In  the  international  field,  too,  there  is  "science  in  policy" 
and  "policy  in  science."  Moreover,  the  impacts  of  science  and  tech- 
nology have  made  diplomacy  itself  more  difficult  by  introducing  the 
factor  of  dynamic  and  rapid  change,  often  of  great  magnitude. 

3.  Importance  of  the  Problem  for  the  Future 

Nowhere  are  the  changes  wrought  by  science  and  technology  more 
evident  than  in  international  affairs.  In  his  study,  "Science,  Tech- 
nology, and  American  Foreign  Policy,"  Eugene  B.  Skolnikoff  observes 


that  "*  *  *  scientific  and  technological  developments  during  and 
since  World  War  II  have  altered  former  relationships  among 
nations,  overturned  traditional  measures  of  power  and  influence,  and 
made  the  future  a  hostage  to  the  scientific  discoveries  that  are  un- 
certain in  form  but  sure  to  come.'"  * 

Elsewhere,  Skolnikoff  observes  that  the  relevance  today  of  the 
"facts  or  expectations  of  science  and  technology  to  many  foreign 
policy  issues  is  not  entirely  without  precedent." 

Quite  a  few  foreign  policy  concerns  in  the  past  were  heavily  conditioned  by 
technical  considerations :  fishery  matters,  treaties  on  the  use  of  common  water 
resources,  international  agreements  on  weights  and  measures,  and  others. 

However  [he  continues],  gradually  since  1900,  and  explosively  since  World 
War  II,  there  has  been  a  change  in  degree  of  dependence  that  is  tantamount  to 
a  change  in  kind.  Now,  not  only  are  many  of  the  central  issues  of  foreign  policy — 
those  that  affect  the  fundamental  international  position  and  security  of  the 
Nation — intimately  tied  to  scientific  and  technological  variables,  but  whole  new 
areas  of  policy  concern  based  on  science  and  technology  have  arisen  that  demand 
the  time  and  attention  of  senior  policy  officials.5 

Apart  from  the  obvious  instances  of  defense  and  space  technology, 
he  calls  attention  to  the  "*  *  *  need  to  estimate  the  future,  to  examine 
the  ways  in  which  international  relations  and  perhaps  the  interna- 
tional political  system  will  be  altered  as  science  and  technology  con- 
tinue their  explosive  advance  *  *  *."  6 

4.  Growing  Recognition,  of  the  Importance  of  Science  and  Technology 
for  American  Diplomacy 
A  quarter  of  a  century  ago,  when  the  great  expansion  in  scientific 
and  technological  effort  in  the  United  States  was  just  getting  under- 
way, Lloyd  Berkner  as  consultant  to  the  Secretary  of  State  presented 
a  report  on  "Science  and  Foreign  Relations"  in  which  he  addressed 
the  dichotomy  of  science-in-policy  and  policy-in-science  in  the  inter- 
national sphere : 

First,  how  can  the  potentialities  of  scientific  progress  be  integrated  into  the 
formulation  of  foreign  policy,  and  the  administration  of  foreign  relations,  so  that 
the  maximum  advantage  of  scientific  progress  and  development  can  be  acquired 
by  all  the  peoples?  Second,  how  can  foreign  relations  be  conducted  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  create  the  atmosphere  that  is  essential  to  effective  progress  of 
science  and  technology?  7 

A  little  more  than  a  decade  after  the  Berkner  report  had  urged  a 
strengthening  of  diplomatic  resources  of  scientific  and  technological 
expertise,  a  similar  recommendation  was  made  to  the  Federal  Council 
for  Science  and  Technology  by  its  International  Committee,  chaired  by 
Walter  G.  Whitman: 

Science  and  its  applications  in  technology  are  exerting  a  revolutionary  influ- 
ence on  the  destinies  of  nations  and  mankind.  Our  domestic  and  foreign  policies 
must  lie  attuned  to  this  revolution  and  to  its  implications  of  change  in  the  pattern 
of  world  relationships. 

4  Eugene  I?.  Skolnikoff.  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Foreign  Polio/.  (Cambridge, 
Ma8BaChU8ett8,  The  M.I.T.  Press.  1907),  p.  .'t. 

"Ibid.,  p.  :'.s.r,.  Sec  also:  Eugene  B.  Skolnikoff.  "Scientific  Advice  In  the  State  Depart 

Dient."  In  William  K.  Nelson,  <•<!.  The  Politics  of  Science:  Headings  in  Science.  Technology, 
and    Gorernment.    (New    York,    Oxford    inlversity    Press,    1968),    pp.    884    396. 

8  Skolnikoff.   Science,   Technology,  and   American    Foreign    Policy,  op.    cit.,    p.    •'!!•-. 

7  Lloyd  viel  Berkner,  "Science  and  Foreign  Relations  :  International  Plow  of  Scientific 
and  Technological  Information."  (Washington,  International  Science  Policy  Survey 
Group,  U.S.  Department  of  state.  I960),  p.  2.  (Department  of  state  Publication  8860, 
General  Foreign  Policy  Series,  No.  30.) 


Not  only  does  our  domestic  strength  rely  on  a  vigorous  technological  base;  our 
nation's  role  as  a  leader  in  the  international  scene  will  increasingly  be  deter- 
mined by  the  accomplishments  of  our  scientists  and  engineers  in  this  country 
and  by  our  contributions  to  the  well  being  of  other  societies. 

[Science,  the  report  continued]  possesses  an  objectivity  which  transcends  dif- 
ferences in  political  and  social  systems — its  language,  its  methods  and  its  ethics 
are  universal.  It  can  therefore  be  a  powerful  tool  for  building  understanding 
among  the  peoples  of  the  world  and  towards  achieving  eventual  world 

These  two  potentials  of  science,  which  often  lead  to  conflicting  conclusions,  are 
each  significant  factors  in  the  formulation  of  policies  to  guide  our  international 
scientific  and  technological  activities.8 

Two  months  later,  Adlai  E.  Stevenson,  U.S.  Representative  to  the 
United  Nations,  in  a  speech  to  a  scientific  group  called  attention  to  the 
lag  of  policy  behind  technological  advance : 

Scientifically  and  technically  [he  said]  the  world  has  already  become  a  single 
community,  yet  in  our  ethical  response  to  this  fact  and  in  our  political  institu- 
tions we,  governments  and  citizens,  are  lagging  dangerously  far  behind  you,  the 

You  have  given  us  dangerous  powers,  but  we  have  not  yet  learned  to  control 
them.  You  have  given  us  tools  to  abolish  poverty,  but  we  have  not  yet  mastered 
them.  You  have  given  us  means  to  extend  the  span  of  human  life,  but  this  may 
prove  a  curse,  not  a  blessing,  unless  we  can  assure  food,  survival,  and  then  health 
and  a  good  life  for  the  bodies  and  minds  of  our  exploding  populations.  You  have 
made  the  world  small  and  interdependent,  but  we  have  not  built  the  new  institu- 
tions to  manage  it — nor  cast  off  the  old  institutions  which  scientific  progress  has 
made  obsolete. 

Every  great  change  wrought  by  science  is  foreshadowed  years  ahead  in  the 
laboratory  and  on  the  drawing  board.  But  it  is  not  until  the  new  device  is  fully 
built  and  functioning,  and  has  astonished  the  whole  world,  that  we  begin  to  think 
of  its  human  and  political  implications.  We  are  forever  running  today  to  catch  up 
tomorrow  with  what  you  made  necessary  yesterday.9 

Subsequently,  Jerome  B.  Wiesner,  in  his  capacity  as  Director  of 
the  Office  of  Science  and  Technology,  told  the  Military  Operations 
Subcommittee  of  the  House  Committee  on  Government  Operations  in 
1962,  the  "Swift  emergence  of  science  and  technology  as  vital  instru- 
ments of  national  policy"  involved  "forces  that  will  determine  our 
future,  will  shape  the  balance  of  power  among  nations,  influence  our 
military  security,  facilitate  our  success  in  achieving  foreign  policy  ob- 
jectives, provide  the  vigor  for  our  domestic  economy,  and  guarantee 
the  health  of  our  citizens.*'  He  went  on : 

In  an  era  of  explosive  growth  and  international  tensions  that  evoke  an  unprec- 
edented demand  on  our  total  resources — physical  and  intellectual — there  is  need 
to  make  most  effective  use  of  our  total  technical  resources. 

We  are  faced  with  two  realities :  The  increasing  role  of  science  and  technology 
in  policy  decision  making,  and  the  increasing  federal  support  for  research  and 
development.  These  two  aspects  are  sometimes  contrasted  as  the  role  of  science  in 
government  and  the  role  of  government  in  science.  While  they  are  clearly  related, 
it  is  important  to  recognize  that  they  often  pose  quite  different  problems.10 

President  John  F.  Kennedy,  in  a  speech  to  the  National  Academy  of 
Sciences,  October  22,  1963,  called  "wholehearted  understanding  today 

8  U.S.  Federal  Council  for  Science  and  Technology.  "International  Scientific  and  Tech- 
nological Activities."  A  report  to  the  Federal  Council  for  Science  and  Technology  by 
its  International  Committee,  June  20,  1961.  (For  Authorized  Committee  Use,  Mimeo, 
1961,  p.  1.) 

9  Adlai  E.  Stevenson,  "Science,  Diplomacy,  and  Peace."  Remarks  by  Adlai  E.  Stevenson. 
U.S.  Representative  to  the  United  Nations.  Made  before  the  International  Astronomical 
Union  at  Berkeley,  California,  August  15,  1961.  Department  of  State  Bulletin  (Septem- 
ber 4.  1961),  pp.  402-3. 

10  Jerome  B.  Wiesner.  "The  Federal  Role  in  Science  and  Technology."  Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists  (November  1962),  p.  42. 


of  the  importance  of  pure  science"  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the 
twentieth  century  in  the  United  States.  It  Avas  well  established,  he 
said,  that  progress  in  technology  depended  on  progress  in  theory. 
Science  had  emerged  from  a  peripheral  concern  of  Government  to 
active  partnership. 

I  would  suggest  that  science  is  already  moving  to  enlarge  its  influence  in  three 
general  ways:  in  the  interdisciplinary  area,  in  the  international  area,  and  in  the 
intercultural  area.  For  science  is  the  most  powerful  means  we  have  for  the  unifi- 
cation of  knowledge,  and  a  main  obligation  of  its  future  must  be  to  deal  with  prob- 
lems which  cut  across  boundaries,  whether  boundaries  between  the  sciences, 
boundaries  between  nations,  or  boundaries  between  man's  scientific  and  his  hu- 
mane concerns. 

[Continued  the  President:]  Every  time  you  scientists  make  a  major  invention, 
we  politicians  have  to  invent  a  new  institution  to  cope  with  it,  and  almost  invari- 
ably these  days,  and  happily,  it  must  be  an  international  institution.11 

5.  Impact  of  Nuclear  and  Rocket  Technologies  on  World  Outlook 

The  two  principal  innovations  that  intensified  awareness  of  the 
relevance  of  science  and  technology  for  diplomacy  in  the  Twentieth 
Century  were  atomic  energy  and  artificial  earth  satellites.  The  first  led 
to  creation  of  the  Atomic  Enerffv  Commission,  the  Office  of  Naval  Re- 
search and  other  military  research  agencies,  and  the  National  Science 
Foundation.  The  second  produced  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space 
Administration,  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Council,  the 
Office  of  the  Director  of  Defense  Research  and  Engineering  and  the 
Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency  in  the  Department  of  Defense, 
and  a  much-expanded  science  organization  in  the  Executive  Office  of 
the  President;  the  emphasis  resulting  from  these  actions  led  in  turn 
to  the  designation  of  a  number  of  Assistant  Secretaries  for  Science 
and  Technology  (or  equivalent)  in  old-line  departments.  The  litera- 
ture responding  to  the  two  notable  scientific/ technological  achieve- 
ments contains  many  references  to  their  international  impact,  of  which 
the  following  are  representative : 

Bernard  M.  Baruch: 

My  Fellow-Members  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  and  my 
Fellow-Citizens  of  the  World, 

We  are  here  to  make  a  choice  between  the  quick  and  the  dead. 

That  is  our  business. 

Behind  the  black  portent  of  the  new  atomic  age  lies  a  hoi>e  which,  seized  upon 
with  faith,  can  work  our  salvation.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves.  We  must  elect 
World  Peace  or  World  Destruction." 

Secretary  of  State  John  Foster  Dulles: 

The  United  Nations  Charter  now  reflects  serious  inadequacies.  One  inade- 
quacy sprang  from  ignorance.  When  we  were  in  San  Francisco  in  the  Spring  of 
1945,  none  of  us  knew  of  the  atomic  bomb  which  was  to  fall  on  Hiroshima  on 
August  6,  1945.  The  Charter  is  thus  a  pre-Atomic  Age  Charter.  In  this  sense  it 
was  obsolete  before  it  actually  came  into  force.  As  one  who  was  at  San  Francisco, 
I  can  say  with  confidence  that  if  the  delegates  there  bad  known  that  the  mysteri- 
ous and  immeasurable  power  of  the  atom  would  be  available  as  a  means  of  mass 

11  U.S.  President  (John  P.  Kennedy).  "Address  at  the  Anniversary  Convocation  of  the 
National  Academy  of  Sciences."  Speech  given  October  22,  196:5.  in  Public  Papers  of  the 
Presidents,  John  F.  Kennedy,  1963.  (Washington,  r.s.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964), 

PP.   802  •". 

« Opening  salutation  by  Bernard  M.  Baruch  to  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission, June  14,  1040,  before  Introducing  his  plan  for  the  International  control  of  atomic 


destruction,  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  dealing  with  disarmament  and  the 
regulation  of  armaments  would  have  been  far  more  emphatic  and  realistic.18 

Secretary  of  State  Dean  Rusk : 

Today  the  United  States  has  operational  weapons  in  its  arsenal  hundreds  of 
times  as  destructive  as  that  first  atom  bomb.  The  Polaris  and  Minuteman  missiles 
are  armed  with  warheads  tens  of  times  as  powerful.  The  Soviets  also  have  weap- 
ons of  great  destructive  power. 

The  hard  fact  is  that  a  full-scale  nuclear  exchange  could  erase  all  that  man  has 
built  over  the  centuries.  War  has  devoured  itself  because  it  can  devour  the 
world.  *  *  * 

No  responsible  man  will  deny  we  live  in  a  world  of  vast  and  incalculable 
risks.  Where  decisions  may  be  required  in  minutes,  we  must  be  constantly  on 
guard  against  the  accident  or  miscalculation  that  can  lead  where  no  one  wants  to 
go.  A  local  conflict  anywhere  around  the  globe  in  which  the  interests  of  the  great 
powers  are  engaged  might  suddenly  pose  the  prospect  of  nuclear  war.14 

Senate  Majority  Leader  Lyndon  B.  Johnson : 

*  *  *  We  have  lost  an  important  battle  in  technology.  That  has  been  demon- 
strated by  the  satellites  that  are  whistling  above  our  heads.13 

Unanimous  statement  by  Senate  Preparedness  Subcommittee: 

We  began  with  a  simple — but  revolutionary — fact.  It  was  that  for  the  first 
time  in  all  history  a  manmade  satellite  was  placed  into  orbit  around  the  earth. 

There  were  many  who  realized  that  this  was  an  inevitable  development  of  the 
march  of  science.  But  the  circumstances  under  which  it  happened  were  startling 
and  brought  into  sharp  focus  facts  which  had  been  known  previously  but  not 
fully  appreciated. 

We  had  expected  to  be  first  with  this  achievement.  In  fact,  we  have  yet  to  prove 
second.  *  *  * 

From  the  beginning,  however,  it  developed  that  there  was  much  more  at  stake 
than  the  prestige  of  being  "first".  *  *  * 

[This  achievement  by  the  Soviet  Union  1  has  two  important  implications. 

First,  it  demonstrates  beyond  question  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  the  propulsive 
force  to  hurl  a  missile  from  one  continent  to  another. 

Second,  the  Soviet  Union  has  gathered  basic  information  about  outer  space. 
*  *  *  It  can  now  be  said: 

*  *  *  The  Soviet  Union  has  led  the  world  into  outer  space.  *  *  * 

We  are  engaged  in  a  race  for  survival  and  we  intend  to  win  that  race.  But  the 
truly  worthwhile  goal  is  a  world  of  peace — the  only  world  in  which  there  will 
also  be  security. 

The  immediate  objective  is  to  defend  ourselves.  But  the  equally  important 
objective  is  to  reach  the  hearts  and  minds  of  men  everywhere  so  the  day  will  come 

13  Address  by  Secretary  of  State  John  Foster  Dulles  before  the  American  Bar  Asso- 
ciation, August  26,  1953.  However,  according  to  Bernhard  G.  Bechhoefer  ["Postwar  Nego- 
tiations for  Arms  Control,"  Brookings  Institution,  1961,  p.  28]  :  "Dulles'  statement  that 
the  delegates  at  San  Francisco  knew  nothing  of  the  bomb  is  not  literally  correct."  Among 
those  present  who  knew  were  Secretary  of  State  Stettinius,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
John  J.  McCloy,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Artemus  Gates,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  Clement  Dunn,  British  Ambassador  Lord  Halifax,  and  perhaps  others. 

14  "Statement  of  Hon.  Dean  Rusk,  Secretary  of  State."  In  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations.  Nuclear  Test  Ban  Treaty.  Hearings  before  the  *  *  *  on 
Executive  M.  88th  Congress,  1st  Session.  The  treaty  banning  nuclear  weapon  tests  in  the 
atmosphere,  in  outer  space,  and  underwater,  signed  at  Moscow  on  August  5,  1963,  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland,  and  the  Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics,  August  12,  13,  14,  15,  19, 
20,  21.  22,  23,  26,  and  27,  1963.  88th  Congress,  first  session.  (Washington,  U.S.  Govern- 
ment Printing  Office,  1963),  p.  12. 

15  Statement  by  Chairman  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  to  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcom- 
mittee Nov.  25,  1957.  (The  Sputnik  had  been  launched  Oct.  4,  1957.)  In  U.S.  Congress. 
Senate.  Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Inquiry  Into  Satellite  and  Missile  Programs.  Hear- 
ings before  the  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcommittee  of  the  *  *  *  Part  I.  Novem- 
ber 25,  26,  27,  December  13,  14,  16,  and  17,  1957,  January  10,  13,  15,  16,  19,  20, 
21  and  23,  1958.  85th  Congress,  first  and  second  sessions.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office,  1958),  p.  3. 


when  the  ballistic  missile  will  be  merely  a  dusty  relic  in  the  museums  of  mankind 
and  men  everywhere  will  work  together  in  understanding.16 

House  Concurrent  Resolution  326 : 

Resolved  by  the  House  of  Representatives  (the  Senate  concurring),  That  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  believes  that  the  nations  of  the  world  should  join 
in  the  establishment  of  plans  for  the  peaceful  exploration  of  outer  space,  should 
ban  the  use  of  outer  space  for  military  aggrandizement,  and  should  endeavor  to 
broaden  man's  knowledge  of  space  with  the  purpose  of  advancing  the  good  of 
all  mankind  rather  than  for  the  benefit  of  one  nation  or  group  of  nations.  *  *  *  a 

Representative  John  W.  McCormack : 

Mr.  McCormack.  Mr.  Speaker  *  *  *  This  resolution  represents  the  unanimous 
views  of  the  members  of  the  Select  Committee  on  Astronautics  and  Space  Explo- 
ration. *  *  *  The  resolution  *  *  *  expresses  the  sense  of  the  Congress  that  the 
United  States  should  strive,  through  the  United  Nations  or  such  other  means 
as  may  best  be  appropriate,  for  international  agreements  designed  to  accomplish 
these  purposes.  *  *  *  But  it  is  impossible  to  analyze  man's  forthcoming  explora- 
tion of  space  solely  in  terms  of  such  technological  benefits ;  its  scope  and  mean- 
ing for  man  and  his  development  far  transcend  such  calculations.  Not  least 
among  the  possibilities  of  this  great  adventure  is  the  potentiality  of  a  reemphasis 
in  men's  hearts  of  the  common  links  that  bind  the  members  of  the  human  race 
together  and  the  development  of  a  strengthened  sense  of  community  of  interest 
which  quite  transcends  national  boundaries.  It  is  my  belief  that  in  such  a  develop- 
ment lies  our  strongest  hope  of  world  peace  and  the  security  necessary  to  live  in 
happiness  and  prosperity.  *  *  *  But  *  *  *  attempts  to  project  nationalistic  rival- 
ries beyond  the  earth's  boundaries  cannot  but  lead  to  a  perpetuation  of  exist- 
ing world  tensions  and  the  increased  likelihood  of  war.  *  *  *  Our  country  must 
cast  the  weight  of  its  great  influence  and  leadership  firmly  on  the  side  of  peaceful 
international  cooperation  *  *  *.18 

Senator  Lyndon  B.  Johnson : 

We  should,  certainly,  make  provisions  for  inviting  together  the  scientists  of 
other  nations  to  work  in  concert  on  projects  to  extend  the  frontiers  of  man  and  to 
find  solutions  to  the  troubles  of  this  earth.  *  *  *  It  would  be  appropriate  and 
fitting  for  our  Nation  to  demonstrate  its  initiative  before  the  United  Nations  by 
inviting  all  member   nations  to  join  in  this  adventure  into  outer  space  together. 

The  dimensions  of  space  dwarf  our  national  differences  on  earth.58 

6.  Further  Contemporary  Evaluations 

The  role  of  science  as  a  medium  of  international  communication  was 
recognized  by  Representative  George  P.  Miller,  chairman  of  the  House 
Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  in  a  statement  to  a  seminar  of 
the  Foreign  Service  Institute,  early  in  1965.  Said  Chairman  Miller : 

Now,  let  me  proceed  to  a  facet  of  Congressional  relationship  with  science  and 
technology  that  holds  great  promise  to  ourselves  and  is,  no  doubt,  of  immediate 
interest  to  you — that  is,  in  the  field  of  international  relations.  I  believe  that  one  of 

10  Unanimous  statement  by  Preparedness  Subcommittee  ("Statement  of  the  Senate 
preparedness  Subcommittee  Issued  by  Chairman  Lyndon  I?.  Johnson  and  Ranking  Minority 
Member  Styles  bridges  at  the  Direction  of  the  Subcommittee")  January  ".'(,  1958.  in 
U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Armed  Services.  Inquiry  Into  Satellite  and  Missile 
Programs.  Hearings  before  the  Preparedness  Investigating  Subcommittee  of  tin-  •  *  * 
Reports  of  Secretary  of  Defense  on  Accomplishments  of  Defense  Department  on  Recom 
■  Herniations  of  the  Preparedness  Subcommittee  dated  January  23,  1  !>;">s.  Tart  III.  Feb- 
ruary 26,  April  .'{,  and  July  24,  1958.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office, 
1958J,  P-  2427. 

17  House  Concurrent  Resolution  320,  which  passed  the  House  June  2,  19T>N,  was  favor- 
ably reported  by  unanimous  vote  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee.  June  1<). 
1!»TiS,  and  was  agreed   to  by  the  Senate  on  July  2'A,   1958.   Ttl   I'.S.  Congress.   Senate.   Special 

Committee  on  space  and  Astronautics.  Final  Report  of  the  *  *  *  Pursuant  to  8.  Bee.  856 
uj  tin  H.'ith  Congress.  Senate  Report  NO.  100,  March  11,  1959.  86th  Congress,  first  session. 
(Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office;  1959),  p.  17. 

'"John  W.  McCormack.  "Relative  to  the  Establishment  of  Plans  for  the  Peaceful 
Exploration  of  Outer  space."  statement  of  the  lion.  John  \v.  McCormack  on  the  floor 
Of  the  House,  in  support  of  House  Concurrent  Resolution  '.W>,  June  2,  1958.  Congressional 
Record   (June  2,  1958),  p.  9912. 

'  •  Address  by  Senator  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  before  a  meeting  of  the  Columbia  Broad- 
casting System  Affiliates,  Shoreham  Hotel.  Washington,  i>.c.  January  14,  1958.  At  that 
time  he  was  chairman  of  the  Senate  Special  Committee  on   Space  and  Astronautics. 


the  most  important  characteristics  of  science  is  that  it  can  be,  and  usually  is, 
outside  the  realm  of  politics.  It  has  provided  us  areas  of  peaceful  dialogue  and  co- 
operation between  ourselves,  our  friends  and  our  potential  enemies  that  have 
hardly  been  possible  in  any  other  field  of  activity.  The  International  Geophysical 
Year  programs  were  great  testimony  to  this  fact.20 

Dr.  James  R.  Killian,  Jr.,  of  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology, 
who  had  been  the  first  Presidential  science  adviser  following  the  Sput- 
nik success  of  the  Soviet  Union,  told  the  same  Seminar  that  the  inte- 
gration of  science  and  technology  into  foreign  policy  was  a  practical 
imperative.  There  was  a  "diplomatic  opportunity  to  grasp  a  powerful 
new  lever  to  advance  our  national  interest  in  the  world  arena." 

The  United  States  [he  continued]  has  exceptional  technical  resources  that  are 
understood  all  over  the  world,  both  by  advanced  peoples  and  by  less-advanced 
peoples.  This  scientific  and  technological  strength  is  among  the  most  conspicuous, 
most  admired,  and  most  persuasive  features  on  the  American  landscape  *  *  *. 
In  this  technology  and  the  education  which  supports  it,  lies  a  unique  diplomatic 
opportunity,  if  we  can  but  cultivate  the  complicated  skills  and  understanding 
required  to  exploit  it,  and  create  the  condition  where  this  skill  and  understanding 
can  be  made  really  at  home  in  agencies  concerned  with  affairs  abroad.  The  power 
of  our  science  and  technology  to  serve  national  goals  at  home  and  abroad  also 
presents  to  the  Department  of  State  a  compelling  reason  to  pursue  policies 
designed  to  maintain  and  augment  this  quality.21 

However,  Dr.  Killian  also  took  note  of  the  fact  that  fewer  than  150 
of  the  members  of  the  Foreign  Service  have  "majored  in  the  sciences, 
engineering,  or  mathematics";  he  called  this  number  "disappointingly 

Scientists  in  the  United  States  have  become  keenly  aware  of  the 
expanding  scope  and  reach  of  scientific  inquiry.  A  report  by  the  Com- 
mittee on  Science  in  the  Promotion  of  Human  Welfare,  of  the  Ameri- 
can Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  in  1965,  warned 
that  "The  entire  planet  can  now  serve  as  a  scientific  laboratory."  22 

Glenn  T.  Seaborg,  Chairman  of  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commis- 
sion, in  a  speech  in  1966,  called  attention  to  the  essential  international- 
ism of  science,  which  he  said  "may  ultimately  be  mankind's  greatest 
blessing."  He  offered  two  reasons  for  this  belief. 

The  first,  and  more  obvious,  is  that  international  cooperation  in  science  will 
accelerate  those  advances  of  mankind  which,  if  applied  wisely  and  equally  around 
the  world,  will  help  to  eliminate  the  causes  of  political  and  economic  strife. 

The  second  idea  is  that  internationality  in  science  extends  the  rational 
processes  of  science  to  other  human  activities  in  all  countries,  and  that  the 
ascendancy  of  scientists  within  their  respective  countries  will  influence  national 
leaders  and  their  people  to  deal  with  problems  in  a  more  rational  and  hence  more 
peaceful  and  productive  way  *  *  *.  If  we  view  science  in  its  broadest  terms,  that 
is,  as  a  highly  organized  and  penetrating  pursuit  of  knowledge  and  truth,  some 
good  is  going  to  come  by  having  the  attitudes  and  approaches  of  science  applied 
to  other  areas. 

As  an  example  of  necessary  international  cooperation,  he  called 
attention  to  the  growth  of  "big  science,"  whose  researches  "demand 

20  Hon.  George  P.  Miller.  "Legislative  Scientific  Committees."  Address  by  the  Hon. 
George  P.  Miller,  Chairman,  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  January  12, 
1965.  Made  at  Foreign  Service  Institute  Seminar.  In  U.S.  Department  of  State.  Science, 
Technology,  and  Foreign  Affairs.  Report  on  the  Seminar  held  at  the  Foreign  Service 
Institute,  January  11  to  February  2,  1965.  Prepared  by  L.  R.  Audrieth,  Visiting  Pro- 
fessor of  Science  Affairs  at  the  Foreign  Service  Institute,  and  H.  I.  Chinn,  Science  Officer, 
International  Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs,  Department  of  State.  (Washington, 
U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1965),  p.  5. 

21  Dr.  James  R.  Killian,  Jr.,  "Science  in  the  State  Department:  A  Practical  Impera- 
tive." Address  by  Dr.  James  R.  Killian,  Jr.,  Chairman  of  the  Corporation,  M.I.T.,  Janu- 
ary 11.   1965.  Made  at  Foreign   Service  Institute  Seminar.   In  Ibid.,   pp.   42—43. 

22  "The  Integrity  of  Science  :  A  Report  by  the  AAAS  Committee  on  Science  in  the  Pro- 
motion of  Human  Welfare."  American  Scientist   (No.  53,  1965),  p.   191. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1 


large  facilities  and  expensive  equipment,  beyond  the  financial  means 
of  many  individual  scientific  organizations  and  even  many  nations."  ** 
Speaking  as  Secretary  of  State  to  the  Panel  on  Science  and  Tech- 
nology of  the  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics,  Jan- 
uary 24, 1967.  Dean  Rusk  described  the  need  to  deal  more  explicity  with 
the  "uncharted  region  where  the  interests  of  science  and  foreign  policy 
meet" : 

For  any  American  involved  in  public  affairs  today  [he  said],  scientific  literacy 
is  a  must ;  and  that  is  particularly  so  in  foreign  affairs.  We  are  firmly  convinced 
that  the  Foreign  Service  officer  should  be  familiar  with  the  ways,  the  concepts, 
and  the  purposes  of  science.  He  should  be  able  to  grasp  the  social  and  economic 
implication  of  current  scientific  discoveries  and  engineering  accomplish- 
ments. *  *  * 

But  the  burden  is  not  all  on  one  side.  Scientists  and  engineers  must,  of  course, 
recognize  very  real  progress  in  many  fields  outside  their  own  specialties,  and  they 
should  be  conscious  of  the  difference  between  the  values  of  society  and  the  verifi- 
able truths  of  the  natural  sciences.  For  such  men  there  is  a  role  in  the  foreign 
policy  process. 

Secretary  Rusk  also  spoke  of  the  need  to  look  ahead,  in  appraising 
future  prospects  and  opportunities  in  science  and  technology  as  these 
impact  on  the  foreign  policy  process :  "We  cannot  clearly  foresee  the 
advances,  discoveries,  and  innovations  which  lie  ahead,  but  the  uses  to 
which  we  put  the  new  knowledge  in  our  human  relationships  may  well 
be  critical."  It  was  necessary  to  "*  *  *  examine  some  aspects  of  the 
changing  modern  environment  which  are  of  direct  concern  to  foreign 
affairs,  many  of  which  can  only  be  dealt  with  internationally."  As 
examples,  he  suggested  the  pollution  of  the  atmosphere,  population 
pressures,  the  spread  of  nuclear  power  reactors,  the  need  for  a  "co- 
operative assault  on  the  treasure  chest  of  the  seas,"  the  "challenges  of 
our  space  environment,"  and  assistance  to  the  developing  countries  in 
building  a  base  for  their  technological  competence.  He  also  called  for 
an  "alliance  of  the  natural  sciences  with  the  social  sciences  in  meeting 
new  facets  of  old  problems  in  the  world  laboratory."  ** 

Caryl  P.  Haskins,  president  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Wash- 
ington, has  called  for  a  "scientific  revolution"  among  the  developing 
countries  as  a  means  of  spurring  their  advance.  While  there  were 
material  reasons  for  his  proposal,  it  was  in  the  "*  *  *  qualities  of 
science  as  a  structure  of  communication,  of  philosophy,  of  faith  that 
we  find  the  deepest  reasons." 

Without  a  living  science,  the  new  countries  will  have  no  access  to  the  cultural 
world  fraternity  that  the  fabric  of  scientific  understanding  implies.  They  will  not 
share  in  the  lofty  concepts  that  form  the  priceless  heritage  of  the  scientifically 
literate  peoples.  They  will  be  denied  access  to  one  of  the  significant  assurances  that 
there  is  an  inherent  logic,  an  underlying  stability,  unifying  the  currents  of  scien- 
tific and  technical  change  that  so  alarmingly  threaten  to  engulf  them.  *  *  * 
Finally,  an  original  science  demands,  as  it  also  stimulates,  the  development  of 
the  critical  and  creative  habits  of  mind  that  are  essential  to  the  leadership  of  the 

23  Glenn  T.  Seaborj,'.  "What's  Ahead  for  International  Science  V  Article  based  upon 
•  i  Bpeech  delivered  at  the  International  Conference  on  Nuclear  Physics  held  in  Gatlinburg, 
Tennessee,  September  13,  1966.  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  (January  1067),  \>.  26. 

-'Dean  Kusk.  "Science  and  Foreign  Affairs."  Keynote  address  made  before  Hie  eighth 
annual  Panel  on  Science  and  Technology  of  the  House  Committee  on  Science  and  Astro- 
nautics, by  the  Hon.  Dean  Kusk,  Secretary  of  State,  January  24,  1!»<!7.  Department  of 
state  Bulletin  (February  13,  19G7),  pp.  238-242. 


new  nations  in  every  field — the  unfettered,  flexible,  empirical  view  so  essential 
if  the  nations  they  lead  are  to  survive  and  grow.83 

On  a  related  subject,  Herman  Pollack,  as  Director  of  International 
Scientific  and  Technological  Affairs,  Department  of  State,  has  ob- 
served that 

The  realization  that  the  vigor  of  a  nation's  economy  is  now  largely  dependent 
upon  the  quality  of  and  the  use  to  which  it  puts  its  science  and  technology  has 
given  rise  to  international  comparisons  of  technological  proficiency  and  in  turn 
to  the  problem  of  the  "technological  gap."  This  today  is  as  meaningful  to  a  diplo- 
mat as  were  comparisons  of  the  size  of  standing  armies  several  generations  ago. 
The  brain  drain  is  no  longer  merely  an  interesting  phenomenon.  It  has  acquired 
the  status  of  a  political  issue  and  a  fairly  hot  one,  at  that.26 

President  Nixon,  in  a  formal  statement  on  "United  States  Foreign 
Policy  for  the  1970's,"  addressing  himself  mainly  to  the  political 
aspects  of  the  subject,  called  attention  to  the  importance  of  science 
and  technology  for  international  relations.  In  military  science,  he 
observed  that  "We  are  now  entering  an  era  in  which  the  sophistica- 
tion and  destructiveness  of  weapons  present  more  formidable  and 
complex  issues  affecting  our  strategic  posture."  In  the  field  of  arms 
control,  he  warned  that  "Modern  technology  makes  any  balance 
precarious  and  prompts  new  efforts  at  ever  higher  levels  of  com- 
plexity." Moreover,  "The  spread  of  technological  skills  knows  no 
national  boundaries;  and  innovation  in  weaponry  is  no  monopoly  of 
the  superpowers."  And  more  generally,  "Unprecedented  scientific 
and  technological  advances  as  well  as  explosions  in  populations, 
communications,  and  knowledge  require  new  forms  of  international 
cooperations."  27 

Earlier,  in  his  address  to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly, 
Sept.  2,  1969,  the  President  had  urged  that  body  to  come  to  grips 
with  several  important  challenges  with  an  important  scientific  and 
technological  content.  Said  the  President,  in  part: 

We  can  only  guess  at  the  new  scientific  discoveries  that  the  seventies  may  bring. 
But  we  can  see  with  chilling  clarity  the  gap  that  already  exists  between  the 
developed  economies  and  the  economies  of  the  developing  countries  and  the  urgent 
need  for  international  cooperation  in  spurring  economic  development. 

If  in  the  course  of  that  Second  Development  Decade  we  can  make  both  signifi- 
cant gains  in  food  production  and  significant  reductions  in  the  rate  of  population 
growth,  we  shall  have  opened  the  way  to  a  new  era  of  splendid  prosperity.  If  we 
do  only  one  without  the  other,  we  shall  be  standing  still ;  and  if  we  fail  in  both, 
great  areas  of  the  world  will  face  human  disaster. 

Increasingly,  the  task  of  protecting  man's  environment  is  a  matter  of  inter- 
national concern.  Pollution  of  air  and  water,  upsetting  the  balance  of  nature — 
these  are  not  only  local  problems,  and  not  only  national  problems,  but  matters 
that  affect  the  basic  relationships  of  man  to  his  planet. 

25  Caryl  P.  Haskins.  "Technology,  Science,  and  American  Foreign  Policy."  Foreign 
Affairs  (January  1962),  p.  239. 

26  Herman  Pollack.  "Science,  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  State  Department."  Address  at 
the  University  of  Illinois  Centennial  Colloquium  on  Science  and  Human  Affairs,  May  17, 
1967,  by  Herman  Pollack,  then  Acting  Director,  International  Scientific  and  Technological 
Affairs,  Department  of  State.  Reprinted  from  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  June  19, 
1967.  In  "Science,  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  State  Department,"  Reprint.  Department  of 
State  Publication  8204  (July  1967),  p.  3. 

27  l\S.  President  (Richard  Nixon),  United  States  Foreign  Policy  for  the  1970's:  A  New 
Strategy  for  Peace.  A  Report  by  President  Richard  Nixon  to  the  Congress,  February  18, 
1970.  Released  from  Office  of  the  White  House  Press  Secretary,  Mimeo  (February  18, 
1970),  pp.  7,  106,  110-111. 


The  United  Nations  already  is  planning  a  conference  on  the  environment  in 
1972.  I  pledge  the  strongest  support  of  the  United  States  for  that  effort.  I  hope 
that  even  before  then  we  can  launch  new  national  and  international  initiatives 
toward  restoring  the  balance  of  nature  and  maintaining  our  world  as  a  healthy 
and  hospitable  place  for  man. 

Of  all  man's  great  enterprises,  none  lends  itself  more  logically  or  more  eom- 
pellingly  to  international  cooperation  than  the  venture  into  space.  *  *  *  We  are 
just  beginning  to  comprehend  the  benefits  that  space  technology  can  yield  here  on 
earth.  And  the  potential  is  enormous. 

For  example,  we  now  are  developing  earth  resource  survey  satellites,  with  the 
first  experimental  satellite  to  be  launched  sometime  early  in  the  decade  of  the 

Present  indications  are  that  these  satellites  should  be  capable  of  yielding  data 
which  could  assist  in  as  widely  varied  tasks  as  these :  the  location  of  schools  of 
fish  in  the  oceans,  the  location  of  mineral  deposits  on  land,  and  the  health  of  agri- 
cultural crops.  *  *  *  We  shall  be  putting  several  proposals  in  this  respect  before 
the  United  Nations.28 

Columnist  James  Reston  epitomized  the  matter :  "The  New  Science 
has  created  a  New  Diplomacy."  29 

In  summary,  science  and  technology  have  effected  changes  in  the 
substantive  tasks  of  foreign  policy,  in  the  methodology  of  diplomacy, 
in  the  management  of  information  on  which  diplomacy  is  based,  in  the 
intellectual  training  of  diplomats,  in  the  range  of  present  options  of 
negotiators,  and  in  the  prospects  for  future  evolution  of  diplomacy, 
foreign  policy  objectives,  and  the  international  political  system. 
Science  and  technology  cannot  be  mere  disciplines  added  to  the  cur- 
riculum of  Foreign  Service  Officers,  or  services  to  be  rendered  by  an 
appointed  officer  or  unit  of  country  teams.  On  the  contrary,  they  are 
an  essential  and  major  ingredient  of  many  aspects  of  foreign  policy, 
diplomatic  relations,  and  international  behavior.  The  need  is  clearly 
evident  for  improved  understanding  of  the  underlying  and  future 
significance  of  scientific  and  technological  developments  and  their 
relation  to  basic  patterns  in  the  formulation  and  conduct  of  interna- 
tional policy. 

Accordingly,  Chairman  Clement  J.  Zablocki  of  the  House  Commit- 
tee on  International  Relations  and  its  Subcommittee  on  International 
Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  (acting  as  chairman  of  the  latter,  then 
named  the  Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 
Developments) ,  in  a  letter  of  September  1969  to  the  Director  of  the 
Legislative  Service,  called  for  this  study  in  the  following  terms: 

Hearings  held  by  the  Sul)eommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 
Developments  during  the  past  year  while  I  have  been  Chairman  have  convinced 
me  of  the  pressing  need  for  greater  coordination  between  science  and  diplomacy 
if  the  United  States  is  to  conduct  a  successful  foreign  policy.  Time  after  time  the 
Subcommittee  has  been  told  of  scientific  and  technological  developments  with 
significant  international  ramifications,  for  which  little  or  no  policy  planning 
has  been  done. 

The  current  conditions  cannot  continue  if  the  United  States  is  to  maintain  a 
posture  of  resi>onsible  leadership  in  international  affairs.  We  must  begin  to 
do  the  hard  thinking  necessary  to  bring  our  technical  abilities  and  our  diplomatic 
skills  into  concert. 

28  U.S.  President  (Richard  Nixon).  "Strengthening  the  Total  Fabric  of  Pence."  Address 
made  before  the  "4th  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  at  the  United  Nations,  NY., 
on  Sept.   18,   1!m;9.  Department  of  State  Bulletin   (October  C,  1969),  p.  301. 

™New  York  Times  (Sunday,  Dec.  13,  1964),  p.  8E. 


Definitions  of  Terms 

1.  Science  and  Technology 

Every  study  that  treats  of  the  interactions  of  science  or  technology 
with  culture  encounters  the  same  problem  of  characterizing  the  various 
descriptive  terms  relating  to  science  and  its  exploitation.  In  an  earlier 
study  by  the  Legislative  Reference  Service,  an  effort  was  made  to 
clarify  the  relationship  of  basic  and  applied  research  with  technology. 
The  concept  expressed  there  was  that  basic  research  has  as  its  goal  the 
discovery  of  facts  about  nature.  It  was  structured  into  such  disciplines 
as  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and  astronomy;  into  such  subdisci- 
plines  as  solid  state  physics,  inorganic  chemistry,  and  solar  astronomy ; 
and  into  such  integrating  disciplines  as  physical  chemistry,  astro- 
physics, and  ecology. 

Applied  research  was  defined  as  the  use  of  information  about  nature, 
derived  from  basic  research,  and  employed  to  make  feasible  some 
social  goal  or  to  create  new  technological  options  for  man.  It  was 
structured  in  two  ways:  (1)  into  loose  categories  of  like  fields  or  sub- 
ject disciplines,  such  as  meteorology,  metallurgy,  electronics,  agron- 
omy; these  overlapped  with  (2)  subject  categories  suggesting  purpose 
or  mission,  such  as  transportation,  communications,  materials,  and 
standards.  All  goals  of  applied  research  were  observed  to  aim  at  a 
single  overriding  objective,  which  was  to  develop  ways  to  improve 
man's  compatibility  with  his  environment. 

The  products  of  applied  research  are  thus  options  which  man  can 
exploit  by  means  of  technology.  Broadly,  these  options  appear  to  fall 
into  four  categories  of  technology,  as  follows: 

1.  Physical  modification  of  man. — An  improvement  in  the 
feasibility  of  man's  capability  to  adapt  himself  to  his  environment 
by  physical  changes  of  his  own  structure. 

2.  Application  of  natural  resources. — An  improvement  in  the 
feasibility  of  man's  exploitation  of  the  resources  of  nature  to 
change  the  physical  environment  to  render  it  more  compatible 
with  man. 

3.  Environmental  restoration. — An  improvement  in  the  feasi- 
bility of  corrective  actions  to  restore  the  physical  environment  by 
reversing  impairments  wrought  by  man  or  by  natural  forces. 

4.  The,  social  environment. — An  improvement  in  the  feasibility 
of  actions  by  man  to  enhance  his  compatibility  as  an  element  of 
the  changing  social/human  environment.30 

In  this  concept,  the  effects  of  basic  science  take  the  form  of  con- 
tributions to  culture — an  appreciation  of  the  universe  of  man  in  all 
its  natural  laws  and  relationships.  The  effects  of  applied  research  are 

30  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astronautics.  Technical  Information 
for  Congress.  Report  to  the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research,  and  Development  of  the 
*  *  *  Prepared  by  the  Science  Policy  Research  Division,  Legislative  Reference  Service, 
Library  of  Congress,  April  25,  1969.  House  Document  No.  91-137,  91st  Congress,  first  ses- 
sion. (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969).  p.  11.  For  a  more  extended 
definition  of  the  terms  "basic  research,"  "applied  research,"  and  "technology,"  see  :  U.S. 
Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Science  and  Technology.  Science  Policy  :  A  Working  Glos- 
sary [Third  Edition — 197-6],  Prepared  for  the  Subcommittee  on  Science,  Research  and 
Technology  by  the  Science  Policy  Research  Division,  Congressional  Research  Service, 
Librarv  of  Congress,  March  1976.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  Com- 
mittee print.)  pp.  56,  57,  82. 


opportunities.  Only  in  technology  does  the  system  of  science  make 
tangible  and  material  impacts  upon  human  affairs.  Technology  is 
thus  the  cutting  edge  of  science,  the  point  at  which  economic  and 
political  decisions  are  required,  as  to  whether  an  innovation  is  com- 
patible with  the  needs  and  limitations  of  society.  Basic  science  can 
reveal  information  about  the  passage  of  pure  water  through  a  mem- 
brane; applied  science  can  develop  information  as  to  which  mem- 
branes work  best  to  separate  water  from  dissolved  salts;  technology 
provides  a  desalting  plant. 

The  relationship  of  technology  to  domestic  and  foreign  affairs  is 
limitless.  It  encompasses  almost  all  forms  of  foreign  aid,  military 
hardware,  arms  control,  the  extraction  of  minerals,  agricultural  tech- 
nology, transportation  and  communications  systems,  exploitation  of 
the  seas  and  the  ocean  floor.  It  raises  questions  as  to  the  reshaping 
of  social  institutions  to  accommodate  new  capabilities  of  man,  whether 
to  feed  his  expanding  numbers  by  the  "Green  Revolution"  or  to  achieve 
peace  through  "balance  of  terror."  Industrial  production  and  gross 
national  product  are  only  two  of  many  measures  of  the  application  of 
technology;  others  are  the  satisfaction  man  can  take  from  his  control 
or  his  preservation  of  his  own  environment. 

Almost  all  forms  of  technology  pass  over  international  boundaries. 
The  beneficial  effects  are  eagerly  sought  in  East  and  West.  Moreover, 
the  sometimes  adverse  second-order  consequences  of  technology  (such 
as  pollution,  noise,  risk  of  accident,  and  the  like)  are  felt  in  all  countries 
where  technology  takes  root.  As  with  science,  the  interest  in  technology 
is  international,  and  diplomatic  concern  is  warranted  for  both  its 
benefits  and  its  costs. 

2.  Diplomacy 

The  word  diplomacy  in  this  study  stands  for  the  broad  function  of 
making  and  carrying  out  foreign  policy,  and  the  word  diplomat  is  used 
for  a  person  engaged  in  this  function.  While  scientists  may  sometimes 
be  diplomats,  in  this  study  the  term  will  be  used  to  identify  those 
whose  primary  training,  interest,  and  work  is  in  international  political 
problems  as  apart  from  scientific  or  technological  problems.  It  includes 
not  only  those  who  negotiate  with  other  nations  directly  but  also 
participants  in  the  foreign  policy  making  machinery  within  the  United 

The  background  of  diplomats,  in  this  sense  of  the  word,  may  be 
quite  varied.  The  preparation  for  a  traditional  diplomatic  career  in 
the  Foreign  Service  has  been  a  liberal  arts  education,  with  much  of  the 
specific  knowledge  and  skills  acquired  through  experience  in  the  State 
Department  or  at  posts  abroad,  supplemented  by  brief  courses  at  the 
Foreign  Service  Institute.  However,  many  who  are  engaged  in  the 
political  and  economic  aspects  of  foreign  policy  are  not  in  the  Foreign 
Service  and  have  never  served  abroad.  They  may  be  generalists  or 
specialists  in  some  geographic  area  or  functional  field,  and  some — 
including  the  President,  many  ambassadors,  heads  of  agencies,  and 
.Members  of  Congress — may  have  achieved  their  influential  positions 
in  the  making  of  foreign  policy  primarily  because  they  were  active  in 
politics,  lather  than  because  of  their  academic  background  or  expert- 
ness  in  any  international  activity. 


The  Context  of  the  Study 

1.  The  /Structure  of  U.S.  Foreign  Policy  Formulation 

The  classical  method  of  the  conduct  of  international  relations  by  the 
United  States  as  well  as  other  nations  was  through  diplomatic  repre- 
sentatives stationed  in  national  capitals.  The  President  was  in  charge 
of  the  dealings  with  other  countries,  assisted  primarily  by  the  Secretary 
and  Department  of  State.  From  the  beginning,  however,  the  making  of 
foreign  policy  in  the  United  States  has  not  been  a  simple  matter  of 
information  and  decisions  flowing  up  and  down  a  chain  of  command 
within  the  Executive  Branch.  In  establishing  a  democratic  republic, 
the  drafters  of  the  Constitution  built  checks  and  balances  into  the 
system  of  making  foreign  policy  as  well  as  into  other  areas.  Senatorial 
approval  was  made  a  requirement  for  all  treaties  and  appointments 
of  ambassadors.  Congress  as  a  whole  was  given  several  major  powers 
directly  related  to  foreign  policy,  such  as  the  power  to  declare  war,  to 
raise  and  support  armies  and  to  provide  and  maintain  a  navy,  and  to 
regulate  foreign  commerce,  as  well  as  the  responsibility  for  making  all 
laws  and  appropriating  funds.  The  people  of  the  United  States  could 
also  make  their  voice  heard  through  communications  and  elections 
and  thus  were  an  important  factor. 

As  profound  technological  and  political  changes  occurred  in  the 
middle  of  the  twentieth  century  and  the  United  States  increased  its 
participation  and  leadership  in  world  affairs,  the  conduct  of  Ameri- 
can diplomacy  became  far  more  complex.  New  agencies  such  as  the 
Central  Intelligence  Agency,  the  Arms  Control  and  Disarmament 
Agency,  and  the  U.S.  Information  Agency,  were  established  to  cope 
with  specific  problems  or  handle  special  programs  in  the  foreign 
affairs  field.  Older  agencies  such  as  the  Department  of  Agriculture, 
the  Department  of  Commerce,  and  the  defense  establishment  found 
themselves  increasingly  involved  in  foreign  affairs.  The  National 
Security  Council  and  other  groups  were  formed  to  help  advise  the 
President  or  to  coordinate  activities  relating  to  foreign  affairs  spread 
throughout  the  Government. 

Official  contacts  with  foreign  governments  were  no  longer  made 
almost  entirely  through  ambassadors  and  other  members  of  the  foreign 
service.  Large  numbers  of  Americans  traveled  abroad  in  a  wide 
variety  of  capacities,  and  an  increasing  number  of  foreign  visitors 
came  to  the  United  States.  Membership  in  numerous  international 
organizations,  such  as  the  United  Nations,  made  multilateral  diplo- 
macy increase  vastly  in  importance.  Rapid  transportation  facilitated 
meetings  between  chiefs  of  state  and  other  high  government  officials, 
and  instantaneous  communication  made  it  possible  for  messages  of 
foreign  policy  importance  to  be  carried  directly  between  both  the  lead- 
ers and  the  people  of  different  nations  outside  of  traditional  diplomatic 
channels.  Diplomacy,  once  the  narrow  task  of  a  few  high  officials  and 
a  select  few  in  the  Foreign  Service,  expanded  into  a  broad  effort 
involving  a  large  part  of  the  Government  as  a  whole. 

2.  Goals  of  American  Foreign  Policy 

Before  taking  up  the  question  as  to  the  place  of  science  and  tech- 
nology in  advancing  the  goals  of  American  diplomacy,  it  may  be 


useful  to  explore  some  relevant  goals  of  American  foreign  policy. 
There  are  overall  goals,  variously  expressed,  of  American  foreign 
policv  toward  which  all  foreign  policy  actions  are  more  or  less  directed, 
but  they  may  seem  too  vague  or  Utopian  to  be  helpful.  While  there  is 
no  single  document  accepted  by  all  Americans  as  the  official  declara- 
tion of  foreign  policy  goals,  there  is  a  consensus  on  what  the  ultimate 
goals  are.  These  might  be  summarized  as  a  world  of  peace  and  freedom, 
or  a  peaceful  world  order  in  which  justice  and  freedom  prevail,  or  a 
world  in  which  the  United  States  may  exist  in  peace  and  security. 

Within  these  broad  goals  there  are  more  specific  objectives.  The 
promotion  Qf  mutual  understanding  and  friendly  relations,  further 
progress  toward  a  sound  and  expanding  world  economy,  the  wider 
application  of  international  law,  the  reduction  and  control  of  arma- 
ments and  the  building  of  collective  security  systems,  for  example,  are 
objectives  through  which  the  United  States  is  seeking  to  attain  a 
world  of  peace  and  freedom.  These  objectives  in  turn  may  be  broken 
down  into  still  more  specific  components  such  as,  in  the  case  of  the 
reduction  and  control  of  armaments,  regulation  of  the  military  use 
of  the  ocean  bed  or  outer  space.  Defining  foreign  policy  goals  in  each 
case  will  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  process  of  determining  how  science 
and  foreign  policy  are  interrelated.  Among  the  questions  which  might 
be  asked  are:  To  what  degree  are  the  goals  of  science  and  foreign 
policy  in  specific  cases  the  same  or  different  ?  Who  formulates  the  goals 
in  each  case?  Can  foreign  policy  goals  be  as  clear  as  scientific  goals? 
How  are  priorities  determined  when  there  is  conflict  between  a  scien- 
tific goal  and  a  foreign  policy  goal,  or  between  different  foreign  policy 
objectives  when  science  and  technology  can  be  applied  to  strengthen 
one  or  the  other? 
3.  The  Growing  Importance  of  Science  and  Technology  in  U.S.  Culture 

The  importance  of  basic  science  for  technological  advance  is  well 
established:  it  provides  essential  new  information  and  ideas,  training 
in  underlying  principles  and  new  concepts  of  hardware,  laboratory 
skills,  and  an  attitude  of  receptivity  of  innovation.  In  the  long  run, 
the  disclosures  of  basic  scientific  research  may  be  the  most  momentous 
factor  in  social  change,  and  political  decisions  concerning  the  support 
of  this  research  may  be  of  the  highest  consequence.  However,  the 
effects  on  society  of  technology  are  more  obvious  and  immediate  than 
those  of  science. 

Agricultural  technology  in  this  century  has  brought  farm  families 
down  from  50  percent  to  less  than  5  percent  of  the  population  while 
cultivated  land  shrank  and  production  rose.  The  application  of  tech- 
nology to  personal  transportation  brought  into  being  the  dominant 
industry  in  the  Nation,  restructured  the  city  and  altered  the  social 
role  and  values  of  the  family.  Public  health,  medical  drugs,  and  pesti- 
cides have  enabled  a  worldwide  increase  in  populations,  raising  life 
expectancy  almost  everywhere.  Communication  technology  has 
spawned  business  enterprises  extending  into  many  political  jurisdic- 
tions, a  large  television  industry  for  home  entertainment,  and  infor- 
mation flows  that  are  national — and  often  international — in  their 
reach.  The  coupling  of  computers  with  wire  communications  serves  as 
an  ever-increasing  part  of  the  population  with  bank  records,  billings, 


and  access  to  data  bases,  giving  to  the  time-sharing  computer  network 
the  character  of  a  public  utility.  Abundant  electrical  energy  is  taken 
for  granted  in  modern  society. 

Government  concern  with  the  stimulation  of  science  and  the  uses  of 
technology  has  greatly  intensified  in  the  Twentieth  Century.  Basic 
scientific  research,  mainly  in  the  universities,  relies  to  a  large  extent 
on  Government  sponsorship.  In  fields  of  applied  science  and  techno- 
logical development,  virtually  every  agency  of  Government  has  found 
some  role  to  play.  For  many  well-established  technologies,  Govern- 
ment regulation  has  been  found  necessary,  such  as  with  rail  and  air 
transport,  electric  power,  radio,  and  pharmaceutical  preparations.  An- 
other main  interest  of  Government  is  in  the  stimulation  of  new  tech- 
nologies; specific  technological  tasks  have  been  widely  assigned  within 
the  Government,  such  as  weather  modification,  water  desalting,  coal 
utilization,  helium  conservation,  weather  satellites,  highway  construc- 
tion, high-speed  trains,  rapid  excavation,  communications  satellites, 
and  marine  resources  exploitation. 

On  the  other  hand,  defects  or  "second-order  consequences''  of  mod- 
ern technology  are  receiving  increasing  public  attention  and  present  a 
challenge  to  engineers  to  reduce  the  adverse  effects  of  their  innova- 
tions. Modern  issues  center  on  pollution  of  the  air ;  pollution  of  streams, 
oceans,  and  ground  water;  the  spread  of  pesticides;  eutrophication  of 
lakes ;  disposal  of  solid  wastes ;  the  effects  of  noise ;  toxic  chemicals  in 
general  public  use;  the  information  explosion;  invasion  of  personal 
privacy ;  the  hazards  of  radiation ;  the  upsetting  of  the  ecological  bal- 
ance ;  automobile  unsafety ;  and,  currently,  the  complex  problems 
created  by  a  growing  energy  shortage  relative  to  a  dynamically  ex- 
panding pattern  of  energy  utilization. 

Cogent  description  of  the  organization  of  scientists  and  engineers 
is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  study.  The  disciplines  of  science  are  prac- 
ticed in  the  universities  and  foundations,  in  some  Government  labora- 
tories, and  to  a  degree  in  private,  industry.  Organizations  of  scientists, 
mainly  to  exchange  and  disseminate  information,  are  largely  by  dis- 
ciplines, although  interdisciplinary  academies  of  sciences  are  active  in 
many  regions.  A  large  and  loose  federation  of  scientists  and  scientific 
societies  exists  in  the  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of 
Science.  A  more  formal  interface  between  science  and  Government  is 
provided  by  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  which  has  access  to  all 
scientific  and  technical  societies  through  the  medium  of  the  National 
Research  Council.  Contact  of  U.S.  scientists  with  those  abroad  takes 
many  routes:  direct  person-to-person  communication,  through  the 
Scientific  Unions,  and  through  scientific  groups  under  the  aegis  of  the 
United  Nations,  among  others. 

Organization  of  technologies  is  still  further  diversified.  Technical 
societies,  along  roughly  disciplinary  lines,  abound — such  as  the  Ameri- 
can Society  for  Metals,  the  Society  of  Plastics  Engineers,  and  the  In- 
stitute of  Electrical  and  Electronic  Engineers.  Other  technological 
societies  have  been  formed  along  "mission"  lines,  such  as  the  American 
Institute  of  Aeronautics  and  Astronautics,  American  Ordnance  Asso- 
ciation, and  the  American  National  Standards  Institute.  Since  tech- 
nology is  a  major  activity  in  most  private  industrial  corporations,  its 


concerns  interlock  with  the  economic  interests  of  the  business  com- 
munity generally.  The  increasing  use  of  technology  to  support  Govern- 
ment programs  has  brought  many  agencies  into  direct  working  con- 
tact with  the  complex  private  networks  of  technologists. 

Since  military  programs  absorb  the  bulk  of  governmental  invest- 
ment in  technology,  the  organizational  consequences  are  profound; 
they  include: 
— The  evolution  of  a  "military-industrial  complex*'  with  specialized 

capabilities  and  needs ; 
— The  development  of  "systems  techniques''  to  make  possible  the 
design  and  construction  of  advanced  military  weaponry  of  great 
cost,  complexity,  and  sophistication ; 
— The  evolution  of  numerous  "think  tanks''  using  mathematical  and 
other   analytical   techniques   to   forecast   requirements,   develop 
weapons  concepts,  examine  alternative  solutions  to  problems,  and 
evaluate  progress. 
The  technologists  also  have  their  more  formal  point  of  contact  with 
the  Government  through  the  offices  of  the  National  Academy  of  En- 
gineering, which  shares  with  the  Academy  of  Sciences  the  facilities 
and  resources  of  the  National  Research  Council. 

4,.  Policy  Formulation  in  Science  and  Technology 

A  study  of  "American  science  policy"  by  Wallace  S.  Say  re,  some 

years  ago,  concluded  that  it  was  fragmented  and  unsystematic  and 

perhaps  necessarily  so.  He  wrote : 

Unity  and  comprehensiveness  are  *  *  *  not  likely  to  be  the  hallmarks  of 
American  science  policy.  Talk  of  a  single,  comprehensive  "American  science 
policy"  has  an  essentially  fictitious  quality.  There  will  be  many  science  policies, 
rather  than  a  master  science  policy.  Diversity,  inconsistency,  compromise,  experi- 
mentation, pulling  and  hauling,  competition,  and  continuous  revision  in  science 
policies  are  more  predictable  continuing  characteristics  than  their  antonyms. 
This  has  been  the  history  of  American  science  policies  and  this  describes  their 
present  state  of  affairs  as  deplorable.  But  to  live  with  diversity  and  accommoda- 
tions of  policy,  and  yet  to  be  impatient  of  them,  may  be  the  process  by  which  a 
democratic  society  achieves  progress  in  science  as  well  as  in  other  fields.  In  any 
event,  the  future  seems  to  offer  American  scientists  more  dilemmas  than  un- 
equivocal answers  in  science  policy.31 

More  recently,  a  study  by  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co- 
operation and  Development,  in  its  "Reviews  of  National  Science 
Policy"  series,  concluded  similarly,  although  its  view  of  science  in- 
corporated both  research  and  development.  Said  the  OECD  report: 

The  vast  research  and  development  enterprise,  as  it  exists  today  [in  the  United 
States],  does  not,  therefore  spring  from  a  deliberate,  coordinated  endeavor  to 
make  the  most  of  the  country's  potential  resources,  but  rather  from  scattered 
initiatives,  taken  in  haste  to  meet  an  emergency  and  prolonged  by  limited  pro- 
grammes. In  many  instances,  the  mobilisation  of  men  and  institutions  and  the 
establishment  of  the  necessary  framework  of  political  structures,  have  been 
improvised  ad  hoc,  as  and  when  the  needs  dictated  by  the  international  situation 
have  been  recognised.  The  goal  of  the  United  States,  asserted  since  the  Second 
World  War,  has  now  become  the  maintenance  and  strengthening  of  its  political, 
economic,  scientific  and  technical  leadership.  *  *  * 

n  Wallace  8.  Bayre.  "Scientists  and  American  Science  Policy."  ( Reprinted  from  Science. 
Vol.  133,  Nil  3456,  March  24,  1961,  pp.  859  864.)  /"  Bernard  Barber  and  Walter  Hlrscb; 
eds.  The  Sociology  of  Science.  (New  York.  The  Free  Press  of  Qlencoe,  1002),  p.  602.  How- 
ever, by  Title  I,  "National  Science.  Engineering,  and  Technological  Policy  and  Priorities", 
of  P.L.  94  2S2.  approved  May  11.  1!>7»>.  the  Congress  undertook  to  reverse  the  position 
taken  by  Sayre  toward  a  "master"  science  policy. 


The  Federal  Government  has  thus  come  to  look  upon  the  scientific  and  tech- 
nical effort  as  a  valuable  instrument  for  achieving  its  political  aims  and  it  has 
been  led  to  assume  primary  responsibility  for  the  development  and  success  of 
this  undertaking.8" 

With  respect  to  the  organization  of  policy  institutions  within  the 
Federal  Government  to  effect  this  general  aspiration,  the  OECD 
report  noted  that  there  was  a  "plurality  of  institutions"  without  an 
overall  plan.  It  said : 

The  Executive  and  the  Legislature  have  each  laboured  in  their  own  field  to 
develop  the  scientific  enterprise.  They  have  done  so  in  the  light  of  their  own 
concrete  problems,  of  defense  or  national  security,  of  the  country's  prestige  or 
its  internal  affairs.  Their  concerns  have  not  always  been  identical,  and  the  priori- 
ties adopted  by  the  one  have  not  always  commended  themselves  to  the  other. 
These  different  wills,  though  very  often  complementary,  partly  explain  the 
institutional  diversity  of  the  Federal  science  policy  mechanism. 

This  Federal  mechanism  thus  embodies  two  sets  of  bodies.  The  first  forms  part 
of  the  inner  workings  of  the  Presidency,  and  especially  of  the  Executive  Office, 
which  takes  a  direct  part  in  preparing  the  decisions  of  the  President.  The  second 
originates  in  the  structure  of  Congress  itself,  which  has  equipped  itself  with 
specialised  bodies  to  carry  out  its  mission  of  keeping  a  watch  on  the  Administra- 
tion and  enforcing  its  own  priorities.  The  two  groups  are  engaged  in  a  continuous 
dialogue  on  the  methods,  means,  and  aims  of  the  scientific  enterprise.33 

Although  national  science  policy  is  a  diffused  responsibility,  the 
policy  regarding  technology  is  much  more  so.  The  exploitation  of 
technology  is  the  business  of  most  private  companies,  and  is  involved 
in  the  programs  of  nearly  every  agency  of  Government.  Accordingly, 
almost  every  committee  of  Congress  encounters  technological  issues 
at  some  time.  Technology  is  the  physical  means  to  many  national 
ends.  Political  leaders  in  the  Congress  and  in  the  executive  branch  tend 
to  look  to  the.  capabilities  of  technology — with  its  support  in  the  more 
basic  sciences — to  wipe  out  disease,  achieve  military  security,  extend 
man's  life,  control  the  numbers  of  his  progeny,  eliminate  the  hazards 
of  accident  and  environmental  degradation,  insure  economic  growth 
and  stability,  erase  pockets  of  poverty,  expand  the  utility  of  leisure 
time,  explore  and  utilize  the  oceans  and  outer  space,  and  perpetuate 
the  resource  base  needed  to  feed,  clothe,  house,  and  equip  man  for 
safety,  comfort,  and  happiness. 

5.  Scientific  and  Technological  Elements  in  International  Relations 

Science  and  technology  are  both  a  part  of  the  substance  of  inter- 
national relations  and  an  influence  on  the  processes  of  international 
relations;  they  create  objectives,  influence  the  environment  surround- 
ing and  conditioning  issues,  and  open  up  future  prospects  for  signifi- 
cant further  change  that  the  process  and  conditions  of  diplomacy 
must  accommodate. 

Substantively,  science  and  technology  create  opportunities  and 
problems  in  the  achievement  of  diplomatic  goals,  and  sometimes 
both  together.  In  the  exploitation  of  the  seabed,  for  example,  science 
and  technology  provide  stimulus  for  global  research  and  cooperative 
developmental  ventures  in  a  traditionally  international  environment, 
and  problems  concerning  soverign  jurisdiction  of  new  "territory."  The 
global  spread  of  such  polluting  materials  as  DDT,  radioactive  wastes, 
and  the  lead  additive  in  hydrocarbon  fuels,  result  from  expanded 

32  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-Operation  and  Development.  "Reviews  of  National 
Science  Policy:  United  States."  (Paris,  OECD  Publications,  March  1968),  pp.  23,  25. 

33  Ibid.,  p.  62. 


opportunity  in  agricultural  production,  energy  generation,  and  human 
mobility.  However,  their  second-order  effects  as  global  pollutants  have 
begun  to  motivate  concerted  action  among  nations  to  preserve  and 
restore  the  world's  natural  environment.  Science  and  technology  are 
called  upon  to  contribute  to  the  solution  of  such  human  problems  as 
the  worsening  food/population  balance,  the  "information  explosion." 
and  the  worldwide  problem  of  water  resource  management.  Science 
and  technology  have  generated  such  diplomatic  problems  as  the  control 
of  atomic  weaponry  and  radiation,  the  rapid  spread  of  diseases  vec- 
tored by  modern  aircraft  transportation,  and  the  occurrence  of  crises 
resulting  from  the  instant  global  communication  made  possible  by 
modern  electronics. 

Science  and  diplomacy  are  intertwined  in  many  other  ways.  The 
multiplication  of  such  global  science  programs  as  the  International 
Geophysical  Year,  World  Weather  Watch,  and  the  International  Bio- 
logical Program,  invariably  have  their  diplomatic  aspects.  The  IGY, 
for  example,  led  a  chain  of  events  that  included  the  Antarctic  Treaty, 
progress  in  the  use  of  satellites  for  space  exploration,  and  the  "Treaty 
Banning  Nuclear  Weapons  Tests  in  the  Atmosphere,  in  Outer  Space, 
and  Under  Water."  The  travel  of  scientists  to  frequent  international 
meetings,  or  personal  consultation,  or  research  abroad,  increases  the 
need  for  services  by  the  Department  of  State  to  help  and  support 
American  scientists  in  these  activities.  Scientists  themselves  participate 
in  unofficial,  exploratory  investigations  of  possible  future  diplomatic 
opportunities,  in  such  ventures  as  the  "Pugwash  Conferences.''  All 
these  international  contacts  among  scientists  and  engineers  are  difficult 
to  evaluate  as  to  their  diplomatic  consequences,  but  they  are  cerrainly 

The  methods  of  science  and  technology  also  offer  support  for  the 
conduct  of  diplomacy  in  the  analysis  and  solution  of  international 
problems.  Investment  in  research  is  a  continuing  function  of  the  U.S. 
Arms  Control  and  Disarmament  Agency,  for  example.  The  factfind- 
ing and  hypothesis-testing  methods  of  science  have  been  advanced  as 
offering  possible  methodologies  for  the  study  of  strategy,  decisionmak- 
ing, and  information  dissemination.  Engineering  techniques  are  com- 
ing into  use  in  the  establishment  and  achievement  of  goals  in  foreign 
aid  and  communications  management.  The  use  of  cybernetics,  systems 
analysis,  and  PERT  (program  evaluation  and  review  technique) 
network  analysis  are  suggested  as  having  application  to  the  manage- 
ment of  the  huge  flow  of  diplomatic  information. 

In  view  of  the  deep  penetration  of  the  substance,  the  problems,  and 
the  methods  of  science  and  technology  into  American  diplomacy,  a 
number  of  questions  become  salient.  To  what  extent  have  the  problems 
generated  by  science  and  technology  been  assessed  by  the  institutions 
created  to  maintain  U.S.  diplomacy  \  I  low  adequately  stalled  and  sup- 
ported are  these  institutions  to  exploit  the  potent  ia lit ies  of  science  and 
technology  in  support  of  the  objectives  of  U.S.  diplomacy?  What 
problems  and  opportunities  for  the  future  are  discernible  as  a  result 
of  the  great  increase  in  the  Government  sponsorship  of  science  and 
technology?  In  what  ways  are  the  results  of  this  expanded  science  and 
technology  beneficial  for  American  diplomacy?  In  what  ways  are  the 
results  injurious,  or  potentially  so  (  And  again,  what  can  be  done  for 
the  future  \ 


Formai,  Aspects  of  the  Study 

./.  Scop*  and  Lim  itations 

As  noted  earlier,  this  study  was  undertaken  at  the  request,  in  1969,  of 
the  then  Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific 
Developments  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  (now  the 
Subcommittee  on  International  Security  and  Scientific  Affairs  of  the 
House  International  Relations  Committee) .  Thus,  the  focus  throughout 
is  on  the  kinds  of  issues  and  outcomes  that  are  of  particular  interest 
to  the  committee  and  involve  institutional  mechanisms  or  policy  con- 
siderations particularly  amenable  to  congressional  review  and  per- 
haps action.  The  substantive  issues  chosen  for  study  are  of  importance 
in  terms  of  the  recent  past  (since  World  War  II),  and  involve  ques- 
tions in  which  some  consensus  has  already  been  reached.  Some  em- 
phasis has  been  placed  on  the  roles,  policies,  and  problems  of  U.S. 
Government  agencies  participating  in  international  scientific  and 
technological  programs,  and  of  international  organizations  (both  gov- 
ernmental and  nongovernmental)  in  which  the  United  States  partici- 
pates officially  or  nonofficially. 

Subjects  have  been  avoided  in  which  the  essence  of  the  situation  in- 
volves extensive  analysis  of  information  denied  to  the  general  public, 
although  some  classified  information  was  reviewed  for  purposes  of 
background.  Covert  international  activities,  such  as  of  the  Central  In- 
telligence Agency,  and  Department  of  Defense  international  scien- 
tific and  technological  policies  and  programs,  also  are  not  treated. 

2.  Methodology 

The  methodology  used  in  this  project  is  the  case  study  approach. 
By  examining  a  selected  set  of  cases  and  issues  illustrating  interac- 
tions of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy,  it  may  be  possible 
to  derive  insights  for  the  Congress  on  how  to  devise  policies  and 
mechanisms  to  improve  U.S.  resources  for  the  management  of  these 

Use  of  the  case  study  method  enables  different  researchers  to  use 
common  and  accepted  concepts  important  in  explaining  decisionmak- 
ing, and  it  facilitates  critical  review  of  the  findings  of  each  case  by  stu- 
dents of  policymaking.  It  also  permits  the  surfacing  of  similar  ob- 
stacles, problems,  and  inefficiencies  at  the  intersections  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  and  other  institutions,  governmental  or  scientific,  with 
an  international  program  content. 

The  case  study  method,  in  this  project,  is  used  to  assess  two  kinds . 
of  interaction  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy ;  one  episodic 
(called  "cases"),  the  other  continuing  (called  "issues").  The  subjects 
to  be  studied  were  chosen  to  provide  an  appreciation  of  the  ways  in 
which  modern  science  and  technology  have  altered  the  environment, 
the  goals,  the  substance,  the  methodology,  the  organization,  and  the 
personnel  qualifications  of  American  diplomats.  The  choice  of  items 
for  study  has  been  guided  by  the  following  considerations : 

(a)  To  point  the  way  to  a  strengthening  of  support  of  the 
diplomatic  process  over  a  broad  spectrum  of  problems  salient 
and  meaningful  to  the  Congress ;  and 

(b)  To  demonstrate  the  workings  of  the  various  administrative 
mechanisms  that  contribute  to  diplomacy,  including  factfinding, 


information  management,  communication,  problem-identification, 
problem-analysis,  policy  decisionmaking,  negotiation  and  media- 
tion, and  implementation  feed-back. 
Cases  are  defined  as  discrete,  coherent,  and  manageable  episodes 
involving  the   interaction   of   science   and   technology   with    foreign 
policy,  which  are,  or  are  capable  of  being,  encompassed  within  a  single 
program.  Interactions  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy  take 
many  forms.  Episodic  subjects  chosen  to  represent  these  various  inter- 
actions are  the  international  control  of  atomic  energy;  commercial 
uses  of  atomic  energy  in  Europe ;  the  Mekong  Regional  Development 
Proposal;  the  United  Nations  and  the  sea  bed;  the  International  Geo- 
physical Year;  and  United  States-Soviet  relations  and  technology 

The  continuing  issues  are  recurrent  international  problems  or  condi- 
tions, with  general,  long-range  goals  and  incremental  or  partial  ease- 
ments. They  are  discussed  by  the  late  Charles  O.  Lerche  in  the  follow- 
ing terms : 

Within  American  foreign  policy  today  there  are  a  number  of  "continuing 
issues."  These  are  problems  stemming  from  the  general  policy  line  the  United 
States  has  been  pursuing  that  are  peculiar  in  that  they  do  not  seem  to  permit 
of  any  final  resolution.  Each  has  been  met  often  within  the  context  of  a  given 
set  of  circumstances,  but  each  change  in  the  situational  milieu  has  required  that 
new  answers  be  given  to  the  old  questions.34 

Among  the  examples  suggested  by  Lerche  were  strategic  weaponry 
policy,  arms  control,  foreign  assistance,  trade  and  tariff  policy,  and 
psychological  factors. 

The  continuing  issues  chosen  for  intensive  analysis  in  this  study  are 
expressed  in  such  terms  as  understanding  the  evolution  and  interna- 
tional political  impacts  of  technology;  influencing  the  level  of  world 
health;  achieving  improvements  in  the  food/population  balance  on  a 
global  basis;  understanding,  evaluating,  and  redirecting  the  flow  of 
scientific  and  technical  personnel  from  one  country  to  another;  ex- 
amining the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  U.S.  Government  programs 
for  sending  U.S.  scientists  abroad;  and  improving  the  diplomatic 
skills  of  scientists  and  the  scientific  understanding  of  diplomats. 

Each  of  these  cases  and  issues  is  dealt  with  in  a  separate  chapter. 
Parts  3  and  4  of  the  study  entail  analysis  of  all  the  "issues"  and 
"cases"  to  ascertain  what  generalizations  might  be  drawn  as  to  present 
measures  and  resources  for  constructively  relating  science  or  technol- 
ogy and  American  diplomacy. 

Plan  of  the  Study 

In  general,  the  issues  selected  for  study  are  definable  but  open- 
ended,  of  a  continuing  nature.  They  Have  wide  ramifications,  and 
require  a  careful  selection  of  data  to  bring  them  into  focus.  Instead  of 
an  outcome,  they  may  reveal  a  general  tendency  or  direction.  The 
cases,  by  contrast,  are  set  in  a  shorter  time  frame.  They  tend  to 
be  more  sharply  defined  and  discrete  as  problems,  more  precise  in 
scope,  with  some  more  measurable  consequences.  For  the  most  part 
they  are  essentially  resolved  as  to  their  outcome. 

**  Charles  0.  Lerche,  Foreign  Policy  of  the  American  People.  Third  Edition.  (Englewood 
Cliffs,  Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1U07),  p.  223, 


1.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Issues 

The  specific  criteria  to  be  satisfied  by  each  subject  for  study,  as  estab- 
lished at  the  outset,  are  four  in  number.  First.  The  subject  should  be 
of  substantial  moment,  and  be  regarded  as  such.  Second.  The  subject 
should  have  a  significant  technical  content,  so  that  it  involves  a  prob- 
lem of  communication  between  the  expert  in  the  field  and  the  gen- 
eralist  concerned  with  the  diplomatic  implications.  Third.  The  prob- 
lem should  involve  some  aspect  of  "science  in  policy"  or  "policy  in 
science" ;  that  is,  it  should  deal  with  the  application  of  science  or  tech- 
nology to  advance  some  international  policy  of  the  United  States,  or 
it  should  deal  with  some  way  in  which  U.S.  science  or  technology  is 
sought  to  be  strengthened  by  diplomatic  action.  Fourth.  The  subject 
should  have  had  sufficient  continuity  and  persistence  as  a  problem  be- 
fore the  diplomatic  community  to  enable  observation  of  changes  that 
have  occurred  as  a  result  of  national  action. 

2.  Format  for  the  Exposition  of  Issues 

An  effort  was  made  to  achieve  some  degree  of  uniformity  in  the 
organization  of  the  various  chapters  on  issues.  The  format  adhered  to, 
as  planned  at  the  beginning  of  the  project,  is  in  general  the  following: 

(a)  Definition  of  the  issue  to  be  studied ; 

(b)  Significance  of  the  issue  in  present  and  future  contexts; 

(c)  How  the  issue  developed; 

(d)  U.S.  involvement  in  the  issue; 

(e)  Congressional  concern  with  the  issue; 

(/)   Formulation  of  policy  to  influence  the  issue; 
(g)   Options  available  to  the  policymakers  and  prospects  for 
the  future ;  and 

(h)  Further  questions  posed  by  the  issue. 
Although  consistency  in  treatment  is  advantageous,  both  for  con- 
venience in  reading  and  for  ease  in  subsequent  comparison  and  analy- 
sis of  cases,  nevertheless  variation  has  been  unavoidable.  Respect  for 
the  subject  matter  as  well  as  independent  authorship  has  inevitably 
compelled  some  degree  of  departure  from  a  superimposed  outline. 

3.  Illustrative  Questions  Researched 

In  developing  the  individual  discussion  of  the  issues  to  be  re- 
ported on,  attention  was  given  to  such  questions  as  the  following: 

(a)  In  what  different  ways  has  the  issue  been  characterized?  What 
conflicts  arise  out  of  different  perceptions  of  it?  Is  there  some  kind  of 
time  frame  in  which  these  different  perceptions  predominate? 

(b)  What  is  the  place  of  the  issue  in  the  general  matrix  of  foreign 
policy?  What  priority  of  attention  has  been  assigned  to  it  at  different 

(c)  What  are  the  significant  interactions  of  the  issue  in  question 
with  other  policy  elements?  Does  it  benefit  or  threaten  other  national 
policies  or  programs  ? 

(d)  Has  response  to  need  been  comprehensive  or  incremental?  Is 
the  effort  mounted  to  influence  the  issue  a  powerful  and  motivated 
national  effort,  or  is  it  being  tackled  bit  by  bit  ? 

(e)  Has  a  clear  and  positive  U.S.  policy  been  evolved  respecting  the 
issue?  What  is  its  place  in  the  general  structure  of  foreign  policy? 

(/)  Has  a  technically  sophisticated  mechanism  been  developed  for 
choosing  among  alternative  courses  or  options  in  achieving  progress 


in  the  problem  ?  Has  the  scientific-technological  community  been  en- 
listed in  the  development  of  a  program?  What  does  the  literature  of 
this  community  say  about  the  way  the  program  has  been  developed, 
and  about  its  outcome  ? 

(g)  What  interactions  have  occurred  between  the  United  States  and 
multinational  bodies,  or  foreign  countries,  in  respect  to  the  issue? 
What  is  the  documentation  of  international  conversations?  What  sort 
of  joint  action  has  been  found  feasible?  What  degree  of  understanding 
as  to  methods  and  expected  results  ? 

If..  Enumeration  of  the  Issues 

Six  issues  were  chosen  for  study.  They  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Evolution  of  international  technology. — A  review  of  the  emer- 
gence of  technology  as  a  factor  of  change  in  international  relations. 
Under  this  heading  are  considered  such  factors  as :  The  growing  aware- 
ness of  the  relevance  of  technology  for  diplomacy ;  the  practical  separa- 
tion of  technology  from  science ;  the  relations  between  the  international 
exchange  of  technology  and  governmental  and  economic  forms  of 
social  organization;  problems  of  technological  transfer  (from  whom, 
what,  to  whom,  and  how)  ;  U.S.  organizations  and  programs  to  exploit 
technology  for  advancement  of  foreign  policy  goals;  recruitment  and 
training;  successes;  prospects. 

(2)  World  medicine. — Long-range  consequences  of  worldwide  appli- 
cation of  medical  sciences.  Considered  under  this  heading  are  such 
factors  as:  An  overview  of  medical  advances  of  the  past  and  their 
impact  on  the  world  society,  cultural  and  medical  standards,  perspec- 
tives on  the  present  state  of  medical  knowledge,  the  dilemmas  of 
world  medicine  and  national  policy,  national  and  international  medical 
organizations  and  programs,  problems  and  prospects  for  the  future. 

(3)  Food  and  population. — A  study  of  the  changing  food/popula- 
tion balance  in  developing  countries.  Under  this  heading  will  be  con- 
sidered such  factors  as :  A  review  of  historical  evolution  of  formulation, 
coordination,  and  administration  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance  policies  to 
provide  for  adequate  food  resource  development  and  management, 
public-health  services,  stabilization  of  the  population  growth  rate, 
direct  transfer  of  American  technological  expertise,  U.S.  policies  in 
support  of  the  development  of  indigenous  E.  &  D.  capabilities  to  ad- 
dress questions  of  the  food/population  balance,  and  obstacles  (cultural, 
social,  political,  economic,  technical)  to  successful  design  and  imple- 
mentation of  U.S.  programs. 

(4)  Programs  for  sending  U.8.  scientists  and  technical  personnel 
abroad. — A  study  of  the  purposes,  scope,  accomplishments,  problems, 
and  needs  of  the  various  Federal  programs  that  sponsor  the  movement 
of  nongovernment  scientists  and  technologists.overseas  to  teach  and  to 

(5)  The  "brain  drain'''  problem-. — Occurrence,  consequences,  and 
issues  of  one-way  flows  of  scientific  manpower  (including  in  this  con- 
text the  entire  array  of  basic  and  applied  sciences  and  associated 
technologies).  Under  this  heading  are  considered:  The  development 
of  trained  scientists  at  home  and  abroad,  factors  attracting  scientists 
to  new  areas,  consequences  of  outflows  and  inflows  of  scientists,  prob- 
lems of  retention  and  use  of  scientists,  and  administration  of  the  forces 
that  influence  scientist  migrations. 


(6)  Science  and  technology  in,  the  Department  of  State. — Under 
this  heading  are  considered  such  factors  as:  State  Department  organ- 
ization and  procedures  for  marshaling  science  and  technology  in  sup- 
port of  both  short-range  and  long-range  U.S.  foreign  policy  objectives, 
educational  programs  and  briefings  on  science  and  technology-  for  the 
Foreign  Service  at  home  and  abroad,  organization  of  specialists  in 
science  and  technology  within  the  Department  of  State  and  their  re- 
lations with  generalists  in  the  Department,  opportunities  and  prob- 
lems, and  prospects  for  the  future. 

5.  Criteria  for  the  Selection  of  Cases 

Being  time-oriented  and  discrete,  the  cases  are  concerned  with  op- 
erational matters  and  action  decisions,  and  with  the  consequences  of 
these.  They  afford  a  somewhat  different  outlook  from  *he  studies  of 
issues  in  the  ways  in  which  foreign  policy  is  determined  and  imple- 
mented in  a  variety  of  specific  problems.  Nevertheless,  most  of  the 
criteria  applicable  to  the  selection  of  issues  for  study  apply  also  to  the 
cases.  They  need  to  be  consequential,  and  regarded  as  such.  They  need 
to  have  a  substantial  technical  content.  And  they  need  to  involve  de- 
cisions as  to  the  uses  of  science  or  technology  to  further  policy,  or  as 
to  the  use  of  diplomatic  measures  to  further  some  basic  capability  or 
activity  of  science  or  technology. 

Some  additional  criteria  are  of  particular  relevance  in  the  selection 
of  the  cases.  Inasmuch  as  a  number  of  fields  involve  sensitive  and 
classified  matters,  for  which  documentation  would  be  difficult  in  an 
unclassified  study,  these  will  be  avoided.  Then,  the  cases  need  to  deal 
with  subjects  that  yield  explicit  findings  of  actions  taken  and  their 
results.  They  should  illustrate  both  geographically-oriented  and  disci- 
pline-oriented problems.  Care  has  been  taken  to  select  a  range  of 
cases  to  illustrate  a  range  of  institutional  structures,  kinds  of  tech- 
nical expertise,  and  administrative  concepts.  Finally,  the  cases  selected 
all  present  the  problem  of  time  orientation  in  a  dynamic  subject-area; 
that  is,  the  timing  of  the  action-decision  and  the  timing  of  its  imple- 
mentation are  relevant  to  the  action  and  its  results. 

6.  Form-at  for  the  Presentation  of  Cases 

An  effort  parallel  to  that  applied  to  the  issues  was  made  to  achieve 
some  degree  of  uniformity  in  the  organization  of  the  various  chapters 
dealing  with  cases.  The  format  adhered  to  is  in  general  the  following : 

(a)  The  environment  of  the  case  and  its  historical  evolution; 

(b)  Definition  and  development  of  the  problem; 

(c)  Organizational  framework  involved  in  dealing  with  the 
problem ; 

(d)  Chronological  account  of  the  development  of  the  problem; 

(e)  How  the  problem  came  to  the  attention  of  the  decision- 
making institution; 

(/)  Methods  and  procedures  employed  in  the  decision  process; 

(g)   Description  of  the  ultimate  decision; 

(h)  Subsequent  developments  that  flowed  from  the  decision  (its 
implementation  and  the  responses  evoked)  ; 

(i)  Evaluation  of  the  decision  in  terms  of  the  ultimate  outcome ; 

(j)  Evaluation  of  the  decisionmaking  process,  with  particular 
attention  to  its  technical  aspects; 

(k)  Further  questions  raised  by  the  case. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.   1-4 


Here  again,  some  departure  from  the  outline  has  been  unavoid- 
able and  probably  desirable.  The  6  cases  have  different  authors  and  dif- 
ferent content,  and  the  subject  matter  has  tended  to  determine  the 
organization  and  exposition  of  the  findings. 

7.  Illustrative  Questions  To  Be  Researched 

In  documenting  and  analyzing  the  respective  cases,  authors  were 
guided  by  the  following  questions : 

(a)  How  was  the  problem  identified  and  characterized?  Was  its  im- 
portance perceived  at  the  outset,  or  did  it  go  through  an  evolutionary 
process?  Was  the  problem  correctly  identified  at  first,  or  did  it  emerge 
from  initial  concern  for  some  different  issue  ? 

(b)  How  timely  was  the  identification  of  the  problem?  Was  it  per- 
ceived in  time  to  take  effective,  constructive  action  or  action  after  the 
fact?  How  did  the  identification  of  the  problem  relate  to  the  con- 
temporary political  climate  and  the  climate  of  public  opinion  ? 

(c)  What  difficulties  were  encountered  with  communication  in  ap- 
proaching and  analyzing  the  problem  ?  Did  technical  content  obscure 
the  political  question  or  did  political  content  obscure  the  technical 
problem  ? 

(d)  What  difficulties  were  encountered  in  separating,  and  giving 
separate  treatment  to,  the  technical  and  political  aspects?  Were  the 
decisionmakers  able  to  coordinate  the  treatment  of  both  together? 

(e)  What  was  the  nature  of  the  decision,  and  how  did  it  relate  to  the 
various  possible  alternatives  available  ?  Were  the  various  alternatives 
fairly  evaluated?  Were  the  decision  criteria  appropriate  to  the  prob- 
lem ?  Were  all  voices  heard  ? 

(/)  How  timely  was  the  decision?  Did  the  technical  difficulties  delay 
action  unnecessarily  ?  Were  opportunities  lost  ? 

(g)  How  stable  has  the  decision  proved  to  be?  Were  the  intended 
purposes  accomplished  ?  Have  alternatives  emerged  subsequently  that 
later  opinion  would  have  preferred  ? 

(h)  How  effective  was  the  decisionmaking  process  used?  Did  it  deal 
comprehensively  and  accurately  with  the  alternatives,  their  technical 
assessment,  and  their  political  evaluation  ? 

8.  Enumeration  of  the  Cases  Researched 
The  6  cases  chosen  for  study  are  as  follows : 

(1)  The  international  control  of  atomic  energy. — The  events  follow- 
ing the  initial  use  in  warfare  of  atomic  weaponry,  and  the  evolution  of 
the  Acheson  report  and  the  Baruch  plan. 

(2)  Commercial  uses  of  atomic  energy  in  Europe. — Events  sur- 
rounding the  Eisenhower  initiative  for  nuclear  sharing,  the  evolution 
of  the  International  Atomic  Energv  Agency,  and  the  events  that  re- 
sulted from  these  actions. 

(3)  The  International  Geophysical  Year. — Interactions  of  the  In- 
ternational Council  of  Scientific  Unions,  national  scientific  institu- 
tions, and  national  governments.  Origins  of  the  program.  Conduct  of 
the  planning  process.  The  roles  of  the  Department  of  State,  the  Na- 
tional Academy  of  Sciences,  and  the  National  Science  Foundation.  As- 
sessment of  t  lie  scientific  and  political  consequences. 

(4)  The  Mekong  Regional  Development  Proposal,— Events  that  led 
to  the  proposal  by  President  Johnson  for  a  comprehensive,  integrated 
multinational,  aid  program  for  Vietnam,  as  an  initiative  to  end  the 


conflict  there,  expressed  in  his  speech  at  Johns  Hopkins  University. 
Assessment  of  the  Mekong  project  itself  as  example  of  the  opportuni- 
ties and  problems  of  the  multinational  regional  approach  to  integrat- 
ing technological  achievement  and  social  policy. 

(5)  The  United  Nations  and  the  Seabed. — Interactions  of  national 
sovereignty  with  international  technology  in  an  international  environ- 
ment. Attempted  resolution  of  the  issue  of  territorial  limits.  Problems 
created  by  the  case  seen  as  political  and  diplomatic  rather  than  techno- 
logical, although  it  is  technology  that  makes  the  case  important. 

(6)  U.S. -Soviet  Commercial  Relations. — Exploratory  assessment  of 
the  political  and  economic  costs  and  benefits  of  the  emerging  trade  re- 
lationship between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  and  of  the 
transfer  of  technology  from  the  former  to  the  latter. 

9.  Organization  of  the  Total  Study 

A  comprehensive  and  detailed  analysis  of  the  12  individual  studies 
(6  cases  and  6  issues)  and  their  findings  is  given  in  parts  3  and  4.  The 
methodology  of  the  analysis  is  described  in  chapter  14.35 

A  word  might  be  said  here  about  the  working  philosophy  which  has 
governed  the  Science,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy  research 
project.  Authors  were  encouraged  to  conduct  and  present  the  analysis 
of  each  case  or  issue  with  two  perspectives  continuously  in  mind :  that 
of  the  case  or  issue  as  a  worthy  subject  in  itself,  as  well  as  that  of  its 
relationship  to  the  broad  theme  of  the  overall  study :  i.e.,  the  interac- 
tion of  science,  technology,  and  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

The  returns  are  in  for  the  first  of  those  two  complementary  aims — 
to  make  available  to  the  congressional  (and  in  general  the  public 
affairs)  community  the  analysis  and  findings  of  specific  cases  and  is- 
sues, on  their  individual  merits ;  the  results  are  gratifying.  All  12  stu- 
dies have  served  significant  congressional  or  other  governmental  pur- 
poses relating  to  their  specific  themes;  all  have  received  serious  atten- 
tion in  academic  circles  as  well;  most  have  had  to  be  reprinted  to 
satisfy  a  demand  which  persisted  for  some  years  after  the  date  of 

But  it  was  the  second  and  larger  aim  that  prompted  Chairman 
Zablocki  to  request  this  extended  research  undertaking  to  begin  with, 
and  to  seek  the  critical  reactions  of  knowledgeable  persons  in  and  out 
of  government  for  the  benefit  of  Congress.  This  was  the  aim  of  making 
an  empirical  examination,  by  the  case  study  method,  of  representative 
instances  of  the  interplay  of  science  and  technology  with  diplomacy 
for  the  light  they  might  shed  on  how  the  U.S.  Government  could  bet- 
ter equip  itself  to  meet  the  compelling  challenges  posed  by  that  inter- 
play. To  see  this  problem  whole,  it  was  planned  at  the  outset  to  bring 
all  of  the  research  results  together  in  one  collected  study.  The  present 
document  represents  fulfillment  of  that  plan. 

« Numerous  references  to  material  In  the  12  basic  studies  occur  throughout  the  overall 
study  In  both  text  and  footnotes.  These  references  cite  pages  of  the  overall  study  rather 
than  the  original  page  numbers. 

-.1  PhaPter-study   equivalents  are  as  follows    (for  full  citations  of  individual  studies,  see 
list  Of  documents  in  the  original  study  series,  p.  VII. 

Chapter  1 — Huddle.  Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a  Scientific  Age 
Chapter  3 — Wu.  The  Bamch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the'Nuclear  Age. 
Chapter  4 — Donnelly.    Commercial    Nuclear    Poner    in    Europe:    The    Interaction    of 
American  Diplomacy  With  a  New  Technology. 



The  empirical  approach  followed  in  the  project,  and  the  broad 
matrix  analysis  of  project  findings  in  chapters  18  through  23,  have 
resulted  in  a  research  product  of  somewhat  formidable  proportions. 
A  certain  amount  of  unavoidable  repetition  has  also  resulted.  (On 
the  other  hand,  many  of  the  insights  scattered  through  the  12  individ- 
ual studies  could  not  be  captured  in  the  concluding  analysis  without 
distracting  from  the  latter,  with  its  main  focus  on  the  shortcomings 
of  American  institutions  for  coping  with  global  issues;  the  individual 
studies  therefore  remain  unique  and  useful  resources  in  themselves.) 

The  complete  study  consists  of  24  chapters  (the  major  subdivisions 
of  which,  identified  by  Roman  numerals,  are  referred  to  as  sections) 
organized  into  a  general  introduction  and  4  parts.  A  short  chapter 
introducing  the  main  analytical  portion  of  the  study  intervenes  be- 
tween parts  2  and  3.  Following  two  introductory  chapters  at  the  be- 
ginning, part  1  contains  a  separate  chapter  for  each  of  the  six  case 
studies.  Part  2  is  made  up  of  six  chapters  presenting  the  studies  of 
continuing  issues.  Part  3  is  devoted  to  a  comprehensive  analytical 
review  of  the  preceding  12  studies,  taken  individually.  Part  4  ex- 
amines the  studies  collectively  under  G  cross-cutting  headings  reflect- 
ing broad  policy  concerns,  with  concluding  observations  as  to  policy 
options  for  the  Congress  and  the  executive  branch.  The  study  ends 
with  an  extensive  annotated  bibliography. 

As  noted  in  Chapter  15  under  Methodology,  the  order  followed  in 
presenting  the  cases  and  issues — both  at  large  in  the  overall  study 
and,  in  parallel,  in  the  analysis  of  parts  3  and  4 — was  established  by 
the  subject  matter  itself,  independently  of  the  date  of  publication  of 
the  particular  study.  The  aim  in  any  given  case  is  to  focus  on  enduring 
problems  and  underlying  relationships,  not  to  provide  up-to-the- 
minute  details.  (As  a  practical  matter,  the  basic  studies — chapters 
3  through  14 — have  not  been  updated  for  inclusion  in  the  full  study 
collection;  Chapters  1,  2,  and  15,  however,  have  been  revised  from  a 
mid-1977  perspective,  and  to  the  extent  deemed  useful  chapters  16 
through  24  also  have  been  brought  up  to  date.)  The  appropriateness 
of  this  approach  seems  borne  out  by  the  fact  that,  in  general,  the  in- 
dividual studies  have  not  been  outdated  with  the  passage  of  time,  and 
that  virtually  all  of  their  findings  remain  valid  and  relevant. 

The  foregoing  introduction  has  been  a  restatement  of  the  original 
project  prospectus.3"  The  latter  is  here  modified  only  to  reflect  the 


Chapter  5 — Rullis,   The  Political  Legacy  of  the  International  Geophysical  Year. 
Chapter  6 — Huddle,  The  Mekong  Project:  Opportunities  and  Problems  of  Regionalism. 
Chapter  7- — Doumanl,  Exploiting  the  Resources  of  the  Seabed. 
Chapters — Hardt  and  Holllday,   U.S. -Soviet  Commercial  Relations:  The  Interplay  of 

Economics,  Technology  Transfer,  and  Diplomacy. 
Chapter  9 — Huddle,  The  Evolution  of  International  Technology. 
Chapter  10 — Quimby,  The  Politics  of  Global  Health. 
Chapter  11 — Nanes,  Beyond  Malthas:  The  Food/People  Equation. 
Chapter  12 — Knezo,   U.S.  Scientists  Abroad:  An  Examination  of  Major  Programs  for 

Nongovernmental  Scientific  Exchange. 
Chapter  13 — Whelan,  Brain   Drain:  A    Study  of  the  Persistent  Issue  of  International 

Scientific    Mobility. 
Chapter  14 — Huddle,   Science  and  Technology   in    tlic  Department  of  Stat<  :    Bringing 

Technical  Content  Into  Diplomatic  Policy  and  Operations. 
Chapters  15  through  -i  (and  Chapter  21     Huddle  and  Johnston,  Science,  Technology, 
ami  Diplomacy  in  the  Vge  of  Interdependence. 
"U.S.   Congress,    House,   Committee  on   Foreign  Affairs,   Toward  a  New  Diplomacy  in  a 
scientific  Age,  in  the  series  Selenee,  Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy,  prepared  for  the 
Subcommittee  on  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments  by  Franklin  P.  Hud- 
dle, Science  Policy  Research  Division.  Congressional  Research  Service.  Library  of  Congress, 
Washington,  D.C.,  c.s.  Govt.  Print.  Off.,  1970,  28  p.  (Committee  print.) 


facts  of  work  completed  in  place  of  the  intentions  of  work  in  pros- 
pect. In  the  final  reckoning,  each  user  of  the  study  can  judge  how 
the  original  goals  of  the  project  have  been  met,  as  expressed  in  the 
closing  words  of  that  prospectus.  The  project,  said  the  latter,  will — 

.  .  .  involve  an  identification  of  the  underlying  principles  of  policy,  organiza- 
tion, and  methodology  in  the  uses  of  science  and  technology  as  instruments  of 
diplomacy,  and  the  concurrent  principles  in  the  uses  of  diplomacy  to  strengthen 
U.S.  goals  in  science  and  technology.  It  will  be  a  search  for  opportunities  for 
new  initiatives,  a  search  for  areas  of  organization  and  administration  needing 
more  emphasis  or  support,  and  the  identification  of  unresolved  issues  of  policy. 
Beyond  this,  it  is  hoped  that  the  intrinsic  merit  of  each  of  the  case  studies 
will  make  it  stand  alone,  as  a  study  of  policy  on  an  important  matter,  and  that 
restatement  of  the  findings  will  serve  as  a  useful  compendium  and  index  of 
the  whole  enterprise. 

Chapter  2 — The  Global  Context  of  Science, 
Technology,  and  American  Diplomacy 



Detente  Vis-a-Vis  the  U.S.S.R 41 

Deterrence  42 

Weaponry 42 

The  P.R.C 42 

Isolationism 43 

U.S.  Economic  Burdens 43 

The  Changing  U.S.  Industrial  Economy 43 

The  Shaky  Global  Economy 45 

Atomic  Energy 45 

Populations  46 

Food 46 

Oceans 47 

Resource   Allocation 47 

Multinational    Corporations 48 

Nationalism 48 

United  Nations 48 

Regionalism '. 49 

Shrinking  World  Community 49 

Global  Flows 50 

Disorientation 50 



U.S.  foreign  policy  today  as  never  before  is  confronted  by  a  world 
of  restless  strivings  and  uncertain  directions.  The  modern  world 
presents  a  complex  mixture  of  dynamic  new  forces  and  drift,  of  active 
or  potential  conflict  and  detente,  of  wayward  nationalism  and  a  grow- 
ing curriculum  of  multinational  cooperative  activities.  The  200th 
anniversary  of  the  beginnings  of  history's  most  successful  experiment 
in  political  democracy  finds  the  Nation  pondering  the  question  of  how 
to  define  and  advance  those  aspects  of  its  heritage  of  independence 
that  are  valuable  in  a  world  of  growing  interdependence.  The  mid- 
1970s  are  thus  a  pivotal  time:  a  time  of  reassessment  of  U.S.  foreign 
policy,  a  time  to  search  for  a  new  and  more  stable,  more  durable  world 
structure  that  could  be  realized  by  creative  diplomatic  initiatives, 
built  deliberately  according  to  a  purposeful  and  coherent  design.  The 
resources  that  the  United  States  can  mobilize  to  meet  this  challenge 
are  mainly  the  technology  and  managerial  skills  in  which  the  Nation 
enjoys  an  unchallenged  superiority.  These  two  strengths,  by  a  con- 
venient fact  of  history,  are  precisely  those  needed  by  most  of  the 
other  nations  of  the  world  in  order  to  achieve  progress  toward  their 
own  internal  national  aspirations. 

However,  elements  of  this  changing  world  do  not  automatically 
simplify  or  facilitate  the  exercise  of  U.S.  leadership  in  applying  these 
needed  skills  toward  the  achievement  of  a  more  stable,  more  durable 
world  structure  of  cooperative  and  peaceful  nations.  The  enormous 
complexity  of  the  world  of  the  1970s  derives  from  the  great  variety 
of  nations  and  groupings  of  nations,  each  with  its  own  rate  and  direc- 
tion of  political,  economic,  and  technological  change,  leading  in  turn 
to  changing  goals  and  national  attitudes.  Change  can  generate  conflict 
or  it  can  promote  harmony  and  cooperation.  All  of  diplomacy  resolves 
ultimately  into  the  balancing  of  these  opposites.  Whether  by  bold 
creative  moves  or  by  slow  and  cautious  increments,  the  largely  un- 
recognized challenge  facing  the  United  States  is  to  use  its  skills  of 
technology  and  management  to  assemble  the  elements  of  the  present 
changing  world  into  the  more  constructive  and  reliable  order  on  which 
the  future  of  civilization  so  manifestly  depends. 

As  the  first  consideration,  what  are  the  salient  elements  of  the 
modern  world?  Some  of  them  are  the  following: 

Detente  Vis-a-Vis  the  U.S.S.R. 

The  rigidities  of  the  cold  war  are  being  replaced  by  a  new  flexibility 
in  which  the  still-potent,  still-dangerous  adversary  relationship 
between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  is  moderated  by  an 
uneasy  and  partial  truce.  This  truce  is  marked  by  trade  agreements, 
grain  transactions,  agreements  on  scientific  and  technological  co- 
operation, technology  transfers,  and  other  unwarlike  dealings  epit- 
omized by  the  term  "detente." 




The  underpinning  of  detente  remains  the  possession  by  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  of  an  overwhelming  nuclear 
destructive  capability  sufficient  to  deny  survival  to  either  party  in  the 
event  of  its  use.  Having  learned  to  live  with  this  fact  for  nearly  two 
decades,  leaders  of  each  nation,  while  still  maneuvering  for  some  slight 
and  transitory  technological  advantage.1  are  mainly  seeking  a  pattern 
of  beneficial  relationships  for  their  own  country — recognizing  that  it 
may  incidentally  be  beneficial  to  the  adversary,  but  in  the  nonmilitary 
sphere.  Emerging  out  of  this  uneasy  truce  may  possibly  be  a  more  or 
less  conscious  balance  of  cooperation  and  conflict  reflecting  both 
ideological  opposition  and  mutual  anxiety  over  survival. 


The  purpose  of  weaponry  is  national  security.  However,  the  enor- 
mous destructive  power  of  thermonuclear  weapons  accompanied  by 
irresistible  delivery  system  possessed  by  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union  has  created  an  impasse.  Both  parties  continue  to  invest 
scientific  talents  and  resources  in  further  refinements  of  nuclear 
weaponry  but  after  a  epiarter  century  of  this  arms  race  the  impasse 
continues,  the  destructive  capability  on  both  sides  has  increased,  and 
the  national  security  on  both  sides  has  diminished.  Beneath  this 
nuclear  umbrella  that  makes  overt  conflict  between  the  two  super- 
powers an  act  of  insanity,  the  adversaries  have  experimented  with 
various  kinds  of  war  by  proxy.  Experiments  in  limited  war  by  the 
United  States  in  Korea  and  Vietnam  showed  that  U.S.  high  technology 
weaponry  had  limited  utility  against  a  determined  adversary  in  open 
warfare.  Competitive  supply  of  weaponry  to  the  opposing  sides  in  the 
Middle  East  has  raised  the  level  of  intensity  of  that  conflict  and  in- 
creased the  risk  of  confrontation  between  the  superpowers.  Exports 
of  U.S.  weaponry  to  Latin  America,  Iran,  Jordan,  and  other  countries 
has  multiplied  the  potential  destructiveness  of  warfare  involving 
these  recipients;  the  gain  to  the  United  States  has  been  measured  in 
favorable  balanee-of-paymenis  increments  and  varying  degrees  of 
transitory  influence,  but  the  cost  has  frequently  been  diminished 
national  security  for  the  United  States.  Proliferation  of  subnuclear 
weaponry  continues  but  the  ultimate  consequences  appear  to  offer  no 
significant  benefit  to  the  United  States  while  making  small  wars  more 
lethal  and  draining  the  resources  of  -mall  States  to  maintain  their 
arsenals  of  high  technology. 

The  P.R.C. 

Emergence  of  the  world's  most  populous  nation  from  the  self-im- 
posed  isolation  of  the  period  of  painful  transition  to  ;i  Communist 
dictatorship  i-  now  in  process.  The  growing  military  and  economic 
power  of  t  hi-  former  "sleeping  giant"  gives  indication  that  in  time  the 
People's  Republic  of  China  will  become,  in  some  respects  at  least, 

the  coequal  pa  rt  ner  ad  \  er-a  ry  of  holh  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union.  Meanwhile  the  l\ \i.(\,  currently  more  hostile  toward 
the  Soviel  Union  than  toward  the  United  Slate-,  seeks  to  persuade 
t  he  la t  ter  of  the  dangers  of  Soviel  aggressive  designs. 

1  A  major  technological  advantage  by  either  adversary  would  be  Intolerable  to  th<>  othor, 
iiikI  wniiiil  pose  :i  serious  Invitation  t"  preemptive  attack  before  the  new  weapon  could  \w 



One  lively  dispute  that  divided  Americans  in  the  period  between  the 
two  great  wars  concerned  the  extent  to  which  this  country  could  re- 
main aloof  from  European  conflicts.  The  rise  of  Nazi  Germany  made 
the  dispute  salient  but  it  was  not  resolved  until  Japanese  ambitions 
for  Asiatic  hegemony  precipitated  a  conflict  halfway  around  the 
world  from  the  initial  theater  of  war.  Thereafter,  the  ties  among  the 
Axis  Powers  undercut  the  position  of  those  who  favored  U.S.  isolation. 
The  views  of  the  interventionists  were  confirmed  by  events:  It  became 
fixed  in  U.S.  foreign  policy  that  the  United  States  had  an  inescapable 
role,  a  compelling  interest,  and  a  great  power  responsibility  in  assur- 
ing world  peace  and  stability.  During  the  cold  war,  this  theme  domi- 
nated U.S.  dealings  abroad.  An  attempt  to  withdraw  from  this  re- 
sponsibility on  the  mainland  of  Asia  led  to  the  Korean  war.  The 
attempt  to  assert  it  led  to  the  U.S.  involvement  in  Vietnam.  The 
declining  fortunes  of  the  United  States  in  Vietnam  led  to  renewed 
questioning  of  the  extent  of  U.S.  responsibility  for  maintaining 
peace  and  stability  abroad,  and  even  to  a  denial  of  such  respon- 

The  rationale  of  great  power  control  over  small-country  wars  and 
internal  disturbances  remains  ill-defined,  but  recent  events  in  the 
Middle  East  have  demonstrated  the  hazard  of  a  unilateral  withdrawal 
of  one  great  power  from  the  scene,  and  the  perhaps  equal  hazard  of 
several  great  powers'  committing  themselves  to  opposing  causes  of 
small  nations.  Several  lessons  can  be  drawn  from  this  sequence. 
The  most  obvious  is  that  the  diplomatic  reaction  to  this  kind  of  crisis 
is  necessarily  ad  hoc  and  governed  by  circumstances;  rigid  adherence 
to  either  isolationism  or  interventionism  would  invite  disastrous 
consequences.  A  less  obvious  but  more  fundamental  lesson  is  that  the 
most  successful  kind  of  diplomacy  is  that  which  anticipates,  and 
devises  initiatives  to  keep  small  crises  from  developing.  It  is  note- 
worthy that  such  successes  generate  no  headlines  and  create  no 
popular  heroes,  and  are  recognized  only  in  a  small  community. 

U.S.  Economic  Burdens 

Since  World  War  II  the  U.S.  dollar  has  remained  the  primary — 
and  until  recently  the  strong  and  stable — currency  of  international 
commerce.  U.S.  assistance  has  been  extended  to  many  nations  abroad 
in  the  form  of  nuclear  deterrence,  trained  soldiery,  and  arms  ship- 
ments to  treaty  allies  and  developing  nations.  These  economic  bur- 
dens have  been  increased  by  U.S.  efforts  to  raise  the  technological 
levels  of  developing  countries  and  by  commitments  to  supply  ag- 
ricultural products  to  needy  countries  at  less  than  market  value. 
Efforts  to  persuade  other  developed  countries  to  shoulder  more  of  the 
burden  of  maintaining  an  international  currency  and  credit  system 
and  to  evolve,  with  the  Soviet  Union,  a  less  demanding  level  of 
armament  programs  are  features  of  the  contemporary  economic 
scene.  However,  the  abrupt  rise  in  world  petroleum  prices,  unease  in 
the  Middle  East,  and  persistent  ideological  and  organizational  ob- 
stacles to  U.S.-U.S.S.R.  cooperation  tend  to  perpetuate  the  U.S. 
economic  burdens. 

The  Changing  U.S.  Industrial  Economy 

The  word  "developed"  applied  to  the  U.S.  national  economy  means 
that  a  large  territory  was  settled,  and  that  the  predominant  form  of 


productive  activity  changed  from  agriculture  to  manufacturing  during 
the  first  third  of  the  20th  century,  and  from  manufacturing  to  services 
in  the  second  third.  The  products  of  agriculture  and  other  extractive 
industries  are  food,  fiber,  lumber,  and  minerals;  those  of  manufacturing 
are  the  highly  diversified  items  ranging  from  clothing  to  automobile-; 
those  of  services  industries  are  information  and  noncommodity- 
related  activities.  This  sequence  is  probably  not  reversible,  and  the 
future  health  of  the  U.S.  economy  depends  on  the  development  of  the 
services  industries  and  the  enhancement  of  their  productivity.  How- 
ever, much  of  the  services  industry  is  in  Government  services  which 
consume  but  do  not  generate  income:  Teachers,  police,  firemen,  other 
State  and  municipal  employees,  Federal  workers,  and  those  in  military 

The  trend  in  the  United  States  toward  services  industries  is  the 
central  feature  in  a  complex  of  developments  that  include  increased 
emphasis  on  the  quality  and  quantity  of  security  services  that  are 
provided  by  governments,  such  as  protections  against  crime,  unem- 
ployment, old  age,  and  medical  costs.  Environmental  protection  has 
recently  been  added  to  this  list.  These  services  are  costly  and  most  of 
them  are  tax-supported  instead  of  yielding  tax  revenues.  Even  as 
population  movements  toward  urban  centers  have  increased,  erosion 
has  occurred  in  the  urban  tax  base  as  the  wealthier  segment  of  the 
urban  population — and  industry  as  well — has  left  the  central  city  for 
the  suburbs. 

Another  complicating  factor,  perhaps  more  transient,  is  the  shift 
in  the  demographic  distribution  of  population  toward  the  young  and 
old  parts  of  the  lifescale;  these  are  less  productive  than  persons  in 
the  middle  range  but  absorb  services  at  a  higher  rate. 

The  U.S.  tax  structure,  which  is  effective  in  an  expanding  economy, 
tends  to  amplify  cycles  of  high  and  low  economic  activity. 

In  turn,  depression  of  the  economy  tends  to  worsen  all  the  other 
economic  problems  that  appear  as  the  Nation  proceeds  further  into 
the  "services"  phase.  As  the  tax  base  shrinks  and  the  service-  industries 
grow,  the  ability  of  the  Federal  Government  to  support  ambitious 
programs  diminishes,  while  the  demand  for  services  and  payment  for 
them  continues  to  grow. 

The  extractive  industries  in  the  United  States  (accounting  for  half 
the  labor  force  in  1890)  now  employ  less  than  5  percent  of  the  labor 
force;  manufacturing  perhaps  another  25  or  30  percent:  and  services 
the  rest.  The  trend  is  toward  further  shrinkage  of  the  first  two  and 
expansion  of  the  third. 

Shrinkage  of  the  tax  base  and  expansion  of  tax-supported  activities 
have  important  implications  for  diplomacy:  as  to  ability  to  fund 
military  programs,  support  foreign  assistance,  contribute  to  United 
Nation-,  agencies  a  major  fraction  of  their  support,  and  invest  in  large 

re  earch  and  develop nt  efforts  whose  product  is  increasinglj  resisted 

h>  the  industrial  sector  as  profit  margins  narrow.  The  pattern  of  U.S. 
trade  is  likewise  disrupted  by  internal  economic  dislocations.  Stag- 
flation, decline  in  the  value  of  the  dollar,  and  increasing  compel  it  ive 
difficult}  of  U.S.  industry  all  lead,  in  turn,  to  balance-of-payments 
deficit-,  making  funding  of  U.S.  programs  abroad  difficult. 

A    public  stniithiKi    in  services  and  welfare  rise,  demands  grow  for 

a  afer  and  more  wholesome  environment,  control  over  hazardous 
condil  ion  in  indust  rj  ,  and  reduced  impacts  of  mining  and  forestry  on 
wilderness  area-. 


While  these  brakes  on  industrial  growth  and  productivity  have  not 
yet  reached  full  strength,  they  have  served  to  warn  that  these  rising 
long-term  and  incremental  costs  in  the  industrial  economy  are  ap- 
proaching a  serious  stage.  When  such  costs  were  coupled  with  the  im- 
pact of  the  petroleum  embargo  and  price  increases  from  1973  on,  the 
observable  result  was  a  mixed  situation  of  recession  combined  with 
inflation.  The  effects  of  these  forces  were  felt  most  keenly  in  areas  of 
largest  populations,  notably  New  York  City.  Escape  from  this  dilemma 
is  vital  to  the  future  health  of  the  U.S.  diplomatic  posture  in  the 
world — as  indeed  also  for  U.S.  domestic  economic  health — but  the 
escape  route  remains  undefined.  The  economic  surplus  needed  to  fund 
past  levels  of  global  programs  may  be  a  product  of  the  U.S.  past.  U.S. 
foreign  policy  may  rest  more  in  the  future  on  the  skill  of  its  diplomacy 
than  on  the  weight  of  its  economic  programs. 

The  Shaky  Global  Economy 

Economic  interdependence  has  long  prevailed  in  international  re- 
lations. In  the  19th  century,  Central  Europe  fed  on  American  grain; 
agricultural  nations  relied  on  Chilean  nitrates;  England  supplied 
capital  to  develop  rail  transportation  systems  in  Argentina,  India,  the 
United  States,  and  China ;  English  textile  mills  wove  cloth  with  United 
States  and  Indian  cotton;  and  so  on.  During  the  1920s  efforts  to  restore 
this  global  economy  conflicted  with  internal  efforts  to  stabilize  na- 
tional economies  and  employment;  the  global  monetary  system  col- 
lapsed in  the  face  of  stiff  tariff  barriers,  competitive  devaluations, 
multiple  currency  schemes,  and  quotas.  Restoration  of  the  global 
economy  was  a  high-priority  U.S.  goal  after  World  War  II  but,  despite 
real  progress,  its  achievement  was  obstructed  by  cold  war  divisiveness, 
nationalistic  tendencies  of  former  colonial  regions,  and — ultimately — 
the  inability  of  the  dollar  to  serve  as  a  global  currency  in  place  of  the 
long-defunct  gold  standard.  Achievement  of  a  stable  global  economy 
continues  to  be  a  U.S.  goal.  D6tente  with  the  Soviet  Union  was  con- 
sidered a  positive  move  toward  its  achievement.  But  many  old  and 
some  new  forces  obstruct  progress  toward  the  goal:  internal  obligations 
of  developed  countries  to  sustain  economic  growth  and  high  levels  of 
employment;  resistance  of  developing  countries  to  terms  of  trade 
which  they  see  as  blocking  their  escape  from  economic  colonialism; 
and  most  recently  the  exploitation  by  the  OPEC  countries  of  a 
(probably  temporary  but  severely  acute)  monopoly  position  in  world 
petroleum  supply.  Efforts  at  reaching  international  agreement  on  a 
new  world  economic  structure  were  underway  at  the  time  of  this 
writing  but  the  issue  remains  in  doubt. 

Atomic  Energy 

Atomic  energy  places  such  extreme  demands  on  technology  that 
its  advance  in  competition  with  fossil  fuels  as  a  source  of  electrical 
energy  has  been  slow.  However,  the  manipulated  rise  in  petroleum 
prices  by  OPEC  and  the  complex  environmental  problems  in  the 
return  to  coal  as  a  principal  energy  source  are  making  atomic  energy 
potentially  more  attractive  for  the  future.  This  trend  makes  more  and 
more  difficult  the  maintenance  of  control  over  fuel  elements  and  by- 
product plutonium  to  protect  the  world  and  its  peoples  against  en- 
vironmental insults  and  irresponsible  conversion  of  plutonium  into 
weapons.  Since  the  early  1960s  a  principal  goal  of  U.S.  foreign  policy 
has  been  prevention  of  nuclear  proliferation.  The  economics  of  energy 
now  places  that  goal  in  serious  jeopardy.  Scientific  efforts  to  develop 


a  safer  form  of  energy  from  nuclear  fusion  are  proceeding  but  the  prob- 
lem is  one  of  greatT  technical  difficulty  and  the  estimates  of  time  to 
achieve  success  range  from  20  to  50  years.  Half  a  century  of  uncon- 
trolled nuclear  proliferation  as  a  consequence  of  supplying  electricity 
to  mankind  is  a  fearsome  prospect. 


The  ultimate  concern  of  all  governments,  in  terms  of  both  ends  ;md 
means,  is  people.  Of  growing  concern  is  the  relationship  between  total 
available  resources  and  population  in  the  entire  world,  but  especially  in 
the  most  populous  regions  and  those  in  which  the  rate  of  population 
increase  is  sharpest.  Populations  are  significant  in  relation  to  resources 
of  arable  land  and  materials,  ability  to  buy  food,  levels  of  consumption 
of  all  goods,  rates  at  which  environmental  pollution  occurs,  and  ability 
to  extend  governance.  As  populations  increase,  problems  worsen  in  all 
these  categories  unless  means  are  found  to  exert  strong  positive  con- 
trols or  motivations.  In  an  interdependent  world,  population  problems 
in  any  country  have  effects  on  all  countries.  Rates  of  population 
increase  of  different  countries  in  the  contemporary  world  tend  to  be  in 
inverse  proportion  to  achieved  levels  of  development.  Technology  is 
available  to  feed  large  increases  in  populations  as  well  as  to  control  the 
rates  of  increase,  but  the  enlistment  of  technology  toward  either 
purpose  requires  institutional  support  which  is  generally  inadequate. 
Many  forces  are  at  work  that  cause  population  increases  while  few 
forces  have  been  devised  to  inhibit  population  growth  in  poor  coun- 
tries, other  than  food  deprivation  as  a  consequence  of  food/population 
unbalance.  International  tensions  resulting  from  population  pressures 
are  regarded  as  serious  and  worsening  but  international  agreement  on 
the  resolution  of  the  problem  is  lacking.  The  dilemma  facing  the  world 
is  that  governments  of  poor  countries  call  for  aid  from  developed 
countries  to  secure  the  rights  of  their  citizens  to  living  standards 
achieved  by  developed  countries,  but  cannot  reconcile  these  expecta- 
tions with  their  practical  impossibility  in  the  face  of  uninhibited 
increases  of  populations. 


As  with  population  control,  the  limiting  factor  on  food  supply  is  not 
primarily  technological  but  institutional.  Wider  exploitation  of  well- 
established  technology  of  plant  genetics,  fertilization,  storage,  process- 
ing, and  marketing  could  treble  or  quadruple  the  available  food  supply 
of  the  world.  But  the  institutional  remedies  for  the  almost  inevitable 
increase  of  famine  conditions  in  the  closing  quarter  of  the  20th  century 
must  deal  with  food  production  and  distribution  as  only  one  ingredient 
in  a  pattern  of  development  that  encompasses  health  and  education, 
nonagricultural  employment  opportunities  in  urban  and  rural  area-, 
stable  currencies  and'  international  exchanges.  Land  management 
reform,  and  stable  institutions  of  government  able  to  administer 
effective  tax  and  investment  programs.  Failing  achievement  of  these 
conditions,  the  poor  countries  will  need  to  rely  increasingly  on  imported 
supplies  of  food  of  which  the  United  States  is  the  leading  exporter. 
For  the  United  Slate,  the  options  include  (a)  short-term  economic 
advantage  by  sales  to  the  best  market,  (b)  stern  compulsion  on  the 
poor  countries  to  effect  reforms  by  deliberate  choice  of  markets  to 
reward  the  countries  that  do  so,  ami  (c)  compassionate  doling  out  of 
dwindling  food  reserves  to  populations  on  the  basis  of  relative  extremes 
of  need.  Averting  so  painful  a  decision  rests  not  with  the  United  States 


alone  but  with  all  potentially  food-deficient  countries  as  well.  But  if 
effective  means  of  cooperation  in  development  are  not  achieved,  the 
ultimate  decision  will  rest  inescapably  with  the  leadership  of  the  most 
productive  country,  the  United  States. 


The  status  of  the  three-fifths  of  the  globe  covered  by  oceans  was  in 
question  in  the  mid-1970s.  Squabbles  over  fishing  rights  and  seaward 
extent  of  national  sovereignty  were  frequent.  U.S.  entrepreneurs 
impatiently  waited  for  some  sort  of  legal  determination  of  seabed 
sovereignty  and  property  rights  in  order  to  exploit  emerging  tech- 
nologies for  securing  the  petroleum  and  metallic  wealth  of  this  remain- 
ing frontier.  Naval  use  of  the  international  medium  of  the  oceans 
remained  a  plausible  exercise  of  national  power,  but  question  was 
being  raised  as  to  U.S.  supremacy  at  sea,  once  taken  for  granted  and 
now  seriously  challenged.  Environmentalists  were  vocal  in  denuncia- 
tion of  Japanese  and  Soviet  overfishing  of  the  dwindling  population  of 
whales  and  of  the  pollution  of  the  oceans  by  oil  spills  and  chemical 
effluents.  Failure  of  the  maritime  nations  to  agree  on  a  new  law  of 
the  sea  in  pending  negotiations  threatened  to  leave  the  ocean  commons 
in  a  state  of  anarchy,  instead  of  leading  to  a  system  of  cooperation  to 
maximize  the  management  of  the  oceans  as  a  sustained  source  of  food 
and  mineral  wealth. 

Resource  Allocation 

Consumption  of  minerals  and  fossil  fuels  is  proportional  to  the 
level  of  economic  development  of  nations,  and  levels  of  development 
differ  greatly.  Production  of  minerals  and  fossil  fuels  is  related  to  their 
occurrence  in  the  earth,  and  they  are  unevenly  distributed  among 
nations.  Since  extractive  industries  are  first  to  be  attempted  by 
developing  nations,  the  effect  is  that  of  a  flow  of  materials  from  the 
poor  countries  to  the  rich,  and  a  flow  of  processed  goods  from  the 
rich  countries  to  the  poor.  Efforts  by  poor  countries  to  correct  these 
evidently  disadvantageous  terms  of  trade  have  brought  controversy 
into  the  United  Nations  and  other  forums.  For  all  poor  countries  to 
reach  the  levels  of  materials  consumption  already  achieved  by  the 
developed  countries  would  far  exceed  the  available  reserves  of  the 
earth.  Demands  by  the  poor  countries  for  a  larger  share  of  the  benefits 
of  the  wealth  from  their  mines  and  oil  fields  signal  the  need  for  eventual 
agreement  among  nations  as  to  an  equitable  allocation  of  these 
resources.  The  wealth  of  developed  countries  is  in  the  form  of  tech- 
nology, management,  a  built  industrial  plant,  and  investment 
capital.  It  remains  to  be  determined  how  much  of  a  transfer  of  the 
technical  resources  of  the  rich  nations  to  the  poor  will  be  acceptable, 
and  how  large  a  share  of  raw  materials  the  poor  nations  will  insist 
on  retaining.  Clearly,  the  developed  nations  will  need  to  practice  a 
greater  conservation  of  imported  resources  and  the  developing  coun- 
tries will  need  to  moderate  their  expectations  of  equaling  the  con- 
sumption levels  achieved  by  the  rich.  There  is  simply  not  enough  to 
go  around.  But  by  the  mid-1970s,  these  constraints  were  insufficiently 
appreciated  in  either  the  rich  or  the  poor  countries.  An  attempt  to 
ascertain  the  limits  to  growth,  though  usefully  signaling  an  alert,  had 
foundered  on  dubious  assumptions  while  neglecting  the  practical 
question  of  how  high  a  standard  of  consumption  was  achievable 
over  the  entire  globe  with  its  inexorably  increasing  population. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-5 


Multinational  Corporations 

In  response  to  efforts  by  many  foreign  nations  to  protect  their 
own  balances  of  international  exchange  by  restricting  the  penetration 
of  foreign  corporations,  a  form  of  international  commercial  institution 
has  rapidly  proliferated.  This  form,  the  multinational  corporation 
or  MNC,  is  designed  to  accomplish  the  age-old  dream  of  the  economist : 
to  minimize  the  economic  significance  of  national  boundaries.  It 
does  help  to  alleviate  once-potent  economic  causes  of  international 
disputes,  and  it  can  be  an  effective  agent  of  technology  transfer, 
but  it  also  generates  new  causes  of  conflict  and  frustration.  Charac- 
teristically, the  MNC  moves  capital,  materials,  credit,  managerial 
expertise,  technological  skills,  intellectual  property,  and  even  trained 
labor  from  country  to  country  in  order  to  maximize  its  total  overall 
and  long-term  profit.  In  the  process  it  erodes  the  national  sovereignty 
of  host  countries,  diverts  capital  and  labor  from  nationally  planned 
economic  allocations,  and  competes  for  economic  and  even  political 
power,  while  preserving  its  own  economic  and  technological  power 
base  remote  from  the  countries  it  penetrates.  At  the  same  time, 
because  of  the  complex  and  farflung  nature  of  its  operations,  it  tends 
to  elude  controls  which  the  base  country  seeks  to  impose,  or  even  at 
times  to  outpace  the  base  country's  perception  that  certain  controls 
may  be  needed  in  its  own  national  interest.  In  so  doing  it  tends  to 
neglect  political,  social,  and  institutional  costs  of  its  operations. 

As  an  institution  the  MNC  offers  the  capability  of  influencing  con- 
structively the  evolution  of  a  stable  world  economy  and  the  develop- 
ment of  lagging  economies.  But  as  the  MNC  currently  operate-,  it 
excites  resentment  among  U.S.  labor  unions  as  an  instrument  to 
cause  unemployment  at  home;  it  excites  resentment  in  developed 
countries  by  superimposing  foreign  management  over  domestic 
labor;  and  it  excites  resentment  in  developing  countries  by  co-opting 
labor  and  resources  to  feed  into  technologies  which  are  often  inap- 
propriate to,  and  tend  to  distort,  the  development  process  in  those 


The  disintegration  of  10th  century  colonial  empires  has  resulted  in  a 
large  increase  (to  L59  as  of  mid-1977)  in  the  number  of  separate 
sovereign  slate-,  each  groping  toward  independence,  governance,  self- 
determination  of  national  policy,  and  coherence.  Some  of  these  states 
have  discovered  the  ancient  formula  whereby  nationalism,  in  term-  of  a 
contrived  hostility  toward  their  own  neighbors,  toward  other  groupings 
of  states,  or  toward  one  or  another  of  the  great  powers,  can  serve  to 
unify  and  promote  coherence  of  their  own  political  structures.  At  the 
same  time,  claims  turn  into  "rights"  and  exchanges  of  values  become 
"exploitation,"  creating  an  attitude  of  manifesl  destiny  of  the  poor. 

I  rnited  Nations 

Bom  in  an  epoch  of  hope  for  a  cooperative  world  of  peaceful  tuitions, 
the  United  Nations  has  degenerated  into  a  cockpil  of  parochial  squab- 
bles. Since  the  penalty  for  intransigence  in  the  United  Nations  is 
inconsequential,  the  motive  for  compromise  has  disappeared  and  deci- 
sions without  practical  effect  are  arrived  at  in  the  U.N.  General 
Assembly  by  counting  the  votes  of  the  ministates.  Effectiveness  of  the 
U.N.  Security  Council  is  largely  nullified  by  exercise  of  the  veto  power 
by  the  leading  permanent  members.  Constructive  programs  of  the 


World  Bank  and  the  World  Health  Organization  offer  a  glimmer  of 
hope  but  the  intransigence  evident  in  the  General  Assembly  has  found 
its  counterpart  in  UNESCO  and  ILO.  By  the  mid-1970s,  respect  for  the 
United  Nations  in  the  United  States  had  been  seriously  impaired  and 
the  cost  benefit  of  the  association  of  nations  was  widely  qtiestioned. 
The  very  substantial  contributions  of  the  U.N.  system  were  largely 
unseen  while  its  futilities  were  highly  visible.  Whether  public  opinion 
would  be  content  to  tolerate  this  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs  long 
enough  to  evolve  a  more  workable  and  useful  U.N.  structure  remained 
to  be  seen. 


A  basic  building  block  available  to  U.S.  diplomacy  in  the  balancing 
of  cooperation  and  conflict  is  the  circumstance  that  many  contiguous 
nations  share  common  geographic  and  economic  problems  and  oppor- 
tunities. Many  such  multinational  regions  exist  throughout  the  world 
but  their  effect  on  the  nations  that  share  them  varies  widely.  Some,  like 
the  Scandinavian  countries,  have  established  cooperative  relations; 
others,  like  the  nations  of  former  French  Indochina,  have  a  long  history 
of  strife;  some,  like  the  States  of  Central  America,  are  groping  toward 
cooperation;  and  some,  like  the  Middle  East,  are  fiercely  divided  by 
religion  and  ideology.  The  opportunity  for  economic  and  social  benefits 
to  such  regions  is  great  but  largely  wasted;  cooperative  planning, 
division  of  labor  in  the  development  and  testing  of  useful  technology, 
shared  infrastructures,  and  the  recognition  of  commonality  of  prob- 
lems, opportunities,  goals,  and  approaches,  are  all  available  as  elements 
to  reduce  the  economic  significance  of  national  boundaries.  Reasons 
for  the  neglect  of  this  opportunity  to  strengthen  international  amity  are 
easy  to  find,  but  the  want  of  effort  to  this  end  seems  hard  to  justify. 

Shrinking  World  Community 

Instant  global  communications,  verbal  and  visual,  bring  the  whole 
world  into  the  living  room.  A  terrorist  attack  in  the  Middle  East  or 
Northern  Ireland,  an  earthquake  in  Chile  or  Turkey,  an  election  in 
Australia  or  Portgual,  is  described  or  shown  minutes  later  everywhere 
else.  The  infinite  variety  of  events  inviting  global  attention  over- 
loads the  receptors  of  the  individual  and  the  time  or  space  of  the 
communicators.  Censorship  is  inherent,  not  only  for  reasons  of  na- 
tional policy  or  economic  advantage  but  because  limited  capacity 
compels  selection  according  to  some  policy  or  principle.  "Newsworthy" 
events — like  war  or  unrest  in  Morocco,  Angola,  Belize,  Ethiopia,  Por- 
tugal, Cyprus,  Lebanon,  or  elsewhere — are  reported  while  crop  statis- 
tics, new  schools,  technological  developments,  and  other  constructive 
events  are  ignored.  Even  so,  the  individual  is  told  more  than  he  can 
assimilate.  Excessive  demands  are  placed  on  his  enthusiasm  and  indig- 
nation. In  response,  the  individual  tends  to  dismiss  the  information 
flow  as  irrelevant  to  his  own  interests,  and  to  rely  on  the  "experts" 
to  deal  with  these  hopelessly  numerous  and  complex  matters.  Or  else,- 
in  support  of  his  own  tradition  or  esthetic  sense,  the  individual  may 
seize  on  some  one  conflict  as  his  own,  choosing  a  side  for  reasons  of 
moral  predilection  or  ethnic,  religious,  or  national  origin.  Even  so, 
the  average  American  in  1977  is  more  aware  of  the  world  outside  his 
own  country  than  ever  before  but  perhaps  more  depressed  by  what 
he  perceives. 


Global  Flows 

Information  on  current  events  is  only  one  of  many  kinds  of  flows 
that  cross  national  boundaries.  The  entire  globe  is  a  complex  network, 
bound  together  by  systems  of  transportation  and  communication  by 
land,  sea,  air,  and  electronic  linkages.  Almost  all  nations  contribute 
to  and  receive  these  flows,  and  the  traffic  along  the  various  media 
continues  to  grow.  The  flows  include  trained  persons  moving  to  new 
homes,  students  seeking  further  education,  tourists  learning  about 
the  world,  business  people  looking  for  opportunities  for  profit,  scien- 
tists seeking  to  exchange  knowledge,  and  diplomats  bent  on  facilitating 
the  conduct  of  international  relations.  Transactional  flows  also  take 
place,  in  the  form  of  credit,  materials  and  products,  ideological  views, 
information,  diplomatic  influence,  and  expressions  of  national  interests 
and  goals.  Still  other  flows,  ranging  from  highly  destructive  to  some- 
thing less  than  constructive,  take  the  form  of  terrorist  attacks,  dis- 
semination of  weaponry,  the  international  movement  of  dangerous, 
drugs,  the  spread  of  disease  epidemics,  hostile  signals  and  threats, 
guerrilla  and  "underground"  movements,  and  covert  operations. 
Encouragement  and  discouragement  of  various  of  these  flows  is  the 
business  of  every  government,  some  more  than  others.  Together  with 
the  responses  to  them  that  feed  back  to  the  original  source  country, 
these  flows  aggregate  into  what  is  called  "foreign  relations."  Since 
most  flows  are  on  the  increase,  it  can  be  said  that  foreign  relations 
are  progressively  intensifying  for  all  countries.  In  the  case  of  the 
United  States,  the  indices  of  size,  wealth,  economic  activity,  military 
strength,  and  other  measures  of  a  dynamic  society,  are  all  surpassingly 
high;  U.S.  foreign  relations  are  accordingly  more  intensive  and  com- 
plex than  those  of  any  other  country  in  the  world. 

However,  U.S.  institutional  mechanisms  to  manage,  plan  for,  or 
even  keep  track  of  these  increasing  flows  are  not  growing  correspond- 
ingly. This  fact  suggests  that  the  United  States  is  less  and  less  able 
to  administer  a  more  and  more  demanding  responsibility  for  foreign 
policy.  It  is  also  probable  that  the  same  deficiency  exists  in  other 
highly  dynamic  developed  countries. 


Rarely,  if  ever,  has  U.S.  foreign  policy  faced  so  many  fundamental 
changes — in  the  power  base  of  its  own  political  system,  in  the  com- 
plexities of  the  external  world,  and  in  the  challenges  and  obstacles  to 
be  met  in  furtherance  of  its  goals.  Disorientation  is  not  too  strong  a 
term  for  the  state  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  in  the  mid-1970s. 

The  Nation  has  recently  emerged  from  a  tragic,  divisive,  and  in  the 
minds  of  ninny  a  futile,  war.  National  attitudes  are  mixed  toward 
further  exercise  of  U.S.  power  and  influence  in  the  world,  even  to  the 
revival  of  the  isolationism  of  the  1930s.  Domestic  issues  are  most 
salient  :  worries  oxer  unemployment  and  inflation,  apprehension  over 
threatened  shortage  of  energy,  concern  for  the  deteriorating  environ- 

A  long  list  of  disrupt  ions  abroad  have  also  been  of  public  and  official 
concern:  the  festering  and  periodically  explosive  A.rab-Israeli  con- 
did,  the  revolt  of  the  Third  World  in  the  U.N.  General  Assembly. 
Third  "World  economic  challenges  to  prevailing  patterns  of  commerce, 
periodically  renewed  concern  over  the  global  increase  in  populations 


relative  to  global  food  supply,  assertions  of  nationalism  and  intran- 
sigence by  the  many  new  nations,  incidents  of  bombing  and  terrorism 
around  the  world,  hijackings  and  kidnapings,  urban  guerrilla  move- 
ments in  several  countries,  religious  conflict  in  Northern  Ireland  and 
communal  conflict  in  Cyprus  and  Lebanon,  power  shifts  or  active 
contests  at  many  points  in  Eurasia  and  Africa,  unease  over  prolifera- 
tion of  nuclear  weapons  and  the  stability  of  the  nuclear  deterrent, 
frustration  over  the  issue  of  seabed  sovereignty,  growing  awareness  of 
the  disintegration  of  the  world  monetary  structure  erected  after  World 
War  II  and  of  the  possibility  of  world  monetary  collapse,  and  a  general 
sense  that  national  goals  of  the  many  old  and  new  nations  of  the  world 
were  at  cross-purposes. 

The  want  of  coherence  and  shared  common  purpose  in  the  United 
Nations,  the  superpowers,  NATO,  and  other  groups  of  nations  that 
once  found  opportunities  for  cooperation  is  a  distressing  characteristic 
of  the  contemporary  world.  It  is  a  time  for  rebuilding  and  new  leader- 
ship toward  purposes  that  all  can  share.  That  is  the  prime  challenge 
of  American  diplomacy  in  the  final  quarter  of  the  20th  century. 


Chapter  3 — The  Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy 
Enters  the  Nuclear  Age 



I.  Introduction 57 

Definition  of  the  Problem  and  Scope  of  the  Study 57 

II.  A  Short  Chronology  of  Atomic  Control  Diplomacy  After  World  War  II  _  59 
Preliminary  Agreements  on  Nuclear  Sharing;  U.S.  Preparations 

To  Negotiate 59 

Impasse  of  Negotiations  in  the  United  Nations 60 

The  Historical  Context  of  the  Negotiations;  the  Turbulent  Post- 
war Years 60 

III.  The  Postwar  Paradox:  Cold  War  and  Internationalism 62 

Preparation  for  International  Control  Efforts 62 

Formulation  of  Atomic  Policy  in  the  United  States 63 

Domestic  Control 64 

Hasty  Demobilization  of  U.S.  Military  Forces 65 

Formulation  of  U.S.  Policy  on  International  Control 66 

Early  Efforts 66 

Preparations  for  Negotiations  in  the  UNAEC 68 

The  U.S.  Negotiator  and  Final  Steps  to  Define  Policy. _  69 

Abortive  Efforts  in  the  United  Nations  Toward  Control 71 

The  U.S.  Proposal 71 

The  Soviet  Proposal 72 

Debate  and  Impasse 73 

IV.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  Between  Diplomacy  and  Nuclear  Technology.  76 

Significance  of  Technological  Factors  for  U.S.  Policy 76 

The  Form  and  Purposes  of  International  Control 80 

Proposals  of  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  Report 80 

The  Board  of  Consultants'  Position  Against  Inspection.  80 
International  Ownership  and  Operation  of  Dangerous 

Activities.  _ 82 

Retention  of  "Safe"  National  Activities 84 

Inspection  Provisions  in  the  Report 85 

Reactions  Among  U.S.  Policymakers  to  the  Proposals  of  the 

Board  of  Consultants 8.6 

Trend  Toward  Control  in  U.S.  Policy 87 

U.N.  Stalemate  Over  Control  and  Inspection 88 

Soviet  Reaction  to  Proposed  Internationalization 88 

Action  by  the  UNAEC 89 

The  Issue  of  Stages  of  Transition  to  International  Control 93 

The  Political  Basis  for  Proceeding  by  Stages 94 

Insistence      by      Acheson      Committee      on      Step-by-Step 

Approach 95 

Origins  of  the  Discussion 95 

Final  Version — Some  Technological  Considerations 97 

Inconclusive  Treatment  of  the  Transition  Issue  by  UNAEC.  99 

The  Issue  of  Enforcement:  Sanctions  and  the  Veto 103 

Determining  U.S.  Policy  on  Sanctions 103 

U.S.  Policy  on  the  Veto:  Its  Relation  to  Enforcement 104 

Political  Unacceptability  of  Veto-Free  Control  in  the  Nego- 
tiations    107 

Recapitulation  of  the  Three  Issues  of  Atomic  Control 108 

V.  Some  Distinctive  Features  of  the  Negotiations 110 

Excessive  U.S.  Reliance  on  Technical  Control  Plan 110 

Lack  of  U.S.  Attention  to  Soviet  Requirements 111 

Soviet  Calculation  of  U.S.  Position 112 



V.  Some  Distintive  Features  of  the  Negotiations — Continued  PaK« 

One  Attempt  at  Technical-Diplomatic  Coordination 113 

Underlying  Misconceptions  in  U.S.  Policy 114 

VI.  Concluding  Observations 118 

Impact  of  New  Technologies  on  International  Relations 118 

The  Diplomatic  Task:  Combining  Effectiveness  and  Acceptability.  119 

U.S.  Attitudes  in  the  Conduct  of  the  Negotiations 122 


I.   Introduction 

This  study  is  concerned  with  the  first  international  negotiations  on 
the  control  of  atomic  energy,  during  the  years  immediately  following 
"World  War  II.  The  arrival  of  the  atom  bomb  was  a  technological 
event  of  unparalleled  significance  for  international  affairs.  The  ulti- 
mate meaning  of  the  bomb  itself,  as  distinct  from  the  possible  peaceful 
applications  of  atomic  energy,  was  that  it  raised  the  cost  of  general 
war  for  total  victory  to  an  unacceptable  level.  This  fact  radically 
altered  the  basis  for  the  positions  of  the  diplomats  at  the  bargaining 
table,  and  brought  with  it  the  problem  of  how  to  evaluate  and  to  com- 
municate the  significance  of  the  new  development.  At  the  same  time, 
a  changed  pattern  of  relations  among  nations  had  emerged  as  a  result 
of  the  worldwide  upheaval  of  World  War  II.  Participants  in  this  new 
configuration  of  power  faced  the  unique  technological  and  diplomatic 
situation  created  by  atomic  energy. 

Technological  advances  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  added  a  new 
dimension  and  a  new  vocabulary  to  world  affairs  through  such  con- 
cepts as  mutual  deterrence  and  preemptive  strikes.  The  dynamics  of  a 
nuclear  arms  race  were  dimly  perceived  at  the  outset  of  the  nuclear 
age;  even  so,  it  is  not  clear  that  awareness  of  this  potential  would 
have  prevented  its  development.  In  retrospect,  it  is  understandable 
how  the  atom  bomb,  a  product  of  science  and  technology  and  a  tool  of 
diplomacy,  prompted  a  world  drive  for  control. 

More  important  to  this  study  is  the  fact  of  failure  in  the  initial 
efforts  of  this  drive.  Despite  the  strong  impetus  for  diplomatic  initia- 
tive in  response  to  a  great  technological  achievement,  the  negotiations 
got  nowhere  then  and  have  made  little  progress  since.  A  principal  aim 
of  the  study  is  to  examine  the  causes  of  this  costly  failure  in  order  to 
provide  insights  into  the  interactions  among  science,  technology,  and 
diplomacy  when  they  are  confronted  with  a  technological  development 
of  the  first  magnitude — in  this  case,  one  with  urgent  implications  for 
the  future  of  all  mankind. 

Definition  of  the  Problem  and  Scope  of  the  Study 

Because  these  early  efforts  to  control  nuclear  weapons  occurred  more 
than  25  years  ago,  much  historical  discussion  has  accumulated  in  pub- 
lished sources.  In  light  of  this  fact  and  considering  the  purpose  of  this 
series  of  reports,  the  study  will  not  duplicate  the  history  of  these  early 
international  negotiations.  Rather,  it  will  focus  on  issues  associated 
with  the  interaction  of  science,  technology,  and  diplomacy. 

The  advent  of  the  atomic  weapon  in  1945  represented  a  unique  tech- 
nological advancement:  applications  of  the  newly  acquired  knowledge 
regarding  atomic  energy  could  serve  either  constructive  or  destructive 
purposes.  This  factor,  combined  with  the  immediate  recognition  of 
atomic  energy  development  as  a  great  step  forward  in  man's  inquiry 
into  scientific  knowledge,  signified  that  such  development  had  political 
implications  of  global  proportions.  Further  recognition  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  technological  development  of  atomic  energy  for  U.S. 

Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1972  by  Leneice  N.  Wu.  , 



foreign  policy  was  inevitable.  Its  significance  was  enhanced  by  the 
fact  that  the  first  demonstration  of  the  technology  was  its  use  as  a 
weapon  in  actual  warfare.  Considering  the  decisive  role  which  the 
atomic  weapon  played  in  ending  the  war  with  Japan,  its  use  gave  rise 
to  a  number  of  questions  for  the  United  States  on  both  the  international 
and  national  levels. 

On  the  international  level,  the  nations  of  the  world  recognized  a 
need  to  prevent  proliferation  of  atomic  energy  weapons  technology 
and  capabilities.  Questions  were  raised  in  official  quarters  both  at  home 
and  abroad  with  regard  to  the  intentions  of  the  United  States,  as  sole 
owner  of  atomic  weapons,  and  how  this  fact  would  affect  its  relations 
with  the  rest  of  the  world.  Officials  in  the  U.S.  Government  perceived 
the  urgency  of  devising  a  policy  regarding  the  U.S.  contribution  to  an 
international  arrangement  for  the  control  of  atomic  energy  to  pre- 
vent its  employment  for  weapons  purposes,  and  also  perceived  the  need 
for  monitoring  by  some  international  means  the  country-by-count  re- 
development of  atomic  energy. 

The  new  nuclear  science  and  its  early  technology  also  offered  the 
potential  for  development  of  atomic  energy  to  serve  beneficial  pur- 
poses, national  and  international.  Traditionally,  scientific  advance- 
ments are  shared  readily  within  the  scientific  community  without  re- 
gard to  national  boundaries.  However,  the  military  implications  of 
atomic  energy  generated  pressures  to  prevent  traditional  free  com- 
munication in  this  instance.1 

Moreover,  concern  for  the  military  applications  of  atomic  energy 
necessarily  overrode  attention  to  peaceful  uses.  In  turn,  these  military 
security  factors  presented  obstacles  and  limitations  for  the  hoped-for 
international  cooperation  in  developing  peaceful  uses,  for  the  formu- 
lation of  a  U.S.  policy  regarding  its  role  in  international  cooperation, 
and  for  a  program  within  the  United  States  itself  to  pursue  peaceful 

What  challenges  did  the  innovation  of  the  atom  bomb  present  to 
traditional  concepts  of  diplomacy  ?  Did  the  policymakers  in  the  United 
States  or  the  diplomats  of  the  negotiations  meet  them  ?  Were  the  scien- 
tific and  technological  factors  of  the  situation  used  to  support  or  to 
correct  established  principles  of  U.S.  foreign  policy?  What  steps  were 
taken  by  diplomats  and  scientists  to  understand  each  other's  points  of 
view  ?  Were  they  successful  ?  How  did  they  fail? 

These  are  a  few  of  the  salient  questions  to  which  this  study  is  ad- 
dressed. The  following  discussion  offers  a  brief  historical  overview 
mikI  an  explanation  of  the  political,  military,  and  technical  factors  of 
(he  atmosphere  in  which  the  negotiations  took  place.  During  the  nu- 
clear policymaking  process  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  interna- 
tional negotiations,  certain  issues  arose  which  are  pertinent  to  this 
series  of  studies  on  science,  technology,  and  American  diplomacy.  The 
study  examines  the  development  of  these  issues  from  (he  I'.S.  policy 
deliberations  through  their  outcome  in  the  negotiations.  Finally,  it 
discusses  a  number  of  prominent  features  in  the  negotiations  and  sets 
forth  some  general  concluding  observations. 

1  It  was  the  early  nuclear  scientists  themselves  who  adopted  a  policy  of  secrecy  In  the 
United  States,  well  before  the  start  of  the  Manhattan  Project,  the  wartime  Rovernment 
effort  which  developed  the  atom  bomb. 

II.  A  Short  Chronology  or  Atomic  Control  Diplomacy  After 

World  War  II 

A  chronological  summary  of  the  sequence  of  early  developments 
aiming  toward  international  controls  may  be  helpful  in.  setting  the 
stage  for  consideration  of  the  international  negotiations  and  why  they 

Deliberations  on  U.S.  policy  in  light  of  the  development  of  the  atom 
bomb  had  been  initiated  as  early  as  May  1945,  when  Henry  L.  Stimson, 
the  Secretary  of  War,  led  a  committee  which  reported  to  President 
Truman  on  the  subject.  Shortly  thereafter,  in  June,  the  stage  was  set 
for  the  machinery  to  handle  the  international  negotiations  on  the  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy,  with  the  signing  of  the  United  Nations  Charter. 
Two  months  later  the  weapon  was  actually  used  on  Hiroshima  on 
August  6,  1945. 

Once  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  destructive  purposes  had  been 
demonstrated,  the  Administration  took  action  to  publicize  as  much  in- 
formation as  was  judged  appropriate  to  contribute  to  public  under- 
standing of  the  weapon  and  its  significance  for  the  United  States.  An 
important  step  in  this  direction  was  the  publication  in  August  1945  of 
the  Smyth  report,2  which  explained  the  basic  scientific  information  on 
the  bomb  but  kept  its  disclosures  within  the  limits  defined  by  security 
considerations.  President  Truman  took  initial  steps  to  enunciate  U.S. 
atomic  energy  policy  at  both  the  national  and  international  levels  in 
two  major  addresses  in  October  1945. 3 

Preliminary  Agreements  on  Nuclear  Sharing;  U.S.  Preparations  To 

Public  attention  shifted  to  international  activity  during  the  closing- 
months  of  1945.  On  November  15,  an  agreement  was  concluded  by  the 
United  States,  Canada,  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Called  the  "Three 
Nation  Agreed  Declaration,"  this  agreement  laid  a  foundation  for  in- 
ternational action  to  control  atomic  energy.  The  Soviet  Union  was  in- 
cluded in  this  endeavor  when  the  Moscow  Declaration  was  signed  the 
following  month,  as  a  result  of  meetings  of  representatives  of  the 
Governments  of  the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia.  In  the 
United  States,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  Dean  Acheson  had  been 
appointed  earlier  in  December  to  head  a  committee  to  report  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  on  U.S.  policy  for  the  international  control  of 
atomic  energy. 

In  January  1946,  the  newly  formed  United  Nations  created  an  orga- 
nization to  deal  with  the  specific  problem  of  controlling  atomic  energy 
when  it  drew  up  the  terms  of  reference  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic 

2  Henry  D.  Smyth.  A  General  Account  of  the  Development  of  Methods  of  Using  Atomic 
Energy  for  Military  Purposes  Vnder  the  Auspices  of  the  U.S.  Government,  1940—^5. 
(Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1945.) 

3  President  Truman  delivered  a  message  to  Congress  on  atomic  energy  on  Oct.  3,  1945, 
and  elaborated  on  U.S.  atomic  energy  policy  in  his  Navy  Day  address  on  October  27,  in 
New  York.  Complete  texts  of  both  can  be  found  in  Public  Papers  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  1945.  (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1961). 
pp.  362-366,  431-438. 



Energy  Commission  (UNAEC).  At  the  same  time,  the  deliberations 
of  Acheson's  group  were  getting  underway  as  an  additional  group  of 
policymakers,  largely  from  the  scientific  community,  provided  the 
technical  advice  necessary  to  an  understanding  of  the  problem  and 
to  formulating  an  appropriate  policy.  This  group,  known  as  the  Board 
of  Consultants,  was  led  by  David  Lilienthal,  Chairman  of  the  Tennes- 
see Valley  Authority. 

The  findings  of  these  two  groups,  known  as  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
report,4  were  released  in  March  1946.  In  the  same  month,  Bernard 
M.  Baruch  was  appointed  by  President  Truman  to  speak  for  the 
United  States  in  the  UNAEC.  Combining  his  own  views  on  interna- 
tional control  of  atomic  energy  with  the  proposals  set  down  in  the 
Acheson-Lilienthal  report,  Baruch  presented  the  U.S.  proposal,  which 
became  known  as  the  Baruch  plan,  at  the  opening  session  of  the 
UNAEC  on  June  14, 1946. 

Impasse  of  Negotiations  in  the  United  Nations 

Opening  proposals  of  the  Soviet  Union  were  presented  to  the 
UNAEC  on  June  19.  The  extensive  differences  between  the  policies 
of  the  two  countries  were  to  undergo  few  modifications  during  the 
negotiations  to  follow.  Once  the  initial  proposals  of  the  major  powers 
had  been  made,  procedural  arrangements  of  the  UNAEC  were  devised 
and  implemented.  An  important  group  was  the  Scientific  and  Tech- 
nical Committee,  which  examined  the  technical  feasibility  of  con- 
trol. The  report  of  this  group  was  issued  to  a  major  organ  of  the 
UNAEC,  called  Committee  Two,  in  October  1946.  Following  discus- 
sions by  this  latter  body,  a  report  of  the  whole  UNAEC  was  made 
to  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  on  December  31,  1947. 

The  Security  Council  did  not  resolve  the  questions  raised  by  the  first 
report  of  the  UNAEC  on  international  control  of  atomic  energy,  and 
referred  the  problem  back  to  the  UNAEC  in  March  1947.  The  second 
session  of  that  body  had  been  underway  since  January  1  and  continued 
until  September  1947,  when  a  second  report  was  issued  to  the  Security 
Council.  Again,  decisive  action  was  not  forthcoming  from  the  Security 
Council,  and  further  deliberations  were  carried  on  by  the  UNAEC, 
which  issued  its  third  and  final  report  on  May  7,  1948.  This  document 
recorded  the  admission  by  the  negotiators  that  their  deliberations  had 
reached  a  stalemate.  The  General  Assembly  pressed  for  continuation 
of  the  discussions,  but  they  were  finally  suspended  in  November  1949. 
In  the  meantime,  an  important  event  substantially  altered  the  char- 
acter and  outlook  of  the  negotiations  and  added  to  the  existing  diffi- 
culties of  an  extremely  complex  international  problem.  This  event  was 
the  explosion  by  the  Soviet  Union  on  September  v2.">.  L949,  of  its  own 
nuclear  device. 
The  Historical  Context  of  the  Negotiations;  the  Turbulent  Postwar 


The  events  reviewed  in  this  study  occurred  during  a  turbulent    I 

years  during   which   the  great    powers  and   the   lesser  powers  moved 

to  establish  post  war  mechanisms  and  configural  ions  of  power,  security. 

and  influence.  The  splitting  of  Europe  occurred  ns  Bulgaria  (Septem- 

u IS  Department  of  State  t  Report  on  the  International  Control  of  Atomic  Energy, 
Publication  No.  2498  (Washington,  D.C  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1040),  re- 
ferred to  as  the  "Acheson  Lilienthal  Report." 


ber  1946),  Czechoslovakia  (June  1948),  Hungary  (August  1949),  and 
East  Germany  (October  1949)  became  Communist  People's  Republics. 
The  Greek  civil  war  raged  through  the  early  postwar  years;  the 
Truman  doctrine  and  Marshall  plan  proposals  came  in  March  and 
June  1947 ;  the  Berlin  blockade  and  airlift  began  in  mid-1948 ;  and  the 
NATO  Treaty  was  signed  in  April  1949. 

The  Far  Eastern  world  was  no  less  in  flux.  Indochina  and  Indo- 
nesian anticolonial  wars  were  in  progress  by  1946.  The  Philippines, 
India,  and  Pakistan  attained  independence  in  1946  and  1947.  U.S. 
dominance  in  the  Pacific  was  consolidated  from  Hawaii  to  occupied 
Japan.  And  the  Chinese  civil  war  ended  in  1949  with  Communist 
ascendency  over  the  mainland. 

The  rapidly  changing  system  of  international  power  relationships 
and  national  interests  in  the  postwar  world  made  more  difficult  the 
analysis  of  policy  alternatives  in  the  national  and  international  con- 
trol of  the  atom.  Viewed  as  the  most  commanding  source  of  military 
power  in  the  postwar  world,  the  atomic  weapon  altered  the  world 
power  structure  immeasurably,  and  the  United  States  tried  to  use  the 
fact  of  its  possession  as  a  surrogate  for  great  troop  strength.  But  its 
very  potency  made  it  an  unusable  weapon  in  influencing  the  shifts  of 
power  alignment  during  these  years.  Meanwhile,  the  Soviet  Union 
sought  to  blunt  the  bomb's  influence  in  diplomacy  while  striving 
vigorously  to  secure  its  own  nuclear  capability.  Taking  into  considera- 
tion all  these  parallel  developments,  it  is  clear  why  the  negotiations  to 
bring  the  new  force  under  international  control  yielded  no  useful 
diplomatic  product. 

III.  The  Postwar  Paradox  :  Cold  War  and  Internationalism 

The  historical  setting  for  U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  aimed  at  the  inter- 
national control  of  atomic  energy  contained  two  opposite  and  irrecon- 
cilable trends.  On  the  one  hand,  the  end  of  World  War  II  had  wit- 
nessed the  emergence  of  two  great  powers,  the  United  States  and  the 
Soviet  Union,  whose  basic  ideologies  were  intrinsically  at  odds  with 
one  another.  The  early  years  of  the  postwar  period  when  the  Baruch 
plan  was  being  negotiated  were  to  reveal  a  growing  antagonism  in 
United  States-Soviet  relations  which  was  to  become  known  as  the  cold 
war.  On  the  other  hand,  there  also  emerged  a  widespread  attitude  of 
international  cooperation  in  world  affairs,  as,  in  June  1945,  the  diverse' 
powers  attempted  to  establish  a  framework  for  peace  through  the 
United  Nations,  an  organization  which  was  to  receive  a  serious  chal- 
lenge in  its  attempts  to  establish  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 
And  despite  the  increasing  awareness  of  the  widening  breach  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  efforts  were  made  to  achieve 
some  measure  of  cooperation  between  the  two  countries,  e.g.,  the  post- 
war conferences  of  ministers. 

Preparation  for  International  Control  Efforts 

On  the  international  level,  a  major  concern  was  the  control  of  atomic 
energy,  both  as  a  means  of  destruction  and  as  a  new  power  which 
could  benefit  mankind,  and  the  nations  of  the  world  acted  to  set  up 
international  machinery  to  cope  with  this  problem.  The  first  step  was 
an  agreement  among  those  powers  which  had  been  involved  in  the 
development  of  atomic  energy  during  the  war,  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  and  Canada.  Meetings  were  held  in  Washington  among 
President  Hairy  S.  Truman,  British  Prime  Minister  Clement  Attlee, 
and  Canadian  Prime  Minister  W.  L.  Mackenzie  King;  as  noted  above, 
the  resulting  agreement  of  November  15,  1945  is  known  as  the  Three 
Nation  Agreed  Declaration.  In  it,  the  three  countries  declared  their 
intention  to  share  with  all  nations  the  scientific  information  associated 
with  atomic  energy  for  peaceful  purposes.  However,  the  Declaration 
acknowledged  the  dilemma  posed  by  the  practical  applications  of 
atomic  energy,  in  that  much  of  the  information  necessary  to  carry  out 
the  industrial  applications  was  virtually  the  same  as  that  needed  for 
weapons  production.  It  was  agreed,  therefore,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
withhold  this  information  until  appropriate  safeguards  could  be  es- 
tablished to  insure  that  it  would  be  used  only  for  peaceful  purposes. 
To  this  end,  the  three  heads  of  state  suggested  that  the  United  Nations 
Organization  set  up  a  Commission  which  would  make  recommendations 
on  the  question  of  international  control  to  the  United  Nations.5 

Russian  agreement  to  the  principles  of  the  Three  Nation  Agreed 
I  teclaration  was  obtained  the  next  month,  at  the  Conference  of  Minis- 
ters in  Moscow,  and  was  made  public  on  December  27  in  the  Moscow 

'For  a  complete  text  of  the  Three  Nation  Agreed  Declaration,  sre  U.S.  Department 
of  State  The  international  Control  of  Atomic  Energy,  drouth  of  a  Policy,  Publication 
•J702    (Washington,    D.C. :    U.S.    Government    Printing  office,    1946),    pp.    118-120. 



Declaration,  a  Soviet-Anglo-American  statement.  In  addition  to  sup- 
porting the  idea  of  establishing  a  Commission  in  the  United  Nations, 
the  Moscow  Declaration  contained  the  text  of  a  proposed  resolution 
to  establish  the  organization,  and  invited  Fiance,  China,  and  Canada 
to  cosponsor  it  at  the  first  session  of  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  in 
January  1946.°  The  text  of  the  Moscow  Declaration  was  incorporated 
unchanged  in  a  resolution  which  was  passed  by  the  General  Assembly 
without  a  dissenting  vote  on  January  24,  1946,  and  which  thereby  es- 
tablished the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission  (UNAEC) . 
Under  the  terms  of  the  resolution,  the  UNAEC  was  to  operate 
closely  within  the  framework  of  the  Security  Council,  with  its  provi- 
sion for  the  veto  power,  a  fact  with  significance  for  subsequent  nego- 
tiations on  the  control  of  atomic  energy.  The  Commission  was  to  be 
composed  of  one  representative  of  each  country  on  the  Security  Coun- 
cil and  receive  directions  from  the  Council  "in  matters  affecting  secu- 
rity." The  resolution  added,  "On  these  matters,  the  Commission  shall 
be  accountable  for  its  work  to  the  Security  Council,"  a  provision  which 
was  included  as  a  result  of  the  initiative  of  the  Soviet  Union  at  the 
Moscow  Conference.  The  rationale  behind  this  approach  rested  on  the 
assertion  that  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  control  question  was 
the  assurance  of  security.  Even  at  this  early  stage,  the  concern  over 
the  military  applications  of  atomic  energy  dominated  the  discussions, 
diverting  attention  from  ways  to  share  knowledge  necessary  in  the 
economic  or  industrial  applications  of  atomic  energy.7  The  resolution 
also  set  down  the  terms  of  reference  for  the  Commission's  proposals 
as  follows : 

(a)  For  extending  between  all  nations  the  exchange  of 
basic  scientific  information  for  peaceful  ends; 

(b)  For  control  of  atomic  energy  to  the  extent  necessary 
to  ensure  its  use  only  for  peaceful  purposes ; 

(c)  For  the  elimination  from  national  armaments  of 
atomic  weapons  and  of  all  other  major  weapons  adaptable 
to  mass  destruction ;  and 

(d)  For  effective  safeguards  by  way  of  inspection  and 
other  means  to  protect  complying  States  against  the  hazards 
of  violations  and  evasion.8 

Formulation  of  Atomic  Policy  in  the  United  States 

The  commanding  position  of  the  United  States  as  a  world  power 
resulting  from  its  role  in  World  War  II  and  in  helping  to  shape  the 
postwar  world  led  to  an  unprecedented  involvement  in  international 
relations.  As  the  nation  in  sole  possession  of  atomic  weapons,  the 
United  States  bore  an  added  responsibility  to  seek  international  con- 
trol over  this  new  and  terrible  form  of  destruction. 

Not  onlv  was  it  necessary  to  define  national  policv  on  international 
control,  but  it  was  also  important  to  determine  an  appropriate  means 
of  domestic  control,  a  responsibility  which  had  been  given  to  the  Army 

6  See  Ibid.  pn.  125-127  for  the  text  of  the  Moscow  Declaration. 

7  Joseph  I.  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  The  Struggle  to  Control  Atomic 
Weapons,  191,5-1,9  (Boston,  Mass.  :  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1970),  p.  213. 

8  "Establishment  of  a  Commission  to  Deal  With  The  Problems  Raised  by  the  Discovery 
of  Atomic  Energy,"  United  Nations  General  Assembly  Resolution  I,  Resolutions  Adopted  b?/ 
the  General  Assembly  During  the  First  Part  of  Its  First  Session  from  10  January  to  11, 
February  191,6,  United  Nations  Document  A/64  (London,  England:  Church  House,  1946), 
p.  9. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-6 


during  the  war.  National  control  of  weapons  production  and  disclos- 
ure of  information  necessary  for  this  purpose  posed  controversy.  In 
addition,  consideration  was  given  to  the  role  of  U.S.  domestic  control 
in  relation  to  international  negotiations  and  control. 


The  congressional  controversy  over  domestic  control  of  atomic  en- 
ergy occurred  during  the  early  stages  of  formulation  of  U.S.  policy 
on  international  control  and  during  the  first  months  of  the  negotia- 
tions in  the  United  Nations.  A  prominent  issue  in  the  vigorous  public 
debate  concerned  the  extent  of  the  military  role  in  U.S.  atomic  energy 
programs.  Proposals  ranged  from  a  military-dominated  commission 
responsible  for  U.S.  development  of  atomic  energy  to  complete  ex- 
clusion of  the  military.  Equally  difficult  was  the  issue  of  the  kind  of 
control  to  be  placed  on  the  release  of  information  on  industrial  appli- 
cations, that  is,  data  which  could  apply  to  weapons  production  as  well, 
without  obstructing  the  exchange  of  information  within  the  scien- 
tific community  necessary  to  foster  maximum  development  of  atomic 

The  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946,  approved  July  26,  provided  for  a 
full-time  civilian  Atomic  Energy  Commission  whose  members  were 
to  be  appointed  by  the  President  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.  It  also  established  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
of  the  Congress  to  oversee  atomic  energy  matters.  Provision  was  made 
for  consultations  with  and  recommendations  from  a  Military  Liaison 
Committee  on  "'matters  relating  to  military  applications,"9  but  final 
decisions  were  left  to  the  civilian  Commission.  As  far  as  dissemina- 
tion of  information  was  concerned,  the  law  set  up  a  category  called 
"restricted  data,""  which  included  primarily  data  associated  with 
atomic  weapons  and  fissionable  materials.  The  law  then  set  down  the 
nature  of  the  punishments  to  be  used  against  those  convicted  of  trans- 
mitting restricted  data  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  the  United  States 
or  for  granting  an  advantage  to  a  foreign  country.  Exchange  of  in- 
formation with  foreign  countries  on  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  in- 
dustrial purposes  was  forbidden  until  Congress  declared  "by  joint 
resolution  that  effective  and  enforceable  international  safeguards 
against  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  destructive  purposes  have  been 

One  section  of  the  law  was  devoted  to  the  relationship  between  do- 
mestic control  and  any  international  control  arrangements  which 
might  be  concluded.  The  law  defined  "international  arrangement"  as 
a  t  reaty  approved  by  t  he  Senate  or  ( )ongress,  and  recognized  the  possi- 
bility t  hat  portions  of  the  U.S.  law  might  be  inconsistent  with  such  an 
arrangement.  If  this  should  be  the  case,  according  to  the  law,  the  pro- 
visions of  the  international  arrangement  would  take  precedence  as 
long  as  the  agreement  was  in  force.  Moreover,  tin-  Commission  was  to 
"give  maximum  effect  to  the  policies  contained  in  any  such  interna- 
t  ional  arrangement."  " 

The  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  may  have  had  some  effect  on  foreign 
perceptions  of  ih<>  U.S.  position  in  the  negotiations  on  international 

"  Sec.  •_'(<■).  nil  Stat.  757. 

"■  Sec    10(a)(1).  «;<>  stat.  7<;<; 

"  Soc  8(C),  00  Stat.  765 


control.  For  example,  an  argument  in  the  United  States  which  favored 
complete  civilian  control  had  been  the  assertion  that  a  military-con- 
trolled program  might  convey  the  impression  that  the  general  purpose 
of  U.S.  atomic  energy  programs  was  oriented  toward  weapons  pro- 
duction, thereby  presenting  an  unfavorable  prospect  for  U.S.  willing- 
ness to  seek  or  accept  international  control.  As  the  bill  was  finally 
passed  by  the  Congress,  the  emphasis  on  civilian  control  may  have 
helped  avoid  such  an  impression.  Moreover,  the  law  marked  an  un- 
precedented intrusion  of  the  Federal  Government  into  private  enter- 
prise through  its  provisions  for  Government  ownership  and  control 
over  fissionable  materials  and  provisions  for  various  licensing  powers 
with  respect  to  facilities  and  activities.  Thus,  by  these  provisions  the 
Congress  demonstrated  its  awareness  of  the  unprecedented  importance 
and  dangers  of  the  development  of  atomic  energy.  The  section  on 
international  control  may  have  served  to  show  a  positive  U.S.  view 
toward  international  control  and  preparedness  to  implement  it. 

However,  the  considerable  precautions  which  were  taken  regarding 
release  of  information  may  have  served  to  reflect  a  U.S.  desire  to  retain 
its  atomic  monopoly.  Although  these  precautions  were  also  based  on 
U.S.  security  considerations  and  on  U.S.  suspicions  of  how  other  coun- 
tries might  use  atomic  weapons  once  they  had  acquired  them,  nonethe- 
less, the  debate  on  this  issue  and  the  resulting  provisions  in  the  law  may 
have  inspired  doubts  in  other  countries  as  to  the  sincerity  of  U.S. 
pledges  to  relinquish  its  monopoly  to  an  appropriate  international  au- 
thority. In  any  case,  the  following  conclusion  of  a  State  Department 
publication  seems  applicable: 

The  evolution  of  a  policy  for  domestic  control  not  only  pro- 
vided parallels  for  the  problems  that  were  certain  to  be  met 
in  international  planning,  but  it  illustrated  as  no  other 
process  could  the  magnitude  and  complexity  of  the  task  that 
awaited  inter-Governmental  collaboration.12 


A  relevant  consideration  in  the  evolution  of  early  U.S.  policy  for 
the  atom  is  the  overall  state  of  the  U.S.  defense  posture  in  1945  and 
1946.13  With  the  advent  of  peace,  the  American  public  and  the  troops 
themselves  clamored  to  bring  the  armies  home,  on  the  grounds  that 
there  was  no  longer  a  need  to  maintain  the  wartime  level  of  military 
manpower.  Besides  being  influenced  by  the  euphoric  atmosphere 
brought  on  by  the  end  of  war,  many  people  looked  to  the  newly  de- 
veloped atomic  bomb  as  a  sufficient  source  of  military  strength.  A 
week  after  the  bomb  was  dropped  on  Hiroshima  in  August  1945. 
President  Truman  responded  to  public  and  congressional  pressure, 
and  announced  that  inductions  would  drop  from  80,000  to  50,000  per 
month  and  that  within  12  to  18  months,  5i/2  million  men  would  be 
released  from  the  service.  By  April  1946,  the  number  of  those  dis- 
charged from  the  Army  had  reached  nearly  7  million.  By  June  30, 
1946,  out  of  a  total  of  about  3  million  military  personnel  remaining  on 

12  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  21. 

"The  following  discussion  is  based  primarily  on  Lieberman.  The  Scorpion  and  the 
Tarantula,  pp.  227-234. 


active  duty  in  all  of  the  U.S.  armed  services  combined,  approximately 
1.4  million  were  in  the  Army.14 

Many  U.S.  Government  officials,  especially  among  the  military 
services,  had  opposed  such  rapid  demobilization  of  the  armed  forces 
because  of  their  mistrust  of  the  Russians.  One  historian  cites  the 
power  vacuum  in  Europe  which  resulted  from  rapid  U.S.  withdrawal 
as  at  least  one  reason  for  the  imposition  of  Soviet  hegemony  in  East- 
ern Europe  during  this  period.15  The  dramatic  cuts  in  the  armed 
forces  also  were  to  have  an  effect  on  the  negotiations  for  the  control 
of  atomic  energy.  One  source  interprets  the  situation  as  follows : 

As  the  nation's  conventional  military  resources  grew 
wTeaker  and  weaker  at  a  time  when  Soviet  dynamism  made 
it  imperative  that  the  United  States  be  strong,  the  place  of 
atomic  weapons  in  the  overall  American  military  posture 
would  naturally  become  more  critical  and  worthy  of 


Early  efforts:  Even  before  the  first  atomic  bomb  was  used  during 
the  war-,  some  persons  in  the  United  States  were  aware  of  the  potential 
need  for  control  of  atomic  energy  and  encouraged  the  Administration 
to  initiate  action  to  formulate  its  policy  on  the  subject.  Largely  at  the 
recommendation  of  Vannevar  Bush,  a  scientific  advisor  to  President 
Truman  and  Chairman  of  the  Office  of  Scientific  Research  and  Devel- 
opment, and  another  presidential  advisor,  Harvard  University  Presi- 
dent James  B.  Conant,  Truman  called  on  Henry  L.  Stimson,  Secretary 
of  War,  to  appoint  a  group  to  consider  the  future  needs  in  the  area  of 
control,  on  both  the  international  and  domestic  levels.  Stimson  recog- 
nized that  to  deal  with  the  unique  situation  created  by  the  development 
of  the  atomic  bomb  required  knowledge  in  both  science  and  politics; 
he  gathered  advisors  from  these  areas,  including  Bush  and  Conant, 
Ralph  Bard,  the  Undersecretary  of  the  Navy,  William  L.  Clayton, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  Affairs,  and  James  F. 
Byrnes,  who  would  become  Secretary  of  State  two  months  later,  to 
serve  as  the  President's  personal  representative  on  the  Committee. 
Other  members  were  George  Harrison,  president  of  the  New  York 
Life  Insurance  Company  and  a  Special  Assistant  to  Stimson,  Karl 
Compton,  a  physicist  and  president  of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology,  and  several  scientists  who  had  led  in  the  development  of 
the  bomb:  Dr.  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer,  Dr.  Ernest  O.  Lawrence,  Dr. 
Arthur  II.  Compton,  and  Dr.  Enrico  Fermi.  The  unpublished  report 
of  what  is  known  as  the  Secretary  of  War's  Interim  Committee,  which 
nut  during  May  L945,  reached  a  number  of  conclusions  affecting  inter- 
national control  which  were  to  remain  at,  issue  in  future  attempts 
toward  such  control. 

Within  a  month  after  the  first  atomic  weapons  were  used,  in  August 
194.">,  a  report  w  as  issued  which  explained  the  basic  scientific  facts  asso- 
ciated with  the  development  of  atomic  energy.  Prepared  in  1944  by  a 
physicist  who  had  been  involved  in  the  bomb  effort,  Dr.  Henry  I). 

11  U.S.  Department  of  Defense,  Selected  Manpower  Statistics  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  l!»7i  >.  p.  lit. 

16  Thomas  A.  Bailey,  '  Dlplomatio  History  of  the  American  People  (New  York  :  Appleton- 
Century  Crofts,  1964),  p.  778. 

19  Lleberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  234. 


Smyth  of  Princeton,  the  report  was  released  to  avert  any  misconcep- 
tion or  wild  speculation  by  the  public  concerning  the  new  weapon. 
Moreover,  it  v  as  hoped  that  by  supplying  a  substantial  amount  of  in- 
formation at  this  time,  the  report  would  alleviate  public  pressure,  espe- 
cially from  the  scientific  community,  for  release  of  all  pertinent  infor- 
mation. The  Smyth  report  supplied  basic  facts,  but  not  enough  to  aid 
rival  efforts  to  develop  an  atomic  weapon.17 

The  decision  to  release  the  Smyth  report  was  much  debated  within 
the  Administration,  but  the  reasons  noted  above  prevailed.  The  Smyth 
report  was  later  used  as  a  basic  source  for  the  discussions  in  a  Scien- 
tific and  Technical  Committee  of  the  UNAEC.  The  conclusion  of  the 
report  is  often  cited  when  the  study  is  considered  in  relation  to  inter- 
national control : 

We  find  ourselves  with  an  explosive  which  is  far  from 
completely  perfected.  Yet  the  future  possibilities  of  such 
explosives  are  appalling,  and  their  effects  on  future  wars  and 
international  affairs  are  of  fundamental  importance.  Here  is 
a  new  tool  for  mankind,  a  tool  of  unimaginable  destructive 
power.  Its  development  raises  many  questions  that  must  be 
answered  in  the  near  future. 

*  *  *  These  questions  are  not  technical  questions ;  they  are 
political  and  social  questions,  and  the  answers  given  to  them 
may  affect  all  mankind  for  generations  *  *  *  In  a  free  country 
like  ours,  such  questions  should  be  debated  by  the  people  and 
decisions  must  be  made  by  the  people  through  their  repre- 
sentatives. This  is  one  reason  for  the  release  of  this  report.  It 
is  a  semi-technical  report  which  it  is  hoped  men  of  science  in 
this  country  can  use  to  help  their  fellow  citizens  in  reaching 
wise  decisions.  The  people  of  the  country  must  be  informed 
if  they  are  to  discharge  their  responsibilities  wisely.18 

Among  the  initial  public  statements  of  U.S.  policy  on  arrangements 
for  international  control  was  President  Truman's  address  to  Congress 
on  October  3,  1945.  Affirming  the  U.S.  commitment  to  seek  interna- 
tional control  of  atomic  energy  and  the  U.S.  desire  to  share  informa- 
tion for  peaceful  purposes,  the  President  announced  the  impending 
discussions  with  Canada  and  Great  Britain  which  were  to  result  in  the 
Three  Nation  Agreed  Declaration.  On  October  27,  1945,  he  further 
defined  U.S.  policy  by  enunciating  five  basic  principles  which,  for 
the  most  part,  had  originated  with  Stimson's  committee.  These  con- 
clusions might  be  viewed  as  a  combination  of  the  primary  technological 
and  political  factors  which  would  condition  the  evolution  of  the  U.S. 
plan  for  international  control  and  the  negotiations  to  achieve  such 
control.  Bernhard  G.  Bechhoefer,  associated  with  early  U.S.  arms  con- 
trol negotiations  in  the  Department  of  State,  has  summarized  these 
principles  as  follows : 

1.  No  nation  can  long  maintain  a  monopoly  of  atomic 

2.  No  nation  could  long  maintain  or  morally  defend  a 
monopoly  of  peaceful  benefits  of  atomic  energy. 

17  Richard  G.  Hewlett  and  Oscar  B.  Anderson,  Jr.  The  New  World  1939/191,6,  A  History 
of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  vol.  I  (University  Park,  Pa.  :  Pennsyl- 
vania State  University  Press,  1962)  pp.  400-407. 

18  Smyth,  General  Account  of  the  Development  of  Methods  of  Using  Atomic  Energy  for 
Military  Purposes,  p.  165. 


3.  For  the  foreseeable  future  there  can  be  no  adequate 
military  defense  against  atomic  weapons. 

4.  All  the  initial  processes  in  the  production  of  fissionable 
materials  and  certain  subsequent  processes  are  identical 
whether  their  intended  use  or  purpose  is  peaceful  or  military. 

5.  The  nuclear  chain  reaction  required  for  the  release  of 
atomic  energy  is  now  based  upon  uranium  or  thorium  as  the 
only  suitable  raw  materials  occurring  in  nature.  Ores  contain- 
ing these  materials  are  only  relatively  rare.  Although  rich  de- 
posits are  not  numerous,  the  lower  concentrations  of  the  ores 
have  a  wide  geographical  distribution.19 

Preparations  for  negotiations  in  the  UNAEC :  In  January  1946, 
1  month  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Moscow  Declaration,  James  F. 
Byrnes,  Secretary  of  State,  announced  that  he  had  appointed  a  com- 
mittee "to  study  the  subject  of  controls  and  safeguards  necessary  to 
protect  this  00^-61-11™^!!^'  during  the  international  negotiations  on 
atomic  energy.  Assistant  Secretary  Acheson  had  been  named  chair- 
man; the  other  members  were  Bush,  Oonant,  General  Leslie  Groves — 
head  of  the  Manhattan  project  which  had  developed  the  atomic  bomb 
during  the  war — and  John  McCloy,  former  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War.  Although  the  members  of  the  committee  had  some  knowledge  of 
atomic  energy  matters  from  the  standpoint  of  both  its  technological 
and  political  aspects,  Acheson  suggested  appointing  a  Board  of  Con- 
sultants to  advise  the  committee  on  the  technological  aspects  of  inter- 
national control.  David  Lilienthal,  Chairman  of  the  Tennessee  Valley 
Authority,  was  given  the  task  of  leading  the  Board.  Its  other  members 
were  Chester  Barnard,  president  of  New  Jersey  Bell  Telephone,  who 
had  been  active  in  the  U.N.  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration ; 
Harry  A.  Winne,  an  engineer  and  a  vice  president  of  General  Electric 
Company,  who  had  participated  in  the  Manhattan  Project ;  and  Dr.  J. 
Robert  Oppenheimer,  the  physicist  who  had  directed  the  weaponry 
installation  of  the  Manhattan  Project  at  Los  Alamos,  New  Mexico. 
The  composition  of  the  two  groups  was  intended  to  provide  the  talents 
necessary  to  consider  both  the  political  and  technological  aspects  of 
the  problem  of  providing  a  basis  for  a  workable  system  of  international 

In  the  course  of  the  next  two  months,  the  Board  drafted  a  basic  plan 
for  international  control.  Following  a  series  of  meetings  with  Ache- 
son's  committee,  which  led  to  certain  modifications  and  additions,  it 
produced  a  document  entitled  "A  Report  on  the  International  Control 
of  Atomic  Energy."  Known  as  the  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report,"  the 
study  set  down  the  basic  technological  factors  involved  in  the  develop- 
ment of  atomic  energy,  particularly  those  which  would  affect  the  na- 
ture of  the  international  control  system.  Once  these  considerations  had 
been  provided,  the  Hoard  outlined  the  basic  features  of  a  control  plan, 
governed  primarily  by  the  technological  data.  ( )n  the  whole,  the  Board 
regarded  its  work  "not  as  a  -final  plan,  but  as  a  place  to  begin,  a  foun- 
dation  on  which  to  build."20  The  report  was  released  in  late  March 
1!»  H'»  as  a  basis  for  public  discussion. 

'•Bernhard   G.    Ftwhhtiofer.   I'ostwar  Xcaotintionfi  for  Arms  Control   (Washington,  D.C.  : 
Brookings,  19fil),  p.  :{.'{. 

*  State  Department  "Aeheson-Llllenthal  report,"  p.  vlii. 


Writing  in  1948,  J.  Robert  Oppenheimer  summarized  the  general 
trend  of  thinking  within  the  scientific  community  toward  the  atomic 
challenge  which  confronted  U.S.  diplomacy  : 

The  control  of  atomic  weapons  always  appeared  possible 
only  on  the  basis  of  an  intensive  and  working  collaboration 
between  peoples  of  many  nationalities,  on  the  creation  *  *  * 
of  supra-national  patterns  of  communication,  of  work,  and  of 
development.  The  development  of  atomic  energy  lay  in  an  area 
peculiarly  suited  to  such  internationalization,  and  in  fact  re- 
quiring it  for  the  most  effective  exploitation,  almost  on  tech- 
nical grounds  alone.  The  development  of  atomic  energy  lay  in 
a  field  international  by  tradition  and  untouched  by  pre-exist- 
ing national  patterns  of  control.  Thus,  the  problem  as  it  ap- 
peared in  the  summer  of  1945  was  to  use  our  understanding  of 
atomic  energy,  and  the  developments  that  we  had  carried  out, 
with  their  implied  hope  and  implied  threat,  to  see  whether  in 
this  area  international  barriers  might  not  be  broken  down, 
and  patterns  of  candor  and  cooperation  established  which 
would  make  the  peace  of  the  world.21 

The  U.S.  negotiator  and  final  steps  to  define  policy :  In  the  mean- 
time, on  March  18,  1946,  to  bring  the  issue  to  the  United  Nations,  the 
President  named  Bernard  M.  Baruch  U.S.  representative  to  the 
UNAEC.  One  source  offers  the  following  description  : 

Bernard  Mannes  Baruch  *  *  *  had  by  his  75th  year  become 
a  symbol  of  America  to  his  fellow  Americans  as  well  as  to 
people  all  over  the  world.  An  immensely  successful  financier 
who  had  built  a  fortune  in  the  lusty  days  of  business  boom, 
a  public  servant  and  sought-after  counselor  to  Presidents  of 
both  political  parties,  Baruch  was  one  of  the  most  trusted  men 
in  all  of  America.  The  fact  that  he  was  Jewish  seemed  to 
assure  his  place  in  the  public  mind  because  it  gave  his  life  that 
quality  of  equal  opportunity  realized,  of  Horatio  Alger,  that 
is  so  important  to  America's  self-image.22 

Included  in  the  delegation  to  the  UNAEC  were  Baruelvs  choices 
from  leading  members  of  the  banking  business :  Herbert  Swope,  John 
M.  Hancock,  and  Ferdinand  Eberstadt ;  the  fifth  member  of  the  dele- 
gation was  Fred  Searls,  a  mining  engineer,  formerly  a  journalist,  and 
head  of  the  New  York  State  Racing  Commission.  Richard  C.  Tolman, 
who  had  served  as  a  scientific  advisor  to  General  Groves,  was  chosen 
for  the  same  role  in  Baruelvs  delegation. 

Aside  from  the  fact  that  Baruch  spoke  for  U.S.  policy  on  inter- 
national control  of  atomic  energy,  his  appointment  might  be  consid- 
ered in  two  respects  with  regard  to  the  central  issues  of  this  study :  the 
primary  motives  behind  the  appointment  and  his  role  in  the  policy- 
making process.  As  to  the  reasoning  behind  the  appointment  of  Ba- 
ruch, at  this  time  the  issues  surrounding  the  domestic  control  of  atomic 
energy  were  far  from  resolved,  and  prominent  among  them  was  the 
possibility  of  excessive  restrictions  on  the  release  of  information.  Con- 
gressional hesitation  to  allow  a  free  flow  of  information  had  been  ex- 

a  J.    Robert   Oppenheimer,   "International    Control   of  Atomic  Energy,"   Bulletin  of  the 
Atomic  Scientists,  v.  4.  no.  2  (February  1948),  pp.  41-42. 
83  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  tarantula,  p.  261. 


pressed  sufficiently  to  make  it  reasonably  clear  that  the  United  States 
would  be  limited,  if  not  completely  crippled,  in  its  ability  to  meet  its 
secret  agreements  with  the  British  for  postwar  collaboration  on  atomic 
energy  matters.23 

His  appointment  was  apparently  motivated  by  a  belief  that  he  could 
help  enlarge  the  Administration's  freedom  of  action  in  the  field  of 
international  negotiation.  Baruch  represented  the  kind  of  public 
servant  who  could  be  entrusted  with  America's  security,  as  well  as 
one  who  was  respected  in  international  circles.  Indeed,  the  chairman 
of  the  Senate  Foreign  Eelations  Committee  pledged  Baruch's  con- 
firmation without  a  hearing,  once  he  had  assured  the  committee  in 
writing  that  "there  would  be  no  treaty  and  no  disclosures  without  safe- 
guards, and  that  no  agreement  of  any  kind  would  be  entered  without 
the  consent  of  Congress."  24 

The  appointment  and  acceptance  of  Baruch  appear  to  have  been 
based  primarily  on  respect  for  his  political  acumen.  At  any  rate,  the 
motivations  behind  the  choice  of  the  chief  negotiator  were  not  of  the 
same  character  which  prompted  the  appointment  and  work  of  Ache- 
son's  committee  and  the  Board  of  Consultants.  Indeed,  by  some  per- 
sons, Baruch  was  not  thought  to  be  qualified  for  the  job.  The  members 
of  the  Board  and  Acheson's  committee  declined  to  continue  in  these 
groups  under  Baruch,  partly  on  the  grounds  that  if  Baruch  pursued 
policies  with  which  they  disagreed,  they  wanted  to  retain  the  right  to 
voice  their  opposition.25 

One  member  of  Baruch's  group — namely,  Hancock — reacted  nega- 
tively to  Baruch's  suggestion  that  the  Board  of  Consultants  continue 
its  work  under  the  auspices  of  the  State  Department.  Hancock  stated : 

These  problems  are  not  often  purely  scientific  problems. 
They  blend  very  quickly  into  political  problems  *  *  *.  The 
scientists  tend  to  be  unbending  and  calculating  in  the  field 
of  science — which  is  natural — but  they  carry  over  their  in- 
elasticity into  arguments  in  the  field  of  international  affairs, 
politics  in  the  proper  sense,  and  negotiation.26 

Apparently  there  was  little  common  outlook  between  those  represent- 
ing mainly  a  scientific  approach,  who  had  developed  the  recommen- 
dations for  a  policy  of  international  control  of  atomic  energy,  and 
those  representing  chiefly  a  political  approach,  who  were  responsible 
for  conducting  the  diplomatic  negol  iations  to  implement  the  emerging 

2n  In  August  1943,  Roosevelt  and  Churchill  had  signed  an  executive  agreement,  known 
as  thi'  Quebec  Agreement,  which  was  nol  made  public,  and  affirmed  Anglo-American  coop 
eration  on  atomic  energy  during  the  war.  A  year  later,  the  two  leaders  signed  an  aide- 
memoire  to  supplement  the  earlier  agreement,  which  provided  for  full  collaboration  between 
the  two  countries  following  the  war.  Attempts  were  made  to  renegotiate  the  agreement 
al  the  time  of  the  Truman-Attlee-Klng  conference,  when  the  Americans  asserted  that  active 
collaboration  could  not  be  carried  out  through  an  executive  agreement.  Nonetheless  they 
agreed,  at  least  in  principle,  to  the  idea  of  equal  partnership,  in  the  form  of  "full  and 
effective  cooperation."  Eventually  In  April  1!)4<;.  when  the  British  pressed  for  further 
fulfillments,  Truman   Informed   them   thai   he  Interpreted   this  phrase  to  Include  only  the 

field  Of  hasic  scientific  Information,  and  thereby  finalized  the  U.S.  decision  to  withdraw 
from  any  arrangement   which  WOUld   have  Involved  lending  practical  assistance  to  endeavors 

such  as  building  ami  operating  production  plants.  The  primary  rationale  behind  thi^  policy 
was  that  the  agreement  could  aol  be  kept  secret  under  the  provisions  of  the  U.N.  ("barter 
and  public  control  efforts  which  were  about  to  begin,  Afte.  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946 
was  passed,  compliance  with  the  agreements,  as  the  British  Interpreted  them,  would  have 
been  legally  forbidden.  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  pp,  i'7s  280,  177    I7:i 

-'  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  264 

"■Hewlett    and    Anderson.    History  of   tin    United  States   Atomic  Energy   Commission, 
p.  560. 

"  Llebennan.  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  291. 


As  to  Baruch's  role  in  the  policymaking  process,  the  negotiator's  own 
view  of  the  part  he  should  play,  as  well  as  that  of  his  advisors,  would 
have  a  substantial  influence  on  the  shape  of  U.S.  policy,  and  on  the 
course  of  the  negotiations.  He  resented  the  fact  that  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  had  been  published,  lest  it  be  regarded  as  a  statement 
of  U.S.  policy,  thus  placing  him  in  the  role  of  a  mere  "messenger  boy." 
Only  after  consultations  with  the  President  and  Byrnes  was  Baruch 
satisfied  that  his  personal  views  on  atomic  energy  control  would  be 
considered,  although  later  accounts  by  Truman  and  Baruch  differ  re- 
garding their  perceptions  of  the  extent  of  Baruch's  powers  at  that 
time. 27 

Although  Baruch  had  asked  Acheson's  committee  and  its  Board  of 
Consultants  to  remain  at  his  disposal  during  the  negotiations,  this  ar- 
rangement did  not  materialize.  Some  meetings  were  held  between 
Baruch's  delegation  and  the  two  groups.  These  encounters  provided 
the  forum  for  expression  of  a  variety  of  views  on  U.S.  policy  but  not 
on  a  sustained  basis. 

Abortive  Efforts  in  the  United  Nations  Toward  Control 

On  June  14,  1946,  the  end  product  of  these  meetings,  and  of  discus- 
sions within  the  Administration,  was  enunciated  by  Baruch  at  the  op- 
ening session  of  the  UNAEC.  The  views  of  both  the  military  services 
and  the  Congress  had  been  considered,  and  some  of  the  basic  ingredi- 
ents of  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  had  been  retained ;  other  impor- . 
taut  characteristics  had  originated  with  Baruch  and  his  deputies. 


In  Baruch's  speech  to  the  opening  session  of  the  UNAEC,  he  noted 
that  his  proposal  was  made  as  a  basis  for  discussion,  although  it 
eventually  came  to  be  regarded  as  a  rather  firm  statement  of  the 
U.S.  position.  Baruch  proposed  that  an  International  Control  Au- 
thority be  established  "to  which  should  be  entrusted  all  phases  of  the 
development  and  use  of  atomic  energy."  It  would  control  or  own  all 
atomic  energy  activities  potentially  dangerous  to  world  security,  and 
would  control,  license,  and  inspect  all  others.  Its  functions  would  in- 
clude fostering  the  beneficial  uses  of  atomic  energy,  and  conducting 
research  and  development  in  the  field,  in  order  to  remain  at  the  fore- 
front of  potential  new  developments.  Once  the  Authority  was  estab- 
lished, all  bomb  manufacturing  would  be  halted  and  existing  bombs 
destroyed,  and  the  Authority  would  possess  all  the  information  as- 
sociated with  atomic  energy.  This  proposal  marked  the  first  time  that 
diplomats  had  sought  to  establish  a  worldwide  system  of  control  and 
use  of  a  scientific  discovery. 

An  important  point  which  was  included,  and  a  major  contribution 
of  Baruch,  concerned  the  issue  of  enforcement  of  the  arrangement  for 
international  control.  Because  of  the  serious  nature  of  atomic  energy 
questions,  Baruch  expressed  the  view  that  any  countries  which  pur- 
sued activities  that  ran  counter  to  or  usurped  those  of  the  Authority 
should  be  subject  to  punishments.  Specific  violations  were  listed,  such 
as  possession  or  manufacture  of  an  atomic  weapon.  Moreover,  in  order 
to  ensure  that  violators  would  be  punished,  Baruch  proposed  that  the 

27  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
pp.  557-560. 


veto  power  in  the  Security  Council  would  not  apply  on  questions  con- 
cerning the  fulfillment  of  sanctions.28 

In  the  course  of  the  negotiations,  the  U.S.  delegation  submitted 
three  memoranda  which  elaborated  on  the  U.S.  position.29  These 
documents  and  the  speeches  of  Baruch  set  forth  the  details  of  the  U.S. 
position  on  the  various  issues  covered  in  the  discussion  below. 


The  Soviet  proposal  was  presented  at  the  second  meeting  of  the 
UNAEC  on  June  19,  1946,  by  Andrei  Gromyko,  Deputy  Foreign 
Minister  and  the  Soviet  Representative  on  the  U.N.  Security  Council. 
Demanding  that  atomic  energy  should  be  used  only  for  peaceful 
purposes,  he  proposed  that  a  first  step  should  be  a  convention  outlaw- 
ing the  production  and  use  of  atomic  weapons.  Following  such  an 
agreement,  he  continued,  there  should  be  established  "a  system  of  su- 
pervision and  control  to  see  that  the  conventions  and  agreements  are 
observed,  and  measures  concerning  sanctions  against  unlawful  use  of 
atomic  energy."  30 

At  this  time,  Gromyko  introduced  two  resolutions  to  implement  the 
Soviet  principles  of  international  control.  The  first  called  for  an  agree- 
ment to  ban  the  use  and  production  of  atomic  bombs  and  to  destroy 
existing  weapons  within  three  months  of  the  conclusion  of  the  agree- 
ment. This  resolution  also  provided  that  the  parties  to  the  proposed 
agreement  would  pass  legislation  to  punish  violators  of  the  agreement. 
The  second  resolution  proposed  that  two  committees  be  established :  one 
to  make  recommendations  on  the  exchange  of  scientific  information, 
and  another  to  examine  methods  of  insuring  compliance  with  the 
prohibitions  of  the  agreement,  including  sanctions.  The  only  direct 
response  by  Gromyko  to  the  U.S.  proposal  was  the  expression  of 
Soviet  opposition  to  elimination  of  the  veto: 

Efforts  made  to  undermine  the  activity  of  the  Security 
Council,  including  efforts  directed  to  undermine  the  require- 
ments of  unanimity  of  the  members  of  the  Security  Council, 
upon  questions  of  substance,  are  incompatible  with  the  in- 
terests of  the  United  Nations  *  *  *  .  Such  attempts  should  be 

The  veto  question  was  to  remain  at  issue  throughout  the  negotiations. 
One  source  has  described  the  Soviet  proposals  as  inchoate: 

Gromyko's  proposals  of  June  19  have,  frequently  been  de- 
scribed in  the  Western  press  and  by  the  Soviet  representatives 
t  hemselves  as  the  "Soviet  plan":  but  they  really  constituted  no 
plan  at  all.  Not,  if  by  a  plan,  one  comprehends  a  systematic 

28  For  a  complete  text  of  Banich's  speech,  see  "Proposals  for  an  International  Atomic 
Development  Authority."  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  v.  14,  no.  364  (June  23,  1946), 
pp.    1057-1062,  or   State  Department,   Growth   of  a  Policj/,  pp.    138-147. 

»The  three  memoranda  were  entitled  U.S.  Memorandum  No.  1.  Submitted  to  Sub- 
committee  No.  1  <>t  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  New  V>rk.  July  -'. 
1946;  D.S.  Memorandum  No.  'J  Dealing  with  the  Functions  and  Powers  of  the  Proposed 
Atomic  Development  Authority.  Submitted  to  Subcommittee  No.  1  of  the  United  Nations 
Atomic-  Energy  Commission,  New  York,  July  r>,  1046;  and  D.S.  Memorandum  No.  3,  Deal 
Ing  With  the  Relations  Between  the  Atomic  Development  Authority  and  the  Organs  of  the 
United  Nations,  Submitted  to  Subcommittee  No.  1  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  New  York,  July  12,  1946.  _, 

30  Joseph  I,.  Nogee,  Soviet  Policy  Toward  International  control  of  Atomic  Energy. 
t  N.>tre  l  lame.  Ind.  :  I'niversit  v  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  l!'t;i  |,  p.  36. 

m  Ibid.,  p.  37. 


and  comprehensive  procedure  for  action.  Gromyko's  "plan" 
was,  in  fact,  the  enunciation  of  three  or  four  basic  principles 
which  guided  Soviet  policy  ( promotion  of  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  atomic  energy,  prohibition  of  atomic  weapons,  agree- 
ment on  international  control,  and  the  retention  of  full  sov- 
ereign freedom  of  action)  plus  proposals  for  the  further 
organization  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  to  deal  with 
the  problems  of  control  and  the  exchange  of  scientific  informa- 
tion. On  the  exact  form  of  international  control,  Soviet  state- 
ments were  deliberately  vague. 



Early  in  the  negotiations,  the  structure  of  the  UNAEC  was  orga- 
nized to  include  four  committees :  a  Scientific  and  Technical  Commit- 
tee, a  Legal  Advisory  Committee,  Committee  Two  to  examine  all  the 
questions  associated  with  a  control  plan,  and  Committee  One  to  coordi- 
nate the  work  of  the  other  three  committees.  In  July  1946,  at  the  second 
session  of  Committee  Two,  Soviet  representative  Gromyko  delivered 
a  major  speech  condemning  the  U.S.  proposals,  and  declaring  that 

as  they  are  presented  now  [the  proposals]  could  not  be  ac- 
cepted by  the  U.S.S.R.,  either  as  a  whole  or  in  their  separate 

When  further  efforts  to  negotiate  seemed  fruitless,  it  was  decided  to 
postpone  the  deliberations  of  Committee  Two  until  a  report  from  the 
Scientific  and  Technical  Committee  had  been  submitted. 

The  report  of  the  latter  Committee,  similar  in  purpose  to  that  of  the 
Acheson-Lilienthal  groups,  was  given  to  Committee  Two  on  October  2, 
1946.  Committee  Two  had  passed  a  resolution  suggesting  that  the  Sci- 
entific and  Technical  Committee  "present  a  report  on  the  question 
whether  effective  control  is  possible,  together  with  an  indication  of 
the  methods  by  which  *  *  *  effective  control  can  be  achieved."  34  The 
Scientific  and  Technical  Committee  had  decided  to  confine  its  con- 
siderations to  the  requirements  of  a  control  system  as  dictated  solely 
by  the  technical  characteristics  of  atomic  energy  development,  and 
disclaimed  any  responsibility  for  taking  political  feasibility  into  ac- 
count. Obviously,  the  major  portion  of  the  information  on  atomic 
energy  was  supplied  by  the  United  States,  primarily  through  the 
Smyth  report  and  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  In  light  of  this  fact, 
the  Soviet  representative  to  the  Committee  interpreted  the  conclusions 
of  the  Committee  as  "hypothetical  and  conditional"  because  the  Soviets 
considered  the  information  "limited  and  incomplete."  35  Despite  this 
statement,  the  members  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Committee 
concluded  that  "we  do  not  find  any  basis  in  the  available  scientific 
facts  for  supposing  that  effective  control  is  not  technologically 
feasible."  3G 

33  Ibid.,  pp.   38-39. 

33  State  Department.  Growth  of  a  Policy,  r>.  SI. 

34  As  quoted  in  First  Renort  on  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Aspects  of  Control.  In  United 
Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  "First  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  to 
the  Security  Council,  31  December  1946,"  Official  Records.  Special  Supplement.  Report  to 
the  Security  Council.  (Lake  Success,  New  York  :  1946),  p.  20. 

35  Ibid.,  n.  50. 

36  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  86. 


In  addition,  the  Committee  reemphasized  the  scientific  principle  which 
had  provided  a  basic  element  in  the  efforts  to  establish  international 
control  of  atomic  energy,  when  it  stated : 

There  is  an  intimate  relation  between  the  activities  required 
for  peaceful  purposes  and  those  leading  to  the  production  of 
atomic  weapons;  most  of  the  stages  which  are  needed  for  the 
former  are  also  needed  for  the  latter.3' 

The  report  defined  the  various  dangerous  points  in  atomic  energy 
development  at  which  some  form  of  safeguard  should  be  applied,  but 
made  no  recommendations  for  specific  methods  of  safeguards. 

Committee  Two  continued  its  deliberations  and  prepared  a  report 
which  set  forth  specific  safeguards  for  various  activities,  but  these 
were  deemed  only  the  basic  elements  of  a  plan  and  not  a  complete  plan 
for  control. 

The  report  on  safeguards  and  that  of  the  Scientific  and  Technical 
Committee  were  included  in  a  report  prepared  by  the  full  membership 
of  the  TT.X.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  and  submitted  to  the  Security 
Council  on  December  31,  1946.  The  report  had  been  approved  by  10 
members  of  the  Commission,  with  the  remaining  two,  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Poland,  abstaining.  Following  this  expression  of  majority  ap- 
proval, Baruch  and  his.  staff  resigned  on  the  grounds  that  the  U.S. 
representative  to  the  United  Nations  (at  this  time,  Warren  Austin) 
should  serve  as  the  U.S.  spokesman  in  the  Security  Council.  This  first 
report  of  the  UNAEC  offered  various  findings  and  recommendations 
based  largely  on  the  proposals  submitted  by  the  United  States.  By 
March  1!>  17.  when  its  debate  on  the  provisions  of  the  first  report  failed 
of  agreement,  the  Security  Council  passed  a  resolution  which  referred 
the  discussions  back  to  the  UNAEC  and  requested  a  second  report 
from  that  body.  The  major  sources  of  disagreement  in  the  negotiations 
are  discussed  below.  There  was  to  be  little  narrowing  of  these  differ- 
ences in  the  subsequent  negotiations  of  the  UNAEC. 

One  source  describes  the  "deadlock"  at  this  time  as  "particularly 
ominous  not  because  of  specific  Soviet  objections  to  the  majority  plan, 
but  because  Soviet  criticism  was  made  a  part  of  its  ideological  con- 
flict with  the  West."  !s  Some  of  the  U.S.  policymakers  who  had  engi- 
neered the  U.S.  plan,  including  both  scientists  and  politicians,  became 
disillusioned  with  the  negotiations,  and  even  suggested  that  the  United 
States  withdraw  from  them.  However,  consultations  with  U.S.  allies 
had  discouraged  such  an  idea,  and  the  negotiations  continued  "'because 
world  opinion  would  not  let  them  stop."  39 

In  September  11)47,  the  UNAEC  submitted  the  second  report  to  the 
Security  ( louncil,  elaborating  on  the  specific  recommendations  for  con- 
trol in  the  first  report.  Besides  engaging  in  this  exercise,  the  second 
round  of  the.  UNAEC  deliberations  had  considered  a  list  of  12  amend- 
ments which  the  Soviet  Union  proposed  be  applied  to  the  findings  and 
recommendations  of  the  first  report.  These  amendments,  which  sought 
to  alter  some  of  the  fundamental  features  of  the  majority  plan,  were 
not  accepted  by  the  Commission.  Examples  of  the  questionsot  principle 

;  [bid.,  p.  36. 

Is  NoRee,  Soviet  Policy,  p.  88. 

80 Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  391. 


raised  by  the  Soviet  amendments  on  which  no  agreement  had  been 
reached  are  the  question  of  what  was  required  for  strict  international 
control  of  atomic  energy,  whether  international  control,  including  the 
prohibition  of  atomic  weapons,  was  to  be  established  by  one  treaty  or 
several  and  in  the  latter  case,  the  question  of  priorities,  or  the  question 
of  the  right  of  the  proposed  Authority  to  conduct  research  in  atomic 
weapons.  As  was  the  case  with  the  first  report  of  the  UNAEC,  the 
second  report  had  been  approved  by  10  members  of  the  Commission, 
but  this  time  only  Poland  had  abstained,  while  the  Soviet  Union  had 
registered  opposition. 

Because  of  more  pressing  matters  on  its  agenda,  like  the  Palestine 
question  or  the  India-Pakistan  question,  the  Security  Council  de- 
cided not  to  consider  the  second  report  of  the  UNAEC.  Deliberations 
continued  in  the  latter  institution  through  the  remainder  of  1947  and 
the  spring  of  1948.  These  discussions  prompted  the  UNAEC  third  re- 
port to  conclude  that  an  impasse  had  been  reached,  and  to  request  that 
UNAEC  negotiations  be  suspended.  A  resolution  for  Security  Council 
approval  of  all  the  reports  of  the  UNAEC  was  vetoed  by  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  summer  of  1948 ;  in  the  fall,  General  Assembly  consider- 
ation of  the  question  of  atomic  energy  control  resulted  in  a  40-6— 1  ap- 
proval of  the  majority  plan,  but  the  value  of  this  non-binding  reso- 
lution lay  in  propaganda  more  than  in  support  for  successful  collabora- 
tion. Further  negotiations  in  the  UNAEC,  which  were  continued  at  the 
insistence  of  the  General  Assembly,  rapidly  deteriorated,  and  by  No- 
vember 1949,  the  General  Assembly  agreed  to  suspend  the  work  of  the 

IV.  Issues  in  the  Interplay  Between  Diplomacy  and  Nuclear 


Identification  of  a  number  of  basic  issues  prominent  in  the  U.S. 
policymaking  process  and  in  the  negotiations  will  help  to  clarify  the 
way  in  which  technological  and  diplomatic  factors  interacted  during 
the  formulation  and  negotiation  of  the  Baruch  proposals.  These  basic 
issues  will  be  explored  to  show  this  interaction,  and  also  how  it  affected 
the  outcome  of  each  issue.  Each  issue  will  be  examined  in  this  man- 
ner, first  in  the  course  of  the  U.S.  policymaking  process  and  then  in 
the  international  negotiations.  Special  attention  will  be  given  to  the 
U.S.  proposals  as  finally  presented,  the  Soviet  reaction  to  them,  and 
the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 

Broadly,  these  issues  all  dealt  with  the  interlocking  concerns  of 
national  power,  human  safety,  secrecy  of  atomic  technology,  privacy 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the  potential  utility  of  peaceful  atomic  en- 
ergy. Three  broad  issues  emerged :  ( 1 )  the  form  of  control,  that  is, 
international  ownership  and  management  versus  inspection ; 
('2)  transitional  stages  for  the  establishment  of  international  control, 
involving  transfer  of  control  of  information  and  nuclear  production 
facilities  from  the  United  States  to  the  international  authority;  and 
( 3 )  the  question  of  sanctions  and  the  veto. 

Significance  of  Technological  Factors  for  U.S.  Policy 

Before  these  issues  are  discussed  in  detail,  it  might  be  helpful  to 
note  a  number  of  general  factors  of  technology  and  diplomacy  which 
may  have  influenced  U.S.  policy  and  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 

Foremost  among  the  technological  considerations  was  the  U.S. 
monopoly  over  atomic  weapons.  The  very  nature  of  scientific  inquiry 
made  it  axiomatic  that  the  U.S.  monopoly  was  transitory.  Acceptance 
of  this  factor  was  a  major  political  motivation  for  U.S.  efforts  toward 
international  control.  Nevertheless,  the  question  arose  as  to  how  the 
United  States  could  prevent  a  premature  end  to  its  monopoly  and 
thereby  avoid  endangering  either  its  own  security  or  world  security 
while  an  international  system  of  control  was  being  established.  U.S. 
policy  on  this  question  would  influence  the  general  political  atmos- 
phere surrounding  the  effort  to  establish  international  control. 

Among  the  possible  measures  which  the  United  States  could  use  to 
protect  itself  and  the  world  from  proliferation  of  atomic  weapons 
until  an  international  system  could  be  set  up  was  stringent  control 
of  the  dissemination  of  information  which  would  contribute  to  devel- 
opment of  military  applications  of  atomic  energy.  This  idea  led  to  a 
persistent  popular  misconception  regarding  the  "secret"  of  the  atomic 

Many  of  the  semantic  difficulties  dated  from  the  first 
months  of  public  knowledge  of  the  wartime  program.  The 
"secret"  of  the  atomic  bomb  was  a  case  in  point.  After  more 
than  two  years  of  efforts  to  explain  this  term  accurately,  use 
of  it  still  induced  an  almost  automatic  emotional  response. 



Polling  questions  which  contained  references  to  both  "bomb 
secrets"  and  "international  control"'  invariably  brought 
fewer  approvals  of  the  control  principle,  the  automatic  reac- 
tion being  to  "keep  the  secrets." 40 

At  the  time  of  the  December  1945  conference  which  resulted  in  the 
Moscow  Declaration,  Senator  Arthur  Vandenberg,  Chairman  of  the 
Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee,  and  other  members  of  Congress 
repeatedly  sought  and  obtained  assurances  from  the  President  that  the 
United  States  would  not  release  atomic  energy  information  prior  to 
the  establishment  of  adequate  safeguards.  The  protective  attitude  to- 
ward the  U.S.  "secrets"  was  heightened  by  the  revelation  in  early 
1946  of  evidence  of  espionage  in  Canada  involving  the  transmission 
of  atomic  energy  information  to  the  Soviet  Union.  These  events  served 
not  only  to  reinforce  the  public  attitude  toward  nuclear  secrecy  sur- 
rounding the  bomb,  but  also  to  engender  a  growing  mistrust  in  the 
United  States  of  the  Soviet  Union.41 

In  general,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward  the  secret  of 
the  bomb  may  have  had  several  effects  on  its  policy  and  on  other  coun- 
tries' conceptions  of  that  policy.  Mistrust  of  the  Soviet  Union,  coupled 
with  the  idea  that  sole  possession  of  the  atomic  weapon  represented  a 
"sacred  trust"  42  in  terms  of  U.S.  responsibility  for  world  security, 
may  have  acted  as  a  motive  to  withhold  as  much  information  as  pos- 
sible, for  as  long  as  possible,  until  the  international  control  system  was 
secure.  But  a  marked  reluctance  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to 
part  with  information  or  facilities  may  have  encouraged  critics  of 
the  U.S.  proposals,  especially  in  the  Soviet  Union,  to  conclude  that 
the  United  States  did  not  intend  to  relinquish  its  monopoly  and 
eventually  would  exercise  "atomic  diplomacy." 

The  notion  of  devising  methods  to  protect  the  secret  of  the  bomb 
figured  importantly  in  U.S.  policy  discussions  on  international  control 
of  atomic  energy.  However,  considerations  of  this  nature  ran  counter 
to  a  principle  which  might  be  deemed  applicable  to  any  field  of  scien- 
tific inquiry :  that  secrecy  cannot  long  delay  the  independent  acquisi- 
tion of  scientific  and  technological  information.  This  principle  had 
special  force  in  the  case  of  atomic  energy,  in  light  of  the  inherent  im- 
portance of  this  information  to  other  nations,  especially  a  great  power 
like  the  Soviet  Union. 

A  related  question  which  entered  U.S.  policy  deliberations  involved 
estimates  of  how  long  it  would  take  the  Soviet  Union  to  develop  its 
own  atomic  weapon  without  access  to  outside  information.  Such  esti- 
mates would  indicate  how  long  the  United  States  could  expect  to 
enjoy  its  preeminence  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  even  if  its  efforts 
to  maintain  secrecy,  before  establishment  of  effective  international 
control,  should  be  entirely  successful.  Thus,  the  U.S.  assessment  of 
Soviet  technological  capabilities  was  a  factor  to  be  reckoned  with  in 
the  U.S.  diplomatic  approach  to  the  international  negotiations. 

"U.S.  Department  of  State,  The  International  Control  of  Atomic  Energy,  Policy  at  the 
Crossroads,  Publication  3161   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1948), 

4R,Pewlett  and  Anderson-  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
I>.  5(11.  The  spv  cas"8  also  had  an  effW-r  on  Oip  concessional  deliberations  oi  domestic 
control  of  atomic  energy  and  on  the  U.S.  attitude  toward  international  information  ex- 
change, e.g.,  wartime  agreements  with  the  British.  Ibid.,  p.  480. 

4-This  phrase  was  used  by  President  Truman  to  describe  the  U.S.  role  in  relation  to  its 
monopoly  on  atomic  weapons.  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p    117. 


Opinions  varied  within  the  Administration  as  to  the  length  of  time 
necessary  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  develop  an  atomic  weapon.  As  early 
as  1D4T).  the  question  was  raised  in  Administration  circles.  During  a 
meeting  of  Stimson's  Interim  Committee,  a  memorandum  was  cited 
which  reflected  the  estimate  by  Bush  and  Conant  that  it  would  be  3 
to  4  years  before  the  Soviets  could  develop  an  atomic  weapon.  General 
Groves'  estimate  is  described  as  follows:  ''Taking  a  very  low  view  of 
Russian  ability,  he  considered  20  years  a  much  likelier  figure."43 
Conant  called  this  figure  "highly  unsafe." 

The  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  noted  the  speculative  nature  of  esti- 
mates of  this  kind.  In  order  to  assess  a  technological  situation  accu- 
rately, the  report  contended,  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  knowledge  of 
the  progress  of  foreign  development.  Such  knowledge,  of  course,  was 
not  then  forthcoming.  But  on  balance,  the  report  seemed  to  minimize 
the  possibility  of  an  imminent  acquisition  of  atomic  weapons  by  other 
countries.  The  Consultants  touched  on  this  question  insofar  as  it  re- 
lated to  how  much  a  rival  effort  would  be  accelerated  by  the  release 
of  U.S.  information.  Even  with  the  release  of  purely  theoretical  in- 
formation, according  to  the  Consultants,  "a  major  program,  surely 
lasting  many  years,  is  required  for  the  actual  production  of  atomic 
weapons."  44  It  might  be  inferred  from  this  statement  that  the  Con- 
sultants' view  of  rival  efforts,  without  access  to  theoretical  informa- 
tion, could  hardly  have  been  an  imminent  cause  for  alarm  to  U.S. 

One  high  Administration  view,  even  more  explicit  regarding  esti- 
mates of  Russia's  ability  to  develop  its  own  bomb,  was  conveyed  to  the 
U.S.  negotiating  team.  Hancock  kept  a  record  of  a  meeting  which  he 
attended  between  Byrnes  and  Baruch,  which  states : 

Mr.  Byrnes  briefly  reviewed  his  impression  that  the  Rus- 
sians don't  know  much  about  atomic  energy  or  its  use  in 
bombs.  Dr.  Conant  got  no  facts  regarding  it  while  he  was  in 
Russia  and  the  assumption  is  that  they  know  nothing.' 

While  it  is  difficult  to  appraise  the  extent  to  which  these  assessments 
of  Soviet  nuclear  development  influenced  U.S.  policy,  one  might  infer 
from  the  course  and  outcome  of  the  negotiations  that  these  considera- 
tions had  weight.  Considering  the  fact  that  differing  estimates  were 
made  regarding  Soviet  atomic  capabilities,  it  is  possible  to  note  an 
example  of  one  problem  which  can  arise  when  diplomacy  is  depend- 
ent upon  science  and  technology.  Policymakers  do  not  always  receive" 
a  technological  assessment  to  which  all  members  of  the  scientific  com- 
munity agree.  A  wide  divergence  only  complicates  the  diplomat's  task. 
If.  for  example,  there  is  no  clear  consensus  that  an  imminent  danger 
exists,  the  diplomat  will  probably  tend  to  be  guided  by  counsels  of 
compromise  rather  than  urgency.  And  perhaps  he  should  be — but  it 
must  also  be  noted  that  the  counsels  of  urgency  could  be  right,  ami  that 
in  the  present  instance  it  was  the  conservative  estimates  of  General 
Groves  which  turned  out  to  be  the  furthest  from  the  true  situation. 

An  equally  thorny  political  factor  which  would  enter  into  the  dis- 

11  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  p.  3.r>4. 

11  state  Department,  "Acheson  Llllentbal  Report,"  p.  51. 

**  Lleberman,  The  Scorpion  and  tin-  Tarantula,  p.  274.  Hancock  may  have  been  referring 
ti.  Conant's  trip  t"  Russia  with  Byrnes,  for  the  meetings  which  resulted  in  the  Moscow 
Declaration.  Ibid.,  pp.  iog-107. 


cussions  was  the  secrecy  shrouding  Soviet  activities.  One  source  de- 
scribes this  phenomenon  as  follows : 

Western  ignorance  about  the  real  condition  of  Russia  was 
deemed  by  the  regime,  quite  logically  from  its  point  of  view, 
as  one  of  the  greatest  assets  it  had  in  its  conduct  of  foreign 
relations.  Access  to  the  U.S.S.R.  was  never  so  difficult — i.e., 
virtually  impossible — for  a  foreigner  who  was  not  a  diplomat 
or  Communist,  travel  throughout  the  country  never  so  limited 
as  between  1946  and  1954.  Not  even  during  the  Great  Purge 
of  the  1930's  were  restrictions  so  all-encompassing.  The  fear 
which  this  restrictive  behavior  suggests  cannot  have  been 
simply  a  concern  over  revelations  about  the  police-state 
aspects  of  Soviet  life.  By  1947,  only  Communists,  fellow 
travelers,  and  the  most  naive  of  Western  liberals  denied  that 
aspect  of  Soviet  reality.  Much  more  dangerous  was  any  revela- 
tion of  Russian  weakness,  of  the  magnitude  of  the  tasks  of 
industrial  reconstruction  and  rapid  demobilization  lying 
ahead  of  this  still  primitive  society.  A  truer  picture  of  Rus- 
sia's strength  and  weaknesses  might  induce  some  new  and 

unwelcome    thinking    in    the    State    Department    and    the 

Just  as  U.S.  secrecy  surrounding  the  bomb  presented  problems  for  its 
policy  and  the  negotiations,  the  secretive  nature  of  the  Soviet  Union 
would  have  a  serious  effect  on  the  efforts  to  reach  agreement  on  some 
of  the  fundamental  elements  of  control. 

Soviet  development  of  atomic  energy  had  proceeded  quite  well  until 
World  War  II.47  In  terms  of  the  quality  of  research,  the  Soviet  capa- 
bility at  that  point  has  been  estimated  to  have  been  on  a  par  with  that 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  Soviets  were  catching  up  in  the  field  of 
equipment.  As  the  extent  of  Soviet  involvement  in  World  War  II  in- 
creased, however,  they  apparently  found  it  necessary  to  abandon  their 
efforts.  All  available  manpower  and  resources  were  directed  to  meet 
the  German  attacks,  rather  than  toward  the  "calculated  gamble"  of 
research  for  a  nuclear  weapon,  at  least  until  the  setback  for  the  Ger- 
mans at  Stalingrad  in  1943.  Moreover,  as  one  writer  has  asserted,  "the 
Soviet  military  strategy  of  enormous  masses  of  ground  troops,  backed 
by  artillery  and  close  air  support  was  not  conducive  to  a  whole-hearted 
search  for  weapons  useful  to  strategic  aircraft."  4S 

Nuclear  research  in  the  Soviet  Union  was  resumed  in  1944,  but  a 
blackout  was  imposed  on  information  at  that  time.  It  has  been  theorized 
that  the  first  Soviet  nuclear  reactor  was  in  operation  by  late  1947.  This 
occurrence  was  considered  a  turning  point  in  the  Soviet  efforts,  a  point 
which  was  reached  less  than  two  years  after  the  opening  of  the  nego- 
tiations for  international  control  of  atomic  energy.  It  was  only  a 
matter  of  time  before  the  Soviet  research  efforts  succeeded,  as  evi- 
denced by  the  explosion  of  its  first  nuclear  device  in  1949. 

The  contribution  of  Soviet  espionage  activities  in  the  United  States 
to  progress  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  is  hard  to  assess.  One  writer 

^Adam  B.  Ulam,  The  Rivals.  America  and  Russia  Since  World  War  II.  (New  York: 
Viking  Press.  1971).  pp.  106-107. 

47  The  following  discussion  is  based  on  Kenneth  Whiting.  "Post-War  Strategy,"  in  Asher 
Lee,  ed.  The  Soviet  Air  and  Rocket  Forces.  (New  York:  Praeger,  1959),  pp.  91-95. 

«Ibid.,  p.  92. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-7 


has  attempted  to  put  this  question  in  perspective  when  he  comments  on 
this  possibility  as  follows : 

We  still  do  not  know  how  much  the  relatively  short  gap 
between  the  first  American  and  the  first  Russian  explosion 
was  due  to  successes  in  Soviet  espionage,  and  how  much  it 
was  due  simply  to  native  Russian  capability.  At  the  time  it 
seemed  to  many  of  us  that  espionage  must  have  been  far  and 
away  the  main  reason  they  were  able  to  accomplish  the  job  so 
quickly,  especially  after  the  devastation  that  had  been 
wreaked  on  them  by  World  War  II.  Haying  since  seen  some 
excellent  Russian  technological  progress  in  other  fields,  we  are 
no  longer  quite  so  sure  that  this  was  the  case.  We  should  note, 
furthermore,  that  it  is  always  easier  to  do  something  a  second 
time,  even  if  the  only  thing  known  from  the  first  time  is  that 
it  can  be  done.49 

All  things  considered,  an  awareness  of  the  progress  of  Soviet  nuclear 

technology  may  contribute  to  an  understanding  in  retrospect  of  the 

Soviet    perceptions   and    attitudes    during   the   negotiations   of   the 


The  Form  and  Purposes  of  International  Control 

The  first  question  which  arose  in  connection  with  the  atomic  energy 
policy  formulation  in  1947  was  whether  the  general  form  of  control 
should  depend  primarily  on  a  system  of  international  ownership  and 
management,  or  on  a  system  which  left  atomic  energy  development  in 
national  hands  and  relied  on  inspection  to  assure  compliance  with  an 
agreement  not  to  develop  atomic  energy  for  military  purposes.  Few 
specifics  regarding  the  substantive  aspects  of  this  control  issue  were 
offered  in  the  early  international  political  actions  on  the  subject.  The 
resolution  which  established  the  UNAEC  simply  called  on  the  pro- 
posed Commission  to  make  proposals  for  "effective  safeguards"  to  in- 
sure compliance  with  the  control  arrangement.  Although  it  mentioned 
inspection  as  one  type  of  safeguard,  it  offered  no  commitment  to  a 
particular  method. 


The  Hoard  of  Consultants'1  position  against  inspection:  The  con- 
cept of  inspection  was  distasteful  to  the  members  <>!'  the  Hoard  of  Con- 
sultants. The  Hoard  saw  it  as  inherent  in  the  leading  alternative  to 
their  own  proposals:  to  leave  atomic  energy  development  in  the  hands 
of  individual  nations  while  prohibiting  its  development  for  military 
purposes  would  require  inspection  of  national  activities.  Thus,  inspec- 
tion would  be  the  sole  means  of  verification  of  the  control  system,  an 
arrangement  which  t  he  ( lonsilltants  opposed. 

The  Hoard's  position,  as  expressed  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report, 
was  not  based  solely  on  technological  considerations;  it  included  "the 
inseparable  political,  social,  and  organizational  problems  involved  in 
enforcing  agreements  between  nations,  each  free  to  develop  atomic 
energy,  but  only  pledged  not  to  use  it  for  bombs."  "  Nevertheless,  the 
argument  against  inspection  in  the  report  originated  with  the  techno- 

'"Herberl  York,  Race  to  oblivion:  A  Participant's  liar  of  the  Arm*  Race.  (New  York: 

Si d  &  Schuster,  1971  >,  pp.  34   35. 

60  State  I)t'i>iirtinent,  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report",  p.  4. 


logical  premise  that  the  processes  associated  with  the  development  of 
atomic  energy,  whether  for  military  or  peaceful  purposes,  "are  in 
much  of  their  course  interchangeable  and  interdependent."  Because  of 
this  factor,  it  was  considered  necessary  under  a  control  arrangement  to 
monitor  each  stage  in  the  process  of  developing  atomic  energy,  from 
raw  materials  to  finished  product,  to  insure  that  the  materials  were 
not  diverted  at  some  point  in  the  process  to  weapons  development  by 
an  individual  nation.  Such  a  comprehensive  inspection  system  would 
take  a  great  number  of  inspectors;  moreover,  the  inspectors  would  be 
called  upon  to  determine  intent  behind  an  operation  associated  with 
atomic  energy  development.  The  Consultants  asserted  that  "at  no 
single  point  can  external  control  of  an  operation  be  sufficiently  reliable 
to  be  an  adequate  sole  safeguard."  51 

Another  technological  argument  against  inspection  concerned  the 
need  for  technical  expertise  in  the  staff  which  monitored  atomic  energy 
activities.  To  determine  the  existence  of  violations,  staff  members  of 
an  inspectorate  would  have  to  be  highly  trained  in  the  field  of  atomic 
energy  development.  Moreover,  the  organization  would  have  to  be 
involved  in  research  and  development  activities  to  keep  abreast  or 
ahead  of  advanced  and  changing  developments,  in  a  field  which  is  "es- 
sentially a  living  art."  Otherwise,  would-be  violators  might  try  to 
exploit  breakthroughs  if  they  discovered  them  first.  According  to  the 
Board  of  Consultants,  an  inspection  system  would  "inevitably  be  slow 
to  take  into  account  changes  in  the  science  and  technology  of  the 
field."  52 

The  remainder  of  the  remarks  against  inspection  in  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  seem  to  be  derived  from  the  "political,  social,  and 
organizational  problems"  of  a  control  system,  rather  than  from  the 
technological  requirements.  The  Consultants  asserted  that  an  inspec- 
tion system  having  a  generally  policelike  character,  would  be  deemed 
negative  and  suppressive.  This  quality  would  have  a  number  of  ill 
effects  on  the  control  system  and  its  personnel.  First,  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  attract  highly  qualified  personnel  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
to  an  inspection  team  having  this  character,  and  the  team  itself  would 
encounter  problems  in  morale.  Second,  because  inspection  of  facilities 
would  require  a  large  number  of  inspectors,  the  presence  of  many  for- 
eigners in  participating  countries  would  intrude  excessively  into  na- 
tional activities,  challenge  the  good  faith  of  the  nations,  and  provide 
a  likely  source  of  tension  and  friction.  On  this  particular  point,  the 
Consultants  declared  that  this  arrangement  would  be  "as  obnoxious  to 
Americans  as  to  any  others."  53  Finally,  the  Consultants  contended,  un- 
der a  system  which  entrusted  atomic  energy  development  to  individual 
nations,  "suspicion  by  one  nation  of  the  good  faith  of  another  and  the 
fear  engendered  thereby  are  themselves  strong  incentives  for  the  first 
to  embark  on  secret  illicit  operations  [and]  any  system  based  on  out- 
lawing the  purely  military  development  of  atomic  energy  and  relying 
solely  on  inspection  for  enforcement  would  at  the  outset  be  surrounded 
by  conditions  which  would  destroy  the  system."  54  Indeed,  a  basic 
source  of  the  problem  associated  with  inspection,  according  to  the 

51  Ibid.,  p.  6. 

52  Ibid. 

53  Ibid.,  p.  7. 

54  Ibid.,  p.  8. 


Board,  was  the  national  rivalries  which  would  result  as  countries  en- 
gaged in  atomic  energy  development : 

National  rivalries  in  the  development  of  atomic  energy 
readily  convertible  to  destructive  purposes  are  the  heart  of 
the  difficulty.  So  long  as  intrinsically  dangerous  activities  may 
be  carried  on  by  nations,  rivalries  are  inevitable  and  fears  are 
engendered  that  place  so  great  a  pressure  upon  a  system  of 
international  enforcement  by  police  methods  that  no  degree 
of  ingenuity  or  technical  competence  could  possibly  hope  to 
cope  with  them.55 

International  oionership  and  operation  of  dangerous  activities: 
Awareness  of  the  political  problems  caused  by  inescapable  national 
rivalries  provided  the  main  basis  for  the  Consultants'  proposals.  The 
Consultants  sought  to  eliminate  these  rivalries  by  internationalizing 
certain  activities  which  might  become  a  source  of  competition  among 
nations.  As  was  the  case  with  the  Consultants'  views  of  inspection,  they 
looked  to  both  technological  and  political  considerations  to  support 
their  ideas  for  assigning  certain  activities  to  an  international 

The  practicability  of  such  an  international  Authority,  in  their  view, 
would  be  derived  from  certain  technological  characteristics  of  atomic 
energy  development.  An  inherent  technological  difficulty  of  an  inspec- 
tion system  was  how  to  determine  the  intent  behind  an  activity  in 
atomic  energy  development,  that  is.  whether  it  was  designed  for  peace- 
ful or  military  purposes. 

The  Consultants  asserted  that  specific  categories  of  activity  could  be 
identified  which,  if  undertaken  by  an  individual  nation,  clearly  would 
constitute  a  violation  of  the  control  system:  such  activities  should  be 
assigned  to  an  international  Authority.  This  arrangment  would  elim- 
inate the  need  to  determine  intent  behind  a  national  activity  in  the 
atomic  energy  field.  This  concept  was  developed  to  the  extent  that  the 
Board  named  in  broad  terms  certain  '"safe"  and  "dangerous"  activi- 
ties. They  warned,  however,  that  these  categories  would  have  to  be 
subject  to  constant  reevaluation  and  revision  in  light  of  potential  ad- 
vances in  atomic  energy. 

One  example  of  how  internationalization  would  function  concerned 
the  raw  materials  needed  for  atomic  weapons;  namely,  ores  of  uranium 
and  possibly  thorium.5"  The  existing  technical  knowledge  at  that  time 
supported  the  conclusion  that  these  materials  were  the  only  source  of 
nuclear  fuel  materials57  which  could  energize  nuclear  reactors  for  use 
either  to  produce  fissionable  materials  for  nuclear  explosives,  or  to 
generate  electricity.  The  practical  problems  posed  by  attempting  to 

monitor  the  use  of  these  raw  materials  were  considered  "most  difficult." 
Hut  management  of  actual  mining  operations  by  an  international 
Authority  would  provide  assurance  that  it  could  account  for  all  sources 

ra  Ihid      ]>    5 

w  The  role  of  thorium  in  atomic  energy  illustrates  the  difficulty  Imposed  by  secrecy.  The 
fact  was  still  "classified"  In  1946.  that  the  addition  of  slow  neutrons  to  thorium  converted 
it  Into  U238,  which  was  fissionable.  Nevertheless  the  Acheson-Lillenthal  report  proposed 
thai  its  presence  In  a  nuclear  reactor  Bhould  be  prohibited  withoul  Baying  why. 

Uranium  ores  could  provide  the  raw  material  for  production  of  the  fissionable  isotope 
uranium-235,  and  also  for  the  manufacture  of  plutonlum  by  the  exposure  of  uranium-238 
to  neutrons  within  a  nuclear  reactor.  Uranium  235  and  plutonlum  could  be  used  for  nuclear 


of  raw  materials.  Moreover,  if  possession  of  raw  materials  should  be- 
come the  exclusive  prerogative  of  the  international  Authority,  any  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  an  individual  nation  to  exercise  control  over  raw 
materials  would  represent  a  clear  violation.  Mere  possession,  irrespec- 
tive of  use  or  intent,  would  be  illegal.  An  added  advantage  owing  to 
technological  factors  was  that  this  particular  violation  would  occur 
early  enough  in  the  development  process  to  allow  other  nations  to  take 
appropriate  action  to  prevent  national  production  of  atomic  weapons. 
Another  advantage  created  by  technological  circumstances  was  that 
uranium  and  thorium  occurred  under  special  geological  conditions 
which  reduced  the  task  of  controlling  the  raw  materials  to  "manage- 
able proportions,"  a  characteristic  of  a  control  system  which  the  Con- 
sultants considered  essential  to  effective  safeguards.  Moreover,  the 
Consultants  concluded  that  enough  knowledge  had  been  acquired  to 
indicate  that  this  principle  regarding  raw  materials  (as  well  as  others) 
was  not  likely  to  be  altered  significantly  by  further  scientific 

A  similar  case  could  be  made  for  the  plutonium-producing  atomic 
reactor,  a  design  which  produces  material  usable  for  either  atomic 
weapons  or  power.  By  granting  responsibility  for  building  and  operat- 
ing such  reactors  solely  to  an  international  Authority,  an  attempt  by  a 
country  to  usurp  this  activity  would  represent  an  unambiguous  viola- 
tion. Determination  of  intent  for  the  use  of  the  product  of  the  re- 
actors would  not  be  necessary. 

Aside  from  the  technological  concepts  which  were  considered  to 
justify  international  operation  of  a  number  of  specified  activities,  the 
report  commented  on  another  quality  of  such  an  approach  which  would 
make  it  advantageous  to  a  secure  system  of  safeguards.  The  activities 
which  the  Consultants  contemplated  turning  over  to  an  international 
Authority  were  also  considered  those  most  likely  to  foster  rivalry 
among  nations.  Removing  these  from  national  hands  would  greatly 
reduce,  if  not  eliminate  competition  among  nations  in  atomic  energy 
development,  thereby  enhancing  the  security  of  nations  under  the  con- 
trol system. 

Another  advantage  of  internationalization  was  illustrated  by  the 
proposal  to  give  the  Authority  the  function  of  development  and  re- 
search in  the  field  of  atomic  energy.  This  function  would  be  aided  by 
the  fact  that  the  Authority  would  conduct  the  principal  processes  of 
atomic  energy  development.  Both  practical  and  political  concepts 
played  a  role  in  establishing  the  report's  position  on  this  point.  In  the 
opinion  of  the  Board,  the  control  organization  would  have  to  stay  in 
the  forefront  of  knowledge  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  to  maintain 
awareness  of  discoveries  which  could  have  a  potential  for  violation  of 
a  control  agreement.  Thus  a  research  and  development  function  for 
the  international  agency  would  enhance  the  efficiency  of  the  control  or- 
ganization in  detecting  violations.  An  additional  reason  for  assigning 
this  function  to  the  international  Authority  was  based  partly  on  the 
technological  prospect  that  in  the  foreseeable  future,  atomic  energy 
could  be  used  substantially  in  a  beneficial  way.  This  function,  it  was 
suggested,  would  attract  and  hold  the  skilled,  imaginative  staff  so 
vital  to  the  successful  operation  of  a  control  authority.  But  the  prin- 

58  Indeed,  one  section  of  the  report,  "The  Adequacy  of  Present  Scientific  Knowledge."  is 
devoted  to  explaining  that  there  were  basic  scientific  principles  which  could  be  expected 
to  remain  unchanged,  and  would  therefore  provide  a  reasonably  sound  basis  for  devising 
a  control  system. 


ciples  to  support  this  idea  are  expressed  in  terms  which  hardly  could 
be  considered  scientific  or  technological : 

While  suppression  is  not  possible  where  we  are  dealing 
with  the  quest  for  knowledge,  this  thirst  to  know  (that  can- 
not be  ''policed"  out  of  existence)  can  be  used,  affirmatively, 
in  the  design  and  building  of  an  effective  system  of  safe- 

Human  history  shows  that  any  effort  to  confine  the  inquir- 
ing human  mind  *  *  *  is  doomed  to  failure.  *  *  *  Like  the 
jiu  jitsu  wrestler  whose  skill  consists  in  making  his  opponent 
disable  himself  with  his  own  thrusts,  the  designers  of  a  sys- 
tem of  safeguards  for  security  should  and  can  utilize  for  en- 
forcement measures  that  driving  force  toward  knowledge 
that  is  part  of  man's  very  nature.59 

Retention  of  "safe"  national  activities :  The  Consultants  recognized 
that  a  complete  monopoly  of  atomic  energy  activities  by  an  inter- 
national Authority  would  not  be  acceptable  politically  or  economically. 
Therefore,  based  on  the  existing  technical  knowledge,  certain  types 
of  activities  were  classified  as  "safe"  and  Mould  be  allowed  to  remain 
in  national  hands.  The  judgment  that  such  activities  could  be  retained 
safely  on  a  national  level  relied  primarily  on  a  technological  assump- 
tion that  "denaturing"  of  atomic  fuel  was  possible.  The  Consultants 
asserted  that  fissionable  materials  could  be  contaminated  in  such  a 
way  that  they  would  "not  readily  lend  themselves  to  the  making  of 
atomic  explosives,  but  they  can  still  be  used  with  no  essential  loss  of 
effectiveness  for  the  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy."60  Re- 
versal of  the  denaturing  process,  to  make  the  materials  suitable  for 
weapons  production,  was  thought  to  involve  a  difficult  and  easily  de- 
tectable effort. 

Using  denatured  materials,  the  Consultants  declared,  nations  could 
puisne  a  number  of  legitimate  activities,  such  as  the  operation  of  re- 
search reactors  (kept  below  a  certain  power  level),  construction  and 
operation  of  reactors  to  produce  radioactive  materials,  and  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  reactors  to  generate  electric  power.  For  these 
activities  to  be  entrusted  to  national  hands,  designs  would  have  to  be 
devised  for  reactors  which  could  not  be  diverted  to  dangerous  use.  The 
denatured  materials  and  operation  of  these  activities  would  have  to 
be  licensed  or  controlled  in  some  way  by  the  international  Authority. 
In  discussing  the  Authority's  licensing  functions  under  which  national 
activities  would  operate,  the  Consultants  raised  the  following 
questions : 

How  shall  control  be  exercised  lightly  enough  to  assure  the 
free  play  of  national  and  private  enterprise  without  risk  to 
security?  I  low  shall  facilities  and  materials  available  for 
national  and  private  exploitation  1m>  allocated  and  at  what 
cosl  '.  How  may  safe  activities,  assigned  to  national  hands,  be 
withdrawn  if  new  discoveries  show  them  to  be  dangerous? 61 

The  entire  discussion  of  national  activities  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
report  would  seem  to  imply  that  the  Consultants  envisioned  and  sup- 
ported rather  active  national  programs  in  atomic  energy  development. 
These  activities  would  be  of  a  sufficient  scale  and  variety  to  encourage 

m  Ibid.,  p.  15. 

00  Ibid  .  p.  2\\. 
81  Ibid.,  p.  35. 


development  and  competition  among  nations  and  private  industry. 
Moreover,  active  national  participation  in  atomic  energy  development, 
they  hoped,  would  "help  correct  any  tendencies  that  might  otherwise 
develop  toward  bureaucratic  inbreeding  and  over-centralization,  and 
aid  in  providing  healthy,  expanding  national  and  private  develop- 
ments in  atomic  energy."  62 

Although  the  Board  contended  that  the  technological  factors  associ- 
ated with  denatured  materials  lent  credence  to  their  expectations  for 
national  activities,  they  warned  that : 

Although  as  the  art  now  stands  denatured  materials  are 
unsuitable  for  bomb  manufacture,  developments  which  do 
not  appear  to  be  in  principle  impossible  might  alter  the 

During  Administration  deliberations  before  the  opening  of  the 
UNAEC,  Baruch  said  denaturing  had  inspired  false  hopes,  and  in  his 
initial  address  to  the  UNAEC  he  stated  that  "Denaturing  seems 
to  have  been  overestimated  by  the  public  as  a  safety  measure.'' G4 
Both  the  first  and  second  reports  of  the  UNAEC  granted  the 
possibility  of  permitting  national  activity  using  denaturing  mate- 
rials only  if  the  denaturing  process  proved  technologically  feasible. 
This  skepticism  of  the  reliability  of  denaturing,  as  well  as  Soviet  op- 
position to  proposals  for  international  ownership  and  inspection,  ap- 
pear to  have  been  responsible  for  the  fact  that  the  proposed  reliance 
on  denaturing  did  not  become  a  major  issue  in  the  negotiations.  In 
retrospect,  the  U.S.  position  on  denaturing  appears  to  have  been 
based  upon  a  technology  forecast — the  assumption  of  a  principle  which 
today,  25  years  later,  has  remained  undemonstrated  in  practice.  This 
fact  points  up  one  occasion  when  forecasts  by  scientific  advisors  would 
not  have  met  the  needs  of  the  diplomats. 

Inspection  jrrovisions  in  the  report :  Despite  the  number  of  nega- 
tive aspects  of  inspection,  the  Board  members  pointed  out  that  the 
need  for  it  could  not  be  eliminated  entirely.  However,  the  overall  plan 
they  recommended  was  aimed  at  making  inspection  "so  limited  and 
so  simplified  that  it  would  be  practical  and  could  aid  in  accomplishing 
the  purposes  of  security."  65  The  requirements  for  inspection  are  dis- 
cussed in  detail  among  the  functions  of  the  proposed  international 

The  discussion  of  the  issue  tended  to  emphasize  that  inspection  could 
be  beneficial.  Because  inspectors  would  also  be  engaged  in  research 
on  atomic  energy ,GC  their  "policing"  of  national  facilities  (for  example, 
those  using  denatured  materials)  would  offer  opportunities  to  provide 
helpful  guidance  and  advice  to  the  operators  of  those  facilities,  mak- 
ing inspection  less  objectionable.  The  only  "systematic  or  large-scale 
inspection  activities"  contemplated  for  the  proposed  Authority  were 
those  which  would  be  used  to  take  control  over  raw  materials.67  In 
addition,  the  report  recognized  that  some  procedure  would  have  to  be 
devised  for  the  investigation  of  suspected  clandestine  dangerous  activ- 

82  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

83  Ibid.,  p.  23. 

64  Baruch,  "Proposals  for  an  International  Atomic  Development  Authority,"  p.  1061. 

65  State  Department,  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report,"  p.  5. 

98  The  inspectors  of  tlie  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  today  do  not  reflect 
this  concept  of  the  scientist-inspector.  Rather,  present-day  inspectors  are  precisely  that, 
professional  men  in  the  complicated  and  uncertain  art  of  nuclear  materials. 

87  Contemporary  inspection  is  focused  more  on  processing,  fabrication,  use.  and  reproc- 
essing of  nuclear  fuel  materials  than  upon  mining  and  refining. 


ities,  which  might  involve  the  International  Court  of  Justice  or  some 
similar  body,  to  determine  if  enough  evidence  of  clandestine  activity 
existed  to  warrant  investigation.68 

The  report  stressed  that  operation  of  dangerous  activities  by  the 
proposed  international  Authority  could  eliminate  the  need  for  deter- 
mination of  intent  behind  national  or  private  facilities,  and  would 
thereby  avoid  the  need  for  extensive  and  intrusive  inspection.  In  addi- 
tion, the  following  statement  regarding  some  of  the  technical  diffi- 
culties of  engaging  in  clandestine  activities  seemed  to  minimize  not 
only  the  need  for  inspection  but  also,  perhaps,  the  possibility  that 
evasions  might  be  attempted  : 

It  is  true  that  a  thoroughgoing  inspection  of  all  phases  of 
the  industry  of  a  nation  will  in  general  be  an  unbearable 
burden;  it  is  true  that  a  calculated  attempt  at  evasion  may, 
by  camouflage  or  by  geographical  location,  make  the  specific 
detection  of  an  illegal  operation  very  much  more  difficult. 
Hut  the  total  effort  needed  to  carry  through  from  the  mine  to 
the  bomb,  a  surreptitious  program  of  atomic  armament  on  a 
scale  sufficient  to  make  it  a  threat  or  to  make  it  a  temptation 
to  evasion,  is  so  vast,  and  the  number  of  separate  difficult 
undertakings  so  hard  to  conceal,  that  the  fact  of  this  effort 
should  be  impossible  to  hide.  The  fact  that  it  is  the  existence 
of  the  effort  rather  than  a  specific  purpose  or  motive  or  plan 
which  constitutes  an  evasion  and  an  unmistakable  danger  sig- 
nal is  to  our  minds  one  of  the  great  advantages  of  the  pro- 
posals we  have  outlined.60 



When  the  Board  originally  presented  its  plan  to  Achesoirs  commit- 
tee, both  Conant  and  Groves  voiced  apprehension  that  the  need  for 
inspection  had  been  minimized  too  much  and  that  the  terms  which 
the  Consultants  used  to  characterize  it  were  too  negative.  Conant  con- 
sidered it  vital  that  there  be  freedom  of  access  for  inspectors.  At  one 
point  McCloy  raised  the  possibility  that  this  plan  might  be  one  way 
"'to  alter  Russia's  closed  society.'' 70  But  Acheson  discouraged  the  idea 
on  the  grounds  that  the  basic  political  issues  associated  with  the  diffi- 
culties in  United  States-Soviet  relations  could  not  be  resolved  through 
the  efforts  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  international  control  of  atomic 
energy.  Although  Lilienthal  agreed  readily  to  make  changes  appropri- 
ate to  the  views  of  Conant  and  Groves,  the  report's  general  tone  on  the 
issue  of  inspection  remained  negat  ive. 

Despite  the  fact  that  the  Board  had  retained  the  idea  of  some  na- 
tional activity,  significant  forces  at  work  in  the  policymaking  proc- 
ess opposed   extensive   internationalization,   for  technical    and   other 

98  For  a  discussion  of  Inspection,  sop  State  Department,  "Acheson-Lillenthal  Report", 
pp.  35  39. 

•"Ibid.,  pp.  36  ':t    The  Board  seems  t<>  have  given  little  thought   to  the  possible  emer 
gence  <>f  an  international  black  market  in  fissionable  materials,  an  issue  that  is  attracting 
considerable  attention  todaj  as  the  United  states  and  other  governments  push  ahead  with 

die  development  "i   i>r ler  reader  technology,  which  can  greatly  increase  the  amount  "i 

fissionable  material  available  for  direct  use  in  weapons  manufacture,  Today  it'  a  nation  or 
other  institutions  can  obtain  nuclear  materials  en  q  black  market,  it  is  probable  that  such 
an    instrumentality    could    fabricate    small,    inefficient,    but    still    enormously    destructive 

at Iininhs. 

7"  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  Stairs  Atomic  Energy  Commxxsion, 
p.   548. 


reasons.  The  issue  of  ownership  of  raw  materials  is  an  apt  example. 
Searls,  the  mining  engineer  on  Baruch's  delegation,  did  not  share  the 
Consultants'  view  regarding  the  manageability  of  all  the  sources  of 
raw  materials,  and  advised  Baruch  that  the  arrangement  proposed  in 
the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  would  be  difficult.  His  views  were  sec- 
onded by  representatives  of  mining  interests  who  sought  out  Baruch 
to  argue  against  international  ownership.  One  mining  executive  told 
Baruch  "an  international  administration  would  upset  wages,  dissat- 
isfy people,  and,  on  account  of  the  different  nationals  involved,  present 
tremendous  management  difficulties."  71 

Another  argument  against  international  ownership  was  that  it  vio- 
lated the  rights  of  private  enterprise.  Hancock,  of  Baruch's  group, 
contended  that  if  uranium  was  the  byproduct  of  mining  operations 
which  contributed  significantly  to  a  country's  economy,  international 
ownership  would  be  unacceptable  to  that  country.  At  one  meeting, 
when  Hancock  expressed  his  preference  for  more  inspection  over  own- 
ership, Acheson  pointed  out  that  the  Russians  would  not  accept  this 
arrangement  as  the  predominant  safeguard.  Hancock  disagreed,  and 
the  two  men  did  not  resolve  the  issue.72  An  alternative  plan  called  for 
operation  of  nationally  owned  mines  under  "reasonable  regulations" 
of  the  Authority  or  "a  system  of  rigorous  inspection  and  accounting 
procedures  for  the  separation  operations  at  mining  locations  through- 
out the  world."  Baruch's  team  was  willing  to  support  this  position 
against  international  ownership.73  When  Baruch  met  with  the  Ache- 
son  and  Lilienthal  groups,  he  announced  the  delegation's  preference 
for  "some  form  of  licensing  of  private  mining  operations"  and  sug- 
gested using  the  term  "dominion"  to  describe  the  relationship  between 
the  international  Authority  and  raw  materials.74  Apparently,  the  tech- 
nological assertions  which  were  advanced  to  support  the  Consultants' 
proposals  for  ownership  of  raw  materials  were  insufficient  for  the 
United  States  to  overcome  traditional  political  and  economic  concepts 
of  sovereignty  and  private  ownership.  The  varying  assertions  by  the 
qualified  experts  on  the  manageability  of  raw  materials  compounded 
the  confusion  surrounding  the  problem  of  atomic  energy  control.  In 
retrospect,  a  more  important  factor  was  the  discovery  of  uranium 
in  the  years  following  the  negotiations  in  places  where  it  was  not 
anticipated  in  1946. 


As  enunciated  at  the  negotiations,  the  main  thrust  of  U.S.  policy  on 
the  general  form  of  control  shifted  somewhat  from  the  plan  proposed 
in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  In  describing  the  international  Au- 
thority, Baruch's  speech  to  the  UNAEC  offered  a  variety  of  specific 
methods  of  control  over  various  phases  of  atomic  energy  development. 
Among  the  safeguards  he  proposed  were  "various  forms  of  ownership, 
dominion,  licenses,  operation,  inspection,  research,  and  manage- 
ment."70 While  Baruch  stated  that  these  duties  should  interfere  as 
little  as  possible  with  the  internal  affairs  of  the  states  involved,  every 
phase  of  atomic  energy  development  would  be  placed  under  the  juris- 

71  Ibid.,  p.  563. 

72  Ibid.,  p.  569. 

73  Lieberman.  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  276. 

74  Ibid.,  p.  281. 

75  Baruch,  "Proposals  for  an  International  Atomic  Development  Authority,"  p.  1060. 


diction  of  the  international  Authority,  in  one  way  or  another.  One 
point  on  which  the  United  States  yielded  to  private  and  national  in- 
terests concerned  raw  materials,  which  were  proposed  to  be  placed 
under  the  international  Authority's  "dominion"1;  specific  forms  of 
control  over  the  natural  deposits  would  depend  on  the  geological,  min- 
ing, refining,  and  economic  circumstances  of  the  various  locations 
where  they  were  found.  While  the  second  U.S.  memorandum  stated 
that  the  Authority  should  have  such  control  as  would  insure  "its  com- 
plete and  absolute  ownership  of  all  uranium  and  thorium  produced,'' 
the  proposal  involved  a  control  system  imposed  upon  national  mining 
and  concentrating  operations,  rather  than  simply  transferring  these 
activities  to  the  international  Authority,  as  the  Acheson-Lihenthal 
report  had  proposed. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  displayed  some 
enthusiasm  for  allowing  national  and  private  participation  in  certain 
areas  of  atomic  energy  development.  But  when  Baruch  presented  the 
U.S.  proposals  to  the  UNAEC,  the  main  concern  over  national  ac- 
tivities was  that  they  Avould  be  subject  to  licensing  and  inspection  by 
the  Authority.  As  noted  above,  he  questioned  the  effectiveness  of  de- 
naturing to  prevent  illegal  diversion  of  activities  in  national  hands. 
Moreover,  Baruch  stated  that  national  activities  should  be  subordinate 
to  the  international  Authority  and  added  that  this  represented  "neither 
an  endorsement  nor  a  disapproval  of  the  creation  of  national  author- 

In  the  brief  discussion  of  inspection  in  Baruch's  speech,  he  men- 
tioned the  advantages  of  the  overall  plan,  which  stressed  international 
ownership,  thus  providing  unambiguous  evidence  of  violations  and 
limiting  inspection  requirements.  He  also  noted  that  those  activities 
licensed  by  the  Authority  would  be  subject  to  inspection.  II is  third 
point,  however,  which  was  to  become  a  focus  for  Soviet  opposition 
dining  the  negotiations,  was  an  insistence  on  freedom  of  access.  He 
said  :  Adequate  ingress  and  egress  for  all  qualified  representatives  of 
the  Authority  must  be  assured."  7"  Less  attention  was  given  to  the  idea 
of  linking  the  developmental  function  with  inspection,  as  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report  had  done.77 


Soviet  reaction  to  jrroposed  interTiationalizaiion:  Typical  of  the 
Soviet  I'nion's  reaction  to  the  notion  of  international  ownership  was 
Gromyko's  comment  on  the  IXAEC's  first  report;  he  labelled  the 
whole  concept  "thoroughly  vicious  and  unacceptable,"  and  added  that 
international  ownership  and  managerial  control  "would  lend  to  inter- 
ference by  the  control  organ  in  the  internal  affairs  and  internal  life 
of  States  and  eventually  would  lead  to  arbitrary  action  by  the  control 
organ  in  the  solution  of  such  problems  as  fall  completely  within  the 
domestic  jurisdiction  of  a  State."  78 

Soviet  reaction  to  the  requirements  for  inspection  set  forth  by 
Baruch    was   unequivocal,  as   indicated   by   a    press  release   which  dis- 

•"  Ibid.,  i>.  1001. 

"The  first  U.S.  memorandum  touched  on  the  issue  of  inspection  In  a  manner  similar  to 
that  of  Baruch's  speech.  The  second  memorandum  expanded  on  the  Idea  by  elaborating  the 
d(  tail-  of  Inspection,  I.e..  adequate  provision  would  have  to  be  made  for  inspectors  in  terms 

Of    communication    and    transportation,    as    well    as    unhindered    access    to    the    facilities    In 


7"Stat>-   Department,   Polioi/  at   the  Crossroads,  p.  80. 


cussed  a  speech  by  Gromyko  to  a  committee  of  the  UNAEC  in  July 


Mr.  Gromyko  said  that  the  proposed  inspection  is  not  re- 
concilable with  the  principle  of  sovereignty  of  states.  "No  in- 
spection as  such  can  guarantee  peace  and  security."  And.  he 
added,  ''This  idea  of  inspection  is  greatly  exaggerated  in  im- 
portance. Tt  is  a  too  superficial  understanding  of  the  problem 
of  control."  The  Soviet  Delegate  repeated  that  inspection  has 
assumed  undue  importance  in  the  course  of  the  discussions 
and  said  that  the  only  real  underlying  method  of  control  is 
"by  the  cooperation  of  the  United  Nations."  79 

The  origin  for  this  opposition  appears  to  have  been  in  the  precepts 
associated  with  the  political  principle  of  national  sovereignty.  One 
U.S.  response  to  this  argument  was  made  by  Baruch  in  a  speech  be- 
fore Freedom  House  in  October  1946 : 

Every  treaty  involves  some  diminution  of  absolute  national 
sovereignty,  but  nations  enter  into  such  treaties  of  their  own 
free  will  and  to  their  common  advantage.  Indeed,  freedom  to 
enter  into  such  voluntary  international  arrangements  is  in- 
herent in  the  very  concept  of  national  sovereignty.80 

Action  by  the  UNAEC:  The  first  report  of  the  UNAEC  declared  in 
its  "Findings"  that : 

Ownership  by  the  international  control  agency  of  mines 
and  of  ores  still  in  the  ground  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  man- 

Broad  terms  of  reference  were  applied  to  dangerous  activities,  a  cate- 
gory which  seemed  to  include  all  aspects  of  the  production  of  fission- 
able materials: 

*  *  *  Effective  control  of  atomic  energy  depends  upon 
effective  control  of  the  production  and  use  of  uranium, 
thorium,  and  their  fissionable  derivatives.  Appropriate  mech- 
anisms of  control  to  prevent  their  unauthorized  diversion  or 
clandestine  production  and  use  and  to  reduce  the  dangers  of 
seizure — including  one  or  more  of  the  following  types  of  safe- 
guards: accounting,  inspection,  supervision,  management, 
and  licensing — must  be  applied  through  the  various  stages  of 
the  processes  from  the  time  the  uranium  and  thorium  ores  are 
severed  from  the  ground  to  the  time  they  become  nuclear  fuel 
and  are  used.82 

Looking  back  from  the  early  1970s,  when  most  contemporary  chal- 
lenges to  nuclear  power  focus  on  safety  and  environmental  effects,  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that  these  matters  received  scant  attention  by  the 
United  Nations  in  the  1940s. 

The  second  report  of  the  UNAEC  elaborated  on  the  general  concept 
of  ownership  by  the  Agency  and  how  it  applied  to  source  material  and 
the  operation  of  dangerous  facilities,  and  thereby  addressed  itself  to 
political  problems  inherent  in  such  an  arrangement.  The  report's  dis- 

79  State  Department,  Groirth  of  a  Policy,  p.  83. 

80  Ibid.,  p.  91.   He  might,  however,  have  added  that  the  ripht  of  withdrawal  is  also  in 
herent  in  national  sovereignty. 

81  United    Nations    Atomic '  Energy    Commission,    "First    Report    of    the   Atomic    Energy 
Commission  to  the  Security  Council,  31  December  1946,"  p.  16. 

8-  Ibid. 


cussion  was  premised  on  the  assertion  that  it  was  not  possible  to  main- 
tain security  by  allowing  nations  or  individuals  to  have  proprietary 
rights  over  source  materials,  nuclear  fuels,  or  dangerous  facilities.  It 
recognized  the  need  to  protect  certain  rights  of  individual  nations 
and  to  guard  against  any  abuse  of  power  by  the  international  Agency. 
Ownership  by  the  Agency  would  be  "in  the  sense  of  a  trust  exercised 
on  behalf  of  signatory  States  jointly."  While  broad  powers  over  the 
materials  and  facilities  would  be  granted  to  the  Agency  as  owner, 
many  of  these,  especially  those  dealing  with  ''rights  of  disposition." 
would  be  '"very  closely  controlled  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  or  conven- 
tion." Certain  arrangements,  for  example,  the  location  of  facilities 
within  a  country  or  compensation  for  source  materials,  would  have  to 
be  determined  through  agreement  with  individual  nations.  Other  ac- 
tivities would  be  executed  by  the  Agency  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples established  by  treaty  for  governing  the  Agency's  rights  and 
duties  as  "trustee." 

Similarly,  the  report  proposed  that  the  treaty  or  convention  deter- 
mine principles  respecting  the  geographic  distribution  of  production 
facilities  and  stockpiles  of  materials  suitable  for  weapons  use ;  these 
principles  would  be  such  that  no  particular  location  would  have  a 
greater  share  of  materials,  and  thus  would  avoid  the  potential  for  a 
military  capability  or  military  superiority.  It  was  decided  that  the 
Agency  could  not  be  allowed  to  determine  policy  on  this  subject  as 
decisions  in  this  area  affected  world  security.83  Thus,  the  UNAEC  en- 
visioned that  decisions  on  political  considerations  arising  from  the 
rights,  duties,  and  limitations  of  international  ownership  would  be 
agreed  to  before  assumption  by  the  Authority  of  the  powers  entrusted 
to  it. 

In  additional  sections  of  the  second  UNAEC  report,  these  and  other 
concepts  were  developed  in  considerable  detail ;  specific  proposals  dealt 
with  the  mining  of  raw  materials  and  with  dangerous  activities.  Dis- 
cussion of  "dangerous  activities''  offered  proposals  on  the  refining  of 
raw  materials;  the  stockpiling,  production,  and  distribution  of  nuclear 
fuels;  and  the  design,  construction,  and  operation  of  isotope  separa- 
tion plants  and  of  nuclear  reactors. 

These  later  sections  of  the  report  contained  several  observations  with 
regard  to  arrangements  with  individual  nations  which  the  Authority 
would  have  to  make,  some  of  which  might  have  to  be  included  in  the 
treaty  or  convention  establishing  the  Authority.  The  need  for  such 
arrangements  was  recognized,  as  certain  activities  of  the  Authority 
might  a  licet  the  economy  of  a  nation  or  might  otherwise  warrant  com 
pensation  by  the  Authority.  The  report  also  listed  the  various  forms  of 
inspection  and  licensing  activities  and  where  they  would  be  required. 
Although  these  proposals  in  the  second  UNAEC  report  were  based 
primarily  on  technological  considerations,  they  also  involved  political 
factors,  as  reflected  in  the  prescription  that  : 

Production  facilities,  facilities  utilizing  nuclear  fuel,  and 
stockpiles  be  distributed  in  such  a  way  as  to  minimize  the 
possibility  that  seizure  could  provide  an  aggressor  with  a 
militarv  advantage.84 

*>  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  "The  International  Control  of  Atomic 
Energy.  The  Second  Report  •  •  ♦  to  the  Security  Council.-  Sept.  11.  1047.  Reproduced  for 
the  United  Nations  Mission  to  the  United  Nations.  U.N.  Document  S/557,  Mimeo  L>e« 
York     United  Nations,  1047),  pp.  13   17. 

"Ibid.,  p.  3 


Despite  the  kind  of  attention  to  detail  which  might  have  been  expected 
to  ease  Soviet  fears,  the  Soviets  continued  to  express  adamant  opposi- 
tion to  some  of  the  fundamental  features  of  the  plan.  This  attitude 
may  have  lessened  the  value  of  the  efforts  by  the  UNAEC  to  formulate 
the  finer  points  of  the  control  system. 

The  third  report  of  the  UNAEC  may  have  been  commenting  on  the 
need  for  the  acceptance  of  the  general  concept  of  international  owner- 
ship, when  it  stated : 

Only  if  traditional  economic  and  political  practices  are 
adapted  to  the  overriding  requirements  of  international  se- 
curity, can  these  proposals  be  implemented.  Traditional  con- 
cepts of  fhe  economic  exploitation  of  the  resources  of  nature 
for  priv  •  e  or  national  advantage  would  then  be  replaced  in 
this  fielu  by  a  new  pattern  of  co-operation  in  international 

With  regard  to  inspection,  the  first  report  of  the  UNAEC  had  stated 
that  "only''  through  an  "international  system  of  control  and  inspec- 
tion" can  atomic  energy  be  "freed  from  nationalistic  rivalries."  86  It 
called  for  "a  strong  and  comprehensive  system  of  control  and  inspec- 
tion." On  the  "freedom  of  access"  issue,  the  UNAEC  seemed  to  put  its 
recommendations  in  even  more  specific  terms  than  Baruch,  when  the 
report  stated  that  the  treaty  or  convention  establishing  the  interna- 
tioral  Authority  should  contain  provisions — 

*  *  *  Affording  the  duly  accredited  representatives  of  the 
utornational  control  agency  unimpeded  rights  of  ingress, 
3gi  ss,  and  access  for  the  performance  of  their  inspections 
and  other  duties  into,  from,  and  within  the  territory  of  every 
participating  nation,  unhindered  by  national  or  local 

Committee  Two's  report,  appended  to  the  first  UNAEC  report,  had 
referred  to  the  need  for  inspection  quite  frequently  in  regard  to  a  num- 
ber of  activities.  The  group  defined  inspection  as  follows : 

2.  Inspection  means  close  and  careful  independent  scrutiny 
of  operations  to  detect  possible  evasions  or  violations  of  pre- 
scribed methods  of  operation.  In  addition  to  direct  auditing 
measures  as  described  above,  inspection  may  include  observa- 
tion of  points  of  ingress  to  and  egress  from  an  establishment 
or  installation  to  ensure  that  materials  and  supplies  are  flow- 
ing in  the  prescribed  manner,  observation  of  the  activities 
within  the  establishment  or  installation,  and  measures  in  the 
form  of  aerial  or  ground  survey  and  otherwise  to  guard 
against  clandestine  activities.  To  be  fully  effective,  the  power 
of  inspection  may  require  that  the  operations  be  carried  on  in 
a  specified  manner  in  order  to  facilitate  the  inspection.  In  this 
event,  inspection  verges  on  supervision.88 

The  need  for  inspection  was  discussed  in  Committee  Two's  report, 
and  during  the  negotiations,  insofar  as  it  related  to  examination  of 
"declared"  activities,  i.e.,  those  facilities  operated  by  the  proposed 

83  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Official  Records.  Third  year.  Special 
Supplement.  "Third  Report  to  the  Security  Council.  May  17.  194S."  (Lake  Success,  New 
York  :  August  1948)  p.  4.  (AEC/31/Rev.  1.  June  27,  1948.) 

86  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  "First  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
mission to  the  Security  Council,  31  December  1946,"  p   16. 

87  Ibid.,  pp.  18-19. 

88  Ibid.,  p.  44. 


Authority  or  by  national  or  private  management  licensed  bv  the  Au- 
thority. Suspected  clandestine  activities  seemed  to  present"  the  most 
difficulties  in  the  findings  and  recommendations  of  the  UNAEC  and 
in  the  negotiations  themselves.  Committee  Two's  report  seemed  to  rec- 
ognize that  inspection  for  clandestine  activities  represented  one  of 
the  more  troublesome  political  problems  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  ne- 
gotiations. Moreover,  it  reflected  a  recognition  of  how  certain  inherent 
technological  demands  of  atomic  energy  control  were  in  conflict  with 
traditional  political  requirements  of  states: 

Like  all  problems  in  atomic  energy,  the  detection  of  clan- 
destine operations  is  greatly  simplified  by  the  technical  facts 
of  the  field.  Nevertheless,  general  and  political  considerations 
play  a  larger  part  in  the  effectiveness  and  acceptability  of  any 
system  for  the  detection  of  clandestine  operations  than  in  most 
other  parts  of  the  problem.  They  will  need  most  careful  con- 
sideration when  the  functions,  powers,  and  organization  of 
the  agency  are  defined.  It  will  be  here  that  the  conflicts  be- 
tween the  requirements  of  the  international  control  agency  on 
the  one  hand  and  considerations  of  national  sovereignty  and 
present  practice  on  the  other  will  have  to  be  resolved.89 

The  second  report  of  the  UNAEC  attempted  to  deal  with  the  politi- 
cal problems  associated  with  inspection  in  a  section  entitled  "Rights 
of  and  Limitations  on  the  International  Agency  in  Relation  to  In- 
spections, Surveys,  and  Explorations."  It  offered  21  specific  proposals 
on  such  subjects  as  procedural  details  of  inspections,  ground  or  aerial 
surveys,  and  the  like.  Six  of  these  were  devoted  to  proposals  dealing 
with  investigation  of  clandestine  activities.90  Many  of  these  procedural 
proposals  were  made  with  the  understanding  that  they  should  be  in- 
corporated in  the  treaty  or  convention  establishing  the  Authority.  The 
following  concluding  statement  may  serve  as  a  general  comment  on 
the  character  of  the  inspection  envisioned  by  the  UNAEC  in  its  sec- 
ond report: 

In  summary,  the  proposals  contained  in  this  chapter  pro- 
vide very  extensive  powers  of  inspection  and  search  which 
enable  the  agency  to  visit  any  accessible  place  and  provide 
appropriate  procedures  applicable  in  certain  specified  circum- 
stances. It  has  to  be  recognized  that,  in  addition  to  these  pro- 
posed procedural  requirements  and  limitations,  the  good  sense. 
as  well  as  the  budget,  of  the  agency  will  themselves  be  limita- 
tions on  the  exercise  of  powers  given  to  the  agency  and  that, 
by  virtue  of  the  prospective  functions  of  the  agency  which 
have  been  proposed  in  previous  chapters,  the  amount  or  inspec- 
tion required  and  t  he  attendant  interferences  will  be  much  less 
than  would  be  necessary  under  a  control  system  which  sought 
to  depend  on  inspection  alone.1'1 

With  regard  to  declared  facilities,  the  Soviets  woidd  agree  only  to 
"periodic  inspections."  or  to  inspections  "carried  out  at  definite  inter- 

» Ibid.,  p.  56. 

■  The  main  categories  of  these  proposals  were  the  following:  (1)  requirement  of  war 
rants  or  special  consenl  ;  cj  i  granting  of  special  consent  :  (3)  resorl  to  domestic  or  inter 
national  court,  body,  or  official;  (i>  domestic  •■,,urts.  bodies,  or  officials  required  to  issue 
warrants  upon  showing  of  probable  or  reasonable  cause;  (5)  International  court,  body,  or 
official  required  to  issue  warrants  upon  showing  of  probable  or  reasonable  cause:  and  (6) 
scope  of  warrants.  Complete  details  of  these  proposals  <;m  be  found  in  United  Nations 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  "The  International  Control  of  Atomic  Energy,  The  Second 
Report  to  the  Security  Council",  pp.  54—55. 

«  Ibid.,  p.  50. 


vals,"  but  opposed  permanent  stationing  of  inspectors  in  countries. 
Soviet  proposals  on  this  subject,  though  more  detailed  than  others, 
were  considered  by  the  majority  of  the  Commission  as  failing  to  pro- 

an  adequate  basis  for  the  development  *  *  *  of  specific 

proposals  for  an  effective  system  of  international  control  of 

atomic  energy.92 

The  U.S.  interpretation  of  the  Soviet  proposals  on  inspection  was  that 
it  was  "concerned  chiefly  with  bookkeeping  and  reports."93  As  far  as 
investigation  of  clandestine  activities  was  concerned,  the  Commission 
reported  that  in  the  "minority"  (Soviet)  position,  "inspection  as  to 
clandestine  or  unreported  facilities  is  virtually  ignored."  94  As  was  the 
case  with  international  ownership,  the  extent  of  agreement  on  details 
achieved  by  a  considerable  number  of  UNAEC  members  was  nullified 
by  Soviet  opposition  to  the  basic  principles  behind  the  proposals  on 

In  commenting  on  the  impasse  in  the  negotiations,  the  third  report 
of  the  UNA  EC  seemed  to  focus  on  how  the  inspection  issue,  and  the 
agreed  technological  requirements  of  control,  challenged  national  at- 
titudes toward  security,  secrecy,  and  sovereignty.  It  said  : 

*  *  *  Secrecy  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  is  not  compat- 
ible with  lasting  international  security.  Cooperative  develop- 
ment and  complete  dissemination  of  information  alone  prom- 
ise to  remove  fears  and  suspicion  that  nations  are  conducting 
secret  activities  *  *  *. 

The  majority  of  the  Commission  is  fully  aware  of  the  im- 
pact of  its  plan  on  traditional  prerogatives  of  national  sov- 
ereignty. But  in  the  face  of  the  realities  of  the  problem  it  sees 
no  alternative  to  the  voluntary  sharing  by  nations  of  their 
sovereignty  in  this  field  to  the  extent  required  by  its  proposals. 
It  finds  no  other  solution  which  will  meet  the  facts,  prevent 
national  rivalries  in  this  most  dangerous  field,  and  fulfill  the 
Commission's  terms  of  reference.95 

Moreover,  the  third  report  placed  the  issue  in  a  larger  perspective 
when  it  expressed,  if  perhaps  too  f acilely,  the  hope  that : 

The  new  pattern  of  international  co-operation  and  the  new 
standards  of  openness  in  the  dealings  of  one  country  with  an- 
other that  are  indispensable  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
might,  in  practice,  pave  the  way  for  international  co-operation 
in  broader  fields,  for  the  control  of  other  weapons  of  mass  de- 
struction, and  even  for  the  elimination  of  war  itself  as  an 
instrument  of  national  policy.96 

The  Issue  of  Stages  of  Transition  to  International  Control 

A  second  major  problem  for  U.S.  policy  and  for  the  negotiations  in- 
volved the  manner  in  which  an  international  control  Authority  would 
assume  its  responsibilities,  or  the  stages  by  which  there  would  be  a 

82  Proposals  and  Recommendations  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
Sec.  2,  "Report  and  Recommendations  of  the  Third  Report  of  the  United  Nations  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  adopted  May  17,  194S."  pp.  77-78,  as  quoted  in  Bechhoefer,  Post- 
war Negotiations,  p.  66. 

93  State  Department,  Polici)  at  the  Crossroads,  p.  137. 

91  U.S.  Participation  in  the  U.N.,  Report  1047,  p.  103,  as  quoted  in  Bechhoefer,  Postwar 
Xeriotiations,  p.  66. 

95  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  "Third  Report  to  the  Security  Council," 
pp.  4-5. 

98  Ibid.,  p.  5. 


transition  from  the  existing  U.S.  control  of  atomic  energy  to  a  system 
of  international  control.  The  issue  of  these  transitional  stages  involved 
partly  the  practical  steps  by  which  the  international  Authority  would 
arrive  at  its  position  of  complete  control  over  atomic  energy,  but  it 
also  concerned  the  underlying  assumption  that  this  transition  would 
have  to  proceed  in  such  a  way  that  the  control  system  would  be  made 
reliable  before  it  could  assume  responsibility  for  the  information  and 
facilities  associated  with  the  dangerous  uses  of  atomic  energy. 

Without  jeopardizing  its  own  military  security  or  that  of  the  other 
nations  of  the  world,  thereby  fulfilling  its  responsibility  as  keeper  of 
the  "sacred  trust''  over  atomic  energy,  the  United  States  had  to  deter- 
mine its  policy  regarding  the  sequence  and  timing  of  the  transfer  of 
information  and  facilities  to  an  international  Authority.  For  other 
countries,  the  issue  of  the  transitional  stages  raised  questions  regard- 
ing whether  and  when  the  United  States  would  relinquish  its  monopoly 
over  atomic  energy7  and  thus  give  up  what  appeared  to  be  a  command- 
ing military  advantage.  Thus,  U.S.  policy  had  to  be  framed  to  satisfy 
multiple  and  conflicting  purposes.  Important  related  questions  for 
policymakers  of  the  United  States  and  other  countries  were,  when 
would  the  United  States  stop  its  production  of  atomic  bombs,  and 
what  would  become  of  its  stockpiles  ? 


The  concept  of  stages  for  the  release  of  information  and  transfer  of 
facilities  had  its  foundations  in  early  U.S.  policy  on  international  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy  and  in  those  international  agreements  which  com- 
mitted the  United  States  to  seek  such  control.  Initial  Administration 
pronouncements  regarding  atomic  energy  included  assurances  that 
the  "secret"  of  weapons  manufacture  would  not  be  released  in  the  ab- 
sence of  international  control.  In  his  October  1945  message  to  Congress, 
which  concentrated  primarily  on  national  control.  President  Truman, 
in  speaking  on  the  problem  of  international  control,  pledged  that 
international  discussions  would  "not  be  concerned  with  disclosures  re- 
lating to  the  manufacturing  processes  leading  to  the  production  of 
the  atomic  bomb  itself,"  and  that  they  would  "constitute  an  effort  to 
work  out  arrangements  covering  the  terms  under  which  international 
collaboration  and  exchange  of  information  might  safely  proceed." 
Although  the  President  did  not  specifically  mention  transitional  stages, 
his  comments  indicate  an  effort  to  avoid  any  implication  that  the  im- 
pending discussions  might  lead  to  dissemination  of  information  on 
atomic  energy,  before  control  of  its  destructive  uses  had  been  achieved. 
As  later  developed  in  U.S.  policy,  this  goal  became  one  of  the  primary 
purposes  for  devising  transitional  stages. 

The  Three  Nation  Agreed  I  >eclaration  of  November  1945  offered  an 
"exchange  of  fundamental  scientific  information  *  *  *  for  peaceful 
ends  with  any  nation  that  will  fully  reciprocate," bul  added  that  much 
of  the  information  on  practical  applications  of  atomic  energy  would 
become   available  "just  as  soon  as  effective  enforceable  safeguards 

"Harry  s  Truman,  "Special  Message  to  the  Conpn>ss  on  Atomic  Energy,  October  3, 
I'M.".  /  ublic  Papers  of  th(  President  of  tin  United  States,  1945  (Washington,  D.C. :  u.b. 
Gove'rnmenl  Printing  Office,  1961  >,  i>.  366. 


against  its  use  for  destructive  purposes  can  be  devised."  98  Moreover, 
the  statement  recommended  that  the  proposed  U.N.  Commission  pro- 
ceed "by  separate  stages,  the  successful  completion  of  each  one  of  which 
will  develop  the  necessary  confidence  of  the  world  before  the  next  stage 
is  undertaken."  "  The  same  phrase  was  incorporated  in  the  Moscow 
Declaration  and  in  the  resolution  which  established  the  UNAEC.  At 
the  Moscow  Conference,  the  provision  that  the  work  of  the  Commission 
should  proceed  by  stages  had  been  strongly  supported  by  the  United 
States;  Russian  agreement  was  obtained  primarily  in  exchange  for 
Western  agreement  to  Soviet  insistence  on  the  close  relationship  of  the 
Commission  with  the  U.N.  Security  Council.100 

The  idea  that  the.  proposed  Commission  should  proceed  by  stages 
may  have  made  it  appear  to  the  United  States  that  its  participation 
in  the  proposed  organization  would  involve  the  release  of  information 
on  atomic  weapons  either  for  the  purposes  of  negotiation  or  to  set  up 
the  system  of  international  control.  Thus,  even  before  taking  part  in 
the  negotiations  on  the  substantive  issues  of  control  the  United  States 
felt  it  necessary  to  seek  assurance  that  atomic  weapons  information 
would  be  protected  in  the  absence  of  international  control,  and  this 
concern  was  carried  over  into  the  negotiations  themselves,  as  it  applied 
to  the  transition  from  U.S.  to  international  control. 


Origins  of  the  discussion:  The  idea  of  transitional  stages  in  the 
Aeheson-Lilienthal  report  originated  in  the  attitude  among  the  mem- 
bers of  Acheson's  committee  that  the  security  of  the  United  States 
had  to  be  protected  before  and  during  the  transition  to  effective  inter- 
national control.  Some  committee  members  expressed  concern  lest  in- 
formation and  facilities  associated  with  manufacturing  the  atomic 
bomb  be  released  by  the  United  States  before  a  reliable  system  of  in- 
ternational control  had  been  established.  The  Board  of  Consultants 
did  not  set  out  initially  to  devise  such  stages.  They  viewed  their  basic 
task  as  to  conceive  a  "workable  system  of  international  control,"  and 
tended  to  disregard  devising  the  steps  to  achieve  it.  It  was  only  at 
the  insistence  of  the  Acheson  committee  that  the  Board  resigned  itself 
to  modifying  its  report  to  include  a  general  discussion  of  stages.  The 
finished  form  of  the  Aeheson-Lilienthal  report,  however,  avoided 
going  into  considerable  detail,  on  the  grounds  that  specific  schedules 
would  have  to  be  negotiated  in  the  UNAEC,  and  that  decisions  on  the. 
timing  of  the  release  of  information  and  facilities  by  the  United  States 
should  be  left  to  the  highest  policymakers  in  the  Government. 

Although  the  political  basis  for  the  concept  of  stages  had  been  es- 
tablished in  the  policy  approved  by  the  President,  the  Board  of  Con- 
sultants apparently  preferred  to  omit  explicit  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject, even  though  Conant  had  earlier  mentioned  to  the  Board  the  need 
for  transitional  stages.101  In  the  Board's  original  report  to  Acheson's 
committee,  the  Consultants  did  not  deal  with  the  issue  of  transitional 

98  state  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  25. 
m  Ibid. 

100  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  216. 

101  Hewlett   and    Anderson,   History  of  the   United  States  Atomic  Energy   Commission, 
p.  534. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.   1-8 


stages  beyond  the  assertion  that  a  necessary  first  step  would  be  a  raw 
materials  survey.  This  consideration  was  primarily  an  operational 
requisite  of  the  international  Authority.  When  the  plan  was  submitted 
to  the  committee,  Conant,  Bush,  and  Groves  were  the  principal  ex- 
ponents of  the  political  and  military  arguments  for  determining  the 
transitional  stages  for  the  release  of  information  and  transfer  of 

Bush  based  his  position  on  the  recognition  that  rapid  demobiliza- 
tion of  U.S.  military  manpower  had  resulted  in  a  U.S.  dependence  on 
the  atomic  bomb  as  its  primary  source  of  military  power,  while  the 
Soviet  Union  had  retained  its  large  armies.  If  the  international  con- 
trol system  should  be  established  in  one  step,  and  the  United  States 
relinquished  its  monopoly,  Bush  argued,  the  Soviets  would  be  left  in  a 
superior  military  position. 

Acheson's  comments  on  the  stages  centered  on  two  considerations. 
First,  while  he  granted  that  the  plan  should  go  into  effect  as  quickly 
as  possible,  he  appeared  to  envision  the  transitional  period  as  one 
which  would  reveal  whether  other  nations  would  adhere  to  a  system 
of  international  control.  Acheson's  remarks  have  been  described  as  fol- 
lows :  "As  soon  as  the  organization  had  completed  the  first  transitional 
phase  and  everyone  was  'playing  pool,'  it  would  turn  to  the  next.  If 
the  first  phase  revealed  bad  faith,  further  progress  was  out  of  the 
question."  102  Acheson's  second  point  was  that  the  United  States  should 
be  prepared  for  crises  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  that  a  variety  of 
issues,  whether  connected  with  the  plan  or  not,  could  sabotage  the 
whole  effort.  Therefore,  U.S.  preeminence  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy 
should  not  be  forfeited  immediately,  in  the  event  that  steps  to  set  up 
the  international  Authority  failed. 

Moreover,  support  for  the  idea  of  stages  was  based  on  the  commit- 
tee's general  view  of  the  complete  plan  for  international  control.  Both 
Acheson  and  Conant  described  the  plan  primarily  as  a  "warning  de- 
vice" whereby  the  United  States  and  other  nations  of  the  world  would 
become  aware  when  a  country  embarked  on  its  own  program  to  de- 
velop nuclear  weapons,  and  could  take  preventive  or  punitive  action. 
Given  this  attitude  toward  the  fully  operational  control  system,  it  is 
understandable  that  the  committee  should  have  sought  to  retain  for 
the  United  States  the  highest  degree  of  military  preparedness  in  the 
event  of  a  breakdown  as  the  system  was  being  established,  while  at  the 
same  time  preventing  other  nations  from  developing  their  own  nuclear 

Committee  members  differed  as  to  the  extent  to  which  a  detailed 
schedule  of  transition  could  be  specified.  Bush  suggested  that  the 
stages  would  have  to  be  defined  clearly  enough  to  insure  acceptability 
of  the  plan,  perhaps  on  the  grounds  that  such  definition  would  serve 
to  strengthen  the  confidence  of  other  nations  in  U.S.  intentions  to  re- 
linquish its  monopoly.  lie  recognized,  however,  that  the  fine  details 
could  not  be  determined  at  that  point,  a  task  which  rightly  belonged 
to  the  American  negotiator.  This  position  was  supported  by  Acheson. 
Throughout  the  deliberations  between  the  Board  and  the  committee, 
General  Groves  supported  the  idea  of  setting  forth  the  most  explicit 
stages  possible,  to  show  "where  the  American  people  would  come  out 

«»  Ibid.,  p.  548. 


if  someone  suddenly  doublecrossed  them."  103  It  was  finally  agreed 
that  the  Board  would  add  a  section  to  its  report  to  deal  with  stages, 
but  only  in  a  "speculative  way."'  The  purpose  of  the  new  section  was 
"to  give  the  report  the  ring  of  reasonableness."  104 

During  the  discussions  with  the  committee,  Lilienthal  had  ques- 
tioned the  group's  competence  to  set  down  the  transitional  stages.  In 
a  meeting  following  the  presentation  of  their  first  report  to  the  com- 
mittee, the  Board  members  were  apprehensive  about  the  idea,  appar- 
ently because  of  its  political  implications.  One  source  has  described  the 
meeting  as.follows : 

All  had  serious  misgivings  about  adding  a  section  on  stages. 
It  was  not  that  they  had  any  illusions  about  Russia.  They 
recognized  that  the  shift  to  international  control  must  come 
in  orderly  steps.  But  they  considered  it  bad  tactics  to  write 
in  an  implied  distrust  of  other  nations.  Their  report  assumed 
the  good  faith  of  Russia.  It  permitted  the  concept  of  stages  to 
evolve  during  the  negotiations.  It  avoided  giving  the  plan  a 
made-in- America  stamp  that  would  prejudice  others  against 
it.  Yet  what  could  the  consultants  do  ?  If  they  refused  to  write 
the  fourth  section,  someone  else  would.  Perhaps  they  ought  to 
stick  with  the  task  and  see  it  done  well.  Distinctly  unhappy, 
fearing  they  were  blighting  the  spirit  of  the  work,  they  de- 
cided to  undertake  the  revision.105 

Final  version — some  technological  considerations :  In  keeping  with 
the  concern  expressed  by  Acheson's  committee,  the  main  thrust  of  the 
discussion  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  on  transition  to  interna- 
tional control  was  the  effect  which  the  transition  process  would  have 
on  U.S.  facilities  and  information,  and  thus  on  the  status  of  U.S. 
military  security.  The  report  stated  that  two  different  kinds  of  sched- 
ules needed  to  be  considered.  One  would  include  "indispensable  re- 
quirements for  the  adoption  and  the  success  of  the  plan  itself"  and 
these  steps  were  "fixed  by  the  plan  itself."  106  The  second  kind  of  sched- 
ules consisted  of  a  number  of  options  which  were  considered  "compat- 
ible with  the  operability  of  the  plan  and  affecting  primarily  its  accept- 
ability to  the  several  nations."  107  The  task  of  choosing  from  these  op- 
tions involved  the  acceptance  of  the  parties  concerned.  Therefore,  it 
should  be  left  to  the  international  negotiations.  In  dealing  with  these 
two  kinds  of  schedules,  the  report  divided  the  nature  of  the  releases 
by  the  United  States  into  two  categories:  material  and  information.. 

The  discussion  of  the  release  of  fissionable  materials  cited  the  two 
kinds  of  schedules  mentioned  above.  In  discussing  those  material  ac- 
quisitions by  the  Authority  which  were  viewed  as  "fixed  by  the  plan  it- 
self," the  report  treated  only  the  initial  operations  of  the  Authority. 
The  first  step,  regarded  as  "an  essential  prerequisite  for  all  further 
progress,"  was  for  the  Authority  to  obtain  "cognizance  and  control 
over  the  raw  materials  situation."  Various  other  steps  were  listed  re- 
garding initial  operations  of  the  Authority,  but  none  would  affect 
U.S.  weapons  production  facilities.  The  report  left  the  determination 

103  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  257. 

lf'4  Hewlett  and  Anderson.  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
p.  549. 

m  Ibid.,  p.  547. 

106  State  Department,  "Acheson-Lilienthal  report,"  p.  45. 

10T  Ibid. 


of  the  schedules  for  the  transfer  of  these  facilities  for  later  negotiation. 
The  same  treatment  was  given  to  disclosures  of  information.  Nego- 
tiators would  need  some  kinds  of  information  to  gain  an  adequate 
understanding  of  atomic  energy,  and  thus  contribute  to  effective  nego- 
tiation of  control.  In  making  a  case  for  these  disclosures,  the  report 
cited  an  earlier  study  of  classified  information,  prepared  by  a  group 
in  the  Manhattan  project,  which  delineated  various  groups  of  infor- 
mation which  could  be  released  or  which  had  to  be  retained.  The 
Acheson-Lilienthal  report  noted  that  this  earlier  report  had  been  able 
to  identify  certain  categories  of  information  which  could  be  released  in 
the  absence  of  international  control  without  jeopardizing  national  se- 
curity. In  appealing  for  the  release  of  certain  kinds  of  information, 
the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  pointed  out  that  all  of  this  information 
fell  into  releasable  categories.108 

The  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  suggested  that  the  timing  and  se- 
quence of  the  release  of  more  sensitive  information  would  depend  on 
the  negotiated  stages  whereby  the  international  Authority  would  as- 
sume its  operations.  Some  of  this  information  would  be  required  to 
enable  the  international  Authority  to  undertake  its  initial  operations. 
Another  portion,  particularly  that  on  atomic  weapons,  would  not  have 
to  be  released  until  such  time  as  the  Authority  was  allowed  to  pursue 
research  in  this  field,  presumably  during  some  later  stage  of  transition. 
The  report  did  emphasize  that  when  the  Authority  was  prepared  to 
take  over  an  operation,  the  United  States  and  other  countries  would 
be  obliged  to  release  to  the  Authority  all  information,  practical  and 
theoretical,  pertinent  to  that  activity.  The  report  also  added  that  in 
order  to  take  over  some  activities,  the  Authority  would  have  to  carry 
on  planning  in  advance,  and  that  for  these  purposes,  information 
might  have  to  be  released  prior  to  actual  operations  by  the  Authority. 
In  discussing  the  need  to  negotiate  many  of  the  schedules  for  the  as- 
sumption of  control  by  the  international  Authority,  the  consultants 
commented  on  the  demands  this  practical  requirement  for  informa- 
tion release  placed  on  U.S.  policy : 

The  extent  to  which  special  precautions  need  to  be  taken  to 
preserve  present  American  advantages  must  be  importantly 
influenced  by  the  character  of  the  negotiation  and  by  the 
earnestness  which  is  manifested  by  the  several  nations  in  an 
attempt  to  solve  the  common  problems  of  international  con- 
trol. These  questions  lie  in  the  domain  of  highest  national 
policy  in  international  relations.109 
The  release  of  both  fissionable  material  and  atomic  information  was 
discussed  in  the  report  in  relation  to  U.S.  security;  in  both  areas,  the 
report  declared  that  the  position  of  the  United  States  would  continue 

»°*The  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  described  the  product  of  the  Declassification  Committee 
as  follows:  "It  recommended  against  declassification  at  the  present  time  oi  a  very  con- 
sidernble  body  Of  technical,  technological,  industrial,  and  ordnance  information,  that  is 
information   bearing  directly  on   the  manufacture  of  weapons  and   the  design   and  operation 

of  production  plants.  Bit*  it  recommended  the.  prompt  declassification  of  a  large  Dortyot 

.'      ..^         S_  -.      '        j      -n     J.--T.-I i     i—e „t:„„     «*     ,,..,,    ,.,-H  I. >iil     nntllro     find     W   (IP    n  III)   lea  111    1 IV. 

furtherlngTffoSn  lo^I-tera  muT.rnaT^cirrit^in  the  absence  of  International  measures. 
Ibid.,  pp.  53  54. 

we  Ibid.,  p.  49. 


to  be  a  favorable  one  during  the  stages  of  transition.  As  far  as  facil- 
ities were  concerned  during  the  transition,  all  operating  facilities 
would  be  located  in  the  United  States;  and  if  a  breakdown  in  the  con- 
trol system  occurred,  this  country  would  have  the  advantage.  Sim- 
ilar assurances  were  given  with  regard  to  the  release  of  information. 
As  noted  above,  information  necessary  for  release  during  the  nego- 
tiations met-  the  security  requirements  set  down  in  the  earlier  study  by 
the  Manhattan  District  Group.  Moreover,  the  report  explained,  the 
items  of  information  it  advocated  were  "of  a  theoretical  and  descrip- 
tive nature  and  have  in  large  part  to  do  with  the  constructive  applica- 
tions of  atomic  energy  [and]  involve  almost  nothing  of  know-how."  110 
The  report  contended  that  a  major  source  of  U.S.  superiority  in  atomic 
energy  rested  in  the  actual  experience  of  working  with  the  facilities. 
Thus,  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report  relied  in  part  on  certain  tech- 
nological considerations  to  meet  some  of  the  political  demands  associ- 
ated with  the  transfer  of  U.S.  information  or  facilities.  (One  example 
is  the  assertion  that  selective  release  of  technical  information  would 
not  jeopardize  U.S.  security.)  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  Consult- 
ants pointed  out  that  many  political  decisions  would  have  to  be  made 
in  order  to  determine  U.S.  policy  on  the  arrangements  for  the  transi- 
tion to  international  control.  These  decisions  would  be  governed  partly 
by  the  general  trend  of  the  negotiations,  but  would  have  to  define  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  United  States  was  willing  to  relin- 
quish those  atomic  energy  facilities  associated  with  its  destructive  ap- 
plications and  which  were  then  viewed  as  temporarily  the  exclusive 
property  of  the  United  States.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  on  this 
latter  point,  the  letter  of  transmittal  of  the  report  to  Secretary  Byrnes, 
written  by  Acheson,  discusses  the  stages  at  length,  and  calls  for  fur- 
ther study  and  decisions  to  support  U.S.  policy  on  transitional  stages. 
Indeed,  the  letter  even  comments  on  the  question  of  U.S.  production  of 
bombs,  but  does  not  take  a  position  : 

The  development  of  detailed  proposals  for  such  scheduling 
will  require  further  study  and  much  technical  competence  and 
staff.  It  will  be  guided,  of  course,  by  basic  decisions  of  high 
policy.  One  of  these  decisions  will  be  for  wThat  period  of  time 
the  United  States  will  continue  the  manufacture  of  bombs. 
The  plan  does  not  require  that  the  United  States  shall  dis- 
continue such  manufacture  either  upon  the  proposal  of  the 
plan  or  upon  the  inauguration  of  the  international  agency. 
At  some  stage  in  the  development  of  the  plan  this  is  required. 
But  neither  the  plan  nor  our  transmittal  of  it  should  be  con- 
strued as  meaning  that  this  should  or  should  not  be  done  at 
the  outset  or  at  any  specific  time.  That  decision,  whenever 
made,  will  involve  considerations  of  the  highest  policy  affect- 
ing our  security,  and  must  be  made  by  our  Government  under 
its  constitutional  processes  and  in  the  light  of  all  the  facts  of 
the  world  situation.111 


The  U.S.  policy  on  stages,  as  enunciated  in  Baruch's  speech  and  in 
the  memoranda  which  elaborated  the  U.S.  position,  did  not  develop 

u°Ibid.,  p.  52. 
v*  Ibid.,  p.  vi. 


the  concept  beyond  the  level  of  detail  contained  in  the  Acheson- 
Lilienthal  report.  Indeed,  very  little  was  said  regarding:  the  relation- 
ship between  the  need  for  stages  and  U.S.  security.  In  his  remarks 
to  the  opening  session  of  the  UNAEC,  Baruch  mentioned  stages  only 
in  regard  to  what  would  seem  to  be  a  procedural  matter.  He  merely 
asserted  that  full  control  of  atomic  energy  would  ''have  to  come  into 
effect  in  successive  stages,"  and  that  the  transition  should  be  set 
forth  in  the  charter  creating  the  Authority.  Baruch  recalled  the 
language  of  the  resolution  creating  the  UNAEC  as  the  basis  for  this 

Baruch  did  mention  the  U.S.  role  during  the  transitional  stages, 
with  regard  to  the  release  of  both  information  and  facilities,  in  terms 
which  obviously  offered  few.  if  any,  immediate  concessions  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States.  As  far  as  information  was  concerned. 
Baruch  outlined  basically  the  procedure  recommended  in  the  Aeheson- 
Lilienthal  report,  stating  that  only  the  information  necessary  to  an 
understanding  of  atomic  energy  in  the  negotiations  would  be  revealed 
by  the  United  States  until  a  successful  conclusion  was  reached.  Further 
disclosures  would  depend  "in  the  interests  of  all.  upon  the  effective 
ratification  of  the  treaty,"  and  would  be  carried  out  when  the  inter- 
national Authority  Avas  prepared  to  assume  certain  functions.  In  his 
comments  on  U.S.  facilities,  he  said  that,  "The  United  States  was 
prepared  to  yield,  to  the  extent  required  by  each  stage,  national  control 
of  activities  in  this  field  to  the  Authority."  112 

The  first  U.S.  memorandum  expanded  somewhat  on  Baruch's  state- 
ment that  the  charter  establishing  the  international  Authority  would 
specify  the  sequence  and  timing  of  the  transition  from  the  existing 
conditions  to  international  control.  Besides  citing  this  requirement, 
the  memo  stated  that  the  charter  also  should  specify  "the  time  when 
and  the  conditions  under  which  the  national  and  private  possession, 
manufacture,  and  use  of  atomic  weapons  shall  be  outlawed."113 
Nevertheless,  U.S.  policy  on  the  specific  question  of  the  timing  for  the 
disposal  of  existing  weapons,  a  major  question  dining  the  negoti- 
ations, was  not  mentioned.  The  second  U.S.  memorandum  treated  the 
question  of  transit  ional  stages  in  a  similar  manner  and  did  not  provide 
any  additional  elaboration  of  the  U.S.  position,  particularly  concern- 
ing its  own  contributions  during  the  transitional  process. 

Soviet  policy  on  the  question  of  stages  was  concerned  primarily 
with  the  timing  of  the  destruction  of  existing  atomic  weapons.  It  called 
for  the  establishment  of  international  control  following  an  agreement 
on  the  prohibition  and  destruction  of  atomic  weapons.  This  sequence 
was  never  accepted  by  the  majority  during  the  negotiations: 

While  it  is  generally  agreed  that  atomic  weapons  must  be 
eliminated  from  national  armaments,  the  majority  have  con- 
cluded that  such  elimination  should  come  at  that  stage  in  the 
development  of  the  international  control  system  which  would 
clearly  signify  to  the  world  that  the  safeguards  then  in  op- 
eration provided  security  for  all  participating  states.114 

Indeed,  the  Soviet  Union  itself  recognized  that  there  could  be  no  guar- 
antee that  a  second  agreement  establishing  a  control  system  would  be 

u*  State  Department,  drouth  of  a  Policy,  p.  146. 
'"Thirl      p    14!) 

u* U.S.  Participation   in   the  U.N.,  Report  1047.  p.   103,  as  quoted  in  Bechhoefer,  Post- 
war  Negotiations,  \>.  I 


concluded  following  conclusion  of  an  agreement  to  prohibit  and  de- 
stroy atomic  weapons.115  Apparently,  Soviet  skepticism  regarding  the 
sincerity  of  U.S.  pledges  to  destroy  its  bombs  after  the  institution  of 
international  control  contributed  to  the  persistence  of  the  Soviets  in 
standing  by  their  own  proposals.  Probably  they  saw  advantage  also  in 
delay.  It  seems  a  strong  probability,  moreover,  that  the  progress  of 
their  own  development  of  atomic  energy  may  have  reinforced  the  de- 
termination of  the  Soviets  to  maintain  their  position.  (The  Soviet 
negotiators  may  not  have  been  aware  of  that  progress,  but  those  from 
whom  they  received  their  policy  directives  presumably  were  fully 

In  regard  to  negotiation  of  the  transitional  stages,  the  issue  was 
probably  reduced  to  the  question  of  when  the  United  States  would 
relinquish  its  monopoly  over  atomic  energy,  or  more  specificially,  its 
bombs  and  the  facilities  for  producing  them.  The  Soviets  asked  what 
assurance  there  was  that  destruction  actually  would  be  carried  out. 
During  the  negotiations,  U.S.  policy  on  this  particular  question  was 
not  defined  beyond  the  pledge  that  destruction  of  existing  stockpiles 
would  take  place  when  effective  safeguards  had  been  established.  Ef- 
forts by  the  UNAEC  to  settle  this  question  in  more  precise  terms  were 
unable  to  reach  an*  agreement  satisfactory  to  the  Soviets. 

The  question  of  U.S.  cessation  of  bomb  production  in  relation  to  in- 
ternational control  had  been  raised  during  the  deliberations  which 
resulted  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  Despite  Acheson's  assertion 
in  the  letter  of  transmittal  that  the  report  had  not  taken  a  position 
on  the  timing  for  a  halt  of  U.S.  weapons  manufacture,  the  treatment 
of  the  issue  in  the  report  has  been  interpreted  as  follows : 

*  *  *  the  report  took  no  definite  position,  implying  there- 
fore, that  atomic  weapons  would  continue  to  be  built.  Bomb- 
making  would  have  to  stop  sometime,  but  that  was  a  ques- 
tion for  the  President  to  determine  consistent  with  consti- 
tutional processes  and  in  the  light  of  the  world  situation.116 

In  a  speech  before  Freedom  House  in  October  1946,  Baruch  pledged 
the  intention  of  the  United  States  to  destroy  its  bombs  "if  the  world 
would  join  in  a  pact  to  insure  the  world's  security  from  atomic  war- 
fare." His  comments  on  destroying  U.S.  weapons  prior  to  establish- 
ment of  the  system  posed  the  question : 

Why  should  America  alone  be  asked  to  make  sacrifices  by 
way  of  unilateral  disarmament  in  the  cause  of  good  will?  If 
equality  of  sacrifice  be  needed  then  each  should  participate.117 

Truman  himself  had  written  to  Baruch  the  previous  July : 

We  should  not  under  any  circumstances  throw  away  our 
gun  until  we  are  sure  the  rest  of  the  world  can't  arm  against 

In  discussing  the  negotiations,  Bechhoefer  describes  this  question  as 
"perhaps  the  most  fundamental  divergence  between  the  Soviet  posi- 
tion and  that  of  the  West."  To  Soviet  questions  on  when  bombs  would 
be  eliminated,  the  U.S.  response  was  that  the  majority  had  concluded 

115  Ibid. .  p.  71. 

ua  Laeberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  258. 
117  State  Department,  Groirth  of  a  Policy,  p.  90. 

118Hnrrv   S.   Truman.   Memoirs,  vol.   2.    Years  of   Trial  and   Hope.    (Garden   City,   N.Y.  : 
Doubleday,  1956),  p.  11. 


that  weapons  should  be  eliminated  "at  that  stage  in  the  development  of 
the  international  control  system  which  would  clearly  signify  to  the 
world  that  the  safeguards  then  in  operation  provided  security  for  all 
participating  States."  119 

Bechhoefer  cites  one  discussion  during  the  second  year  of  the  negoti- 
ations which  illustrates  the  "indecisive  nature"  of  the  negotiations  on 
the  question  of  stages.  The  Soviet  Union  had  proposed  an  amendment 
to  the  first  report  which  simply  called  for  destruction  of  manufactured 
and  unfinished  weapons.  The  first  UNAEC  report  had  proposed  dis- 
posal of  bombs,  an  expression  which  meant  the  elimination  of  the  bomb 
mechanism  and  the  peaceful  use  of  the  nuclear  fuel  from  the  dis- 
mantled weapons.  The  Soviet  amendment  had  omitted  any  provision 
for  use  of  the  nuclear  fuel,  which  posed  the  real  danger  following  de- 
struction of  the  bomb  mechanism,  although  they  agreed  that  the  fuel 
should  not  be  destroyed.  During  discussion  of  the  amendment,  the 
U.S.  representative  raised  the  point  that  the  real  issue  was  not  destruc- 
tion of  the  weapons  but  control  of  the  nuclear  fuel  from  dismantled 
weapons.  In  response,  the  Soviet  representative  insisted  that  the 
issue  of  control  could  not  be  discussed  apart  from  destruction  of  weap- 
ons. Attempts  to  settle  this  question  in  the  form  of  a  resolution  were 
fruitless,  when  the  group  could  not  even  agree  on  a  definition  of  the 
term  "'destruction."  References  to  the  term  could  not  be  separated  from 
the  issue  of  stages,  which  comprised  the  basic  source  of  disagreement 
between  the  positions  expressed  by  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 

In  the  face  of  this  impasse,  a  section  on  the  majority  plan  for  control 
in  the  third  report  of  the  UNAEC  included  the  following  statement 
regarding  stages,  which  had  been  retained  verbatim  from  the  recom- 
mendations in  the  first  report : 

The  treaty  should  embrace  the  entire  programme  for  put- 
ting the  international  system  of  control  into  effect  and  should 
provide  a  schedule  for  the  completion  of  the  transitional  proc- 
ess over  a  period  of  time,  step  by  step,  in  an  orderly  and 
agreed  sequence  leading  to  the  full  and  effective  establish- 
ment of  international  control  of  atomic  energy.  In  order  that 
the  transition  may  be  accomplished  as  rapidly  as  possible, 
and  with  safety  and  equity  to  all,  the  United  Nations  Atomic 
Energy  Commission  should  supervise  the  transitional  proc- 
ess, as  prescribed  in  the  treaty,  and  should  be  empowered  to 
determine  when  a  particular  stage  or  stages  have  been  com- 
pleted and  subsequent  ones  are  to  commence.1'-'1 

The  final  report  recognized  that  more  details  would  be  desirable,  but 
stated  that  it  would  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  attempt  to  elaborate  on 
this  and  other  questions  "until  agreement  on  the  basic  principles  of 
control  has  been  reached."  122 

Thus,  it  would  appear  that  efforts  to  determine  the  sequence  and 
t  imingof  the  assumption  of  control  by  the  international  Authority  may 
have  originated  in  the  negotiations  simply  as  a  question  of  tin1  pro- 

1W  I*  S     Participation  in   the  U.N.,  report  1947,  p.  10.1  as  quoted  in  Beehhoofer,  Postwar 
\  egotiations,  p.  74, 
<-*'  For  ;i  il.'iailod  discussion  of  this  particular  point,  see  ibid.,  i>i».  72-74. 

121  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission^  "Third  Report  to  the  Security  Council", 
p.  17    is 

122  Ibid.,  p.  3. 


cedural  steps  necessary  for  setting  up  the  control  system.  However,  the 
negotiations  soon  became  preoccupied  with  the  political  implications 
of  stages,  which  were  important  to  the  security  interests  of  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union ;  that  is,  the  question  of  when 
the  United  States  would  no  longer  be  the  sole  power  in  possession  of 
atomic  weapons. 

The  Issue  of  Enforcement :  Sanctions  and  the  Veto 

The  third  important  issue  in  the  effort  to  establish  international 
control  of  atomic  energy  was  that  of  imposition  of  sanctions  on  viola- 
tors. The  question  of  whether  violators  of  international  control  should 
be  punished  grew  out  of  Baruch's  advocacy  of  the  idea.  He  succeeded 
in  having  it  adopted  as  part  of  the  U.S.  proposal.  During  the  negotia- 
tions, the  question  of  the  procedural  arrangements  to  deal  with  sanc- 
tions— specifically,  whether  the  veto  power  in  the  U.N.  Security  Coun- 
cil could  be  exercised  over  decisions  on  them — represented  a  major 
obstacle  to  agreement. 


Conant  had  cautioned  the  Board  of  Consultants  at  the  outset  that 
the  issue  of  sanctions  was  a  matter  for  the  Security  Council  to  con- 
sider ;  and  during  later  discussions,  one  member  of  the  Board  pointed 
out  that  it  would  have  been  presumptuous  for  a  group  of  technical 
consultants  to  comment  or  make  recommendations  on  such  a  political 
subject.  During  its  deliberations,  the  Board  foresaw  war  as  the  prob- 
able outcome  in  case  of  a  violation,  but  needless  to  say  it  did  not  enter 
into  the  subject  of  the  organizational  mechanism  that  would  be  em- 
ployed to  initiate,  conduct,  and  coordinate  the  war.  This  was  a  political 
problem,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Board,  and  there  was  no  discussion  of  it 
in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report. 

Baruch's  idea  of  establishing  sanctions  to  enforce  the  control  system 
was  discussed  at  the  time  the  U.S.  proposal  was  being  developed.  At  a 
meeting  between  Baruch's  group  and  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  groups, 
opposition  by  the  latter  to  the  idea  of  sanctions  was  unanimous,  ap- 
parently on  the  grounds  that  they  did  not  consider  the  concept  work- 
able under  existing  political  circumstances.  In  turn,  the  members  of 
Baruch's  delegation  to  the  UNAEC  viewed  the  Acheson-Lilienthal 
plan  as  offering  merely  a  warning  device  and  less  than  a  secure  system 
to  guarantee  control  of  the  destructive  uses  of  atomic  energy.  Although 
Lilienthal  granted  that  the  plan  was  only  a  warning  device,  he, 
Acheson,  and  other  members  of  their  groups  argued  that  absolute 
security  was  unattainable,123  Nonetheless,  Baruch  felt  strongly  that  the 
plan  did  not  provide  an  adequate  measure  of  security  and  continued  to 
press  Secretary  Byrnes  for  a  policy  which  included  penalties.  Baruch's 
position  on  penalties  has  been  described  as  follows : 

It  was  important  to  *  *  *  show  the  necessity  of  enforcing 
the  engagements  of  the  nations.  Baruch  considered  penalties 
the  sine  qua  non.  He  was  quite  aware  this  might  bring  the 

123  Later,  Baruch  called  upon  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  comment  on  the  plan  for  atomic 
energy  control.  Both  General  Dwisrht  Eisenhower  and  Admiral  Chester  Nimitz  voiced  doubts 
on  the  effectiveness  and  acceptability  of  sanctions,  while  General  Carl  Spaatz  supported  the 
idea.  Although  Baruch  sought  the  advice  of  the  military,  their  views  did  not  enter  into  the 
discussions  which  determined  policy.  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  pp.  575— 576. 


United  States  ""athwart  of  the  veto  power."  for  war,  the  ulti- 
mate penalty,  might  be  necessary.  *  *  *  Penalties  means  im- 
mediate punishment  and  elimination  of  any  veto  of  it.  *  *  * 
As  for  the  warning  elements  in  the  plan,  the  American  people 
should  know  how  little  it  amounted  to.124 

Eventually,  Baruch  obtained  approval  from  President  Truman  of 
both  the  idea  of  sanctions  and  the  provision  that  the  veto  power  of  the 
Security  Council  would  not  apply  to  the  decision  to  administer  them. 
Two  days  before  the  opening  of  the  UNAEC,  Baruch  briefed  the  Sen- 
ate Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  on  the  U.S.  proposals,  and 
the  members  appeared  to  welcome  the  plan  approved  by  the 


Because  U.S.  policy  on  the  veto  over  sanctions  was  a  principal  target 
of  Soviet  opposition,  and  a  major  hindrance  in  the  negotiations,  a 
discussion  of  this  question  might  be  useful  to  an  understanding  of  the 
principal  issues  of  this  study.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  principle 
of  unanimity — that  is,  the  veto  power — among  the  permanent  mem- 
bers of  the  Security  Council  on  security  matters  had  been  a  contro- 
versial issue  during  negotiation  of  the  U.N.  Charter.  Strong  U.S.  sup- 
port for  the  veto  power  has  been  explained  as  follows : 

*  *  *  The  Western  powers  *  *  *  realized  that  the  veto  privi- 
lege placed  a  premium  on  inaction  at  precisely  the  most  criti- 
cal point  of  great-power  disagreement.  Long  and  fruitless  ef- 
forts were  therefore  made  by  American  experts  *  *  *  to  de- 
vise some  method  of  decisionmaking  on  security  issues  that 
would  allow  the  Council  to  override  the  negative  vote  of  at 
least  one  permanent  member.  All  such  formulae,  however, 
collapsed  before  the  dominating  political  fact  that  the  ad- 
ministration was  not  prepared  to  allow  American  armed 
forces  to  be  ordered  into  some  unknown  future  military  action 
without  U.S.  consent.  Even  had  Executive  officials  felt  less 
strongly  on  the  question,  they  would  never  have  assumed  that 
Congress  could  be  persuaded  to  relinquish  so  much  authority 
to  an  untried  international  organization.1-" 

Thus,  the  policy  of  the  United  States  on  the  veto,  as  it  applied  to 
the  question  of  enforcement  of  atomic  energy  control,  represented  a 
significant  departure  from  its  earlier  policy  on  the  veto  within  the 
general  framework  of  the  United  Nations.  Although  the  question  of 
sanctions  and  its  relationship  with  the  veto  power  was  primarily  a 
political  matter,  a  number  of  technological  factors  associated  with 
atomic  energy  control  may  have  influenced  the  United  States  in  its 
policy  decisions  on  these  subjects. 

This  change  in  US.  policy  was  probably  attributable  to  the  nature 
of  atomic  weapons  and  the  destructive  force  which  they  represented  to 
policymakers,  a  perception  epitomized  in  Baruch's  opening  address  to 
the  [TNAEC: 

Science  has  torn  from  nature  a  secret  so  vast  in  its  poten- 
tialities that  our  minds  cower  from  the  terror  it  creates.  Yet 

121  Ibid.,  pp.  .-,7.",  574. 
'=■'•  [bid.,  pp.  565  574 

120 Emphasis  added,   itnth   B.   Russell,  The  United  Nations  <m<l  United  States  Security 
Policy.  (Washington,  D.C.  :  Brookings,  1968),  i>.  51. 


terror  is  not  enough  to  inhibit  the  use  of  the  atomic  bomb.  The 
terror  created  by  weapons  has  never  stopped  men  from  em- 
ploying them.  For  each  new  weapon  a  defense  has  been  pro- 
duced, in  time.  But  now  we  face  a  condition  in  which  adequate 
defense  does  not  exist.  *  *  *  The  search  of  science  for  the 
absolute  weapon  has  reached  fruition  in  this  country.127 

In  light  of  the  fact  that  the  atomic  bomb  inspired  such  awe,  it  is 
not  difficult  to  understand  how  an  important  U.S.  political  stance  could 
experience  such  a  drastic  modification  in  the  form  of  the  proposal 
that  the  veto  power  should  not  be  exercised  over  sanctions  for  viola- 
tions of  atomic  energy  control.128 

Another  technological  consideration  which  may  have  had  a  bearing 
on  U.S.  policy  toward  the  veto  question  concerned  the  "warning  de- 
vice" aspect  of  the  plan  in  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report.  Policy  dis- 
cussions revealed  that  the  Board  had  not  envisioned  any  international 
stockpile  of  bombs.  Thus,  if  a  nation  decided  to  embark  on  an  atomic 
weapons  development  program  by  seizing  production  facilities  of  the 
international  Authority,  the  sequence  of  technological  processes  of 
producing  atomic  weapons  would  take  considerable  time.  The  Board 
estimated  that  it  would  be  approximately  1  year  before  enough  atomic 
weapons  could  be  produced  to  constitute  a  significant  threat.  During 
the  drafting  of  the  Acheson-Lilienthal  report,  one  member  of  the 
group  envisioned  the  following  situation  in  the  event  of  a  violation  of 
the  international  control  system : 

Supposing  denatured  material  had  been  allocated  to  a  plant 
which  is  located  in  Ruritania,  and  the  Ruritanian  Pooh-Bah 
decides  to  wTelsK  on  the  Atomic  Development  Authority  by 
removing  the  denaturants.  The  •Authority's  representatives, 
made  up  of  people  of  many  nationalities,  try  to  check  on  the 
plant,  on  the  watch  for  just  such  a  move.  So  the  Pooh-Bah 
sends  soldiers  to  get  the  ADA  people  out  of  the  way  and  seize 
the  factory.  Assuming  that  the  Pooh-Bah  has  the  scientists 
working  for  him,  it  will  still  take  him  in  the  neighborhood  of 
a  year  to  turn  out  a  bomb.  While  he's  at  it,  the  member  coun- 
tries of  the  Authority,  having  received  no  satisfactory  answer 
to  what's  become  of  their  inspectors,  go  to  war  with  Ruritania 
*  *  *  the  war  would  have  to  be  along  conventional  lines. 
Naturally,  the  atomic  plant  would  be  the  first  target  for  the 
attacking  planes.129 
Presumably,  the  Board  considered  that  the  warning  device  aspect 
of  the  plan  satisfied  the  technological  requirements  of  security.  How- 
ever, this  conception  was  not  shared  by  all  of  those  involved  in  U.S. 
policy  deliberations.  One  source  states  that  Baruch's  position  on  this 
question  was  that  the  Board's  plan  provided  "no  more  of  a  warning 
than  S3  months  to  a  year,' "  although  the  origin  of  his  estimate  is  not 
clear.  Moreover,  Baruch  added  that  technological  developments  could 
shorten  even  that  amount  of  time.130  These  estimates  may  account  for 

127  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  pp.  138-139. 

12R  Nonetheless,  it  should  be  recalled  that  this  was  not  the  first  occasion  when  this  line 
of  thinking  on  the  destructive  potential  of  atomic  energy  affected  policy,  for  it  had  played 
an  important  role  in  inflnpncinc  nations,  including  the  United  States,  to  take  the  initial 
steps  ;  for  example,  the  Three  Nation  Agreed  Declaration,  et  cetera,  toward  seeking  agree- 
ment on  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 

1=0  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  247.  n~m~.i<,oin*, 

130  Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
p.  573. 


the  sense  of  urgency  with  which  Baruch  treated  the  veto  question  in 
his  opening  speech  to  the  UNAEC : 

*  *  *  There  must  be  no  veto  to  protect  those  who  violate 
their  solemn  agreements  not  to  develop  or  use  atomic  energy 
for  destructive  purposes. 

The  bomb  does  not  wait  upon  debate.  To  delay  may  be  to 
die.  The  time  between  violation  and  preventive  action  or 
punishment  would  be  all  too  short  for  extended  discussion  as 
to  the  course  to  be  followed.131 

It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  these  factors  alone  can  account  for 
Baruch's  adamant  position  on  penalties  and  the  veto  question.  Early 
in  the  policy  deliberations  following  Baruch's  appointment,  the  elder 
statesman  had  raised  the  possibility  to  Secretary  Byrnes  and  others 
that  the  negotiations  of  the  UNAEC  might  provide  a  forum  for  the 
attainment  of  world  disarmament,  encompassing  all  weapons.  One 
writer  labelled  Baruclrs  notion  as  "an  expression  of  his  idealism  and 
expansive  self-image."  132  although  his  position  was  supported  by  Eber- 
stadt  and  Hancock.  When  Hancock  learned  that  the  Secretary  of  State 
was  not  enthusiastic  about  Baruch's  idea,  one  source  describes  his  reac- 
tion :  "As  Hanock  sized  up  the  situation,  Byrnes  was  trying  to  simplify 
the  job  by  limiting  it  to  atomic  energy."  133  The  exchange  on  the  subject 
between  Baruch  and  Byrnes  has  been  described  as  follows: 

*  *  *  Byrnes  would  have  none  of  this  vision.  It  would  be 
"a  serious  mistake,"  he  said,  to  attempt  to  cover  these  other 
weapons  as  part  of  Baruch's  present  assignment.  Baruch  was 
equally  strong  in  response :  "The  problem  of  atomic  energy  is 
a  problem  of  the  hearts  of  men — no  plan  so  far  proposed  gives 
any  guarantee  of  assurance."  Only  total  disarmament  offered 
such  a  guarantee.  Byrnes  was  unmoved.134 

News  of  Baruch's  proposal  for  total  disarmament  prompted  one 
member  of  the  Senate  Special  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  to  admon- 
ish him  to  "stick  to  his  knitting."  l35  Thus,  since  Baruch's  idea  of  a  com- 
prehensive disarmament  proposal  had  been  thwarted,  it  is  understand- 
able, perhaps,  that  if  his  efforts  had  to  be  confined  to  atomic  energy, 
he  might  seek  a  control  system  which  would  be  as  secure  as  possible. 
by  providing  "immediate,  swift,  and  sure  punishment  of  those  who 
violate  the  agreements  that  are  reached  by  the  nations."130 

In  addition.  Baruch's  insistence  on  removal  of  the  veto  as  a  vital 
component  of  the  proposed  system  of  punishments  may  have  l>cen 
prompted  by  the  -rowing  U.S.  attitude  of  mistrust  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  belief  was  strong  that  violations  most  likely  would  origi- 
nate with  the  Soviet  Union  or  one  of  its  allies.  Moreover,  the  Soviet 
Union's  performance  during  the  first  months  of  the  United  Nations, 
which  was  characterized  by  frequent  use  of  the  veto  in  the  Security 
Council,  fortified  the  impression  that  Moscow  would  have  recourse 
to  the  veto  to  avoid  the  consequences  of  its  violations.137 

*»  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  pp.  142-143. 
"3  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  277. 

Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  p.  569. 
■  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  mni  the  Tarantula,  p.  290. 
Hewlett  and  Anderson,  History  o)  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  p.  o7G. 
i«  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  p.  138. 

«i  During  ii..-  meetings  of  the  iNAI'c  itself,  a  resolution  was  Introduced  In  tbe  General 
Assembly,  calling  for  an  investigation  of  Soviet  abuse  of  the  veto.  Bechhoefer,  Postwar 
Negotiations,  p.   57. 


Thus,  by  proposing  sanctions  to  achieve  "an  international  law  with 
teeth  in  it,"  Baruch  may  have  compensated  for  losing  the  personal  op- 
portunity to  propose  and  negotiate  a  comprehensive  disarmament  plan. 
He  may  also  have  sought  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  a  control  system 
which  he  believed  the  emerging  political  relationships  of  the  atomic  age 



At  issue  during  the  negotiations,  sanctions  and  the  veto  became  in- 
volved with  the  political  arguments  associated  with  the  general  issue 
of  the  veto  power  in  the  United  Nations.  In  order  to  understand  how 
this  issue  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations,  it  might  be 
helpful  to  examine  briefly  the  course  of  the  issue  and  U.S.  policy  during 
the  international  discussions  of  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 

During  the  negotiations,  the  third  U.S.  memorandum  provided  a 
vehicle  to  answer  the  various  legal  questions  arising  from  the  rela- 
tionship between  the  proposed  international  Authority  and  the  United 
Nations,  and  an  important  part  of  this  issue  was  sanctions.  The  memo- 
randum listed  those  activities  which  if  pursued  by  an  individual  na- 
tion would  constitute  a  serious  threat  to  the  peace.  These  included 
virtually  every  possible  breach  of  the  control  arrangement.138 

The  memorandum  proposed  that  the  Security  Council  would  deter- 
mine the  response  to  these  violations.  In  defending  the  provision  to 
exclude  these  matters  from  the  veto,  the  U.S.  position  was  that  it  did 
not  impair  the  principle  of  unanimity  in  the  United  Nations,  because 
nations  would  enter  into  this  particular  arrangement  freely.  It  also 
emphasized  that  the  proposal  to  exclude  the  veto  applied  only  to  the 
question  of  atomic  energy.  An  additional  point  raised  by  the  memo- 
randum was  that  the  question  of  sanctions  could  not  be  discussed 
without  considering  the  provisions  of  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  Charter, 
which  recognized  the  "inherent  right  of  individual  or  collective  self- 
defense  if  an  armed  attack  occurs  against  a  Member  of  the  United 
Nations."  Besides  noting  that  an  attack  with  atomic  weapons  would 
justify  a  response  under  Article  51,  the  memorandum  suggested  that 
a  broader  definition  of  "armed  attack"  might  be  included  in  the  treaty 
for  the  Authority,  to  include  certain  preliminary  steps  to  such  action. 

Baruch  was  unyielding  on  the  veto  question  during  the  negotiations, 
and  his  perseverance  was  matched  by  the  adamant  opposition  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  One  example  of  the  Soviet  position  on  this  question  is 
in  a  speech  by  Gromyko  in  July  1946 : 

We  believe  that  it  would  be  wrong,  and  perhaps  fatal,  to 
undermine,  in  practice  to  abandon,  the  principle  of  unanimity 

i3s  inegal  possession  or  use  of  an  atomic  bomb ;  illegal  possession,  or  separation,  of 
atomic  material  suitable  for  use  in  an  atomic  bomb  ;  seizure  of  any  plant  or  other  property 
belonging  to,  or  licensed  by,  the  Authority  ;  willful  interference  with  the  activities  of  the 
Authority  ;  creation  or  operation  of  dangerous  projects  in  a  manner  contrary  to,  or  in  the 
absence  of,  a  license  granted  by  the  Authority.  The  U.S.  proposal  also  granted  that  admin- 
istrative decisions  would  be  made  and  carried  out  only  by  the  international  Authority,  and 
that  the  Authority  could  make  decisions  on  other  matters,  which  were  not  serious  threats 
to  the  peace.  The"  latter  could  be  enforced  by  the  Security  Council  as  procedural  matters, 
a  process  which  did  not  involve  the  veto.  State  Department,  Growth  of  a  Policy,  pp. 


of  the  permanent  members  of  the  Security  Council  *  *  *  We 
cannot  accept  any  proposal  which  would  undermine  in  any 
degree  the  principle  of  unanimity  of  the  permanent  members 
of  the  Security  Council  on  all  questions  relating  to  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  and  security.139 

Bechhoefer  notes  that  Baruch  attempted  "to  soften  the  impact  of 
his  position"  by  recalling  that  the  proposal  to  eliminate  the  veto  would 
apply  only  to  the  control  of  atomic  energy.  He  also  points  out  that  in 
terms  of  the  legality  of  the  provision,  it  would  not  affect  the  veto 
power  as  established  by  the  U.N.  Charter.  But,  in  Bechhoefer's  view, 
because  the  proposal  "ran  counter  to  the  basic  concept  of  the  continued 
unity  of  the  great  powers  as  embodied  in  the  Charter,"  it  indicated  to 
the  Soviet  Union  "a  U.S.  decision  to  attack  the  underlying  basis  of 
postwar  settlements."  14° 

Baruch  was  so  firmly  convinced  of  the  correctness  of  his  stance 
on  the  veto  that  he  may  have  missed  an  opportunity  to  bargain  with 
the  Soviets  on  the  issue,  or  at  least  to  place  them  in  a  position  where 
they  would  be  called  upon  to  reveal  further  details  of  their  proposals. 
Bechhoefer  cites  an  instance  in  1947,  when  the  Soviet  Union  proposed 
an  amendment  that  the  Authority  "should  carry  out  their  control  and 
inspection  functions,  acting  on  the  basis  of  their  own  rules,  which 
should  provide  for  the  adoption  of  decisions,  in  appropriate  cases, 
by  the  majority  vote".141  The  Soviet  Union  was  willing  to  grant  the 
majority  vote  of  the  Authority  "in  appropriate  cases,"  a  term  which 
could  have  been  explored.  Nonetheless,  discussion  of  this  amendment 
would  have  "shifted  the  question  from  the  problem  of  a  veto  to  the 
issue  of  the  authority  of  the  control  commission,  which  was  politically 
far  less  sensitive."  However,  Baruch  would  accept  nothing  less  than 
his  original  proposal.142 

While  U.S.  policy  on  the  veto  had  its  foundations  in  both  techno- 
logical and  political  factors,  it  would  appear  that  the  underlying  po- 
litical relations  of  the  great  powers  in  the  United  Nations  provided  a 
major  source  of  the  difficulty  in  the  negotiations.  Indeed.  Bechhoefer 
concludes  that  Baruch's  position  on  the  veto  gave  the  Soviets  the  op- 
portunity to  oppose  the  U.S.  proposals  "'for  the  wrong  reason."  The 
basis  for  this  assertion  is  that  disagreement  over  the  veto  involved  basic 
political  differences  between  the  two  countries  rather  than  the  substan- 
tive, technical  aspects  of  control.143 

Recap'/tiihiflon  of  the  Three  Issues  of  Atomic  Control 

Thus,  the  United  States  brought  before  the  United  Nations  three 
issues  making  up  a  program  of  international  control  of  atomic  energy. 
The  first  involved  the  control  institution  itself.  This  called  for  a 
scheme  of  international  ownership  and  regulation,  with  considerable 
intimate  interaction  with  national  programs  of  atomic  energy  develop- 
ment. Possibly  the  newly-formed  United  Nations  would  have  been  un- 
equal to  the  large  task  of  managing  such  a   program.   But  the  tech- 

"■  [bid.    p.  B2. 

'hhoefer,  Postwai    Negotiations,  pp.  .~>7   58. 

1,1  State  Department,  Policy  >ii  the  Crossroads,  p.  ~f>. 

"■'  Emphasis  added.  Bechhoefer,  Postwar  Negotiations,  p.  59. 

'"  [bid.,  pp.  59  '''<> 


nical  orientation  of  the  design  of  the  proposed  institution  left  un- 
answered many  political  questions,  and  after  long  debate  in  the  United 
Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  the  scheme  was  tabled. 

The  issue  of  the  transition  from  U.S.  monopoly  to  international  con- 
trol met  the  same  fate.  Lacking  agreement  on  the  what,  it  was  hard  to 
design  the  hoir  of  a  plan.  After  much  deliberation,  the  UNAEC  came 
reluctantly  to  this  conclusion. 

The  question  of  what  should  be  done  to  preserve  world  security  in 
the  event  of  a  violation  of  an  international  atomic  control  agreement 
likewise  went  unresolved.  This  question  went  to  the  heart  of  the  issue 
of  collective  security  versus  national  sovereignty.  But  even  though  it 
came  at  a  time  when  only  one  nation  possessed  atomic  weapons  cap- 
ability, the  quest  for  agreement  went  unsatisfied. 

V.  Some  Distinctive  Features  of  the  Negotiations 

It  appears  as  though  the  negotiations  came  to  nothing  because  the 
control  plans  advanced  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
were  each  based  upon  their  perceptions  of  a  desirable  world  order 
and  the  defense  of  their  respective  national  interests.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances of  that  period,  these  views  and  the  plans  based  on  them 
were  not  reconcilable.  The  reasoning  and  perceptions  underlying  Soviet 
policy  decisions  at  that  juncture  are  not  known  with  certainty  25  years 
later,  and  clearly  were  less  well  perceived  at  that  time.  The  fact  that 
many  of  the  following  observations  relate  mainly  to  U.S.  policy  is  not 
intended  to  be  solely  a  comment  on  this  country's  approach  to  atomic 
energy  control.  That  such  observations  are  useful  arises  from  the  fact 
that  basically  it  was  the  U.S.  plan  which  was  accepted  by  the  majority 
in  the  international  negotiations.  Therefore,  an  important  part  of  an 
inquiry  into  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  lies  in  the  origins  of  U.S. 
policy  and  inputs  of  U.S.  scientists  and  diplomats.144 

Excessive  U.S.  Reliance  on  Technical  Control  Plan 

One  characteristic  of  the  efforts  to  achieve  control  of  atomic  energy 
which  may  have  contributed  to  their  failure  was  the  tendency  on  the 
part  of  U.S.  policymakers  and  of  the  majority  of  the  negotiators  in 
the  UNAEC  to  accept  the  constraints  developed  out  of  technological 
considerations  as  the  basis  for  their  proposals  for  a  control  arrange- 
ment. The  foundations  for  the  concrete  proposals  by  the  United  States 
were  the  technological  studies  of  the  Board  of  Consultants,  and  when 
the  first  signs  of  impasse  appeared  in  the  UNA  EC,  in  1946,  the  negotia- 
tors chose  to  await  a  report  from  the  Scientific  and  Technical  Commit- 
tee before  proceeding  with  the  negotiations.  However,  each  scientific 
group,  Lilienthal's  and  the  UNAEC  committee,  divorced  itself  from 
any  responsibility  for  considering  the  political  factors  involved  in  a 
control  arrangement.  And  the  diplomats  and  politicians,  in  addressing 
themselves  to  the  basic  political  problems  which  were  preventing  agree- 
ment, chose  to  seek  a  firm  basis  for  their  proposals  in  what  were  con- 
sidered to  be  the  undeniable  technological  facts  of  the  situation. 

When  it  was  evident  that  there  was  little  hope  for  agreement,  the 
basic  assertion  from  the  UNAEC  was  that  a  minority  had  failed  to 
recognize  the  compelling  technical  factors  needed  to  shape1  an  ade- 
quate control  system.145  But  there  appears  to  have  been  a  larger  failure 

of  the  i    \    can  only  be  .'i  matter  for  speculation 



of  the  participants  on  both  sides  to  appreciate  that  even  as  powerful 
a  scientific  and  technological  event  as  the  discovery  and  decisive  mili- 
tary use  of  atomic  energy  could  not  of  itself  prompt  so  radical  a  re- 
ordering of  diplomacy  as  to  reconcile  the  overwhelming  political 
stakes  at  issue  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Spe- 
cifically, this  was  a  failure  to  reconcile  (a)  the  basic  technological 
fact  that  any  effective  international  control  system  would  have  to  cope 
with  the  difficulty  of  separating  peaceful  from  military  activities,  and 
(b)  the  fundamental  diplomatic  reality  that  any  such  system  would 
have  to  accommodate  both  the  Soviet  Union's  traditional  fear  of  for- 
eign intrusion  and  the  U.S.  fear  of  becoming  an  inferior  military 
power.  In  retrospect,  it  is  hard  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  con- 
cessions necessary  on  all  sides  to  establish  a  workable  arrangement 
for  international  nuclear  control  were  beyond  the  scope  of  traditional 
international  behavior.  A  profound  change  in  concepts  of  sovereignty 
and  security  would  have  been  required  to  insure  the  success  of  the 
negotiations.  Possibly  this  principle  remains  as  unappreciated  today  as 
it  was  at  the  time  the  Baruch  plan  was  being  considered. 


Based  upon  U.S.  perceptions  of  Soviet  motives  and  of  Soviet  capa- 
bility for  nuclear  development,  acceptability  of  the  U.S.  plan  for 
atomic  energy  control  was  secondary  to  requirements  for  an  effective 
control  system.  As  early  as  the  U.S.  preparations  for  the  Truman- 
Attlee-King  meetings,  before  the  Soviet  Union  had  had  an  oppor- 
tunity to  participate  in  any  forum  on  the  atomic  energy  question,  the 
intent  of  U.S.  policy  was  to  devise  a  workable  system  of  control  with- 
out special  regard  for  acceptability  of  the  plan  to  any  other  parties.14* 
Similarly,  throughout  the  deliberations  between  Achesoivs  committee 
and  Lilienthal's  group,  very  little  was  said  regarding  the  possibility 
of  or  the  requirements  for  Soviet  acceptance  of  the  plan,  although 
there  was  some  recognition  of  the  prevalent  political  facts  of  life, 
largely  mutual  suspicion,  which  would  characterize  United  States- 
Soviet  relations  during  the  early  postwar  period.  But  an  awareness 
of  these  factors  did  not  prompt  active  consideration  of  whether  the 
Soviet  Union  would  accept  the  plan.  Rather,  it  became  the  goal  of 
U.S.  policy  to  devise  the  necessary  arrangements  to  prevent  violation 
of  a  control  system,  and  eventually,  with  Baruclvs  policy  on  punish- 
ments and  the  veto,  a  guaranteed  course  of  action  in  the  event  of  viola- 
tion. To  the  United  States,  the  most  likely  target  of  its  policy  toward 
thwarting  or  punishing  violators  was  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  suspicious  and  negative  attitude  in  the  "West  toward  the 
Soviet  penchant  for  secrecy  was  undoubtedly  reinforced  by  the  ex- 
pansionist actions  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  East  European  countries 
following  the  war.  Yet  Soviet  expansionism  has  been  explained  as 
an  effort  to  buffer  that  country  from  foreign  incursions,  a  traditional 
fear  which  had  been  exacerbated  by  the  devastating  Soviet  experience 

148  Indeed,  Secretary  Byrnes  approached  the  negotiations  for  international  control  of 
atomic  energy  with  a  negative  attitude,  which  was  carried  over  into  a  policy  paper  which 
Bush  prepared  for  the  meeting.  In  characterizing  a  conversation  with  Ryrnes  on  the  issue. 
Bush  commented  to  Conant  that  "we  were  discussing  carefully  ways  and  means  toward  an 
effective  accord  [i.e..  one  which  was  without  risk  to  the  United  States]  rather  than 
merely  struggling  with  the  question  of  whether  any  accord  is  possible."  Bush  to  Conant. 
Xov.  8,  1945,  in  the  Bush  Papers,  as  quoted  in  Liebernian,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Taran- 
tula, p.  167. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1-9 


during  World  War  II.147  The  question  of  how  this  particular  ex- 
planation of  Soviet  actions  at  that  time  might  have  justified  Soviet 
foreign  policy  in  general  is  a  political  problem  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
study.  Still,  it  may  be  worth  noting  that  this  observation,  as  a  pos- 
sible explanation  of  Soviet  expansionism,  has  been  offered  to  account 
for  Soviet  rejection  of  certain  elements  of  the  Baruch  plan.148  In  the 
Soviet  view,  these  proposed  arrangements  would  have  made  the  Soviet 
Union  vulnerable  by  admitting  foreig]  rs  to  the  Soviet  Union  in  posi- 
tions of  authority.  Apart  from  the  ideological  trauma  of  this  foreign 
penetration,  their  presence  might  enable  potential  enemies  of  the 
Soviets  to  detect  sources  of  strength  to  attack  and  evidences  of  weak- 
ness to  exploit.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  United  States  had  recog- 
nized Eastern  Europe  as  a  Soviet  sphere  of  influence,  the  same 
argument  continues,  this  gesture  may  have  represented  enough  of  a 
concession  by  the  West  to  contribute  to  obtaining  a  Soviet  concession : 
modification  of  its  stand  on  the  presence  of  foreign  inspectors.  To 
some  extent,  a  certain  amount  of  outside  inspection  probably  would 
have  been  necessary  for  effective  control,  and  obviously  a  change  in 
the  Soviet  position  was  essential  to  reaching  agreement.149 


The  Soviet  Union's  calculation  of  the  motives  of  the  United  States 
probably  encountered  uncertainty  with  regard  to  the  place  which 
atomic  weapons  held  in  the  overall  defense  posture  of  the  United 
States.  While  the  Soviets  had  retained  their  large  forces  of  manpower 
following  the  war,  the  United  States  had  undergone  rapid  demobili- 
zation of  its  armies.  The  extent  of  U.S.  dependence  on  the  atomic  bomb, 
and  thus  any  demonstration  of  its  willingness  to  relinquish  it.  were 
governed  by  basic  U.S.  security  considerations.  In  turn,  the  fact  that 
the  atomic  weapon  had  become  such  an  integral  part  of  the  U.S.  de- 
fense posture  only  complicated  its  own  efforts  to  devise  an  equitable 
policy  on  a  system  of  international  control  without  jeopardizing  U.S. 
or  world  security.  Indeed,  Bechhoefer  points  out  that  "By  January 
1947  *  *  *  it  had  been  ascertained  that  *  *  *  United  States  de- 
mobilization had  reached  the  stage  where  Soviet  acceptance  |  of  the 
U.S.  plan]  would  leave  the  United  States  naked."  Bechhoefer  be- 
lieves this  might  account  for  l.S.  failure  to  explain  t  ransitional  stages 
in  detail,  including  the  stage  for  elimination  of  the  bomb,  although 
he  does  not  explicitly  question  the  sincerity  of  U.S.  motives.1™ 

The  principle  behind  the  declarations  by  the  United  States  that  it 
would  hold  atomic  energy  in  a  "sacred  trust"  in  the  absence  of  inter- 
national control  raises  an  additional  point  which  might  explain  Soviet 
skepticism  toward  the  U.S.  plan.  This  point  concerns  the  moral  force 
which  US.  officials  attached  to  their  pronouncements  bearing  on  the 
U.S.  position  in  the  negotiations.  It  would  seem  that  merely  by  stat- 
ing its  aims  and  responsibilities  in  atomic  energy,  these  officials  may 
have  expected  other  count  lies  to  accept  the  U.S.  pledges  without  ques- 
tion. For  example,  during  a  policy  discussion  of  stages,  Acheson's  re- 

147  Lieberman.  The  Scorpion  and  tin-  Tarantula,  j>  402. 
"s  [bid.,  p.  404. 

""  iMii  ,  p    mi    Lieberman'a  Interpretation  Is,  however,  o  hypothesis  which  it  is  impos- 
Bible  id  prove  or  disprove  nl  tin-  present  time. 
uo  Bechhoefer,  Postwar  Vegotiationa,  p.  11. 


marks  are  described  in  one  source  as  follows:  "When  the  United 
States  presented  its  plan,  it  would  have  to  explain  the  process  of  tran- 
sition. Then  the  nations  would  establish  an  international  authority. 
*  *  *  The  United  States  would  not  give  everything  away  the  day  it 
agreed  to  institute  the  plan ;  rather,  it  would  promise  to  do  so."  151  Cer- 
tain actions — e.g.,  the  atomic  test  at  Bikini  in  July  1946,  less  than  one 
month  following  the  opening  of  the  UNAEC,  or  the  U.S.  failure  in  the 
UNAEC  negotiations  to  define  the  specific  control  conditions  which 
would  determine  when  it  would  relinquish  its  atomic  weapons — 
might  well  have  cast  doubt  on  those  pledges,  particularly  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Soviet  Union. 

Thus,  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  acted  in  the 
negotiations  primarily  to  meet  their  individual  needs  of  security,  based 
on  their  own  particular  perceptions  of  the  existing  threat.  Some  of 
these  perceptions  may  have  been  less  than  accurate.  Nevertheless,  as 
a  result,  a  basic  element  in  each  country's  policy  toward  atomic  energy 
control,  which  could  not  be  ignored  or  superseded  by  technological 
requirements,  was  to  avoid  an  arrangement  which  would  have  sub- 
jected one  party  to  the  suspected  goal  of  domination  by  the  other. 
For  the  most  part,  there  is  little  evidence  that  a  substantial  effort  was 
made  to  combine  or  reach  a  compromise  between  those  technological 
and  diplomatic  elements  which  were  necessary  to  reach  agreement  on 
international  control.  By  and  large,  representatives  from  each  field 
retained  their  parochial  interests,  especially  in  light  of  the  attitudes 
of  representatives  of  one  field  toward  the  other,  and  approached  the 
problem  of  atomic  energy  control  accordingly.  In  short,  once  the  diplo- 
mats had  grasped  the  import  of  the  possibility  of  a  facile  solution 
offered  by  the  technical  experts,  they  began  to  mistrust  it.  For  their 
part,  the  technical  experts  had  probably  underestimated  the  political 
difficulties  in  implementing  the  solution.  And  finally,  the  tasks  of 
both  groups  were  made  difficult  by  the  many  previous  commitments 
to  allies  and  other  countries  and  to  the  American  people. 

One  Attempt  at  Technical-Diplomatic  Coordination 

One  example  of  an  attempt  to  combine  technological  and  political 
factors  of  atomic  energy  control  may  be  evident  in  the  proposal  of  the 
groups  led  by  Acheson  and  Lilienthal  to  assign  a  research  and  develop- 
ment function  to  the  international  Authority.  Recognizing  the  nega- 
tive human  response  to  police  methods  of  inspection,  they  hoped  that 
the  purposes  of  security  could  be  served  in  two  ways  through  research 
in  atomic  energy.  First,  because  some  national  activity  would  be  re- 
tained in  this  area,  the  potential  for  national  rivalries  would  be  chan- 
neled into  constructive  purposes.  Second,  this  function  of  the  interna- 
tional Authority  would  keep  the  supranational  body  technically  ad- 
vanced in  terms  of  detecting  activities  which  were  illegal  under  the 

151  Hewlett  and   Anderson,  History  of  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission, 
p.  548. 


terms  of  the  agreement.  The  research  carried  on  by  the  international 
Authority  would  serve  as  a  beneficial  source  of  consultation  for  the  na- 
tional efforts;  periodic  inspections  would  not  be  solely  investigative, 
in  the  sense  of  arousing  suspicions,  which  would  only  threaten  the 
entire  system  of  control.  Rather,  as  envisioned  by  the  Board,  inspec- 
tions would  provide  an  opportunity  for  individual  nations  to  receive 
guidance  in  their  efforts  through  the  knowledge  of  the  inspectors,  and 
inspections  would  be  less  intrusive  because  of  the  generally  beneficial 
expertise  developed  in  the  inspectors  by  the  Authority.  Thus,  the  pur- 
poses of  security  would  be  served  through  methods  which  met  the 
needs  of  the  technology  and  the  less  tangible  human  factors  inherent 
in  international  control.  However,  obstacles  to  agreement  were  so 
weighty  in  relation  to  the  total  effort  to  agree  on  a  system  of  interna- 
tional control  that  this  element  of  the  U.S.  plan  exercised  no  positive 
influence  on  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations. 

Underlying  Misconceptions  in  U.S.  Policy 

A  number  of  misconceptions  and  miscalculations  during  the  U.S. 
policymaking  process  on  matters  pertaining  to  both  the  technology 
and  the  politics  of  atomic  energy  control  may  have  influenced  the  out- 
come of  the  negotiations.  U.S.  policy  in  the  negotiations  may  possibly 
have  been  conditioned  by  an  attitude  that  possession  of  the  bomb  pro- 
vided great  leverage  for  the  United  States  to  press  for  acceptance  of 
its  proposals. 

This  attitude  rested  on  a  number  of  technological  assumptions, 
which  eventually  proved  incorrect.  First,  U.S.  estimates  regarding  the 
Soviet  Union's  ability  to  develop  its  own  atomic  weapons  ranged  any- 
where from  5  to  25  years,  whereas  the  first  Soviet  atomic  explosion 
occurred  in  IUV.),  just  3  years  following  the  opening  of  the  UNAEC. 
This  development  changed  the  entire  character  of  the  atomic  energy 
control  problem.  Although  negotiations  on  the  Baruch  plan  continued 
until  the  early  1950's.  Soviet  possession  of  atomic  weapons — some 
sources  reason — necessitated  a  different  approach  to  arms  control,  and 
perhaps  even  made  the  Baruch  proposals  obsolete. 

The  length  of  time  during  which  the  United  St#es  could  expect 
to  maintain  its  supremacy  in  the  field  of  atomic  energy  posed  a  dilemma 
for  U.S.  policy.  On  the  one  hand,  there  was  the  assumption,  based  on 
historically  valid  technological  considerations,  that  the  loss  of  the  U.S. 
monopoly  was  inevitable.  This  recognition  contributed  greatly  to  the 
U.S.  commitment  to  seek  international  control  of  atomic  energy.  On 
the  other  hand,  erroneous  technological  intelligence  estimates  which 
favored  the  U.S.  position  appear  to  have  prompted  a  further — and  as 
it  proved,  unwarranted — U.S.  assumption  that  it  could  attain  interna- 
tional control  on  its  own  terms,  and  that  it  could  afford  to  insist  on 
certain  points  in  its  proposals.  This  attitude  was  interpreted  as  "atomic 
diplomacy"  by  critics  of  U.S.  proposals,  and  was  justified  by  propo- 
nents of  U.S.  policy  as  fulfillment  of  the  U.S.  responsibility  for  the 
"sacred  trust"  over  atomic  energy. 

An  additional  technological  misconception  which  may  have  played 
at  least  a  minor  role  in  the  outcome  of  the  negotiations  concerned  the 
extent  to  which  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  would  be  made  readily 
available  to  benefit  a  large  number  of  countries.  Much  of  the  scientific 
and   technological    information    which   would   have   contributed   sub- 


stantially  to  development  of  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  could 
not  be  released  in  the  absence  of  international  controls,  as  such  peace- 
ful development  was  so  closely  connected  with  the  information  neces- 
sary for  development  of  an  atomic  weapon.  Thus,  the  hope  of  sharing; 
the  knowledge  for  beneficial  uses  of  atomic  energy  became  an  incentive 
for  the  Lilienthal  Board  to  devise  an  effective  control  system.  Such 
hopes  apparently  influenced  both  U.S.  policymakers  and  the  other 
negotiators  in  the  UNAEC  to  believe  that  the  control  plan  offered 
something  more  than  a  rein  on  the  destructive  forces  of  atomic  energy. 
Although  present-day  development  of  atomic  energy  for  peaceful 
uses — a  quarter-century  later — is  advancing  at  a  substantial  pace,  the 
predictions  of  1945  regarding  the  imminent  development  of  peaceful 
uses  seem  overly  optimistic.  Notwithstanding  the  optimism,  however, 
security  factors  so  overshadowed  all  other  issues  in  the  negotiations 
that  the  drive  by  individual  countries  for  active  international  coopera- 
tion in  peaceful  development  failed  to  develop  real  momentum  at  that 

These  technological  factors  tended  to  limit  the  ontions  of  the  non- 
nuclear  countries  participating  in  the  negotiations.  Essentially,  for 
any  such  country  there  were  only  two  options :  development  of  its  own 
atomic  bomb,  at  considerable  industrial  effort  and  economic  cost,  or 
controlled  access  to  the  technology  through  acceptance  of  a  plan  for  in- 
ternational control,  defined  by  the  only  country  which  possessed  the 
ultimate  weapon.  To  supporters  of  the  U.S.  proposals,  perhaps  suffici- 
ent confidence  existed  between  them  and  the  United  States  that  its 
pledges  and  its  control  plan  seemed  reasonable.  Moreover,  many  coun- 
tries, recovering  from  their  massive  war  efforts,  lacked  the  reserves  of 
resources  to  develop  their  own  atomic  weapons.  The  promise  of  the 
potential  benefits  of  atomic  energy  for  national  purposes,  however 
limited,  which  the  control  plan  offered  may  have  provided  additional 
incentive  for  approval  of  the  U.S.  proposals. 

It  is  doubtful  that  the  Soviets  experienced  a  similar  reaction.  In 
commenting  on  the  plan  proposed  by  the  Board  of  Consultants,  one 
source  speculates  on  the  Soviet  reaction  as  follows : 

*  *  *  The  members  of  the  Lilienthal  Board  were  con- 
vinced that  adoption  of  their  plan  by  the  Soviet  Union  would 
cause  no  less  than  another  revolution  in  Russian  society — a 
revolution  which  was  to  be  accomplished  apparently  in  re- 
turn for  Russian  involvement  in  atomic  development.  This 
could  not  have  seemed  a  very  desirable  quid  pro  quo  to  the 
Russians,  who  knew  that  they  were  capable  of  building 
atomic  weapons  themselves  in  three  or  four  years.152 

A  political  miscalculation  by  the  United  States  affecting  the  negotia- 
tions can  be  identified  in  light  of  U.S.  experience  in  its  relations  with 
the  Soviet  Union.  One  source  has  expressed  the  possible  Soviet  percep- 
tion of  the  Baruch  plan  as  follows:  "The  clear  advantage  offered  the 
U.S.S.R.  was  relief  from  an  'out  of  the  blue'  American  atomic  air 
attack,  but  at  a  price  of  forgoing  any  early  moves  toward  nuclear 
equality."  153  An  almost  axiomatic  reflex  of  the  Soviet  approach  to 
arms  control  negotiation  has  been  the  notion  that  the  Soviet  Union 
will  not  negotiate  from  an  inferior  military  position.  One  explanation 

152  Lieberman,  The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  p.  409. 

163  George  H.  Quester.  Nuclear  Diplomacy:  the  First  25  Tears  (New  York  :  Dunellen  Co., 
1970),  p.  20. 


for  the  delay  in  the  opening  of  recent  negotiations  on  strategic  arms 
limitation  has  been  Soviet  reluctance  to  bargain  until  it  had  attained 
"parity"  with  the  United  States  in  strategic  weapons.154 

A  fuller  appreciation  of  this  Soviet  attitude  during  the  UNAEC 
negotiations  might  have  broadened  the  perspective  of  U.S.  policy. 
Moreover,  if  U.S.  policymakers  had  been  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
Soviet  Union  had  been  working  assiduously  on  its  own  atomic  weapons 
during  the  negotiations,  a  different  approach  might  have  been  used. 
Two  cabinet  members,  Secretary  Stimson,  and  the  Secretary  of  Com- 
merce, Henry  Wallace,  suggested  that  the  Soviet  Union  be  treated  in  a 
more  open  manner  on  atomic  energy  questions.  Stimson,  who  left  the 
Administration  in  September  1945,  suggested  including  the  Soviets  in 
atomic  energy  development  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  war.  Such  a 
move,  he  believed,  would  avert  Soviet  suspicions  regarding  U.S.  inten- 
tions and  would  mark  a  first  step  toward  the  necessary  internationali- 
zation of  atomic  energy,  without  giving  rise  to  an  arms  race.  During 
the  UNAEC  negotiations,  Wallace  publicly  encouraged  more  active 
cooperation  with  the  Soviet  Union,  to  the  point  where  his  remarks  be- 
came a  source  of  embarrassment  to  the  Administration;  to  Baruch  the 
vigorous  expression  of  the  Wallace  position  was  undermining  the  U.S. 
position  at  the  UNAEC.  As  a  result,  Truman  asked  Wallace  to  leave 
his  cabinet.  Obviously,  the  suggestions  of  both  Stimson  and  Wallace 
fell  on  deaf  ears  of  those  in  power,  who  felt  it  necessary  to  adopt  a 
defensive  position  toward  the  Soviet  Union.155 

One  source  declares  that  a  major  weakness  of  the  U.S.  policy  on 
atomic  energy  was  its  diplomatic  timing.  Details  of  U.S.  policy  on  in- 
ternational control  remained  unclear  for  a  few  months  after  the  first 
atomic  weapon  was  used.  And  the  approach  to  the  Soviet  Union  at 
the  Moscow  conference  was  made  only  after  consultations  with  the 
British  and  the  Canadians,  a  move  which  one  source  sees  as  an  indica- 
tion to  the  Soviets  of  a  conspiracy  against  them.156 

Another  issue  in  the  negotiations  which  may  have  represented  a  po- 
litical miscalculation  by  the  United  States  concerned  its  policy  on 
eliminating  the  veto  over  sanctions.  Bechhoefer  concludes  that  U.S. 
insistence  on  this  provision  gave  the  Soviets  the  wrong  reason  for 
opposing  the  U.S.  control  plan,  since  it  presented  an  issue  which  was 
unrelated  to  the  substantive  problems  of  control.157  In  light  of  the  way 
U.S.  policy  on  the  veto  developed  just  two  years  after  the  opening  of 
the  UNAEC,  the  political  impact  of  Baruch's  attitude  toward  the  veto 
in  atomic  energy  matters  does  not  seem  to  have  been  noticed  by  other 
policymakers  at  the  time  of  the  UNAEC  meetings.  Indeed,  U.S.  policy 
toward  the  veto  soon  developed  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  inconsistent  with 
the  position  which  Baruch  was  striving  to  maintain.  The  Vandenberg 
resolution,  passed  by  the  U.S.  Senate  in  July  1948,158  recommended 

,M  For  example.  Dr.  Mnrshnll  Shulman.  Director  of  the  Russian  Institute  at  Columbia 
University,  recently  testified  to  a  Senate  committee  that  "Perhaps  one  reason  for  the  delay 
in  the  Soviet  response  was  the  desire  to  wait  until  deployments  then  planned  had  made 
their  appearance,  so  thai  negotiations  could  lie  conducted  on  the  hasis  of  equality."  U.S. 
Congress,  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations.  Subcommittee  on  Arms  Control,  Inter- 
national Law  and  Organization.  Arms  Control  Implications  of  Current  Defense  Budget. 
Hearings,  June  and  July,  1971,  92d  Cong.,  first  scss.  (Washington,  U.S.  Government 
Printing  Office.  l!»71 1.  n  246. 

163  For  detailed  accounts  of  the  positions  taken  by  Stimson  and  Wallace,  see  Lleberman, 
The  Scorpion  and  the  Tarantula,  pp.  138-155  and  pp.  334-358,  respectively. 

>'■"  Ibid.,  p.    in:, 

inT  Bechhoefer,  Postwar  Negotiations,  pp.  59-60. 

«»For  a  complete  texl  o1  tin  Vandenberg  resolution,  see  U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Sub- 
committee on  the  t " n i t <<t  Nations  Charter.  Review  <>f  tin  United  Nations  Charter,  t  Col- 
lection of  Documents.  83d  Cong.,  Second  scss.,  January  7,  1954.  (Washington.  U.S. 
Government  Printing  Office,  1956),  pp.  140-141. 


that  the  United  States  supports  "voluntary  agreement  to  remove  the 
veto  from  all  questions  involving  pacific  settlements  of  international 
disputes  and  situations,  and  from  the  admission  of  new  members." 
(These  were  areas  most  hindered  by  Soviet  use  of  the  veto  in  the  Se- 
curity Council.)  However,  consideration  of  the  resolution  may  have 
reinforced  the  U.S.  position  of  maintaining  its  veto  power  over  mat- 
ters of  enforcement,  particularly  those  involving  the  use  of  armed 
force.  The  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  report  stated : 

Some  advocates  of  Charter  revision  contend  that  the  veto 
should  be  stripped  from  decisions  involving  enforcement  ac- 
tion and  the  use  of  armed  forces  by  the  Security  Council.  It 
should  be  pointed  out,  however,  that  such  a  proposal  would 
be  vigorously  opposed  by  all  the  great  powers,  who  remain 
unwilling  to  permit  their  troops  to  be  thrown  into  action 
without  their  consent,  and  by  many  other  members  of  the 
United  Nations  as  well.  Moreover,  it  is  significant  that  it  is  not 
enforcement  action  in  a  single  instance  which  has  been  blocked 
by  the  veto.159 

Through  this  resolution,  the  Senate  helped  to  clarify  U.S.  policy  on 
enforcement  in  the  United  Nations,  but  these  principles  represented 
a  divergence  from  Baruch's  position  on  atomic  energy  questions. 

The  Vandenberg  resolution  also  paved  the  way  for  the  United  States 
to  take  an  active  part  in  engineering  collective  defense  arrangements 
such  as  NATO,  under  the  terms  of  Article  51  of  the  U.N.  Charter.  The 
fact  that  the  United  States  sought  this  kind  of  vehicle  to  ensure  its 
security  and  that  of  its  allies  marked  a  recognition  by  the  United 
States  of  a  need  for  alternatives  to  the  Security  Council  in  this  regard. 
As  expressed  in  the  UNAEC  negotiations,  the  U.S.  position  on  the 
security  arrangements  of  atomic  energy  control  placed  a  great  deal  of 
emphasis  on  the  Security  Council  as  the'  principal  organ  to  deal  with 
questions  of  this  nature.  However,  this  position  toward  the  machinery 
for  security  matters  seemed  to  undergo  a  transition,  as  indicated  by 
subsequent  U.S.  participation  in  collective -defense  arrangements.  The 
development  of  collective  security  arrangements  may  or  may  not  rep- 
resent a  possible  alternative  which  was  neglected  in  the  effort  to  set  up 
machinery  for  security  under  atomic  energy  control.  But  it  may  in- 
dicate a  general  trend  which  was  casting  the  Security  Council  in  a  dif- 
ferent role  from  that  which  seemed  to  govern  the  atomic  energy 
proposals.  And  as  involvement  of  the  Security  Council  demanded, 
resolution  of  the  question  of  how  the  veto  would  be  used,  the  emphasis 
on  that  body  may  have  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations. 

Given  the  existing  political  conditions  at  the  time,  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult in  retrospect  to  determine  whether  a  change  of  one  or  several  fac- 
tors or  developments  might  have  altered  the  results  of  the  negotiations. 
The  complexity  of  the  relationships  among  science,  technology,  and 
diplomacy  is  abundantly  illustrated  through  an  examination  of  these 
first  efforts  to  control  atomic  energy.  It  is  clear,  from  the  perspective 
of  this  study,  that  elements  of  both  the  diplomatic  and  technological 
aspects  of  atomic  energy  contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  initial  inter- 
national efforts  to  control  it. 

159  Ibid.,  p.  135. 

VI.  Concluding  Observations 

The  discovery  of  nuclear  fission  and  its  subsequent  military  appli- 
cation by  the  United  States  altered  the  balance  of  power  among  the 
major  nations  of  the  world  and  gave  to  the  United  States  a  few  brief 
years  of  exclusive  possession  of  a  military  weapon  of  truly  revolution- 
ary potency.  During  this  transitional  period  and  until  the  present  era 
of  nuclear  stalemate,  American  diplomacy  was  able  to  function  from 
a  position  of  great  military  strength  with  little  need  to  make  conces- 

One  of  the  first  impacts  of  the  discovery  upon  American  diplomacy 
was  the  task  accepted  by  U.S.  diplomats  of  doing  what  they  could  to 
bring  the  nations  of  the  world  into  sufficient  agreement  to  establish 
the  international  control  of  nuclear  energy.  Examination  of  their  un- 
successful attempt  to  do  so  suggests  several  observations  about  the  im- 
pact of  science  and  technology  upon  American  diplomacy  and  inter- 
national relations. 

In  this  examination,  it  is  necessary  to  be  aware  of  a  distinction  be- 
tween two  questions  associated  with  international  control  of  atomic 
energy  and  the  issue  of  the  interplay  among  science,  technology,  and 
diplomacy.  First  one  can  examine  the  events  surrounding  the  Baruch 
plan  as  they  exemplify  the  impact  on  diplomacy  of  an  unprecedented 
technological  achievement,  the  atom  bomb.  The  second  consideration 
arises  from  the  fact  that  there  were  certain  technological  principles  of 
atomic  energy  which  determined  the  necessary  technological  character- 
istics of  the  control  system.  One  might  call  this  area  the  "technology 
of  control.'*  Thus,  the  second  question  to  consider  is  the  interaction 
between  the  technology  of  control  and  the  conduct  of  the  diplomatic 
negotiations  to  establish  a  control  system.  A  recognition  of  this  distinc- 
tion in  terms  of  the  scope  of  this  study  is  important  to  an  understand- 
ing of  the  following  discussion. 
I  in  pact  of  New  Technologies  on  I nt,  motional  Relations 

In  light  of  the  way  the  discoveries  associated  with  atomic  energy  gal- 
vanized U.S.  diplomacy  and  stimulated  an  extended  and  global  diplo- 
matic effort,  this  case  suggests  that  the  creation  and  application  of 
new  technologies  arising  from  scientific  discoveries  may  so  change  re- 
lations among  nations  that  a  system  of  international  control  of  that 
technology  becomes  desirable  to  one  or  more  parties.  Nuclear  en- 
ergy is  neither  the  first  nor  the  last  example  of  a  technological  innova- 
tion suggesting  the  desirability  of  international  machinery  and  proce- 
dures for  controlling  it.  Hut  it  is  probably  the  most  dramatic  example 
to  date."" 

On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  diplomatic  effort  arose  out  of 
the  discovery  of  fission,  a  radical  development  in  itself,  did  not  change 
the  basic  function  of  diplomacy  or  the  behavior  of  diplomats.  The  U.S. 

""Other  examples  would  include  aviation,  warships,  supertankers,  ami  communications 


( us) 


experience  suggests  the  venerable  aphorism :  "Plus  ca  change,  plus 
c'est  la  meme  chose."  The  idealism  of  science  and  its  traditions  for  in- 
ternational cooperation  were  not  strong  enough  to  overcome  interna- 
tional political  differences.  Not  even  an  awareness  of  the  awesome  de- 
structive force  of  the  atomic  bomb  provided  sufficient  incentive  to 
nations  to  agree  on  a  secure  form  of  control  over  atomic  energy.  In  the 
face  of  a  new  weapon  which  drastically  altered  traditional  concepts  of 
war,  intense  rivalries  among  different  national  interests  prevented  a 
movement  toward  common  ground  on  international  control  of  atomic 

While  exclusive  possession  of  a  new  technology  stemming  from  a 
scientific  discovery  may  give  a  nation  an  advantage  in  international 
affairs,  that  advantage  is  likely  to  shrink  quickly.  In  the  case  of  nuclear 
energy,  the  principal  disadvantaged  country  was  able  to  duplicate  the 
discovery  of  fission  and  to  create  a  rudimentary  initial  technology 
sufficient  to  permit  detonation  of  a  nuclear  device  while  the  negotia- 
tions were  still  in  progress.  Yet  during  this  time  U.S.  negotiators  ap- 
parently assumed  that  secrecy  could  preserve  their  advantage  for  a 
comfortably  long  period  of  diplomatic  accommodation.  Thus,  another 
lesson  from  this  study  is  that  it  is  unrealistic  to  rely  on  secrecy,  once 
the  application  of  a  new  technology  has  been  forcefully  demonstrated 
before  the  world  as  in  the  case  of  the  atomic  bombs,  to  prevent  other 
nations  from  acquiring  or  recreating  this  technology. 

In  approaching  the  problem  which  the  new  atomic  energy  technology 
imposed  on  U.S.  diplomacy,  there  was  recognition  of  the  need  to  com- 
bine elements  of  both  areas  to  achieve  a  solution  to  the  problem.  While 
this  principle  was  easily  accepted  by  diplomats  and  scientists  alike, 
members  of  each  profession  were  not  successful  in  putting  the  principle 
into  practice.  To  a  considerable  extent,  the  differences  between  men 
like  Lilienthal  and  Baruch  were  founded  on  a  certain  lack  of  apprecia- 
tion on  each  side  for  the  manner  in  which  the  members  of  the  other 
side  approached  the  problem  of  the  international  control  of  atomic 
energy.  Perhaps  this  case  indicates  that  for  science  and  diplomacy  to 
work  together  efficiently,  the  members  of  each  field  must  express  their 
respective  points  of  view  fully  and  in  terms  which  can  be  understood 
and  applied  by  members  of  the  other  field.  At  the  same  time,  there 
must  be  a  special  receptivity  by  members  of  each  field  and  a  special 
willingness  to  accommodate  to  the  outlook  of  the  other,  in  order  to 
attain  the  ultimate  goal. 

Not  only  were  mistakes  made  in  the  course  of  the  interaction  of 
science  and  diplomacy,  but  there  were  also  a  number  of  miscalcula- 
tions by  the  experts  in  their  respective  fields,  as  described  in  the  previ- 
ous section.  Whether  or  to  what  extent  these  particular  elements, 
contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  would  be  difficult  to  deter- 
mine. Total  accuracy  on  the  part  of  either  scientists  or  diplomats  may 
be  too  much  to  expect,  but  certainly  in  areas  basic  to  the  solution  of 
critical  problems,  a  high  degree  of  accuracy  would  seem  to  be  a  reason- 
able and  necessary  goal. 

The  Diplomatic  Task :  Combining  Effectiveness  and  Acceptability 

The  second  major  portion  of  this  conclusion  deals  with  the  tech- 
nology of  control  and  the  diplomatic  efforts  to  cope  with  it.  This  ques- 
tion breaks  down  further  into  two  features  of  a  control  system  in  which 
science,  technology,  and  diplomacy  became  involved:  effectiveness  and 


acceptability.  The  first  concerns  those  characteristics  required  of  an 
effective  system,  that  is,  one  which  merely  fulfilled  the  function  of  con- 
trol. For  the  most  part,  these  could  be  found  primarily  in  the  area  of 
science  and  technology  of  atomic  energy,  although  certain  political 
factors  were  thought  to  be  essential  to  a  workable  plan.  The  second  has 
to  do  with  the  acceptability  of  the  plan,  those  technological  and  polit- 
ical characteristics  of  the  plan  which  would  lead  to  agreement  among 
nations.  In  turn,  those  aspects  of  the  plan  which  promoted  its  capacity 
for  effectiveness  or  acceptability  interacted  in  ways  which  may  have 
contributed  to  the  failure  of  the  negotiations. 

During  negotiation  of  the  Baruch  plan,  one  can  detect  two  absolute 
factors  which  were  peculiar  to  the  efforts  to  attain  an  effective  system 
of  international  control  over  atomic  energy:  a  technological  reality 
and  a  political  reality  created  by  the  discovery  and  use  of  atomic 
energy.  In  turn,  both  of  these  realities  created  substantial  problems 
for  the  negotiations,  and  thus  for  the  acceptability  of  the  plan. 

The  predominant  political  characteristic  of  atomic  energy  was  the 
fact  that  the  keeper  of  the  military  use  of  the  atom  represented  an 
absolute  power  for  a  finite  period  of  time.  Thus,  the  control  system  had 
to  be  effective  in  such  a  way  as  to  exercise  adequate  control  over  this 
tremendous  military  force.  The  primary  problem  this  presented  for 
the  United  States  was  the  fact  that  international  control  affected  the 
very  heart  of  its  military  security.  To  the  Soviet  Union,  the  political 
impact  of  the  United  States  as  sole  owner  of  the  bomb  strengthened  the 
impression  of  a  very  real  threat  to  Soviet  military  security.  More 
assurance  of  an  end  to  that  threat  would  have  been  necessary  in  ex- 
change for  Soviet  renunciation  of  its  own  efforts  to  develop  a  bomb 
and  accept  international  control. 

The  technological  reality  of  atomic  energy  which  was  important  to 
the  negotiations  was  the  fact  that  the  processes  associated  with  the 
peaceful  and  military  uses  of  atomic  energy  were  approximately  the 
same.  And  it  appeared  from  the  outset  that  the  security  of  a  control 
system  would  have  to  be  maintained  through  inspections  of  an  exceed- 
ingly intrusive  character.  The  Soviet  Union  was  faced  with  this  pe- 
culiar attribute  of  the  technology  of  atomic  energy  which  weighed 
heavily  on  the  choices  of  a  control  system  and  which  seriously  chal- 
lenged the  closely  guarded  society  of  that  country.  To  the  United 
States,  a  major  consideration  influenced  by  this  technological  fact  of 
life  was  how  to  penetrate  the  rigid  secrecy  of  the  Soviet  Union  in 
order  to  prevent  or  detect  its  expected  violation  of  the  control  system. 
Perhaps  also,  to  some  indeterminate  degree,  this  penetration  of  Soviet 
society  was  regarded  in  the  United  States  as  an  intrinsically  desirable 
goal,  apart  from  considerations  of  atomic  control. 

Thus,  during  the  negotiations  to  devise  a  control  system,  both  the 
United  States  and  the  Soviet  I'liion  were  faced  with  certain  political 
and  technological  absolutes  which  were  directly  opposite  to  certain 
fundamental  features  of  their  respective  countries.  These  features 
were  integral  to  meeting  what  each  country  considered  the  require- 
ments for  maintenance  of  its  national  security.  The  negotiations  ne- 
glected to  reconcile  these  requirements  with  these  dominating  techno- 
logical and  political  factors  of  atomic  energy  in  order  to  attain 
adequate  and  acceptable  international  control. 


On  the  whole,  the  technology  of  atomic  energy  seems  to  have  deter- 
mined the  parameters  of  the  proposals  and  therefore  set  the  tone  of  the 
negotiations.  When  obstacles  arose  in  the  policymaking  process  and  in 
the  negotiations,  the  consensus  was  that  there  had  been  a  failure  to 
recognize  the  technological  factors  which  supported  the  proposal  for 
the  international  control  system.  Yet  little  effort  was  made  by  the 
diplomats  to  come  to  terms  with  some  of  the  political  problems  which 
contributed  significantly  to  the  impasse.  At  the  same  time,  scientists 
who  were  in  a  position  to  influence  policymakers  in  the  United  States 
and  in  the  UNA  EC  refused  to  accept  any  responsibility  for  comment- 
ing on  the  political  feasibility  of  control  or  the  political  elements  of  a 
possible  control  system. 

Perhaps  a  guiding  assumption  among  policymakers  and  negotiators 
alike  was  that  the  technological  necessities  of  effective  control  would 
force  acceptance  of  that  control.  But  in  reality,  the  drive  to  devise 
effectiveness  in  the  control  system  seems  to  have  ignored,  if  not  to  have 
defied,  the  need  for  special  diplomatic  efforts  to  achieve  acceptability. 

The  area  of  acceptability  received  little  if  any  consideration  in  U.S. 
policy  discussions.  The  basis  for  the  U.S.  approach  may  be  found  in 
several  considerations:  a  moralistic  attitude  which  characterized  the 
U.S.  negotiating  technique,  arrogance  generated  by  the  notion  of  U.S. 
leverage,  or  prejudice  toward  Soviet  science  and  technology  which  led 
to  overly  hopeful  estimates  of  the  life  expectancy  of  the  U.S.  monopoly 
over  atomic  weapons. 

It  is  clear  that  while  science  and  technology  alone  could  devise  a 
control  system  which  would  be  efficient  in  its  task,  and  diplomacy 
could  provide  the  fundamentals  for  an  acceptable  system  to  protect 
national  security,  only  a  combination  of  the  elements  from  science, 
technology,  and  diplomacy  could  be  expected  to  devise  a  workable 
system  for  control  which  would  be  acceptable  to  the  leading  nations 
of  the  world. 

Underlying  many  of  the  conclusions  on  acceptability  is  an  assump- 
tion that  all  parties  entered  the  UNAEC  negotiations  in  good  faith, 
and  were  prepared  to  bargain  diligently  for  a  goal  which  represented 
the  promise  of  assured  security  for  all.  It  would  be  virtually  impossible, 
of  course,  to  determine  accurately  what  were  in  fact  the  motives  of 
each  country  as  it  entered  the  negotiations.  But  it  is  reasonably  certain 
that  the  tone  of  the  initial  proposals  could  have  helped  shape  the  sub- 
sequent behavior  of  the  countries  in  the  negotiations.  As  it  was,  the 
initial  proposals  may  have  lessened  the  force  of  the  drive  which  was 
necessary  to  sustain  the  bargaining  process  successfully. 

In  light  of  the  fact  that  the  Soviets  were  not  far  from  developing 
their  own  atomic  weapon,  one  might  infer  alternatively  that  the  So- 
viets entered  the  negotiations  simply  for  propaganda  value  and  were 
not  genuinely  interested  in  achieving  a  system  of  international  con- 
trol of  atomic  energy.  Whether  or  not  this  was  the  case,  not  everything 
possible  was  done  by  the  West  to  create  an  atmosphere  of  trust  or  a 
spirit  of  compromise  which  would  seem  to  be  basic  ingredients  to 
meaningful  negotiation.  This  fact  could  cast  doubts  on  the  intentions 
of  the  West.  On  the  whole,  one  cannot  discount  entirely  the  possibility 
of  some  measure  of  reluctance  on  the  part  of  both  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union  to  accept  the  idea  of  international  control  of 
atomic  energy,  a  sentiment  which  would  inevitably  have  influenced 
their  behavior  in  the  negotiations. 


U.S.  Attitudes  in  the  Conduct  of  the  Negotiations 

Diplomats  were  clearly  the  focus  of  action,  with  scientists  in  an 
advisory  capacity.  No  radically  new  participation  of  scientists  was 
observed  in  these  international  negotiations. 

The  interplay  between  science  and  technology  and  diplomacy  was 
not  so  continuous  or  extensive  as  to  require  direct  participation  by 
scientists  in  the  negotiations.  Rather,  the  advice  and  analysis  from 
science  advisers  served  mainly  to  set  the  stage  for  the  diplomats  and 
their  negotiations. 

At  a  time  when  scientists  enjoyed  the  peak  of  postwar  public  esteem 
for  their  contribution  to  the  victory  in  World  War  II,  their  normal 
role  in  the  Baruch  plan  negotiations  did  not  extend  beyond  technical 
advice.  Apparently,  the  scientific  approach  with  its  emphasis  upon 
objective,  experimentally  demonstrable  fact  did  not  provide  a  useful 
paradigm  for  the  international  negotiators. 

The  characteristics  of  the  proposed  control  plan,  as  enunciated  by 
the  scientists  of  the  Lilienthal  Board  and  those  of  the  UNAEC  Scien- 
tific and  Technical  Committee,  suggest  that  the  authors  were  thinking 
in  terms  of  an  ideal  situation.  Many  of  the  features  of  this  plan,  while 
considered  necessary  to  an  effective  control  system,  presented  notions 
which  were  totally  unacceptable  to  the  Soviet  Union.  A  possible  al- 
ternative in  the  U.S.  policymaking  process  might  have  been  to  deter- 
mine the  basic  technological  and  political  requirements  for  an  effective 
control  system  which  each  side  would  accept,  and  then  to  try  to  estab- 
lish some  common  ground  between  the  two  positions.  With  this  process 
as  a  starting  point  for  the  negotiations,  perhaps  the  discussions  could 
have  proceeded  to  elaborate  on  the  control  system  in  such  a  way  as  to 
explore  a  variety  of  proposals  and  arrive  at  the  proper  combination 
of  technological  and  political  characteristics  which  would  provide  both 
an  effective  system,  and  one  reasonably  acceptable  to  all  concerned.  A 
willingness  to  proceed  on  this  basis  might  at  least,  in  the  Baruch  plan 
negotiations,  have  emphasized  good  faith  and  signalled  an  understand- 
ing that  each  side  had  its  special  political  problems  to  resolve. 

Chapter    4 — Commercial    Nuclear    Power    In 

Europe:  The  Interaction  of  American 

Diplomacy  With  a  New  Technology 



I.  Reasons,  Purpose,  and  Scope 131 

Some  Reasons  for  the  Study 131 

Scope  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 131 

Sources  of  Information 133 

II.  Some  Facts  About  Nuclear  Power 134 

Fission  and  Fusion:  Two  Sources  of  Nuclear  Energy 134 

Breeding   or   the    Conversion   of   Useless   Atoms    Into    Useful 

Nuclear  Fuel 134 

Natural  and  Enriched  Uranium  as  Nuclear  Fuel 134 

Plutonium:  A  Manmade  Nuclear  Fuel 135 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power 136 

The  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 137 

Fusion  Power:  An  Expectation  Yet  To  Be  Fulfilled 138 

Safeguards :  Ways  To  Assure  Discovery  of  Unauthorized  Diver- 
sion of  Fissionable  Materials 139 

Some  Limitations  of  Safeguards 140 

III.  From  Hiroshima  to  Atoms  for  Peace:  Postwar  Trends  in  Regional 

Multinational  Cooperation  in  Europe 141 

An  Initial  Prohibition  of  International  Cooperation 141 

Initial  Pessimism  Toward  Nuclear  Power 142 

Changing  Technology  and  Diplomacy 143 

Interest  in  International  Collaboration 143 

The  Evolving  Scene:  1945-1953 144 

The  Postwar  Struggle 144 

The  Marshall  Plan 145 

The  Truman  Doctrine 145 

Unification  in  Europe 146 

The  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 146 

The  European  Economic  Community 146 

Common  Organs  of  the  European  Communities 147 

The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 147 

The  Council  of  Ministers 147 

The  European  Parliament 147 

The  Economic  and  Social  Committee 147 

The  Court  of  Justice 148 

Financing  the  Communities 148 

The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development.  148 

U.S.  Attitude  Toward  European  Unity 148 

IV.  Atoms  for  Peace:  A  Presidential  Initiative 150 

Origins  of  Atoms  for  Peace 150 

President  Eisenhower's  U.N.  Address : 150 

Implications  for  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe 152 

Legislation  for  Atoms  for  Peace 152 

The  Eisenhower  Proposal  to  Congress 153 

The  Congressional  Response 153 

International  Cooperation  and  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954_  154 

Some  Questions  From  the  Scientific  Community 156 

Accomplishments  of  Atoms  for  Peace 156 

V.  Bilateral  Agreements  for  U.S.  Technical  Assistance  to  Commercial 

Nuclear  Energy  in  Europe 158 

Legislation  for  Technical  Cooperation  in  Nuclear  Energy 158 

AEC  Organization:  The  Division  of  International  Programs —  160 

The  First  Bilateral  Agreements  for  Nuclear  Cooperation 161 

Pressures  To  Promote  Nuclear  Power  Abroad 161 



V.  Bilateral  Agreements,  etc. — Continued  Pase 

Providing  Working  Experience  With  Nuclear  Energy 164 

The  Research  Reactor  Program 164 

Some  Doubts  and  Insights 164 

Fuel  for  Research  Reactors 165 

The  Power  Reactor  Program 165 

The  Bilateral  Agreement  Situation  in  1971 167 

Additional  Measures  To  Stimulate  Foreign  Interest  in  Nuclear 

Power 168 

Allocation  of  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 168 

Establishing  Prices  for  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 169 

Financial  Assistance  for  Foreign  Nuclear  Powerplants 170 

Fuel  Reprocessing  and  Waste  Disposal 171 

Authority  for  the  U.S.  Nuclear  Industry  To  Provide  Nu- 
clear Products  and  Assistance 172 

A  Reluctance  To  Export  Technology 172 

Safeguarding   Nuclear   Materials   Supplied   Through   Bilateral 

Agreements 173 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 174 

VI.  Creating  an  International   Organization:  The  International  Atomic 

Energy  Agency 176 

The  IAEA:  A  Brief  Description 176 

Changing  Goals  and  Situations 177 

The  Fruits  of  Negotiation 178 

The  Role  of  Scientists  in  the  Negotiations 179 

Some  Insights  From  Congressional  Review 179 

Limitations  Upon  the  U.S.  Commitment 181 

Warnings  of  Consequences  of  Failure  To  Ratify 182 

The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  Participation  Act  of 

1957 182 

Bilateral  Agreements  and  the  IAEA 183 

A   Bilateral   Agreement   With   the   IAEA   and    Three    Policy 

Questions 184 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  IAEA 185 

Initial  U.S.  Support 185 

Trends  in  U.S.  Support 186 

A  Hardheaded  Approach  to  IAEA  Functions 187 

A  Stronger  Role  for  the  IAEA:  The  Smyth  Report  of  1962 188 

A  State  Department  Commentary 189 

An  AEC  Reaction 190 

A  Pessimistic  Postscript 

The  Decline  of  the  Supply  Function 191 

International  Standards  for  Nuclear  Safety 192 

International  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 194 

Congressional  Interest  in  IAEA  Safeguards 195 

Bilateral  Versus  IAEA  Safeguards 197 

Evolution  of  IAEA  Safeguards:  A  Brief  Chronology 198 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 201 

VII.  Creating  a  Regional  Nuclear  Organization:  The  European  Atomic 

Energy  Community  (Euratom) 203 

Origins  of  Euratom 203 

Advice  for  the  Decisionmakers 204 

A  Target  for  Euratom 204 

U.S.  Support  for  European  Nuclear  Integration 205 

Soviet  Opposition  to  Euratom 206 

Three  Policy  Issues  of  Euratom 207 

Whether  Euratom  Should  Manufacture  Enriched  Uranium.  207 

Whether  To  Include  Military  Activities  in  Euratom 208 

Whether  Euratom  Should  Have  a  Monopoly  of  Nuclear 

Materials 208 

A  Treaty  for  Euratom 208 


VII.  Creating  a  Regional  Nuclear  Organization — Continued 

Establishing  the  Infrastructure  for  European  Nuclear  Power...  209 
Financing    and    Operating    Commercial    Nuclear    Power- 
plants 210 

Creating  a  Nuclear  Common  Market 210 

Joint  Enterprises:  An  Innovation  in  International  Organi- 
zation   210 

Early  Changes  in  Euratom  Objectives 211 

Research  for  Nuclear  Power 211 

Funding  of  Euratom  Research 212 

In-House  Research  and  Development  for  Euratom 212 

Dissension,  Crisis,  and  Delay  in  Euratom's  Programs 213 

The  First  5- Year  Plan  (1958-1962) 214 

The  Second  5- Year  Plan  (1963-1967) 214 

Failure  To  Adopt  a  Third  5- Year  Plan 215 

Plutonium  for  Fast  Breeder  Research 216 

The  Supply  and  Control  of  Nuclear  Materials 216 

Supranational  Ownership  of  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 217 

Supplying  Nuclear  Materials 217 

Euratom  Manufacture  of  Enriched  Uranium 217 

Some  Difficulties  of  the  Supply  Agency 218 

Safeguarding  Nuclear  Fuel  Materials 218 

Euratom  Safeguards  and  U.S.  Policy 220 

Euratom  and  Nuclear  Safety 220 

Euratom  and  Environmental  Effects  of  Nuclear  Power.  . 221 

Duplication  and  Dilution  of  Effort 221 

Proposals  for  New  Research  Functions  for  Euratom 222 

The  McKinney  Report  Recommendations  of  1959 222 

Views  of  the  EEC 223 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 223 

VIII.  Joint  United  States-Euratom  Research  and  Development 226 

U.S.  Interest  in  Euratom  Demonstration  of  Nuclear  Power 227 

Initiation  of  the  Joint  Programs 228 

The  United  States-Euratom  Agreement  of  1958 229 

The  Joint  Boards:  An  Organizational  Innovation 230 

A  Note  on  the  Environment  of  the  Negotiations 230 

The  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  of  1958 231 

A  Bilateral  Agreement  With  Euratom 232 

The  Joint  Power  Program 233 

The  First  Invitation  To  Participate 233 

The  Second  Round  of  Invitations 235 

Financing  the  Demonstration  Plants 235 

The  Fuel  Guarantee  Authority 235 

The  Joint  Research  Program 236 

The  First  5- Year  Plan  (1959-1964) 236 

The  Second  5- Year  Plan  (1965-1969) 237 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 237 

IX.  The    Nuclear    Energy    Agency:    Another    Regional    Approach    to 

International  Organization  for  Nuclear  Energy 239 

Origins  of  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency 239 

NEA  Functions 239 

Some    NEA    Innovations    in    Organization    of    International 

Projects 240 

The  Halden  Project  in  Norway 240 

The  Dragon  Project  in  the  United  Kingdom 241 

The  Eurochemic  Project  in  Belgium 242 

Building  the  Infrastructure  for  Nuclear  Power 242 

NEA  and  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 243 

U.S.  Participation  in  NEA  Activities 243 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 244 

X.  U.S.  Fuel  for  European  Nuclear  Power 246 

The  Enriched  Uranium  Business 246 

Requirements  for  Enriched  Uranium  and  Enrichment  Services.  247 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1 


X.   U.S.  Fuel  for  European  Nuclear  Power — Continued  Page 

U.S.  Supply  Policy 248 

Advantages  to  the  United  States 248 

Disadvantages  to  the  United  States 249 

Evolution  of  U.S.  Supply  Policy 249 

Special  Conditions  for  Euratom 250 

Toll  Enrichment 251 

Financing  Nuclear  Fuel  Inventories 252 

The  Deferred  Payment  Plan 252 

Pricing  Uranium  Enrichment  Service 253 

European  Opposition  to  U.S.  Enrichment  Monopoly 253 

The  U.S.S.R.  as  an  Alternative  Source  of  Supply 254 

Supply  Policy  Alternatives 255 

Maintaining  the  Competitive  Position  of  the  United  States  in 

the  World  Enrichment  Market 255 

Enrichment  Requirements 256 

The  Prospects  for  Expanding  U.S.  Enrichment  Capacity.  _  257 

Sharing  the  U.S.  Monopoly 258 

Some  Views  of  the  Joint  Committee 261 

The  Gas  Centrifuge:  A  Technical  Perturbation  for  U.S.  Policy?.  261 

The  Centrifuge  and  Proliferation 262 

Breaking  the  Secrecy  Barrier 263 

The  French  Drive  for  a  European  Diffusion  Plant 263 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 264 

XI.  The  Nonproliferation  Treat y  and  Safeguards 266 

New  Urgency  for  Safeguards 266 

The  Four  Functions  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty 267 

U.S.  Ratification  and  Support  of  the  Treaty.. 268 

U.S.  Support  for  Safeguards 269 

Safeguards  Provisions  of  the  Treaty 270 

Elements  of  the  IAEA  Safeguards  System 271 

Negotiation  of  IAEA  Safeguards  Agreements:  The  IAEA 

Safeguards  Committee 272 

Some  Facets  of  the  Negotiations 272 

Protection  of  Commercial  Interests 273 

Inspections  and  Their  Scheduling 273 

"Strategic  Points" 274 

Enforcement  of  Safeguards 274 

U.S.  Support  of  the  Safeguards  Committee 275 

The  Soviet  View 275 

Criticisms  of  IAEA  Safeguards 275 

Some  Congressional  Doubts 276 

Costs  of  Safeguards 277 

Financing  Safeguards  Under  the  Treaty 278 

A  Joint  Committee  Reservation 279 

Physical  Security  of  Nuclear  Materials 279 

Nonproliferation  and  Euratom 280 

Euratom  Concern 281 

A  Recent  Development 282 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 282 

XII.  Some  Issues  Recapitulated 285 

Nuclear  Power  for  U.S.  Foreign  Policy 286 

Sustaining  U.S.  Technological  Leadership  in  the  1970s 286 

Reducing  European  Dependence  Upon  Imported  Energy.  286 

Controlling  the  Possibilities  for  Proliferation 287 

Demonstrating  the  Practicability  of  Inspection  for  Arms 

Control 287 

Improving  the  U.S.  Position  in  World  Trade 287 

A  Potential  Limitation   Upon  Nuclear  Power  for  Foreign 

Policy 288 


XII.  Some  Issues  Recapitulated — Continued 

Foreign  Policy  for  Nuclear  Power 288 

Maintaining  the  Competitive  Position  of  the  U.S.  Nuclear 

Industry  in  the  World  Market 288 

Further  Development  and  Demonstration  of  U.S.  Nuclear 

Technology  Abroad 288 

Expediting    the    Solution    of    Environmental    Effects    of 

Nuclear  Power 289 

Establishment    of    International    Standards    for    Nuclear 

Power 289 

Protecting  the  U.S.  Position  in  Uranium  Enrichment 289 

Glossary 290 


I.  Status  of  Agreements  for  Cooperation  as  of  April  1,  1958 163 

II.  International  Agreements  in  1970 168 

III.  U.S.    Contributions   to   the   International   Atomic   Energy   Agency, 

Calendar  Years  1960-73 187 

IV.  Appropriations  for  Euratom  Research  and  Training  Programs  From 

1958  to  1971 213 

V.  AEC    Contracts    for    Toll    Enrichment    With    Foreign    Customers, 

November  1970 252 

VI.  Total  Manpower  and  Cost  Estimates  for  IAEA  Safeguards 278 

VII.  Summary  of  Nuclear  Facilities  in  Non weapons  States 278 

I.  The  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 138 





>H VjV 

Garigliano  Nuclear  Power  Plant    (SENN),   Scauri,   Italy.  This   160,000  KW. 
station  began  commercial  operation  in  November  1964. 


I.  Reasons,  Purpose,  and  Scope 

The  interaction  between  American  diplomacy  and  the  new  tech- 
nology of  unclear  power  during  the  past  three  decades  illustrates  how 
the  development  of  nuclear  power  has  been  a  resource  for  U.S.  diplo- 
macy and.  conversely,  how  diplomacy  has  helped  the  domestic  devel- 
opment of  nuclear  power  in  the  United  States.  The  purpose  of  this  re- 
port is  to  describe  this  interaction  and  to  identify  issues  that  may  need 
attention  during-  the  1970s. 

Some  Reasons  for  the  Study 

One  of  the  most  dramatic  scientific  discoveries  of  our  time  is  that 
of  atomic  energy.  During  the  brief  span  of  30  years  from  the  first 
demonstration  of  a  nuclear  chain  reaction  in  1942  to  date,  a  whole  new 
technology  has  been  developed,  demonstrated,  and  brought  into  practi- 
cal use  in  such  widely  divergent  applications  as  enormously  destruc- 
tive military  weapons,  naval  propulsion,  generation  of  commercial 
electricity,  and,  most  recently,  the  possible  civil  use  of  nuclear  ex- 
plosives in  engineering,  mining,  ancl  recovery  of  natural  gas.  There 
exist  today  38  working  nuclear  power  stations  in  Europe  in  comparison 
with  28  operable  nuclear  power  stations  in  the  United  States.1 

The  applications  of  this  new  science  and  technology  by  public  and 
private  bodies  have  inevitably  interacted  with  American  diplomacy. 
On  the  one  hand,  American  preeminence  in  military  and  civil  use 
of  nuclear  power  has  provided  certain  advantages  ancl  leverages  for 
U.S.  diplomatic  action.  On  the  other  hand,  U.S.  foreign  policy  deci- 
sions have  been  made  to  further  the  progress  of  domestic  use  of  nu- 
clear power  in  the  United  States.  These  decisions  have  led  to  the 
creation  of  not  only  one  but  three  international  organizations  and 
to  the  establishment  of  a  complex  network  of  bilateral  agreements 
for  technical  assistance  by  the  United  States  to  its  allies  and  friends 
to  promote  use  of  nuclear  energy. 

As  the  United  States  and  the  industrial  nations  of  the  world  stand 
on  the  threshold  of  an  anticipated  massive  deployment  of  civil  nuclear 
power  during  the  coming  years,  further  issues  for  diplomacy  merit 
attention  before  the  pace  of  events  so  accelerates  that  there  will  be  no 
time  for  unhurried  decisions. 

Scope  and  Limitations  of  the  Study 

The  immediate  impact  of  nuclear  energy  upon  American  diplomacy 
following  World  War  II  is  to  be  found  in  the  fruitless  efforts  of  the 
United  States  and  the  United  Nations  Atomic  Energy  Commission 
to  bring  about  the  international  control  of  this  new  science  and  tech- 
nology. Although  the  UXAEC  was  to  continue  in  existence  until  Janu- 
ary 1952,  it  had  for  all  practical  purposes  ceased  to  function  in  1949 

1  These  nuclear  power  stations  are  distributed  among  the  nations  of  Europe  as  follows: 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  .">,  France  S,  Italy  3,  Netherlands  1,  Spain  2,  Sweden  2, 
Switzerland  3.  and  the  United  Kincdom  14 

Note  :  This  chapter  was  prepared  in  1972  by  Warren  H.  Donnelly. 



and  with  its  demise  died  the  hope  that  atomic  energy  could  be  put 
under  international  ownership  and  control.  An  analysis  of  this  inter- 
action of  atomic  energy  and  American  diplomacy  is  to  be  found  in 
a  companion  study  of  the  Congressional  Research  Service  :  Tht  Baruch 
Phi n  :  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Nuclear  Age.2 

The  subsequent  interaction  between  U.S.  diplomacy  and  nuclear 
power  is  the  subject  of  the  present  study.  Since  the  first  use  of  nuclear 
weapons  terminated  the  war  with  Japan  in  1945,  U.S.  diplomacy  and 
nuclear  energy  have  been  closely  and  continually  intertwined.  The  re- 
lationships have  changed  over  the  years  from  the  early  postwar  period 
when  the  United  States  possessed  the  great  military  advantage  of  the 
atom  bomb  to  back  its  foreign  policy  and  diplomacy  to  the  situation 
today  when  the  possession  of  enormously  destructive  nuclear  arma- 
ments by  the  superpowers  of  the  world  has  brought  a  period  of  nu- 
clear stalemate.  While  large-scale  armed  conflict  between  major  nations 
has  not  occurred  since  1945,  the  many  smaller  wars  and  conflicts  have 
prevented  the  postwar  years  from  being  an  era  of  peace. 

The  starting  point  for  this  examination  of  American  diplomacy  and 
commercial  nuclear  power  for  Europe  is  President  Eisenhower's 
Atoms  for  Peace  Plan  of  1953.  This  initiative,  together  with  the  sub- 
sequent rewriting  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954,  opened  the  way 
to  accelerated  development  of  commercial  nuclear  power  in  the  United 
States,  and  to  greater  technical  assistance  to,  and  cooperation  with, 
other  countries  and  with  international  organizations  in  nuclear  power. 
Against  this  background,  the  bilateral  technical  assistance  arrange- 
ments of  the  United  States  are  described  and  also  the  U.S.  relations 
with  the  three  international  organizations  set  up  to  foster  use  of  nu- 
clear power  in  the  free  world:  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  Euratom,  and  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  Next  follows  in- 
formation on  U.S.  policy  and  programs  for  supplying  nuclear  fuel  to 
Europe.  The  next-to-last  section  deals  with  the  Xonprolifcration 
Treaty,  and  the  safeguards  which  it  would  impose  on  civil  use  of 
nuclear  fuel  materials  in  Europe.  The  study  concludes  with  a  reca- 
pitulation of  the  issues  and  a  look  to  the  future. 

Commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  presents  an  instructive  case  of 
major  interaction  between  technology  and  foreign  policy  for  two  rea- 
sons. First,  the  strengthening  of  Europe  during  and  since  the  era  of 
the  cold  war  has  been  a  keystone  of  U.S.  foreign  policy;  Second. 
Europe  is  the  only  area  other  than  North  America  where  commercial 
development  of  nuclear  power  has  attained  any  prominence.  Further- 
more, during  the  late  L950's  the  economics  oi  the  European  energy 
market  were  more  attractive  for  the  early  demonstration  and  appli 
cation  of  commercial  nuclear  power  than  were  those  of  the  United 
States  with  its  then  abundant  and  cheap  energy  supplies  of  coal,  oil, 
and  natural  gas. 

No  attention  is  given  in  this  report  to  commercial  nuclear  power 
in   the   developing   nations  of  the    world   because   the  technology   for 

nuclear  power  has  not  evolved  in  this  direction.  Nuclear  power  tech- 
nology so  far  has  been  characterized  by  high  capital  costs,  rcquire- 

* Lenelce  N.  Wu.  The  Baruch  Plan:  U.S.  Diplomacy  Enters  the  Xuclcar  Age,  A  report 
prepared  fur  the  Subcommittee  mi  National  Security  Policy  and  Scientific  Developments  of 
tiir  House  Committee  mi  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Foreign  Affairs  Division,  Congressional 
Research  Service,  Library  of  Congress  (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1972),  67  p. 


ments  for  a  sophisticated  infrastructure  of  supporting  technical  and 
industrial  products  and  services,  a  need  for  highly  trained  personnel, 
and  dependence  upon  the  United  States  for  nuclear  fuel  supplies.  The 
combination  of  these  factors  has  made  nuclear  power  less  attractive 
to  developing  countries  than  had  been  hoped  for  by  early  proponents 
of  nuclear  power.  Thus  the  commercial  use  of  nuclear  power  is  con- 
centrated largely  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  Europe,  Japan,  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  During  the  period  covered  by  this  study,  Europe 
has  been  a  principal  theater  of  interaction  between  American  diplo- 
macy and  nuclear  technology — both  civil  and  military.  For  this  reason, 
and  for  the  sake  of  manageability,  this  examination  is  limited  to 
commercial  or  civil  use  of  nuclear  power  in  Western  Europe. 

This  analysis  is  not  intended  to  be  a  definitive  account  of  the  domes- 
tic nuclear  power  program  of  the  United  States,  nor  of  the  nuclear 
programs  of  the  several  international  organizations  that  were  created 
to  further  the  peaceful  use  of  this  new  technology.  Rather  it  is  intended 
to  illustrate  typical  interactions  between  a  rapidly  evolving,  science- 
based  technology  and  diplomacy,  and  to  suggest  some  issues  for  Amer- 
ican diplomacy  that  may  be  anticipated  as  the  evolution  of  nuclear 
power  continues. 

Sources  of  Information 

The  principal  sources  of  information  used  in  this  study  include  the 
hearings  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  the  annual  reports 
of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  and  hearings  before  the  foreign 
relations  committees  of  the  House  and  the  Senate.  Additionally  it 
draws  upon  publications  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry,  notably  Nuclear 
Industry,  which  is  the  monthly  magazine  of  the  Atomic  Industrial 
Forum,  and  Nucleonics  Week,  a  commercial  weekly  newsletter;  also 
used  were  Nuclear  Science  and  Engineering,  which  is  a  commercial 
British  journal,  and  the  monthly  bulletins  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  and  Euratom.  Several  books  on  nuclear  energy  which 
have  been  useful  for  this  analysis  include  those  of  Nieburg,  Polach, 
Kramish,.  Scheinman,  and  Willrich.3  The  report  does  not  attempt  an 
exhaustive  examination  of  all  of  the  literature,  but  rather  seeks  to 
select  materials  that  illustrate  interaction  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  and 
domestic  policy  with  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 


3  Harold  L.  Nieburg,  Nuclear  Secrecy  and  Foreign  Policy  (Washington,  D.C.  :  Public 
Affairs  Press,  1964),  255  pp. 

Jaroslave  G.  Polach,  Euratom:  Its  Background,  Issues  and  Economic  Implications 
(Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York  :  Oceana  Publications.  Inc.,  1964),  232  pp. 

Arnold  Kramish,  The  Peaceful  Atom  in  Foreign  Policy  (New  York:  Harper  &  Row. 
Publishers.  1963).  276  pp. 

Lawrence  Scheinman,  Atomic  Energy  Policy  in  France  Under  the  Fourth  Republic 
(Princeton,  New  Jersey  :  Princeton  University  Press.  1965),  259  pp. 

Mason  Willrich,  ed..  Civil  Xuclear  Power  and  International  Security  (New  York: 
Praeger  Publishers.  1971).  124  pp. 

Non-Proliferation  Treaty:  Framework  for  Nuclear  Arms  Control  (Charlottesville, 

Va.  :  The  Mlchie  Company,  1969),  341  pp. 

II.  Some  Facts  About  Nuclear  Power 

The  discovery  that  useful  energy  could  be  obtained  from  uranium 
atoms  initially  attracted  more  academic  than  commercial  interest,  and 
the  first  Government  interest  in  its  use  was  for  naval  propulsion  rather 
than  commercial  application.4  This  discovery,  together  with  earlier 
speculations  that  the  enormous  energy  of  the  sun  also  originated  in  a 
different  nuclear  reaction,  laid  the  foundation  for  the  peaceful,  com- 
mercial use  of  nuclear  power,  and  for  employment  of  this  new  tech- 
nology as  an  element  of  U.S.  foreign  policy. 

Fission  and  Fusion :  Two  Sources  of  Nuclear  Energy 

The  two  basic  processes  for  the  release  of  nuclear  energy  are  fission 
and  fusion.  Fission  is  a  demonstrated  and  practical,  although  poten- 
tially dangerous,  source  of  energy.  Fusion  remains  to  be  demonstrated 
as  a  controlled  source  of  useful  energy,  although  its  proponents  expect 
that  this  capacity  will  be  achieved  before  the  end  of  this  century.5 

Fission  refers  to  the  splitting  apart,  or  fissioning,  of  atoms  of  ura- 
nium and  plutonium  accompanied  by  the  release  of  energy  and  the  pro- 
duction of  intensely  radioactive  wastes.  For  present  nuclear  tech- 
nology, the  nuclear  fuel  in  general  use  is  atoms  of  uranium  of  atomic 
weight  235,  or  the  U-235  isotope.  In  nature,  for  each  1,000  atoms  of 
uranium,  7  are  U-235  and  the  other  993  are  the  uranium  isotope  of 
weight  238  (U-238)  which  is  not  directly  useful  for  nuclear  fuel. 

Breeding,  or  the  Conversion  of  Useless  Atoms  into  Useful  Nuelear 

In  the  fission  process  in  a  working  nuclear  power  reactor,  some  atoms 
of  U-238  or  thorium  can  be  transformed  into  useful  nuclear  fuel, 
namely,  atoms  of  plutonium  and  U-233  respectively.  If  more  of  these 
'"fertile"  materials  are  transformed  into  nuelear  fuel  than  are  consumed 
by  the  reactor,  the  process  is  known  as  "breeding. "  Through  breeding 
it  is  possible,  in  principle, to  use  all  of  the  U-23S  and  thorium  in  nature 
as  a  nuclear  fuel.  As  a  practical  matter,  it  is  estimated  that  successful 
demonstration  of  breeder  technology  would  multiply  the  energy  re- 
coverable from  uranium  resources  at  least  fifty-fold,  would  virtually 
make  nuclear  power  independent  of  the  costs  of  mining  uranium  ores, 
and  would  add  the  nuclear  energy  of  world  thorium  deposits  to  world 
energy  reserves. 

Natural  and  Enriched  Uranium  as  Nucleai  Fuel 

In  some  types  of  nuclear  power  reactors,  the  uranium  obtained  from 
nature  can  be  used  as  a  fuel.  This  was  tin1  approach  favored  by  the 
I  nited  Kingdom  and  France  during  the  l!>50's  and  well  into  the  L960'& 

'The  lirst  U.S.  Government  Interest  was  at  the  Naval  Research  Laboratory  of  the 
Department  of  the  Navy  where  research  was  proposed  to  explore  the  potential  use  of 
nuclear  energy  fur  naval  propulsion, 

8  Details  about  tli«'  scientific  anil  technological  aspects  of  nuclear  power  are  available  in 
such  sources  as  Samuel  Glasstone's  two  definitive  imoks  :  Sourcebook  on  Atomic  Energy 
(New  York:  I)  Van  Nostrand  Company,  Inc.,  1967);  and  .\miinr  Reactor  Engineering 
(New  York  :  I >.  Van  Nostrand  Company,  inc.,  1963) 



The  natural  uranium  reactors  offered  the  advantage  that  a  country 
possessing  uranium  deposits  could  have  nuclear  power  without  having 
to  build  its  own  enrichment  facilities  or  obtain  enrichment  from 
abroad.  On  the  other  hand,  for  technical  reasons,  this  type  of  reactor 
is  larger  and  more  expensive  than  reactors  of  other  types.  To  get  the 
same  power  out  of  smaller,  less  expensive  reactors  it  is  necessary  to 
process  the  uranium  fuel  to  increase  the  relative  proportion  of  U-235 
atoms  from  the  0.7  percent  in  nature  to  perhaps  3  percent.  This  de- 
sired "enrichment"  can  be  obtained  by  several  processes.  The  process 
in  general  use  is  the  gaseous  diffusion  process  in  which  a  gaseous  form 
of  uranium — uranium  hexaHuoride — is  diffused  through  a  porous 
ceramic  barrier.  Each  time  the  gas  passes  through  such  a  barrier,  there 
is  a  slight  separation  of  the  lighter  U-235  atoms  from  the  heavier 
U-238  atoms.  Many  hundreds  of  diffusion  stages,  even  a  thousand  or 
more  for  a  large  plant,  are  needed  to  manufacture  material  sufficiently 
enriched  in  U-235  for  use  in  weapons.  Another  enrichment  process 
that  has  strong  proponents  today  is  the  gas  centrifuge  process.  Here 
the  uranium  hexaHuoride  is  whirled  rapidly  about  with  the  heavier 
atoms  being  forced  outward  by  centrifugal  force.  As  with  gaseous  dif- 
fusion, a  series  or  cascade  of  centrifuges  is  required,  for  the  separa- 
tion at  each  stage  is  slight.  Of  the  two  processes,  the  gaseous  diffusion 
process  requires  a  large  industrial  facility  and  a  large  supply  of  elec- 
tricity. In  principle,  centrifugal  separation,  if  it  is  demonstrated  to  be 
economically  feasible,  should  permit  building  of  smaller  plants  at  less 
capital  investment  and  with  less  demand  for  electricity. 

Because  enriched  uranium  has  been  available  in  the  United  States 
from  the  three  plants  that  were  built  to  make  materials  for  weapons 
and  for  naval  propulsion,  and  because  of  advantages  of  enriched 
uranium  as  fuel,  it  was  natural  for  the  infant  nuclear  industry  to 
apply  its  military  experience  with  enriched  uranium  to  commercial 
nuclear  power  plants.  As  a  result,  the  principal  path  of  evolution  for 
U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  has  been  the  use  of  slightly  enriched 
fuels.  Now,  at  the  outset  of  the  1970's,  this  technology  has  become 
dominant  for  much  of  commercial  nuclear  power  in  the  United  States, 
in  the  Soviet  bloc  nations,  and  in  Europe.  Even  in  the  United  Kingdom 
and  France  it  appeal's  that  many  future  nuclear  power  plants  are 
likely  to  use  enriched  fuels. 

Plutonium :  a  Manmade  Nuclear  Fuel 

Nuclear  power  reactors  fueled  with  natural  or  slightly  enriched 
uranium  also  produce  plutonium  as  a  byproduct.6  While  some  of  the 
plutonium  atoms  are  fissioned,  enough  remain  in  the  used  fuel  when  it 
is  removed  from  a  reactor  to  make  recovery  of  this  byproduct  nuclear 
fuel  economically  feasible.  The  recovered  plutonium  can  be  used  for 
weapons  or  as  fuel  for  other  nuclear  reactors.  This  dual  utility  of  plu- 
tonium is  troublesome  for  world  peace :  As  nuclear  power  grows,  so 
will  the  stocks  of  plutonium,  which  some  observers  fear  may  increase 
the  risk  of  theft  or  undetected  diversion  of  this  material  to  clandestine 
manufacture  of  nuclear  weapons.  Fortunately,  the  operation  of  a  nu- 
clear reactor  for  power  produces  a  mixture  of  plutonium  isotopes, 
plutonium-239  and  plutonium-240.  The  longer  uranium  fuel  is  ex- 

0  U-238  atoms  capture  neutrons  emitted  by  the  fissioning  U-235  atoms  and  are  trans- 
formed into  plutonium. 


posed  to  the  fission  reaction,  the  higher  the  proportion  of  plutonium- 
240  (Pu-240).  The  more  Pu-240  is  present,  the  less  usetul  the  ma- 
terial is  for  weapons  because  it  makes  the  behavior  of  the  material  less 
controllable.  On  the  other  hand,  limiting  the  exposure  of  uranium 
fuel  in  a  power  reactor  limits  the  amount  of  plutonium-240  and  makes 
the  recovered  material  more  suitable  for  weapons. 

When  nuclear  power  reactors  are  operated  to  produce  the  cheapest 
electricity,  the  plutonium  they  produce  as  a  by-product  is  not  suitable 
for  very  efficient  nuclear  weapons  because  of  the  Pu-240  present. 
"Weapon  grade"  plutonium  should  contain  no  more  than  10  percent 
of  these  non-fissionable  isotopes  and  preferably  less.7 

One  way  in  which  nuclear  power  reactors  could  be  used  to  produce 
weapons  grade  plutonium  would  be  to  limit  the  time  the  fuel  spends 
in  the  reactor  to  a  few  weeks,  which  is  about  a  tenth  of  the  normal 
exposure  time  for  economic  nuclear  power.  However,  even  though  con- 
taminated with  up  to  30  percent  of  plutonium-240,  the  by-product 
plutonium  normally  produced  in  present  nuclear  power  reactors  would 
still  be  usable  as  the  explosive  material  for  primitive  but  still  effective 
nuclear  weapons.8 

When  the  breeder  reactors  favored  by  the  United  States  are  commer- 
cially deployed  during  the  1980's,  they  will  produce  more  plutonium 
than  the  nuclear  fuel  they  consume.  Use  of  this  technology  will  allow 
many  more  nations  to  become  self-sufficient  in  the  production  of  nu- 
clear fuel.  Any  nation  with  sufficient  deposits  of  natural  uranium  can 
then  achieve  a  nuclear  fuel  cycle  independent  of  other  nations  provided 
it  has  enough  enriched  uranium  or  plutonium  to  start  the  cycle.  From 
the  point  of  view  of  preventing  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  preferable  fuel  for  fast-breeders  will  be  the 
same  as  that  for  efficient  nuclear  weapons,  namely,  plutonium  con- 
taining little  of  the  isotope  plutonium-240.  The  problem  of  preventing 
the  diversion  of  fissionable  material  seems  likely  to  become  more  dif- 
ficult as  fast-breeder  reactors  come  into  widespread  commercial  use.9 

Commercial  Nuclear  Power 

The  large-scale  generation  of  electricity  from  steam-electric  power 
plants  requires  access  to  an  industrial  base  that  can  supply  the  furnaces, 
boilers,  turbines,  generators,  switchgear,  and  other  electrical  apparatus. 
Additionally,  it  requires  access  to  transportation  facilities  to  move 
huge  amounts  of  fossil  fuels — coal,  oil,  and  natural  gas.  To  introduce 
commercial  nuclear  power  requires  access  to  industries  that  can  design, 
manufacture,  install,  and  service  the  components  of  nuclear  power 
reactors,  fabricate  and  reprocess  uranium  fuels,  and  indefinitely  store 
the  residual  radioactive  wastes.  Of  these  industrial  capabilities,  prob- 
ably the  most  unusual  are  those  for  enriching  uranium  and  for  reproc- 
essing used  nuclear  fuels.  The  other  facilities  are  not  greatly  different 
from  those  to  be  found  in  an  industrialized  country. 

The  enrichment  plants  that  have  been  built  to  date  by  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet    Union  are  verv   large   industrial   installations 

i  Stockho'm   International    Pence   Research   Institute.    World    Armaments  and   Disarma- 
ment: 8IPR1  Yearbook  t:>: l  (New  fork:  Humanities  Press,  1972),  p.  366. 
-  Loc,  -it. 
0  ll.i.l  .  p.  290. 


representing  capital  investment  thought  to  be  beyond  the  resources  of 
most  countries.  The  United  Kingdom  and  France  have  small  enrich- 
ment plants  which  were  built  to  make  highly  enriched  uranium-235 
for  weapons,  but  these  are  not  large  enough  to  supply  fuel  for 
commercial  nuclear  power.  Enrichment  plants  now  in  operation  use  a 
process  known  as  ''gaseous  diffusion"  and  sometimes  are  referred  to  as 
gaseous  diffusion  plants.  Recently  there  has  been  revived  European 
interest  in  the  gas  centrifuge,  and  work  is  in  progress  to  demonstrate 
the  feasibility  of  this  process  as  an  alternative  to  gaseous  diffusion  for 
the  manufacture  of  enriched  uranium. 

Fuel  reprocessing  plants  are  unusual  industrial  facilities.  They  must 
be  designed,  built,  and  operated  to  process  intensely  radioactive  mate- 
rials. Because  the  required  equipment,  processes,  and  personnel  are  not 
readily  available  from  other  industries,  the  construction  and  operation 
of  a  fuel  reprocessing  plant  is  costly  and  does  not  offer  possibilities  of 
conversion  to  other  uses  if  the  markets  for  fuel  reprocessing  should  not 
meet  expectations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  scale  of  financial  and  indus- 
trial effort  should  be  within  the  capability  of  most  industrial  countries. 

An  undesired  and  troublesome  waste  from  fuel  reprocessing  is  the 
radioactive  materials  produced  when  uranium  or  plutonium  atoms  are 
fissioned.  The  radioactivity  of  these  wastes  decreases  slowly,  and  the 
wastes  remain  dangerous  for  centuries.  While  proponents  of  nuclear 
power  assert  that  these  wastes  can  be  made  inert  and  be  safely  stored 
for  many  years,  some  critics  fear  their  ultimate  release  to  the  environ- 
ment with  disastrous  results.  After  some  25  years  of  research  and 
development  for  nuclear  power,  the  United  States  has  yet  to  demon- 
strate on  a  working  scale  the  technology  for  the  indefinite  storage  of 
these  wastes. 

At  present,  only  a  few  industrialized  countries  now  have  the  indus- 
trial capabilities  to  supply  all  the  special  materials,  products,  and 
services  for  commercial  nuclear  power.  But  many  countries  are  plan- 
ning to  build  their  own  fuel  fabricating  and  fuel  reprocessing  plants 
to  service  their  nuclear  power  plants.  The  International  Atomic  En- 
ergy Agency  expects  that  by  the  late  1970 's  several  additional  countries 
will  possess  the  industrial  base  necessary  for  nuclear  power.  At  pres- 
ent these  countries  are  limited  to  Canada,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  the 
United  Kingdom,  the  United  States,  West  Germany,  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  But  of  these  only  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  have 
a  large-scale  capability  to  produce  enriched  uranium  for  nuclear  fuel. 
The  Japanese  are  exploring  with  the  United  States  and  France  the 
possibilities  of  some  form  of  joint  international  enrichment  project, 
while  the  French  also  have  been  seeking  partners  to  build  an  inter- 
national enrichment  facility  in  Europe. 

The  Nuclear  Fuel  Cycle 

From  the  preceding  notes  on  vital  aspects  of  nuclear  energy,  it  is 
apparent  that  the  construction  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants, 
in  contrast  to  conventional  hydro  or  steam  electric  power  plants  that 
burn  oil,  coal,  or  natural  gas,  is  only  one  step  in  a  long  and  complex 
sequence  of  technological  activities  that  are  necessary  for  the  genera- 





TO  UF6 








Figure  1 

tion  of  nuclear  power.  The  entire  sequence  is  called  the  nuclear  fuel 
cycle  and  is  illustrated  in  Figure  I.  In  summary,  the  major  parts  of 
the  nuclear  fuel  cycle  are  as  follows : 

(1)  Mining  and  milling  of  uranium ; 

(2)  Refining  of  uranium  and  conversion  to  uranium  hexafluo- 

(3)  Enrichment  of  uranium ; 

(4)  Conversion  of  enriched  uranium  into  fuel  material ; 

(5)  Fabrication  of  fuel  elements  for  the  nuclear  power  re- 
actors ; 

(6)  Use  of  the  fuel  elements  in  working  nuclear  power  plants; 

(7)  Reprocessing  of  spent  fuel  to  recover  useful  nuclear  fuel 
materials;  and 

(8)  Perpetual  storage  of  intensely  radioactive  waste's  from  the 
fission  process. 

Fusion  Power:  an  Expectation  Yet  to  be  Fulfilled 

In  the  fusion  process,  atoms  of  light  elements,  primarily  hydrogen, 
are  fused  together  with  a  resultant  release  of  energy.  The  uncon- 
trolled fusion  process  is  the  basis  for  the  hydrogen  bomb  which  has 
so  revolutionized  foreign  relations  and  national  security  in  the  20th 
century.  If  a  controlled  fusion  process  could  be  achieved  and  demon- 
strated to  be  technologically  and  economically  feasible  for  generation 
of  elect  licit  v.  the  world  would  have  a  literally  inexhaustible  supply  of 
energy.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  United  States,  the  Soviet  Union, 
and  many  other  countries  are  engaged  in  fusion,  or  "controlled  ther- 
monuclear," research. 

As  ;in  environmental  benefit,  fusion  would  not  produce  the  enormous 
amounts  of  radioactive  wastes  characteristic  of  lission,  and  could  offer 


the  prospect  of  more  efficient  conversion  of  energy  into  electricity ;  a 
fusion  powerplant  would  discharge  less  waste  heat  to  the  environ- 
ment than  its  fission  counterpart,  thus  easing  problems  of  thermal 

At  least  three  major  technical  obstacles  stand  in  the  way  of  a  demon- 
stration of  a  workable  controlled  fusion  reaction.  Optimists  expect 
these  can  be  overcome  within  the  next  few  decades.  On  the  other  hand, 
until  a  demonstration  is  actually  achieved,  national  energy  policies 
cannot  assume  that  fusion  will  in  fact  be  available  to  supply  energy 
needs  of  the  21st  century. 

Safeguards :  Ways  to  Assure  Discovery  of  Unauthorized  Diversion  of 
Fissionable  Materials 

The  nuclear  age  brought  a  new  meaning  to  the  word  "safeguards" 
in  international  relations.  Safeguards  are  measures  to  guard  against 
the  diversion  of  nuclear  fuel  material  from  uses  permitted  by  law  or 
international  agreement  and  to  give  timely  indication  of  possible  diver- 
sion or  assurance  that  diversion  has  not  occurred.10  Safeguards  are  a 
means  of  detecting  but  not  preventing  diversion. 

Diversion  of  plutonium  produced  in  nuclear  power  plants  is  con- 
sidered to  be  the  chief  danger  to  national  security  from  commercial 
nuclear  power.  A  fundamental  goal  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  is  to  dis- 
courage nations  which  now  lack  nuclear  weapons  from  building  fa- 
cilities to  produce  nuclear  materials  to  make  weapons.  The  expected 
installation  of  nuclear  power  plants  in  many  of  these  countries  will 
make  available  large  amounts  of  plutonium  with  an  attendant  risk 
of  diversion.  The  Internationa]  Atomic  Energy  Agency  estimates  that 
by  1980  the  daily  accretion  to  the  world's  stock  of  nuclear  fuel  mate- 
rials will  be  sufficient  to  manufacture  10  nuclear  weapons  a  day.11 

Some  observers  expect  that  from  300,000  to  450,000  kilograms  of 
plutonium  will  be  accumulated  by  1980  in  civil  nuclear  power  pro- 
grams throughout  the  world.12  As  for  slightly  enriched  uranium,  while 
it  cannot  be  used  directly  in  weapons,  it  could  be  further  processed  to 
increase  its  enrichment  to  weapons  grade. 

Fortunately  for  international  security,  the  plutonium  produced  in 
commercial  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  is  not  ideal  for  use  in 
weapons.  Nonetheless,  it  would  be  possible  in  principle  to  operate 
some  nuclear  power  plants  to  produce  plutonium  better  suited  for 
weapons  materials.  "With  present  nuclear  technology,  this  action  would 
require  the  plants  involved  to  be  shut  down  frequently,  which  would 
be  a  conspicuous  signal  of  suspicious  behavior. 

All  safeguards  systems  depend  upon  two  elements:  (1)  the  main- 
tenance and  review  of  records  showing  the  receipt,  production,  con- 
sumption, transfer,  and  storage  of  nuclear  materials:  and  (2)  the 
undertaking  of  on-site  inspections  to  determine  the  validity  of  these 
records.  Physical  inspection  is  necessary-  to  verify  the  amount  of  safe- 
guarded materials  actually  on  hand.  An  inspector  must  have  access 
to  the  materials  to  take  measurements  and,  in  some  cases,  take  samples 
for  analvsis. 

10  The  Department  of  State  used  this  definition  in  :  U.S.  Congress.  Senate,  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  Hearings,  Xonprolifcratinn  Treat;/.  90th  Cong.  2d  Sess.,  196S,  p.  50. 

11  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  IAEA  Safeguards,  (circa  1968)  p.  7. 

12  Mason  Willrich.  "The  Nature  of  the  Problem,"  in  Mason  Willrieh.  ed.,   Civil  Nuclear 
Power  and  International  Security  (New  York  :  Praeger  Publishers,  19T1),  p.  3. 


Some  Lim  itations  of  Safeguards 

Control  of  nuclear  materials,  both  because  of  their  monetary  value 
and  for  their  utility  to  make  nuclear  weapons,  would  seem  to  require  a 
combination  of  accounting  and  physical  controls  and  protection.  This 
double  control  is  not  now  in  practice.  Safeguards  systems  do  not 
extend  to  physical  protection  against  theft  or  diversion,  but  are 
designed  only  to  detect  such  theft  or  diversion.  The  hope  for  safe- 
guards is  that  their  detection  capability  will  deter  a  would-be  diverter 
by  his  risk  of  early  detection  and  unmasking  in  the  world  community. 
This  limitation  of  safeguards  has  important  consequences.  It  means 
that  assuring  the  physical  security  of  nuclear  materials  is  a  separate 
responsibility  of  the  possessing  nation. 

A  second  limitation  of  safeguards  is  technical  and  statistical.  Ex- 
perience indicates  that  large  users  and  producers  of  nuclear  materials 
can  never  know  precisely  how  much  materials  they  have ;  there  can  be 
no  assurance  of  the  detection  of  every  slight  diversion.  Unavoidable 
process  losses  and  statistical  errors  in  sampling  and  measurement  set 
limits  on  accuracy.  These  limitations  do  not  mean  that  safeguards 
cannot  achieve  a  high  level  of  effectiveness.  They  do  mean  that  some 
margin  of  error  is  inescapable  which  might  mask  some  small  diver- 
sions. The  diversion  of  substantial  amounts  of  plutonium  or  highly  en- 
riched uranium-235  would  probably  be  detected,  but  there  remains  the 
nagging  possibility  that  enough  materials  might  be  diverted  without 
detection  to  make  a  few  nuclear  weapons.  The  possession  of  a  few  illicit 
weapons  by  a  smaller  nation,  or  possibly  a  non-national  organization 
which  might  obtain  the  nuclear  materials  on  a  nuclear  black  market,  is 
a  real  disadvantage  of  nuclear  power  to  be  weighed  when  considering 
the  balance  of  cost  and  benefit  from  a  policy  of  promoting  its  world 
use.  Moreover,  the  higher  the  rate  at  which  atomic  fuel  is  used,  re- 
processed, and  increased  by  breeding,  the  larger  will  be  the  margin 
of  uncertainty  attributable  to  statistical  error  and  the  greater  the 
chance  of  undetected  diversion. 

III.  From  Hiroshima  to  Atoms  for  Peace:  Postwar  Trends  in 
Regional  Multinational  Cooperation  in  Europe 

Nuclear  power  is  capable  of  both  military  and  peaceful  applica- 
tions. While  the  first  research  aimed  at  application  of  nuclear  power 
was  for  ship  propulsion,  the  first  actual  application  was  a  bomb.  It 
was  the  latter  use  that  colored  the  impact  of  the  atom  upon  U.S. 
diplomacy  for  the  later  1940's  and  well  into  the  1950's. 

The  first  postwar  impact  of  nuclear  power  upon  American 
diplomacy  was  evident  in  the  unsuccessful  struggle  of  diplomats  to 
achieve  international  control  of  atomic  energy  through  the  United 
Nations  and  the  U.N.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  As  the  effort  failed, 
the  diplomats  had  to  grapple  with  the  implications  of  possession  of 
atomic  bombs  by  the  Soviet  Union.  And  even  as  diplomacy  was  learn- 
ing to  accommodate  to  the  military  implications  of  atomic  energy, 
scientists  and  engineers  were  adding  a  new  factor  as  their  research 
and  development  led  to  the  expectation  of  early  commercial  use  of 
nuclear  power.  By  the  early  1950's  this  optimism  began  to  affect  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States,  as  its  diplomats  and  scientists 
undertook  initiatives  that  ultimately  led  to  the  creation  of  two  regional, 
multinational  organizations  to  coordinate  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear 
energy,  a  military  alliance  for  its  military  use,  a  worldwide  interna- 
tional atomic  energy  organization,  a  network  of  bilateral  agreements 
by  the  United  States  with  other  countries  for  technical  assistance 
with  nuclear  energy,  and  a  treaty  to  prevent  proliferation  of  new 
national  capabilities  to  manufacture  nuclear  weapons.  These  develop- 
ments evidence  the  impact  of  the  discovery  of  fission  upon  American 

In  addressing  the  interaction  between  American  diplomacy  and 
programs  to  foster  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe,  this  study 
gives  limited  attention  to  the  role  of  the  United  Kingdom.  While  the 
British  were  a  principal  partner  of  the  United  States  in  the  wartime 
development  of  the  atomic  bomb,  this  special  relationship  was  dis- 
solved by  the  restrictions  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946.  There- 
after the  United  Kingdom's  government  moved  vigorously  to  estab- 
lish a  civil  nuclear  power  program  both  to  supply  energy  for  domestic 
use  and  in  hopes  of  increasing  future  export  trade.  This  they  did 
independently  of  the  United  States  and  also  of  the  nations  that  were 
later  to  form  the  European  Common  Market.  The  British  tradition 
of  separation  from  and  independence  of  Europe  has  persisted  until 
recently.  Clearly  the  separation  efforts  of  the  British  caused  diplo- 
matic interactions  between  the  governments  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States.  However,  an  analysis  of  these  interactions  is 
not  within  the  scope  of  this  study. 

An  Initial  Prohibition  of  International  Cooperation 

To  maintain  nuclear  secrecy,  Congress,  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Act 
of  1946,13  terminated  nuclear  collaboration  with  the  wartime  allies 

13  Public  Law  79-585,  60  Stat.  755. 



of  the  United  States.  The  Act  stipulated  that  until  Congress  should 
declare  by  joint  resolution  that  effective  and  enforceable  international 
safeguards  against  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  destructive  purposes 
had  been  established,  there  could  be  no  exchange  of  information  with 
other  nations  for  the  use  of  atomic  energy  for  industrial  purposes. 
Xo  such  joint  resolution  has  ever  been  introduced. 

As  the  cold  war  intensified,  the  United  States  began  to  favor  the 
sharing  of  some  nuclear  information  to  strengthen  its  NATO  allies. 
To  this  end,  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  was  amended  in  1951  14 
to  authorize  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  (AEC)  under  cer- 
tain conditions  to  enter  into  arrangements  with  allies  of  the  United 
States  to  give  them  certain  nuclear  information.15 

In  congressional  debate  on  this  amendment  many  Members  indi- 
cated their  belief  that  such  nuclear  cooperation  should  be  entered  into 
only  for  reasons  so  compelling  as  to  overbalance  the  preference  for 
secrecy  of  the  original  legislation.  Clearly,  the  1951  amendment  was 
intended  to  strengthen  military  alliances  rather  than  to  foster  commer- 
cial use  of  nuclear  energy  in  Europe. 

The  restrictions  of  the  194G  atomic  energy  legislation  upon  U.S. 
technical  cooperation  with  other  nations  are  notable  for  attitudes  they 
represent.  During  the  war  years,  close  collaboration  of  scientists  and 
engineers  of  the  allies  had  produced  the  atom  bomb  within  the  short 
span  of  six  years  from  the  initial  observation  of  fission  in  uranium. 
Once  atomic  energy  had  entered  the  arena  of  international  relations 
the  attitude  changed  from  cooperation  to  secrecy.  One  early  task  of 
U.S.  diplomacy  was  to  reconcile  the  nuclear  interests  of  U.S.  allies 
with  this  legislative  constraint  upon  international  cooperation  and 
communication  of  information  for  nuclear  energy. 

Initial  Pessim  ism  To  travel  Nuclear  Power 

Early  postwar  preoccupation  with  military  use  of  nuclear  energy 
and  initial  pessimism  as  to  the  commercial  utility  of  nuclear  power 
concentrated  the  impact  of  atomic  energy  upon  American  diplomacy. 
With  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  arsenal,  particularly 
after  perfection  of  the  hydrogen  bomb,  U.S.  diplomats  for  many  years 
operated  from  a  unique  position  of  strength  that  offset  the  rapid  post- 
war reduction  of  the  Nation's  armed  forces. 

That  commercial  nuclear  power  would  soon  be  feasible  seemed  un- 
likely in  the  late  1940's.  A  leading  theoretician  of  nuclear  power,  Dr. 
Walter  Zinn,  in  draft  ing  the  firsl  program  for  nuclear  power  in  1947. 
called  attention  to  the  shortage  of  nuclear  fuel.  Existing  stocks  of 
uranium  ores  were  judged  scarcely  large  enough  to  sustain  produc- 
tion of  a  modes!  number  of  weapons,  but  inadequate  to  supply  fuel 
for  future  nuclear  power  plants.  Zinn  concluded  that  the  only  hope 
for  nuclear  power  lay  in  successful  perfection  of  the  breeder.  Trans- 

"  Public  Law  82  235,  05  Stat.  692. 

u The  Act  amended  Section  10. (a)  (3)  it  required  unanimous  action  by  the  five  ('mn- 
ioners  on  such  an  agreement  and  provided  further  that  certain  Information  about 
weapons  nut  be  communicated  ;  thai  no  such  arrangement  be  entered  into  with  any 
nation  "threatening  the  sccuritj  of  the  United  States";  thai  the  data  involved  ".  .  .  shall 
he  limited  ami  circumscribed  i"  the  maximum  degree  consistent  with  the  common  defense 
ami  Miu ri t y  .  .  ." ;  thai  the  Presidenl  gel  written  recommendations  of  the  National 
Security  Council  ami  incorporate  these  in  a  determination  that  the  arrangement  would 
".  .  .  substantial]}  promote  ami  would  not  endanger  tin'  common  defense  ami  security  of 
the  United  States   .   .  ami  that   before  tin'  arrangement    was  consummated,   the  Joint 

Committi  i'  "a  Atomic  Energj  should  be  Informed  ami  thirtj  days  pass. 


luting  the  breeder  concept  into  practice  appeared  to  be  extremely 
difficult  and  in  1947  the  chances  for  successful  breeding  were  said  to 
be  marginal  at  best.10 

The  General  Advisory  Committee17  shared  Zinn's  pessimism.  On 
November  23,  11)47,  the  committee  expressed  doubt  that  it  would  be 
possible  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances  for  any  considerable 
portion  of  the  power  supply  of  the  world  to  be  replaced  by  nuclear 
fuel  within  20  years.18 

Subsequent  history  confirmed  their  observation.  Even  by  the  early 
1970s,  nuclear  power  accounts  for  only  a  small  percentage  of  electrical 
power  generation  in  the  United  States  and  of  the  world.  However,  by 
the  1990s  it  is  expected  to  supply  half  of  the  electricity  needs  of  the 
United  States  and  a  quarter  of  U.S.  total  energy  needs. 

Changing  Technology  mid  Diplomacy 

During  the  late  1940's  and  early  1950's  diplomats  struggled  toward 
international  control  of  atomic  energy.  Efforts  of  the  United  Nations 
Atomic  Energy  Commission  resulted  in  diplomatic  frustration.  Mean- 
while, scientists  and  engineers  were  progressing  toward  commercial 
nuclear  power,  and  the  initial  pessimism  about  commercial  nuclear 
power  shifted  to  optimism,  an  optimism  that  was  soon  to  affect  Amer- 
ican diplomacy.  For  example,  in  June  1952  a  Canadian  leader  in 
nuclear  energy,  J.  Lome  Gray  of  Atomic  Energy  of  Canada,  Ltd., 
said : 19 

We  are  convinced,  even  with  our  present  incomplete  knowledge  of  this  tech- 
nology, that  fission  of  natural  uranium  will  produce  energy  that  can  and  will 
compete  economically  with  coal  or  oil.  We  are  thinking  at  this  stage  of  quite  large 
control  power  stations. 

A  few  months  later,  AEC  Commissioner  Eugene  M.  Zuckert 
wrote : 20 

Study  of  the  development  of  atomic  energy  from  1942  leads  me  to  feel  that  the 
strides  the  engineers  and  scientists  are  making  are  so  great  that  "power  only" 
reactors  may  be  nearer  than  we  dare  hope  for,  even  though  we  are  still  in  the 
early  phases  of  research  and  development. 

By  December  1952,  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  had 
concluded  that  atomic  power  for  industrial  purposes  was  technically 
feasible,  and  that  the  only  problem  was  its  cost.21 

Interest  in  International  Collaboration 

If  this  optimism  was  to  be  justified,  prototype  nuclear  power  plants 
had  to  be  designed,  built,  and  put  into  operation  to  provide  engineering 
and  operating  experience  for  the  nuclear  industries  and  the  electric 
utilities.  The  AEC  wished  to  get  on  with  this  demonstration,  but 
its  nuclear  power  program  became  caught  up  in  the  controversy  of 
public  versus  private  generation  of  electricity.  One  pragmatic  solution 
was  to  build  demonstration  plants  overseas.  Arranging  such  demon- 

16  Richard  G.  Hewlett  and  Francis  Duncan.  Atomic  Shield,  1947/1952  (University  Park, 
Pa.  :  The  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press.  1969).  p.  29. 

17  The  General  Advisory  Committee  to  the  USAEC  was  created  by  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act  of  1946  and  for  almost  a  decade  had  a  powerful  influence  within  the  Commission. 

18  Hewlett  and  Duncan,  op.  cit..  p.  116. 

19  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  .Atomic  Energy.  Atomic  Poirer  anil  Private  Enter- 
prise, 82nd  Cong..  2d  Hess..  December  1952    (Joint  Committee  print),  p.  3. 

20  Loc.  cit.  Reference  to  "power  only''  reactors  is  important,  for  previously  many 
observers  hwl  argued  that  at  best  nuclear  power  could  be  economically  competitive  only  as  a 
byproduct  from  manufacture  of  plutonium  for  bombs. 

=l  Loc.  cit. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  11 


strations  became  the  task  of  the  diplomats.  The  AEC  supported  the 
idea  of  building  demonstration  plants  abroad.  In  1952,  AEC  Com- 
missioner T.  Keith  Glennan  forecast  an  increasing  demand  abroad 
for  nuclear  power:  "This  demand  naturally  will  arise  first  where 
present  costs  of  electrical  energy  are  high  and  this  suggests  that  such 
a  program  may  have  an  important  place  in  a  future  Point  Four  pro- 
gram," J2  Europe  was  a  likely  location  because  it  needed  electricity  and 
costs  of  European  electricity  were  higher  than  in  the  United  States. 
thus  setting  an  easier  economic  goal  for  the  designers  and  engineers. 
AEC  Commissioner  Henry  D.  Smyth  endorsed  the  idea  that  the 
nuclear  power  stations  might  be  built  abroad  with  U.S.  financial  help 
through  Point  Four  funds.  He  too  pointed  out  that  since  power  pro- 
duction in  the  United  States  was  much  cheaper  than  in  other  countries, 
the  economic  incentive  for  nuclear  power  would  be  greater  abroad. 

By  the  early  1950's  nuclear  power  had  begun  to  attract  the  interest  of 
the  makers  and  executors  of  foreign  policy.  Still  it  remained  of  limited 
import  as  the  governments  and  diplomatic  services  of  the  United 
States  and  its  allies  struggled  to  assure  the  survival  of  a  free  Western 
Europe.  The  experience  then  with  a  massive  outpouring  of  U.S.  fi- 
nancial and  technical  aid  through  multinational  organizations  was  to 
point  the  way  for  later  multinational  ventures  in  nuclear  power. 

The  Evolving  Scene:  191^5-1953 

Eight  years  elapsed  between  the  end  of  fighting  in  Europe  and 
President  Eisenhower's  Atoms  for  Peace  plan  of  195)1  The  events  and 
trends  of  these  years  generated  pressures  upon  the  United  States  to 
take  new  diplomatic  initiatives.  One  initiative  was  the  President's  plan 
to  foster  the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy  throughout  the  world  by 
means  which  included  construction  and  operation  of  demonstration 
nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe. 

These  8  years  saw  the  initial  recovery  of  Europe,  the  start  of 
the  cold  war.  the  onset  of  economic  stagnation  in  Europe,  the  mount- 
ing of  the  Marshall  plan  and  the  related  establishment  of  the  Or- 
ganisation for  European  Economic  Co-operation  (OEEC),  creation 
of  the  .North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  (NATO),  the  Korean 
"War.  U.S.  pronouncement  of  the  doctrine  of  massive  retaliation,  and 
the  formation  of  two  multinational  European  organizations  for  eco- 
nomic cooperation.23 


Fighting  ended  in  Europe  on  May  5,  L945.  The  enormous  devasta- 
tion on  the  continent  and  in  the  British  Isles  made  survival  and 
restoral  ion  of  commerce  and  industry  the  imperatives  of  the  day.  Yet 
despite  this  devastation,  the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission 
for  Europe  estimated  that  Western  Europe  had  by  1946  regained  its 
prewar  levels  of  industrial  production.  Unfortunately,  the  extremely 
harsh  winter  of  1946  17  impeded  this  initial  recovery,  which  came  to 
a  halt  altofrtherin  L947. 

-Ihi.l  .  p.  25 

M  While  an  examination  <>r  r.s  Soviet  relations  In  Europe  lies  outside  the  scop.'  of  this 
paper,  there  were  i"  be  interactions  between  these  power  blocs  with  respeel  ii>  nuclear 
power,  for  background  on  the  general  relations,  the  reader  may  wish  to  consult  Thomas 
\Volfe,  Soviet  Power  and  Europe:  1915  t970  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press, 


With  the  cessation  of  hostilities  in  Europe  and  the  elimination  of 
the  Nazi  threat,  the  Soviet  Union  gave  priority  to  its  historical  strug- 
gle  with  the  capitalist  world,  the  leading  member  of  which  was  the 
United  States.  By  1047.  Eastern  Europe  was  under  full  Soviet  domi- 
nation :  the  Soviet  Union's  subsequent  refusal  to  accept  Marshall  plan 
aid  for  herself  and  her  satellites  decisively  ended  the  wartime  alliance 
and  there  began  the  period  known  as  the  cold  war.  The  subsequent 
struggle  short  of  war  pervaded  all  sectors  of  society  in  both  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  including  the  scientific  and  technical 
communities,  as  the  two  opponents  attempted  to  prove  the  superiority 
of  their  respective  systems. 

The  Soviet  threat  to  Western  Europe,  together  with  the  threat  of 
economic  breakdown  and  resulting  political  instability,  led  to  Presi- 
dent Truman's  initiatives  of  the  Marshall  plan  and  the  Truman 
doctrine.  These  moves  were  deemed  necessary  because  conditions  in 
Western  Europe  presented  a  power  vacuum  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  United  States  feared  that  Soviet  forces 
would  enter  Western  Europe,  especially  through  Germany,  where  they 
already  had  a  foothold.  Consequently,  U.S.  diplomatic  objectives 
were  aimed  at  strengthening  Western  Europe  politically  and  eco- 
nomically until  this  power  vacuum  could  be  filled. 


The  concepts  of  the  Marshall  plan  were  announced  by  Secretary 
of  State  George  C.  Marshall  on  June  5,  1947.  The  basic  principle  of 
American  foreign  policy  was  to  foster  closer  collaboration  among 
European  nations.  Further  help  from  the  United  States  therefore 
should  be  given  only  after  these  nations  had  agreed  together  upon 
their  basic  needs  and  had  organized  to  make  effective  use  of  aid  from 
the  United  States.  Such  aid  was  in  the  U.S.  national  interest,  said 
Secretary  Marshall,  because  the  modern  system  of  industrial  division 
of  labor  in  Europe  was  in  danger  of  breaking  down  with  a  consequent 
demoralizing  effect  on  the  world,  the  generation  of  disturbances,  and 
undesirable  consequences  for  the  U.S.  economy. 

The  Marshal]  plan  continued  in  operation  until  1951.  In  addition 
to  the  financial  support  it  provided,  the  plan  also  stimulated  European 
nations  to  organize  for  economic  development  through  the  Organisa- 
tion for  European  Economic  Co-operation.  By  the  end  of  this  remark- 
able venture  in  international  aid.  the  industrial  outputs  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  West  Germany.  France,  and  other  nations  of  Western 
Europe  had  increased  substantially  over  the  levels  of  1947,  ranging 
from  an  increase  of  35  percent  for  the  United  Kingdom  to  334  per- 
cent for  West  Germany. 


On  November  17.  1947,  President  Truman  announced  to  a  joint  ses- 
sion of  Congress  that  he  would  propose  a  long-range  European  re- 
covery program  to  support  the  freedom-loving  countries  of  West- 
ern Europe  in  their  endeavors  to  remain  free.  A  few  weeks  later  in 
his  foreign  aid  message  of  December  19.  1947.  the  President  proposed 
major  U.S.  aid  to  Europe,  coupling  this  with  the  Marshal  plan  con- 


cept  of  European  joint  action  and  also  to  the  national  interests  of  the 
United  States. 

Unification  in  Europe 

Alter  the  crisis  of  initial  survival  had  passed,  the  remaining 
problems  facing  the  governments  of  Western  Europe  were  three- 
fold : 

(1)  To  develop  an  effective  system  of  collective  security; 

(2)  To  sustain  economic  stability ;  and 

( :; )  To  foster  further  industrial  development, 
U.S.  foreign  policy  toward  European  recovery  received  another, 
largely  unanticipated,  technological  shock  in  1949  when  the  Soviet 
Union  detonated  its  first  atomic  explosive.  Four  years  later  the 
U.S.S.R.  tested  its  first  hydrogen  bomb.24  As  the  Soviet  Union  began 
to  acquire  a  nuclear  arsenal,  the  nations  of  Western  Europe,  saw  rea- 
son to  seek  unity  in  their  future  dealings  with  the  Soviet  bloc.  A  uni- 
fied or  federated  Western  Europe  also  might  hope  to  emerge  as  an 
independent  global  power,  capable  of  exercising  substantia]  influ- 
ence in  world  affairs  independently  of  the  United  States  or  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  European  approach  to  unity  featured  the  creation  of  three 
international  communities:  a  coal  and  steel  community,  a  common 
market,  and  a  nuclear  power  community. 

The  European  Coal  mid  Steel  Com  in  mi  ity 

A  major  step  toward  the  goal  of  European  unity  was  taken  when 
West  Germany,  France.  Italy,  and  the  Benelux  countries  (  Belgium, 
Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands)  ratified  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on 
July  25,  L952,  and  brought  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
(  EUSC)  into  force  as  an  independent  multinational  organization.  The 
treaty  required  that  the  six  members  remove  all  tariff  and  other  bar- 
riers to  the  free  movement  of  coal,  iron  ore,  and  steel  within  two  years, 
and  abolish  all  discrimination  against  imports  from  other  members. 
Max  Beloff  of  the  Brookings  Institution  sees  the  importance  of  this 
multinational  organization  in  the  impetus  it  gave  to  Western  Euro- 
pean cooperation  and  integration  in  political  and  defense  matters.25 

Tin-  Euro/"  mi  Economic  Community 

Within  a  few  years  the  example  of  the  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
led  to  the  formation  of  two  additional  communities:  a  European  com- 
mon market .  and  an  atomic  energx  community. 

The  starting  point  for  these  ventures  was  a  conference  of  the  for- 
eign ministers  of  the  ECSC  nations  at  Messina  in  June  1955,  shortly 
before  the  opening  of  the  United  Nation's  first  international  confer- 
ence on  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy.  Two  years  later  the  Treaty 
of  Rome  was  signed,  on  March  25,  L957,  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community  (EEC),  commonly  known  as  the  Common 
Market.  The  treaty  came  into  force  on  January  1.  l!>f>8. 

The  aims  of  the  Common  Market  are  to  promote  a  harmonious 
development  of  economic  activity  and  cooperation  among  its  members 
through  gradual  elimination  of  financial  and  physical  restrictions  on 
the  free  movement  of  goods,  capital,  and  workers  among  member 
countries:  the  harmonization  of  economic  policies;  and  the  consolida 

«  December  R,  1953 

!»M:i\    Beloff,    77"    United   States   <m<!   th<    Unity   of   Europe    (Washington,   D.C. :    The 

Brook i n gs  Institution.  1963),  p.  »'■  1 


tion  of  a  single  external  tariff.  By  the  close  of  1961,  internal  tariffs 
among  members  had  been  reduced  by  40  percent  on  industrial  goods 
and  by  30  percent  on  farm  products.  Quotas  on  industrial  goods  had 
been  abolished,  and  the  EEC  was  working  toward  a  common  external 
tariff  intended  to  be  20  percent  below  the  average  of  The  national 
tariffs.  Complete  internal  free  trade  was  to  be  established  on  July  1, 
1907.  Quotas  on  trade  were  removed  and  national  tariffs  toward  non- 
member  countries  were  aligned  toward  the  common  external  tariff, 
effective  July  1968. 

The  second  community  originating  at  the  Messina  conference  was 
the  European  Atomic  Community  (Euratom).  This  multinational 
supranational  organization  of  six  nations  to  foster  use  of  nuclear 
energy  is  treated  in  detail  in  sections  VII  and  VIII. 


The  parallel  membership  and  organization  of  the  Coal  and  Steel 
Community,  the  Economic  Community,  and  Euratom  led  to  an  agree- 
ment in  1965  to  combine  them  under  a  single  system  of  executive, 
legislative,  and  judicial  bodies.  This  agreement  took  effect  on  July  1, 
l'.MlT.  and  the  three  communities  now  share  in  common  a  Commission 
of  Member  States,  a  Council  of  Ministers,  a  European  Parliament, 
an  Economic  and  Social  Committee,  and  a  Court  of  Justice. 

The  Commission  of  the  European  Communities:  The  Commission 
consists  of  nine  members :  two  each  from  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many, France,  and  Italy,  and  one  each  from  the  Netherlands,  Belgium, 
and  Luxembourg.  It  implements,  administers,  and  enforces  the  Treaties 
of  Paris  and  Rome.  The  Commission  works  on  the  principle  of  col- 
legiate responsibility  for  respective  sectors.  Energy  is  identified  as 
one  such  sector,  which  in  1970  was  the  responsibility  of  the  member 
from  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.26 

The  Council  of  Ministers:  A  Council  of  Ministers  represents  the 
interests  of  member  states,  with  one  representative  from  each  member. 
Usually  the  representative  is  the  minister  concerned  with  the  subject 
before  the  Council,  but  the  foreign  affairs  ministers  participate  in 
the  most  important  sessions.  The  work  of  the  Council  is  prepared  by 
a  Committee  of  Permanent  Representatives  of  the  member  states. 

The  European  Parliament :  The  legislative  arm  of  the  common  or- 
ganization is  the  European  Parliament,  which  supervises  the  execu- 
tive organs  of  the  communities  and  debates  their  annual  reports.  It 
has  the  power  by  vote  of  censure  of  a  two-thirds  majority  to  dismiss 
the  executives  of  the  communities.  The  Parliament  maintains  12  stand- 
ing committees  to  follow  the  work  of  the  three  communities.  One  of 
these  committees  deals  with  energy,  research,  and  atomic  affairs.  While 
the  Commission  need  not  defer  to  the  Parliament,  in  practice  it  tries 
to  shape  its  proposals  to  attain  approval  by  a  majority.27 

The  Economic  and  Social  Committee:  An  Economic  and  Social  Com- 
mittee of  101  members  represents  employers,  trade  unions,  and  the  gen- 
eral interest.  Its  function  is  advisory. 

:G  The  13  sectors  which  have  been  identified  are:  external  relations,  external  trade,  eco- 
nomic and  financial  affairs,  industry,  internal  market  and  regional  policy,  competition, 
budget  and  information,  agriculture,  energy,  social  affairs,  transport,  research  and  tech- 
nology, and  development  aid. 

»  The  U.S.  Department  of  State  Fact  Book  of  the  Countries  of  the  World  (New  York: 
Crown  Publishers,  Inc.,  1970),  p.  785. 


TIk  Court  of  Just i,-e:  A  supreme  court  of  seven  judges  sits  in 
Luxembourg  with  power  to  decide  whether  acts  of  the  communities, 
member  governments,  and  private  organizations  are  compatible  with 

the  treaties.  The  Court  can  annul  acts  of  the  Commission  and  the 
( Jouncil  of  Ministers.  Its  decisions  are  directly  binding  upon  all  parties 
and  are  not  subject  to  appeal.  The  seven  justices  are  appointed  for 
terms  of  six  years  by  the  member  governments.  Through  1968  some 
56<  i  cases  had  been  brought  before  the  Court. 

Financing  the  communities:  The  communities  are  financed  by  na- 
tional contributions,  much  as  was  the  federal  government  of  the  United 
States  during  the  era  of  the  Continental  Congress.  From  Janu.  ry  1, 
1975.  the  communities  are  scheduled  to  have  their  own  independent 
financial  resources  derived  from  :  (1)  variable  levies  on  farm  imports: 
(2)  customs  duties:  and  (3)  proceeds  of  up  to  1  percent  of  a  value 
added  tax. 

The  general  budget  of  the  communities  in  1969  came  to  about  $2.7 
million  and  was  financed  by  the  member  governments  in  the  following 
proportions:  France,  West  Germany  and  Italy,  28  percent  each:  Bel- 
gium and  the  Netherlands,  7.1)  percent  each:  and  Luxembourg  0.2 

The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Dt  velojmu  nt 

Interest  in  European  cooperation  extended  beyond  the  communities 
of  the  six  nat  ions  and  led  to  establishment  of  a  European  multinational 
organization  that  quickly  developed  a  parallel  interest  in  nuclear 
energy.  On  December  14.  1960,  the  Organisation  for  European  Eco- 
nomic Co-operation,  which  had  been  set  up  in  1948  to  coordinate  efforts 
to  restore  Europe's  economy  under  the  Marshall  plan,  was  reorganized 
into  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development 
(OECD).  England,  which  was  not  a  member  of  the  Common  Market, 
was  a  member  of  OECD.  One  fundamental  purpose  of  OECD  was 
"to  achieve  the  highest  sustainable  growth  and  employment  and  a 
rising  standard  of  living  in  member  countries,  while  maintaining 
financial  stability  and  thus  to  contribute  to  the  development  of  the 
world  economy."  This  objective  was  to  be  accomplished  in  part  by 
efforts  to  reduce  or  abolish  obstacles  in  exchange  of  goods  and  services 
and  by  the  maintenance  and  liberalization  of  capital  movement  between 
countries.  A  new  major  goal  was  coordination  of  economic  aid  to  less 
developed  count  ries. 

The  OECD  in  the  mid-1950's  became  interested  in  nuclear  energy 
and  established  a  Nuclear  Energy  A.gency.  OECD  interests  extend  to 
peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  science  policy  research  cooperation, 
scientific  and  technical  personnel,  indust  rial  matters,  and  energy  prob- 
lems. The  OECD  is  headed  by  a  council  composed  of  representatives 
of  t  he  member  count  lies. 

/  .S.Attitudt  Toward  European  Unity 

Every  I'.S.  administration  of  the  postwar  period  has  supported 
European  unity  and  has  looked  to  the  institutions  of  the  European 
communities  as  the  most  promising  way  of  achieving  that  unitv.  An 
early  example  of  the  I'.S.  attitude  appears  in  President  Truman's 
pledge  in  L948  that  the  consolidated  effort  of  the  free  countries  of 
Europe  to  protect  themselves  would  be  matched  by  the  I'.S.  determi- 
nation to  help  them  do  so.  Support  by  Congress  for  European  unity 


was  also  evident  in  Senate  Resolution  239,  sponsored  by  Senator  Van- 
denberg,  adopted  by  a  vote  of  64  to  4  on  June  11,  1948.  The  resolution 
urged  t  be  President  to  pursue  ". . .  progressive  development  of  regional 
and  other  collective  arrangements  for  individual  and  collective  self 
defense."  It  called  for  "association  of  the  United  States,  by  constitu- 
tional process,  with  such  regional  and  other  collective  arrangements 
as  are  based  on  continuous  and  effective  self-help  and  mutual  aid,  and 
as  affects  its  national  security."  28 

The  Congress  further  endorsed  unification  and  integration  in  Europe 
through  the  Mutual  Security  Acts  of  1951  and  1952.  In  the  former, 
Congress  specified  as  an  objective  of  U.S.  foreign  policy  the  economic 
unification  and  political  integration  of  Europe.29  During  1951,  the 
Department  of  State  apparently  decided  that  the  political  unification 
should  be  more  actively  encouraged,  and  at  a  meeting  between  Mem- 
bers of  Congress  and  the  Council  of  Europe  the  U.S.  representatives 
pressed  hard  in  that  direction.  The  Mutual  Security  Act  of  1952 
included  a  forthright  statement  of  support  for  European  unity : 30 

The  Congress  welcomes  the  recent  progress  in  political  federation,  military 
integration  and  economic  unification  in  Europe  and  reaffirms  its  belief  in  the 
necessity  of  further  vigorous  efforts  towards  these  ends  as  a  means  of  building 
strength,  establishing  security,  and  preserving  peace  in  the  North  Atlantic  area. 
In  order  to  provide  further  encouragement  to  such  efforts,  the  Congress  believes 
it  essential  that  this  act  should  be  so  administered  as  to  support  concrete  meas- 
ures for  political  federation,  military  integration  and  economic  unification  in 

Through  the  late  1940's  and  into  the  early  1950's  the  principal 
impact  of  nuclear  science  and  technology  upon  American  diplomacy 
was  the  temporary  military  advantage  it  gave  to  the  United  States  in 
relation  to  the  European  Community.  Although  the  United  Kingdom 
and  France  had  some  knowledge  of  nuclear  weapons  they  lacked  the 
industrial  base  to  make  them.  Possession  of  nuclear  weapons  initially 
enabled  American  diplomats  to  extend  to  allies  of  the  United  States 
an  umbrella  of  protection  against  attack. 

But  the  exclusive  military  advantage  was  short-lived  as  scientists 
and  engineers  of  the  Soviet  Union  developed  their  own  nuclear 
weapons.  By  the  mid-1950's  the  realization  that  the  Soviet  Union 
would  acquire  large  nuclear  weapons  plus  the  optimism  of  U.S. 
scientists  and  engineers  as  they  surveyed  the  initial  results  of  the  first 
few  years  of  work  to  produce  commercially  useful  nuclear  power, 
had  set  the  scene  for  a  major  new  diplomatic  initiative:  President 
Eisenhower's  Atoms  for  Peace  plan  of  1953. 

A  new  scientific  and  technological  achievement  was  soon  to  divert 
interest  from  nuclear  energy.  With  the  Soviet  Union's  successful 
launching  of  Sputnik  on  October  4,  1957,  the  attention  of  the  world 
became  directed  toward  outer  space.  Facing  technological  rivalry  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  the  United  States,  while  still  giving  some  attention 
to  nuclear  power,  began  its  efforts  (which  are  still  continuing)  to  get 
Europe  to  cooperate  in  space  programs. 

28  Congressional  Record,  vol.  04.  June  11,  194S  p.  7791 

29  The  Mutual  Security  Act  of  1951,  P.I,.  82-165.  65  Stat.  373. 

30  The  Mutual  Security  Act  of  1952,  P.L.  82-400,  66  Stat   141. 

IV.  Atoms  for  Peace:  A  Presidential  Initiative 

"Atoms  for  Peace"  is  the  name  of  a  presidential  exercise  of  diplo- 
matic powers  to  foster  foreign  use  of  the  science  and  technology  of 
nuclear  energy.  It  signaled  the  start  of  U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  to  cre- 
ate an  international  atomic  energy  agency;  American  encouragement 
to  two  European  regional,  multinational  agencies  for  nuclear  energy: 
establishment  of  a  network  of  bilateral  agreements  between  the  United 
States  and  individual  nations  for  technical  assistance  in  nuclear  en- 
ergy: and  a  treaty  to  establish  international  safeguards  over  nuclear 
fuel  materials.  These  diplomatic  ventures  sought  to  foster  civil  use  of 
nuclear  energy  abroad,  ranging  from  applications  of  radioisotopes 
for  research  and  for  diagnosis  and  treatment  in  medicine  to  the  demon- 
stration of  nuclear  power  for  the  generation  of  electricity.  I  underlying 
the  publicized,  idealistic  purpose  of  sharing  U.S.  nuclear  science  and 
technology  were  pragmatic,  practical  considerations  of  advantages  to 
the  United  States.  In  this  way.  the  idealism  of  American  nuclear 
scientists  and  engineers  was  coupled  effectively  to  the  support  of  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives. 

Three  basic  goals  of  I'.S.  policy  and  interest  in  Europe  have  re- 
mained constant  since  the  end  of  World  War  II:  integration  of  the 
nations  of  Western  Europe,  the  defense  of  I  '.S.  security,  and  the  quest 
for  East-West  detente.  '  Atoms  for  Peace  was  to  have  implications 
for  all  three  goals. 

Origins  of  Atoms  for  Peoxn 

Atoms  for  Peace  grew  out  of  a  frustrating  era  for  United  States 
diplomacy.  The  Soviet  Union  had  exploded  an  atomic  bomb  in  1949, 
an  unexpectedly  early  date.  Military  forces  of  North  Korea  had  in- 
vaded South  Korea  in  1950.  The  attempts  in  Europe  to  establish  a 
European  Defense  Community  had  failed  and  international  dis 
armament  negotiations  were  deadlocked.  One  U.S.  response  was  a 
policy  that  threatened  "massive  retaliation"  with  nuclear  weapons 
against  Communist  aggression.  Another  was  the  President's  Atoms  for 
Peace  proposals  as  an  alternative  to  the  arms  race. 

president  Eisenhower's  ct.n.  address 

By  1953,  President  Eisenhower  was  persuaded  thai  the  world  was 
courting  disaster  in  the  continuing  armaments  race  and  that  something 
had  to  be  done  to  put  n  brake  on  its  momentum.  lie  sought  "any  kind 
of  an  idea  thai  could  bring  the  world  to  look  at  the  atomic  problem 
in  a  broad  and  intelligent  way  and  -till  escape  the  impasse  to  action 
created  by  Russian  intransigence.  .  .  ." :rj  After  discussion  with  Prime 

*'  l  ;on1  recent  discussion  of  U.S.  interests  find  objectives  In  Western  Europe  from 

the  standpoint   of  n   diplomat,  see  the  speech  of  I»;i\i<l   B.   Bolen,   First    Secretary   of  the 
American  Ei  In  Bonn,  in  the  Congressional  Record,  September  20,  1971,  pp.  S14589 


'Dwiffht   l>    Elsenhower,  Mandate  for  Change:   1953    1956   (Garden  City,  N.Y.  :  Double 
day,  1963  I,  p.  252 



Minister  Churchill  at  the  Bermuda  conferences  of  1953,  and  receiving 
British  encouragement,  President  Eisenhower  offered  his  Atoms  for 
Peace  proposal  in  an  address  to  the  General  Assembly  of  the  United 
Nations,  December  8, 1953. 33 

Speaking  first  of  the  destructive  potential  of  nuclear  weapons,  the 
President  emphasized  two  atomic  realities  of  the  day :  (1)  knowledge 
of  atomic  power  which  some  nations  then  possessed  would  eventually 
be  shared  by  others;  and  (2)  even  a  vast  superiority  in  numbers  of 
nuclear  weapons  would  not  prevent  the  damage  and  toll  of  human 
lives  that  could  be  inflicted  by  surprise  aggression.  Even  against  the 
most  powerful  defense,  he  said,  an  aggressor  having  enough  atomic 
bombs  for  a  surprise  attack  could  probably  inflict  hideous  damage  on 
chosen  targets.  What,  then,  should  be  done?  The  consequences  of  in- 
action were  too  forbidding  to  accept.  He  said : 3i 

To  pause  there  would  be  to  confirm  the  hopeless  finality  of  a  belief  that  two 
atomic  colossi  are  doomed  malevolently  to  eye  each  other  indefinitely  across  a 
trembling  world.  To  stop  there  would  be  to  accept  helplessly  the  probability  of 
civilization  destroyed — the  annihilation  of  the  irreplaceable  heritage  of  mankind 
handed  down  to  us  from  generation  to  generation — and  the  condemnation  of  man- 
kind to  begin  all  over  again  the  age  old  struggle  upward  from  savagery  toward 
decency,  and  right,  and  justice. 

The  President  proposed  to  promote  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  power 
as  a  way  to  reverse  the  trend  of  atomic  military  buildup.  Nuclear  ma- 
terials committed  to  peaceful  purposes  would  not  be  available  for 
weapons.  To  this  end,  he  proposed  that  the  nuclear  nations  of  the 
world,  primarily  the  United  States  and  U.S.S.K.,  contribute  fissionable 
materials  to  an  international  pool  that  would  be  administered  by  an 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  This  pool  would  provide  fuel 
for  abundant  electrical  energy  to  the  power-starved  areas  of  the  world. 
The  initial  contributions  to  the  pool  would  be  small.  However,  the  pro- 
posal had  the  great  virtue,  said  the  President,  that  it  could  be  under- 
taken without  the  irritations  and  mutual  suspicions  incident  to  any 
attempt  to  set  up  a  system  of  worldwide  inspection  and  control.  Elabo- 
rating on  his  proposal,  the  President  said : 35 

The  Atomic  Energy  Agency  could  be  made  responsible  for  the  impounding, 
storage,  and  protection  of  the  contributed  fissionable  and  other  materials.  The 
ingenuity  of  our  scientists  will  provide  special  safe  conditions  under  which  such 
a  bank  of  fissionable  material  can  be  made  essentially  immune  to  surprise 

The  more  important  responsibility  of  this  Atomic  Energy  Agency  would  be  to 
devise  methods  whereby  this  fissionable  material  would  be  allocated  to  serve  the 
peaceful  pursuits  of  mankind.  Experts  would  be  mobilized  to  supply  atomic 
energy  to  the  needs  of  agriculture,  medicine,  and  other  peaceful  activities.  A 
special  purpose  would  be  to  provide  abundant  electrical  energy  in  the  power- 
starved  areas  of  the  world. 

The  President  specifically  invited  participation  of  the  Soviet  Union 
and  committed  himself  to  seek  the  legislation  necessary  for  the  United 
States  to  carry  out  its  part  of  the  proposals. 

Within  the  United  Nations,  the  response  to  the  Atoms  for  Peace 
proposal  was  instantaneous  and  favorable.  The  speech  was  scored  as 
a  victory  for  the  United  States  in  international  affairs  by  undercut- 

m  "Address  bv  the  President  before  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly,"  Congressional 
Record,  vol.  100.  January  7,  1954,  pp.  61-63. 

34  Ibid.,  p.  62. 

35  Loc.  cit. 


ting  a  persuasive  Communist  propaganda  offensive  that  represented 
the  United  States  as  motivated  by  "atomic  imperialism'"  and  aimed 
at  monopolizing  the  benefits  of  nuclear  technology  through  its  policy 
of  atomic  secrecy.  James  J.  Wadsworth,  later  to  become  U.S.  am- 
bassador to  the  conference  that  was  to  create  the  international  agency, 
wrote  that  the  United  States  had  gained  a  diplomatic  advantage  over 
the  Soviet  Union  by  making  the  first  overture  to  the  world  commu- 
nity for  the  peaceful  use  of  nuclear  energy.36 

Implications  for  Nuclear  Power  in  Europe 

From  the  point  of  view  of  Western  Europe,  the  main  implications 
of  the  Atoms  for  Peace  message  were  threefold : 

(1)  In  principle  it  would  be  possible  to  obtain  from  the  United 
States  enriched  uranium  and  scarce  materials  such  as  heavy  water, 
for  development  of  nuclear  power,  subject  to  agreements  for  ex- 
change of  technical  information  and  control  of  the  materials 
supplied ; 

(2)  The  United  Nations  would  be  entrusted  with  supply  and 
safeguards  functions  via  the  proposed  international  agency : 

(3)  A  great  amount  of  scientific  and  technical  information  and 
data  on  nuclear  energy  would  be  released  to  the  world. 

This  latter  was  significant  for  until  then  much  of  the  technology 
for  nuclear  power  was  kept  secret  in  the  United  States. 

The  first  tangible  result  of  the  message  was  an  international  confer- 
ence on  atomic  energy  sponsored  by  the  United  Nations  in  Geneva  in 
1955.  In  retrospect,  the  conference  was  a  unique  event.  None  of  the 
three  subsequent  U.N.  conferences  released  at  one  time  so  much  scien- 
tific and  technical  information  in  such  an  exhilarating  atmosphere.  But 
the  United  States,  which  was  the  principal  participant  in  the  confer- 
ence, tended  to  oversell  atomic  energy,  which  many,  if  not  all,  countries 
looked  to  as  a  symbol  of  modernity  and  greatness.  The  year  1955 
marked  the  launching  of  all-out  nuclear  programs  in  many  countries, 
with  attendant  overestimating  of  promised  benefits  and  underestimat- 
ing of  the  technical  and  economic  problems  of  nuclear  power.37 

Legislation  for  Atoms  for  Peace 

A  complete  redrafting  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  legislation 
quickly  followed  President  Eisenhower's  Atoms  for  Peace  proposals 
to  clear  the  way  for  private  development  of  civil  nuclear  power  in  the 
United  State-  and  to  open  opportunities  for  nuclear  cooperation  with 
other  nations  and  with  international  bodies.  The  modifications  em- 
bodied in  the  1954  legislation,88  while  permitting  expanded  interna- 
tional cooperation,  also  included  provisions  to  insure  that  this  coopera- 
t  ion  would  promote,  not  compromise,  national  security. 

m  James  .1  Wadsworth.  "Atoms  for  Peace  "  hi  J,  Stoessinger  and  A.  Westin,  eds.,  Power 
and  Order  (New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace  and  World.  Inc.,  1964),  p.  35. 

This  aspeel  of  "over  ell"  is  emphasized  by  Jules  Queron,  former  general  director  of 
research  ; i ml  development  for  Euratom,  In  liis  essay.  "Atomic  Energy  In  Continental 
Western  Europe,"  in  Richard  L.  Lewis  and  Jane  Wilson,  eds..  Mamooonin  Pins  Twenty- 
Yeara  (New  York  :  The  Viking  Press,  t.iti  I  p.  146 
••Public  Law  83  703,  68  Stat.  919,  approved  August  30,  1!»r>4.  The  vote  In  the  House  was 
231  for.  154  against,  'i  present,  and  4.".  not  voting;  in  the  Senate  it  was  r.7  for,  28  against, 
nnd  11  not  vrot  inc. 



Scarcely  two  months  after  his  Atoms  for  Peace  message,  President 
Eisenhower  on  February  17,  1954  proposed  revision  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  of  1946.39  He  called  for  expanded  international  cooperation 
in  atomic  energy,  but  was  silent  as  to  the  proposed  international  atomic 
energy  agency.  The  changes  he  recommended  were  to : 

Widen  cooperation  with  U.S.  allies  in  certain  atomic  energy 
matters ; 

Improve  procedures  for  the  control  and  dissemination  of  atomic 
energy  information ;  and 

Encourage  broadened  participation  in  the  development  of  peace- 
time uses  of  atomic  energy  in  the  United  States.40 
These  recommendations,  the  President  observed,  were  separate  from 
his  proposal  to  seek  a  new  basis  for  international  cooperation  in  atomic 
energy  as  outlined  in  his  Atoms  for  Peace  address.  Consideration  of 
additional  legislation  which  might  be  needed  for  that  proposal  should 
await,  he  said,  the  outcome  of  discussions  with  other  nations.41  But  no 
subsequent  message  ever  came. 


The  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  May  and  June  1954  held 
extensive  hearings  on  the  proposed  revisions  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Act.  Administration  witnesses  supported  international  cooperation  for 
its  benefits  to  the  United  States.  AEC  Commissioner  Smyth  testified 
that  the  requested  amendments  would  contribute  substantially  to  world 
peace,  strengthen  the  national  defense  and  the  defense  and  economy  of 
the  free  world,  and  assure  the  continued  leadership  of  the  United 
States  in  atomic  energy.42  Commissioner  Thomas  Murray  further  de- 
veloped the  case : 

Industrially  underdeveloped  countries,  whose  future  economic  growth  is  being 
hampered  by  inadequate  or  high-cost  fuels  and  electric  energy,  might  benefit 
significantly  if  the  technical  and  financial  problems  can  be  overcome.  For  the 
industrially  advanced  nations,  encountering  difficulty  in  continuing  to  secure 
adequate  supplies  of  cheap  fuel  and  electric  energy  in  the  face  of  diminished 
reserves  and  mounting  costs  for  local  or  imported  fuel,  nuclear-power  develop- 
ment may  prove  to  be  a  key  element  in  future  industrial  growth.43 

39  Atomic  Energy  Art  of  1946 — Message  from  the  President.  (H.  Doc.  No.  32S)  Con- 
gressional Record,  Vol.  100.  February  17,  1954,  pp.  1921-1924. 

40  Elaborating  tbe  reasons  for  international  cooperation,  the  President  spoke  of  the 
need  for  authority  to  provide  certain  information  and  also  nuclear  materials  to  foreign 
countries  : 

In  the  development  of  peaceful  uses  for  atomic  energy,  additional  amendments  are 
required  for  effective  United  States  cooperation  with  friendly  nations.  Such  coopera- 
tion requires  the  exchange  of  certain  "restricted  data"  on  the  industrial  applications 
of  atomic  energy  and  also  the  release  of  fissionable  materials  in  amounts  adequate 
for  industrial  and  research  use.  I  therefore  recommend  that  the  Atomic  Energy  Act 
be  amended  to  authorize  such  cooperation.  Such  amendments  should  prescribe  that 
before  the  conclusion  of  any  arrangement  for  the  transfer  of  fissionable  material  to 
a  foreign  nation,  assurances  must  be  provided  against  its  use  by  the  recipient  nation 
for  military  purposes.  Ibid.,  p.  1922. 

41  Loc.  cit. 

42  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv,  Hearings,  8.  SS2S  and  H.R.  8862,  to 
Amend  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  191,6,  83d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1954,  part  II,  p.  562. 

43  Ibid.,  p.  574.  This  point  was  made  by  EEC  Commissioner  Murray,  an  industrialist. 


Secretary  of  State  Dulles,  after  underscoring  Soviet  military  nuclear 
progress,  concluded  that  the  strict  secrecy  requirements  of  the  1946 
Act  no  longer  represented  the  wisest  international  policy  for  the  United 
States.  He  identified  three  circumstances  that  had  combined  to  create 
the  need  to  relax  the  original  limits  on  international  cooperation: 
(1)  the  developing  Soviet  nuclear  program,  (2)  U.S.  dependence  on 
foreign  uranium  to  manufacture  nuclear  weapons,  and  (3)  legitimate 
hopes  for  nuclear  power  abroad.  Arguing  the  benefits  to  U.S.  self-in- 
terest,44 Secretary  Dulles  supported  the  legislation,  in  part,  so  that  the 
United  States  could  stay  ahead  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  providing 
knowledge  of  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy.45 

Replying  to  a  question  as  to  international  implications  of  failure 
to  enact  the  proposed  amendments.  Secretary  Dulles  claimed  that  it 
would  be  quite  disastrous  for  the  United  States.46 

Some  members  of  the  Joint  Committee  expressed  concern  lest  the 
proposed  amendments  be  regarded  as  an  international  "giveaway"  of 
U.S.  secrets,  technology,  and  materials.  These  fears  were  countered 
by  Representative  TV.  Sterling  Cole,  then  chairman  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  Atomic  Energy.  He  minimized  the  significance  of  the  pro- 
posed relaxation  of  controls  over  exchange  of  scientific  information 
with  other  countries.  He  observed  that  in  comparison  with  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  of  1946,  the  new  proposals  made  only  one  addition  to 
information  that  could  already  be  exchanged.  This  was  dissemination 
of  information  on  industrial  and  other  applications  of  nuclear  energy 
for  peaceful  purposes.  This,  he  said,  was  no  giveaway. 

So  when  you  hear  talk  that  this  bill  proposes  to  give  vital  information  away 
to  the  peoples  of  the  world,  to  foreigners,  to  enemies  as  well  as  friends,  just  tell 
those  people  who  talk  that  way  to  look  at  the  record.  The  bill  does  no  such 
thing.  It  scarcely  enlarges  the  field  of  the  exchange  of  information  beyond  what 
is  presently  authorized  by  law.  .  .  ." 

Interna  fi  oh  ill  Coopcrat'ton  and  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1954 

The  overhauling  of  the  Nation's  basic  atomic  energy  legislation  in 
l!>r>4  greatly  expanded  the  scope  of  possible  international  relations 
to  encourage  commercial  use  of  nuclear  energy  abroad.  In  doing 
so  it  placed  new  demands  upon  U.S.  diplomacy.  For  this  reason  it 
is  pertinent  to  identify  provisions  of  the  new  law  that  affected  move- 
ment of  scientific  information,  technology,  and  materials  of  nuclear 
energy  from  the  United  States  to  other  nations. 

41  For  example,  be  sa  id  : 

In  extending  abroad,  under  proper  security  safeguards,  the  evolving  technology  of 
atomic  energy  for  peaceful  purposes,  we  shall  tighten  the  lion, is  thai   tie  our-  friends 

abroad  to  us,  we  Bhall  assure  materials  resources  that  we  need,  and  we  shall  maintain 
world  leadership  In  atomic  energy — leadership  which  today  is  such  a  large  clement  of 
our  national  prestige.  Ibid.,  p.  685. 

*»  He  said   : 

Other  countries  an-  making  progress  In  atomic-power  technology.  There  Is  n  crowing 
tendency  for  certain  raw  materials  supplying  nations  which  are  not  industrially  well 
advanced,  to  turn  to  such  other  countries  for  nuclear  power  information  because  they 

have  l n  disappointed  by  our  Inability  to  give  them  significant  help.  It  is  clear  to  me 

that  if  this  trend  continues,  ihe  interests  of  the  United  states  will  be  seriously  and  det- 
rimentally affected  There  is  no  need  lure  to  emphasize  how  Important  It  Is  for  us  in 
■tay    ahead   of   the   U.S.S.R.    In    providing   knowledge    of    how    to    put    atomic    energy    to 

peaceful  uses.  ibid.,  p.  <;85. 

M  lie  said  : 

I  would  lie  sorry  if  (lie  international  aspect  of  this  hill  failed  .  .  .  because  I  do  want 
to  emphasize  with  the  greatest  earnestness  of  which  I  am  capable  that   I  believe  it 

would  be  quite  a  disastrous  thing  fi.r  the  United  States  If  these  foreign  policy  aspects 
of  the  hill  were  1 1 ■ . i  adopted. 

It  would  gravely  Interfere  in  my  opinion  with  our  ability  to  get  indispensable 
quantities  of  source  material  which  we  have  to  get  from  foreign  markets  and  which  I 
do  not  think  we  can  continue  to  get  except  on  a  basis  of  exchange  of  Information, 
piTlng  of  information,  which  is  more  liberal  than  that  which  Is  permitted  by  the  present 

I. or.    eil. 

♦7  Congressional  Records  vol    lno,  July  23,  1954,  p.  11656. 


The  Congress  declared  that  development,  use,  and  control  of  atomic 
energy  should  be  so  directed  as  to  "promote  world  peace,  improve  the 
general  welfare,  increase  the  standard  of  living,  and  strengthen  free 
competition  in  private  enterprise."  To  attain  this  goal,  the  Act  speci- 
fied a  program  to : 

.  .  .  promote  the  common  defense  and  security  and  to  make  available  to  co- 
operating nations  the  benefits  of  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy  as  widely 
as  expanding  technology  and  considerations  of  the  common  defense  and  security 
will  permit. 

In  support  of  this  program,  the  Act  authorized  the  AEC  to  cooperate 
with  any  nation  by  distributing  nuclear  fuel  and  source  materials,  and 
certain  artificial  radioisotopes.48  International  nuclear  cooperation 
would  be  effected  through  bilateral  agreements  for  cooperation  with 
individual  nations  or  with  a  regional  defense  organization.  These 
agreements  departed  from  conventional  practice.  Instead  of  being 
treaties,  they  were  agreements  negotiated  by  the  AEC  which  were 
simpler  to  negotiate  and  did  not  require  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate  for  their  ratification.  This  arrangement  was  judged  appropriate 
because  of  the  many  foreign  nations  that  were  expected  to  wish  to 
benefit  from  U.S.  nuclear  science  and  technology. 

Congress  did  place  some  limitations  upon  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  and  the  State  Department  in  negotiating  such  agreements. 
Section  123  of  the  Act  required  that  each  such  agreement  include: 

(1)  The  terms,  conditions,  duration,  nature,  and  scope  of  the 

(2)  A  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  security  safe- 
guards and  standards  agreed  upon  would  be  maintained ; 

(3)  A  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material  to 
be  transferred  pursuant  to  an  agreement  would  not  be  used  for 
atomic  weapons,  or  for  research  or  development  for  weapons,  or 
for  any  other  military  purposes ;  and 

(4)  A  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material 
and  any  restricted  data  to  be  transferred  would  not  be  transferred 
to  unauthorized  persons  or  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  cooperat- 
ing party  except  as  specified  in  the  agreement. 

Section  123  further  required  the  President  to  approve  each  agree- 
ment for  cooperation  and  to  make  a  written  determination  that  the 
proposed  agreement  would  promote  rather  than  constitute  an  unrea- 
sonable risk  of  the  common  defense  and  security.  Finally,  Congress 
preserved  for  itself  the  option  to  intervene  by  requiring  that  a  pro- 
posed agreement  for  cooperation  together  with  the  Presidential  ap- 
proval and  determination  must  lie  before  the  Joint  Committee  for  30 
days  while  Congress  is  in  session. 

The  expanded  legislative  charter  for  AEC  to  foster  use  of  nuclear 
power  abroad  prohibited  transfer  of  information  on  design  and  fabri- 
cation of  atomic  weapons  and  limited  the  exchange  of  restricted  data 
for  peaceful  uses  to  six  categories.40 

Since  1954.  this  framework  of  legislative  policy,  program,  and  au- 
thorization has  been  the  basis  for  U.S.  cooperation  with  European 

<q  Section  54  authorized  forelcn  distribution  of  special  nuclear  materials  ;  section  64  distri- 
bution of  source  materials  ;  and  section  82  distribution  of  byproduct  materials. 

19  The  six  categories  included  in  Section  144(a)  of  the  Act  are  (1)  Refining,  purification, 
and  subsequent  treatment,  of  source  material:  (2)  Reactor  development:  (3)  Production  of 
special  nuclear  material:  (4)  Health  and  safety;  (5)  Industrial  and  other  applications  of 
atomic  energy  for  peaceful  purposes;  and  (6)  Research  and  development  relating  to  the 


nations — singly  and  in  organizations — to  foster  commercial  applica- 
tion of  nuclear  power.  It  furnished  the  point  of  departure  for  the 
diplomats  who  worked  to  create  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  Euratom,  the  European  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,  the  network 
of  bilateral  and  multilateral  agreements  subsequently  negotiated  by 
the  United  States,  and  the  Nonprolife  ration  Treaty.  Before  1954, 
the  diplomats  had  to  deal  mainly  with  the  military  impacts  of  the  dis- 
covery of  nuclear  energy.  Thereafter,  their  responsibilities  were  ex- 
panded to  include  the  negotiations  and  other  diplomatic  activities 
intended  to  secure  for  the  United  States  the  greatest  advantages  from 
cooperating  Avith  and  encouraging  the  development  of  commercial 
nuclear  energy  in  Europe,  and  elsewhere. 

Some  Questions  from  the  Scientific  Community 

Some  scientists  saw  the  Atoms  for  Peace  plan  as  raising  serious  ques- 
tions. One  such  scientist  was  physicist  Ralph  Lapp,  who  had  served  in 
tin'  wartime  bomb  project.  In  1956  he  posed  five  questions  about  inter- 
national promotion  of  the  use  of  nuclear  power  which  two  decades 
later  remain  largely  unanswered.  He  wrote : 50 

President  Eisenhower's  atomic  plan  raises  some  very  serious  questions  along 
the  following  lines : 

(1)  Is  nuclear  power  technically  capahle  of  aiding  foreign  nations? 

(2)  Can  adequate  safeguards  be  devised  to  keep  account  of  nuclear  fuel  and 
prevent  nn  atomic  power  plant  from  becoming  a  bomb  producer? 

(3)  Is  the  United  States  prepared  to  implement  its  plan  by  sharing  technical 
know-how  with  other  nations? 

(4)  Will  tie  demand  of  power  plants  for  nuclear  fuel  be  great  enough  in  the 
near  future  to  siphon  off  bomb  material  from  military  uses? 

(5)  "What  is  the  danger  that  we  will  accelerate  the  nuclear  arms  race  (the 
fourth-power  problem)  by  aiding  other  nations  in  nuclear  technology? 

Accomplishments  of  Atoms  for  Peace 

The  initial  objectives  of  Atoms  for  Peace  were  to  help  contribute 
to  a  more  stable  and  peaceful  world  by  sharing  with  other  nations  the 
benefits  of  nuclear  science  and  technology,  to  improve  U.S.  relations 
with  other  nations  through  such  sharing,  and  to  minimize  pressures  for 
independent  and  potentially  hazardous  nuclear  programs  by  cooperat- 
ing in  peaceful  uses  under  conditions 'which  would  discourage  diversion 
of  atomic  materials  and  equipment  to  military  purposes. 

In  recent  hearings  before  the  House  Subcommittee  on  International 
Cooperation  in  Science  and  Space  of  the  House  Committee  on  Science 
and  Astronautics,  the  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  observed  that 
these  objectives  continue  to  bo  valid.  With  the  passage  of  years,  addi- 
tional objective-,  have  taken  on  increased  importance.  For  example. 
the  Atoms  for  Peace  program  has  enabled  the  United  States  to  take 
part  in  the  rapidly  expanding  world  market  for  nuclear  noods  and 
service.  The  program  is  also  "providing  an  invaluable  mechanism  for 
a  worldwide  approach  to  health,  safetv,  and  environmental  problems 
which  transcend  national  boundaries."  r'' 

60  R.'ili>Ji  B,  Lapp,  Atoms  and  People   (Now  York:  Harper  k  Brothers,  Publishers,  1950), 
p.  182. 

Statement  of  Myron  B.  Kratzer,  Director,  Division  of  International  Affairs,  TT.S. 
Atomic  Energy  Commission,  In  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Science  and  Astro- 
nautics,   Rubcommltl i    International    Cooperation   in   Science  and   Space,   Hearings,  A 

General  Review  of  International  Cooperation  m  Science  ami  space,  02d  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
1971,  p,  :::::: 


Atoms  for  Peace  has  been  unique  as  a  form  of  international  coopera- 
tion. While  cooperation  across  national  boundaries  has  occurred  in 
many  scientific  fields,  international  cooperation  in  the  peaceful  uses  of 
nuclear  energy  came  about  as  the  result  of  deliberate  decisions  and  spe- 
cific actions  of  governments,  rather  than  of  scientific  communities,  to 
share  the  benefits  of  an  important  new  science  and  technology. 

The  basic  concept  of  Atoms  for  Peace  was  to  draw  on  two  major 
U.S.  assets:  (1)  the  knowledge  of  peaceful  applications  of  nuclear 
energy;  and  (2)  the  industrial  capacity  of  the  United  States  to  pro- 
duce in  large  quantities,  and  at  reasonable  cost,  the  essential  materials 
of  the  nuclear  age,  especially  enriched  uranium. 

The  costs  to  the  United  States  of  undertaking  Atoms  for  Peace  were 
to  be  minimal,  inasmuch  as  the  technology  to  be  made  available  was 
under  development  for  domestic  use,  while  the  plants  and  equipment  al- 
read}*  existed  to  supply  the  essential  materials.  Most  of  the  capital  in- 
vestment in  special  factories,  laboratories,  and  test  sites  had  already 
been  made;  thus,  the  U.S.  contribution  of  nuclear  resources  to  Atoms 
for  Peace  was  limited  largehT  to  costs  of  materials  and  labor. 

In  retrospect  over  15  years,  Atoms  for  Peace  has  involved  only  mod- 
est financial  aid  by  the  United  States.  U.S.  cooperation  has  been  flexi- 
ble, designed  to  meet  the  needs  and  capabilities  of  countries  at  various 
stages  of  technological  and  economic  development.  With  the  develop- 
ing countries,  Atoms  for  Peace  cooperation  has  tended  to  center  on  non- 
power  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  particularly  use  of  radioisotopes  in  medi- 
cine and  agriculture.  With  the  advanced  countries,  particularly  in 
Europe,  nuclear  power  has  been  the  dominant  theme  of  cooperation.52 

Not  everyone  has  been  sanguine  about  Atoms  for  Peace.  W.  Sterling 
Cole,  after  his  experience  as  the  first  Director-General  of  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency,  was  pessimistic.  In  the  early  1960's  he 
judged  that  the  Atoms  for  Peace  program  no  longer  existed;  that  the 
United  States  gave  only  lip  the  concepts  of  Atoms  for  Peace; 
that  it  was  not  a  distinct  entity ;  and  that  it  had  become  submerged  in 
foreign  aid  along  with  other  types  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance.  He  hoped 
that  the  President  would  revive  and  rejuvenate  Atoms  for  Peace  by 
setting  it  apart  as  a  special  type  of  assistance.53  Whether  Atoms  for 
Peace  has  fared  as  poorly  as  this  is  a  subjective  question.  As  Cole  has 
said,  no  separate  agency  was  ever  given  the  clearcut  responsibility  for 
carrying  out  the  Atoms  for  Peace  program.  The  AEC  may  have  in- 
herited the  responsibility,  but  it  did  not  receive  a  specific  legislative 
charter  to  take  a  strong  promotional  position. 

62  II. id.,  p.  334. 

M  Testimony  of  W.  Sterling  Cole.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Fnertrv, 
Hearing*,  United  States  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Aaencu  S7th 
Cong  ,  2.1.  Sess.,  1962,  p.  :;:;. 

V.  Bii-ateral  Agreements  for  U.S.  Technical  Assistance  to 
Commercial  Nuclear  Energy  in  Europe 

Realization  of  the  ambitious  goals  for  Atoms  for  Peace  by  other 
nations,  particularly  in  Europe,  required  U.S.  technical  assistance  in 
nuclear  energy.  Two  well  established  methods  for  pursuing  this  policy 
were  available.  The  United  States  could  provide  technical  assistance 
directly  to  individual  countries  or  it  could  also  support  and  work 
through  regional  or  international  organizations.  Each  method  had  its 
advantages.  Direct  assistance  was  quicker,  credit  for  successes  would  go 
to  the  donor  nation,  and  there  were  the  prospects  of  influence  or  lover- 
age  for  the  donor  in  dealing  with  the  recipients.  International  bodies, 
on  the  other  hand,  had  a  traditional  function  of  setting  standards 
and  providing  a  neutral  ground  for  exchange  of  information  and  coop- 
eration between  nations  of  divergent  policies  and  interests.  In  the  case 
of  atomic  energy,  both  methods  were  employed.  The  United  States 
through  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  has  entered  into  many  coun- 
try-to-country agreements — more  commonly  known  as  bilateral  agree- 
ments. It  also  has  cooperated  with  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Com- 
munity (Euratom)  and  with  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  of  the 
Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD) 
to  open  American  nuclear  technology  to  Europe,  and  is  a  principal 
member  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  which  also  has 
technical  assistance  functions. 

This  section  examines  direct  technical  assistance  from  the  United 
States  through  the  mechanism  of  bilateral  agreements  with  individual 
countries.  It  relies  heavily  upon  two  reports  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  which  were  submitted  to  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy  in  1960  during  that  committee's  review  of  the  international 
atomic  policies  and  programs  of  the  United  States.54 

Legislation  for  Technical  Cooperation  in  Nuclear  Energy 

At  the  time  of  the  Atoms  for  Peace  message,  the  authority  of  the 
Government  to  provide  technical  assistance  to  foreign  nations  to 
encourage  their  use  of  nuclear  power  was  severely  limited.  While  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  194C> 55  provided  for  a  program  to  share  with 
other  countries,  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  information  concerning  the  prac- 
t  ical  indusl  rial  applications  of  atomic  energy,  this  could  not  be  imple- 
mented before  ".  .  .  effective  and  enforceable  safeguards  against  its  use 
for  destructive  purposes  [could]  be  devised." 56  With  the  failure  of  the 
U.S.  proposal  for  the  international  control  of  atomic  energy,  this  con- 
dition was  never  fulfilled  and  the  restriction  ended  the  notable  col- 

423     I'M. 

P  L.  585,  79th  Cong.,  60  Stat.  7.r,r,  7:.. 
id  .  section  I. (b)(2). 



laboration  of  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  and  Bel- 
gium which  had  characterized  the  wartime  atom  bomb  project.  The 
only  cooperation  remaining  after  1946  was  in  exploration  for  and  pro- 
curement of  uranium  ores  needed  for  the  continuing  nuclear  weapons 
program  of  the  United  States.  The  restrictions  on  technical  assistance 
were  relaxed  slightly  in  1951  by  an  amendment  to  the  Act 57  which 
authorized  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  to  exchange  certain  infor- 
mation with  other  countries  about  the  "refining,  purification  and  sub- 
sequent treatment  of  source  materials,  reactor  development,  production 
of  fissionable  material,  and  research  and  development  related  to  the 
foregoing."  Canada  was  a  primary  beneficiary  of  this  amendment.  The 
Canadians  had  continued  to  transmit  information  on  nuclear  energy  to 
the  United  States  despite  U.S.  restrictions  upon  information  in 
exchange.  After  this  amendment,  the  United  States  was  able  to  provide 
information  to  friendly  nations  that  were  beginning  to  show  an  interest 
in  civil  nuclear  energy.  Notable  among  these  countries  was  Belgium, 
which  still  controlled  large  uranium  deposits  in  the  Belgian  Congo. 

In  this  amendment,  the  Congress  laid  down  four  principles  for  U.S. 
technical  assistance  in  nuclear  energy,  principles  that  were  to  be  in- 
fluential when  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  was  rewritten  in  1954.  These 
were : 

(1)  A  prohibition  against  communications  of  weapons  design 
and  fabrication  data ; 

(2)  A  requirement  for  adequate  security  standards  in  countries 
receiving  classified  information ; 

(3)  A  determination  by  the  President  that  the  arrangements 
would  promote  and  would  not  endanger  the  common  defense  and 
security;  and 

(4)  A  requirement  that  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
be  informed  of  the  arrangement  30  days  prior  to  its  consum- 

The  specification  of  these  principles  indicates  ways  the  United 
States  can  control  its  technical  assistance  to  and  cooperation  with 
other  countries,  ways  which  would  not  be  possible  were  such  assist- 
ance to  be  channeled  exclusively  through  an  international  organization. 
The  last  principle  also  is  of  interest  for  it  asserts  congressional  interest 
in  arrangements  for  furnishing  technical  assistance  to  nuclear  indus- 
tries abroad.  During  the  early  years  of  the  technical  assistance  pro- 
gram, the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  closely  examined  the 
individual  agreements  and  their  administration.  The  Joint  Commit-, 
tee  on  Atomic  Energy  held  hearings  on  international  agreements  in 
1964, 1965,  and  1966. 

Congress  gave  fresh  recognition  to  international  cooperation  in 
nuclear  energy  when  it  revised  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954.5S  One 
of  six  statutory  programs  and  objectives  specified  in  the  Act  was  a 
"program  of  international  cooperation  to  promote  the  common  de- 
fense and  security  and  to  make  available  to  cooperating  nations  the 
benefits  of  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy  as  widely  as  expand- 
ing technology  and  considerations  of  the  common  defense  and  secu- 
rity will  permit."  59 

57  Public  Law  82-235,  65  Stat.  692. 
68  Public  Law  83-703.  68  Stat.  919. 
68  Sec.  3e.  of  P.L.  83-703. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  12 


Additionally,  the  1954  revision  defined  limits  and  procedures  for 
technical  cooperation  with  other  nations  and  provided  for  certain 
forms  of  cooperation  to  be  conducted  under  executive  agreements,  or 
"Agreements  for  Cooperation,"  commonly  known  as  '"bilateral  agree- 
ments." Under  the  revised  act,  the  United  States  could  encourage 
foreign  use  of  atomic  energy  and  nuclear  power  through  various  in- 
centives, which  included : 

1.  Supplying  nuclear  fuel  materials  for  research  and  power 
reactors ; 

2.  Providing  assistance  in  the  design  and  construction  of  these 
reactors ; 

3.  Exchange  of  certain  scientific  and  technical  information  after 
mutually  agreeable  controls  for  sensitive  materials  and  secret  in- 
formation had  been  agreed  upon. 

The.  Congress  specified  detailed  conditions  and  limitations  on  nego- 
tiation of  the  agreements.  Section  123  of  the  Act  states  that  no  co- 
operation with  any  national  or  regional  defense  organization  shall  be 
undertaken  until : 

a.  the  Commission,  has  submitted  to  the  President  the  proposed  agreement  for 
cooperation,  together  with  its  recommendation  thereon,  which  proposed  agree- 
ment shall  include  (1)  the  terms,  conditions,  durations,  nature,  and  scope  of 
the  cooperation:  (2)  a  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  security  safe- 
guards and  standards  as  set  forth  in  the  agreement  for  cooperation  will  be  main- 
tained ;  (3)  a  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material  to  be  trans- 
ferred pursuant  to  such  agreement  will  not  be  used  for  atomic  weapons,  or  for 
research  on  or  development,  of  atomic  weapons,  or  for  any  other  military  pur- 
poses: and  (4)  a  guaranty  by  the  cooperating  party  that  any  material  or  any 
Restricted  Data  to  lie  transferred  pursuant  to  the  agreement  for  cooperation 
will  not  be  transferred  to  an  unauthorized  person  or  beyond  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  cooperating  party,  except  as  specified  in  the  agreement  for  cooperation: 

b.  The  President  has  approved  and  authorized  the  execution  of  the  proposed 
agreement  for  cooperation,  and  has  made  a  determination  in  writing  that  the 
performance  of  the  proposed  agreement  will  promote  and  will  not  constitute  an 
unreasonable  risk  to  the  common  defense  and  security  :  and 

c.  The  proposed  agreement  for  cooj>eration.  together  with  the  approval  and 
the  determination  of  the  President,  has  been  submitted  to  the  Joint  Committee 
and  a  period  of  thirty  days  has  elapsed  while  Congress  is  in  session  (in  com- 
puting such  thirty  days,  there  shall  he  excluded  the  days  on  which  either  House 
is  not  in  session  because  of  an  adjournment  of  more  than  .".  days) . 

The.  Act  further  specified  that  the  communication  of  Restricted 
Data.00  the  export  of  facilities  to  produce  of  use  nuclear  fuel  materials, 
and  the  distribution  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  to  another  country  could 
occur  only  pursuant  to  an  Agreement  for  Cooperation.  U.S.  citizens 
and  companies  were  prohibited  from  directly  ot-  indirectly  engaging 
in  the  production  of  any  nuclear  fuel  materials  outside  of  the  United 
States,  except  under  an  Agreement  for  Cooperation  or  an  AEC  au- 
thorization. Tn  this  way.  the  Act  out  control  of  cooperation  between 
the  domestic  nuclear  industry  and  private  industries  of  other  coun- 
tries firmly  into  the  hands  of  (  he  A  EC. 

AEC  Organization:  the  Division  of  International  Programs 

In  response  lo  the  new  positive  outlook  for  international  technologi- 
cal collaboration  authorized  by  the  Atomic  Enersrv  Act  of  1054,  the 
AEC  established  a   Division  of   [international   Affairs  in  November 

••Tlif  term  "Restricted  Data"  Is  defined  to  menu  "nil  dnta  concerning  (1)  design,  mnnu- 
f.-K-ii"-,.    ,,r  utilization  of  ntomle  weapons :   ('Ji    the  production  of  special  nuclear  material 
or  i  •"■  i  the  use  of  special  nuclear  material  In  the  production  of  energy,  bul  shall  not  include 
data  declassified  or  removed   from  1 1  n-  Restrict**'!   Data   category.   .  .  ." 


1955.  Its  function  was  to  develop  and  direct  a  program  of  international 
cooperation  for  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy.  The  division's 
responsibilities  included  coordination  of  AEC  activities  relating  to 
various  types  of  agreements  for  international  cooperation;  assistance 
with  negotiations  for  an  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency;  and 
liaison  with  the  State  Department,  including  direct  participation  with 
the  State  Department  in  preparing  proposals  to  be  presented  to  the 
United  Nations.61  In  a  subsequent  AEC  reorganization,  the  division 
was  renamed  the  Division  of  International  Programs. 

The  First  Bilateral  Agreements  for  Nuclear  Cooperation 

The  AEC  moved  quickly  to  use  its  new  authority  by  opening  nego- 
tiations with  27  countries  for  bilateral  agreements.  By  the  end  of  1955, 
agreements  with  22  countries  had  been  comj^leted. 

The  first  agreements  negotiated  were  those  with  the  three  wartime 
nuclear  collaborators  of  the  United  States.  Each  agreement  reflected 
the  special  and  close  relationship  that  had  developed  between  the 
United  States  on  one  hand  and  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  and 
Belgium  on  the  other.  The  differences  among  these  agreements  also  re- 
flected the  stages  of  development  of  the  nuclear  science  and  technology 
of  the  countries  involved. 


The  mid-1950s  witnessed  increased  pressure  to  promote  demonstra- 
tion of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  abroad.  One  example  of  this 
pressure  was  a  report  of  the  Panel  on  the  Impact  of  the  Peaceful  Uses 
of  Atomic  Energy,  which  was  appointed  by  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy  in  1955 62  63  and  was  chaired  by  newspaper  pub- 
lisher Robert  M.  McKinney.  It  urged  vigorous  measures  to  encourage 
the  use  of  atomic  energy  abroad.  The  measures  included  convening  a 
series  of  regional  conferences  with  bilateral  partners  of  the  United 
States  to  establish  realistic  goals  for  nuclear  power;  U.S.  supplying  of 
nuclear  fuels  and  technological  assistance  for  installation  of  at  least 
1000  megawatts  of  nuclear  power  capacity  outside  the  United  States 
by  I96064;  furnishing  financial  assistance  through  normal  govern- 
mental and  private  channels;  and  applying  of  safeguards  to  such 

The  anticipated  returns  from  encouraging  foreign  nuclear  power 
were  seen  as  substantial  for  U.S.  world  leadership  and  also  for  the 
domestic  nuclear  industry.  According  to  the  McKinney  panel :  66 

61  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
July-December  1955  ( Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1956),  p.  85. 

w  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Report  of  the  Panel  on  the  Impact 
of  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy,  S4th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  January  1956.  (Joint  Com- 
mittee print  i .  155  p. 

84  One  of  the  four  principal  instructions  to  the  Panel  was  to  "consider  also  the  effects 
of  the  application  of  atomic  energy  upon  economies  and  industries  abroad."  The  Joint 
Committee  instructed  the  panel  to  take  into  account  the  interlocking  effects  that  such 
development  and  application  abroad  might  have  on  the  United  States  economy  and 
industries.  Ibid.,  p.  v. 

81  More  specifically,  the  Panel  recommended  that  the  United  States,  In  issuing  invita- 
tions to  such  conferences,  "announce  that  it  Is  prepared  to  furnish  nnclear  fuels,  provide 
necessary  technological  assistance  and  permit  contracts  for  the  installation  of  at  least 
1  million  kilowatts  of  atomic  generating  capacity  outside  the  United  States  as  soon  as 
possible — we  hope  by  1960.  The  attention  of  the  world  should  be  called  to  the  fact  that 
such  a  program  would  parallel  and  possibly  exceed  the  capacity  installed  during  the  same 
period  at  home."  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

65  Loc.  cit. 

66  Ibid.,  p.  95. 


...  In  the  uncommitted  areas  of  the  world,  American  leadership  in  making 
atomic  power  available  could  be  a  strong  influence  in  guiding  these  areas  toward 
a  course  of  freedom.  In  this  sense,  atomic  power  acquires  great  importance  in 
international  relations.  This  consideration  should  strongly  influence  our  national 
policy  as  to  the  rate  at  which  the  development  of  atomic  power  suitable  for  such 
purposes  is  pressed.  There  is  urgency  for  the  development  in  the  United  States 
of  atomic  powerplants  suited  to  the  needs  of  the  other  nations  of  the  free- 
world.  .  . 

This  urgency  which  exists  for  foreign  atomic  power  has  domestic  benefits 
as  well.  The  growth  of  an  atomic  power  program  will  probably  not  become  signifi- 
cant before  1965.  A  gap  may  occur  for  the  power  equipment  manufacturing 
industry  between  present  domestic  interest  in  atomic  power  reactors  and  actual 
sales  in  substantial  volume.  If  the  equipment  manufacturers  .  .  .  are  to  be 
expected  to  carry  forward  research  and  development  directed  toward  making 
atomic  power  competitive  in  the  United  States,  the  foreign  market  for  power 
reactors  with  its  high  near  term  growth  potential  may  offer  a  solution  to  bridg- 
ing this  gap.  The  potential  demand  may  represent  a  $30  billion  market. 

But  this  sense  of  urgency  was  not  strong  enough  to  warrant  U.S. 
incentives  to  the  European  electricity  industry  that  went  beyond  those 
offered  by  the  AEC  to  the  domestic  nuclear  power  industry.  The 
McKinney  Panel  avoided  proposals  to  supply  nuclear  fuel  without 
charge,  or  to  pay  repurchase  prices  for  byproduct  plutonium  from 
European  power  plants  higher  than  those  paid  to  domestic  nuclear 
power  producers.  Also,  no  special  financial  arrangements  were  pro- 
posed. Instead,  the  panel  preferred  the  normal  channels  of  U.S.  foreign 
financial  assistance.  "Any  other  course  will  complicate  to  the  point 
of  un  workability  what  should  be  a  straightforward  comprehensive 
policy  covering  international  activities  of  the  United  States."  r,r 

In  reference  to  the  domestic  concerns  that  byproduct  plutonium 
from  nuclear  power  might  lead  to  proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons, 
the  McKinney  Panel  opted  for  a  two-pronged  approach  to  safeguards. 
It  called  for  inspection  rights  under  the  bilateral  agreements  plus 
reprocessing  of  the  used  European  fuel  in  the  United  States.88 

By  April  1,  1958,  the  AEC  had  in  effect  30  agreements  for  coopera- 
tion in  nuclear  research  and  11  for  nuclear  power  with  39  countries. 
Four  more  research  agreements  and  three  power  agreements  with  an 
additional  four  countries  were  signed  and  being  ratified.09  Table  I  lists 
these  agreements. 

•"Ibid.,  p.  06. 

«T1ic  panel  said:  "We  believe  the  United  States  should  pet  on  with  making  atomic 
power  available  now  to  these  nations.  We  believe  that  this  can  and  should  be  done  on 
an  Interim  basis  with  bilateral  agreements  permitting  appropriate  Inspection,  providing 
for  earmarking  Of  plutonium  and  uranium  233  thus  recovered  exclusively  for  further 
peaceful  uses.  Other  control  mechanisms  for  a  broader  nature  can  be  devised  and  agreed 
upon  later."  Ibid.,  p.  96. 

"•U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  Hearings,  Development,  Grotrth 
and  State  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Industry,  85th  Cong..  '2d   Sees.,   1958,  p.  79. 



number  of 
countries    Country 

Scope  of  exchange 

Effective  date 

1  Argentina 

2  Australia 

3  Austria 

4  Belgium... 

5  Brazil 

6  Canada 

7  Chile 

8  China,  Republic  of 

9  Colombia - 

10  Cuba 

11  Denmark 

12  Dominican  Republic 

13  Ecuador 

14  France 

15  Germany,  Federal  Republic  of. 
Germany:  City  of  West  Berlin. 

16  Greece. 

17  Guatemala 

18  Israel 

19  Italy.... 

20  Japan 

21  Korea,  Republic  of 

22  Lebanon 

23  Netherlands 

24  New  Zealand 

25  Nicaragua 

26  Norway 

27  Pakistan 

28  Peru 

29  Philippines 

30  Portugal 

31  South  Africa 

32  Spain 

33  Sweden.. 

34  Switzerland... 


35  Thailand 

36  Turkey 

37  United  Kingdom 

38  Uruguay.. 

39  Venezuela 


Research  and 


Research  and 


Research  and 







Research  and 








Research  and 



Research  and 






Research  and 







Research  and 
























































































Brazil.. Power 

40  Costa  Rica... ._ Research 

41  Iran _ ._ do 

42  Iraq do 

43  Ireland do 

Italy Research  and  power. 

Peru do 

July  21,1957 
May  18,1956 
Mar.  5,1957 
June  7,1957 
Mar.  16,1956 
July  3, 1957 
July   19,1957 

Source:  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  hearings,  "Development,  Growth  and  State  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Industry,"  85th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1958,  p.  79. 


Providing  Working  Experience  with  Nuclear  Energy 

For  the  United  States  to  share  the  benefits  of  nuclear  energy  with 
other  countries,  particularly  those  of  Europe,  required  a  growing  cadre 
of  trained  scientists  and  engineers  in  those  countries.  One  way  to  ex- 
pose these  technologists  to  U.S.  nuclear  technology  was  for  them  to  be 
trained  at  and  work  in  the  laboratories  of  the  AEC.  Arrangements 
to  this  end  were  included  in  the  bilateral  agreements  for  cooperation. 
Another  way  was  to  encourage  the  installation  and  use  of  nuclear  re- 
actors abroad  which  would  provide  still  more  experience  for  local 
scientists  and  engineers.  Arrangements  to  this  end  were  negotiated 
by  the  AEC  and  the  Department  of  State  with  many  countries.  Some 
agreements  provided  for  help  in  obtaining  research  reactors,  others 
extended  to  demonstration  nuclear  power  plants.  The  latter  were  to  be 
of  particular  importance  for  fostering  commercial  nuclear  energy  in 


U.S.  efforts  to  get  research  reactors  into  the  hands  of  scientists  and 
engineers  abroad  began  November  5,  1054.  At  that  time  Ambassador 
Henry  Cabot  Lodge  announced  to  the  U.N.  General  Assembly  that  the 
United  States  was  prepared  to  negotiate  bilateral  agreements  with 
other  nations.  These  agreements  would  commit  the  United  States  to 
supply  technical  assistance  and  nuclear  fuel  materials  for  the  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  research  reactors.  By  the  end  of  1955,  the  AEC 
reported  that  agreements  for  the  exchange  of  information  on  design, 
const  ruction,  and  operation  of  research  reactor-  included  the  couut  ries 
Japan,  Lebanon,  Netherlands,  Pakistan,  the  Philippines,  Portugal, 
the  Republic  of  China,  Spain.  Switzerland.  Turkey,  and  Venezuela/0 

On  June  11.  1955,  President  Eisenhower  at  Pennsylvania  State  Uni- 
versity outlined  new  programs  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  U.S.  assistance 
to  other  nations  in  development  of  research  and  power  reactor  projects 
under  agreements  with  other  nations  or  through  the  International 
Atomic  Energy  Agency.  For  research  reactors  the  President  proposed 
that  the  United  States* would  contribute  half  the  cost  and  furnish  the 
nuclear  fuel  needed.  lie  said  : 71 

We  propose  to  offer  research  reactors  to  the  people  of  free  nations  who  can 
use  them  effectively  for  die  acquisition  of  the  skills  and  understanding  essential 
to  peaceful  atomic  progress.  The  United  states,  in  the  spirit  of  partnership  that 
moves  as.  will  contrihute  half  the  cost.  We  will  also  furnish  the  acquiring  na- 
tion the  unclear  material  needed  to  fuel  the  reactor. 

To  keep  the  commitment  within  bounds,  the  arrangements  for  fi- 
nancing  set  a  limit  of  $350,000  upon  the  U.S.  contribution,  which  was 
to  he  paid  in  dollars  to  the  cooperating  nation  after  it  had  completed 
the  project  and  certified  the  completion.  By  the  end  of  1!K>7.  six  re- 
search reactors  of  US.  manufacture  were  in  operation  abroad  and  10 
others  were  under  construction  or  on  order.  The  total  US.  commitment 
at  thai  time  was  $2.4  million  for  the  research  reactor  projects. 

Some  doubts  and  insights:  Several  years  later,  in  1964,  the  Joint 
( Jommittee  \  oiced  some  reserval  ions  as  to  the  accomplishments  of  the 

7"  r  s.  Atomic  Energv  Commission,  Major  ictirities  in  the  Itomic  Energy  Programs, 
.lulu   December   1955    (Washington,   D.C. :  U.'S.  Government    Printing  Office,   1956),   p.   85. 

71  r.S  atomic  Energy  Commission,  Eighteenth  Semiannual  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission    (Washington,   D.C. :   r.s.  Government    Printing  Office,   1055),  p.   13. 


research  reactor  program.  By  then  a  total  of  26  grants  had  been  made 
to  12  countries  which  had  established  atomic  energy  programs.  While 
the  initial  purpose  of  this  program  had  been  to  provide  scientists  with 
working  experience  with  nuclear  reactors,  some  nations  sought  posses- 
sion of  a  research  reactor  as  a  symbol  of  national  prestige  although 
they  lacked  the  trained  scientists  to  operate  them.  The  AEC  was 
faced  with  a  touchy  international  issue.  Rather  than  offend  some  na- 
tions by  refusing  them  research  reactors,  the  AEC  often  installed  them 
in  countries  that  could  not  use  them  effectively.72 

Today  there  is  little  mention  of  these  research  reactors.  For  the  in- 
dustrial  countries,  they  have  served  their  initial  purpose  and  have 
been  bypassed  by  more  modern  reactors  for  experimentation  and  the 
training  of  nuclear  scientists  and  engineers:  for  the  developing  coun- 
tries the  reactors,  while  perhaps  a  mark  of  prestige,  did  not  appre- 
ciably accelerate  the  use  of  atomic  energy.  In  retrospect,  the  research 
reactor  program  raises  the  question  of  how  far  a  highly  industrialized, 
technological  nation  should  go  in  providing  sophisticated  equipment 
to  countries  lacking  the  personnel  or  the  industrial  base  to  use  it  effec- 
tively. There  is  also  the  question  of  the  extent  to  which  scientific  and 
technical  manpower  assigned  to  these  research  reactors  in  the  develop- 
ing nations  could  have  been  more  profitably  assigned  to  other  work  of 
greater  short  term  benefits. 

Fuel  for  research  reactors :  Initially  the  United  States  limited  its 
offer  to  supply  nuclear  fuel  for  research  and  test  reactors  to  material 
of  20  percent  enrichment  or  less,  which  could  not  be  readily  used  for 
clandestine  manufacture  of  nuclear  weapons.  By  1956,  the  desire  of 
the  industrial  nations  for  improved  research  and  test  reactors  had 
caused  the  United  States  to  announce  a  major  revision  in  policy  which 
permitted  the  export  of  uranium  enriched  up  to  90  percent  for  use  in 
special  testing  reactors.  This  raised  the  safeguards  issue.  The  United 
States  required  the  recipient  nations  to  accept  comprehensive  controls 
and  safeguards. 

Two  years  later,  in  1958,  this  policy  was  liberalized  when  the 
AEC  announced  that  highly  enriched  fuel  could  be  supplied  for 
research  as  well  as  test  reactors.  The  following  year,  in  1959,  the 
AEC  announced  its  intention  to  lease  such  materials  to  foreign 
countries  either  through  the  International  Agency  or  through  bilat- 
eral agreements. 


If  the  United  States  wished  to  demonstrate  the  use  of  U.S.  nuclear 
power  technology  in  Europe,  it  had  to  attract  the  interest  of  European 
utilities.  The  "power  agreements"  were  the  means  to  this  end.  In  his 
June  11, 1955  announcement,  President  Eisenhower  said : 73 

72  The  USAEC  commented  on  this  as  follows  : 

During  the  recent  hearings  on  our  agreements  for  cooperation,  we  discussed  the  matter 
of  follow-up  on  the  research  reactor  grants  which  had  been  made  to  developing  countries. 
Information  on  these  grant  reactors  is  received  from  a  variety  of  sources  such  as  reports 
by  our  AEC  scientific  representatives,  reports  by  IAEA  technical  teams  and  consultants, 
and  reports  by  United  States  scientists.  From  these  reports  we  are  able  to  obtain  an 
idea  of  the  extent  to  which  these  reactors  arc  being  utilized.  In  general,  we  have  con- 
cluded that  these  reactors  are  making  a  contribution  to  the  scientific  program  of  the 
country  but  they  are  also  capable  of  being  used  to  a  greater  degree.  Cf.  U.S.  Congress, 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International  Agreements  for  Cooperation, 
88th  Cong.,  1st  Sess..  1964,  p.  127. 

73  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Eighteenth  Semiannual  Report  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Commission,  January-June  1955,  op.  cit.,  p.  13. 


Within  prudent  security  considerations,  we  propose  to  make  available  to  the 
peoples  of  such  friendly  nations  as  are  prepared  to  invest  their  own  funds  in 
power  reactors,  access  to  and  training  in  the  technological  processes  of  construc- 
tion and  operation  for  peaceful  purposes. 

By  the  end  of  1955,  several  countries  had  initiated  negotiations  in 
response  to  this  invitation.  Early  in  1956,  negotiations  were  concluded 
with  the  governments  of  Australia,  the  Netherlands,  and  Switzerland 
for  the  iirst  bilateral  agreements  for  power  reactor  projects.  The  agree- 
ments provided  for  the  transfer  of  Restricted  Data  74  and  special  nu- 
clear materials.  They  also  provided  for  sale  of  nuclear  fuel  materials 
to  each  country,  with  the  United  States  retaining  an  option  to  the  plu- 
tonium  produced  and  the  right  to  approve  the  transfer  of  such  pluto- 
nium  to  any  other  nation  or  to  an  international  organization  if  the 
United  States  decided  not  to  exercise  its  option.  Additionally,  subject 
to  limitations  of  available  space,  facilities,  and  personnel,  the  United 
States  and  its  bilateral  partners  agreed  to  open  their  specialized  nu- 
clear research  facilities  to  each  other. 

The  first  bilateral  agreement  for  nuclear  power  development  also 
opened  the  way  for  direct  relations  between  representatives  of  the  U.S. 
nuclear  industry  and  private  individuals  and  organizations  in  the 
cooperating  nations,  thus  removing  the  AEC  as  a  direct  participant  in 
commercial  dealings.  Other  provisions  of  the  bilateral  arrangements 
provided  for:  75 

(1)  Patent  arrangements  covering  inventions  or  discoveries 
resulting  from  the  exchange  of  Restricted  Data; 

(2)  Security  and  safeguards  arrangements  to  protect  classified 
information  and  equipment  and  nuclear  materials; 

(3)  Future  consultation  about  transfer  of  rights  or  responsibil- 
ities of  the  agreement,  particularly  those  relating  to  safeguards 
to  the  International  Atomic  Energy  as  might  be  mutually  agreed 
upon,  and 

(4)  Disclaiming  of  any  warranty  by  the  communicating  Party 
on  the  accuracy  and  completeness  of  information,  material,  equip- 
ment or  devices  transferred  under  the  agreement  and  of  its  suit- 
ability for  any  particular  use  or  application. 

74  At  that  time  exchange  of  Restricted  Data  was  significant,  for  much  of  nuclear  power 
technology  was  still  classified  ami  unavailable  In  open  literature.  The  Restricted  Data  to 
lie  exchanged  Included:  (1)  general  Information  on  research  reactors,  experimental  and 
demonstration  power  reactors;  (2)  technical  Information  as  mighl  lie  agreed  upon  for 
specific  research  ami  demonstration  power  reactors;  and  (3)  the  exchange  of  classified 
information  on  reactor  materials,  specifications,  physics  and  engineering,  and  also  of 
environmental  safety  information.  Restricted  Data  of  military  Significance  were  not  to  be 
exch.i  aged. 

"  It  should  he  noted  that  this  disclaimer  was  also  used  by  the  UISAEC  for  information, 
materials,  devices,  services,  etc.,  that  It  supplied  to  the  domestic  nuclear  Industry  and 
so  was  not  unique  to  the  bilateral  agreements. 


The  term  of  each  of  the  first  bilateral  agreements  was  10  years. 

By  l(.>r>7.  advancing  technology  of  nuclear  power  led  several  Euro- 
pean countries  to  the  initiation  of  negotiations  with  the  United  States 
for  the  transfer  of  large  quantities  of  nuclear  fuel  for  specific  power 
projects.  Such  arrangements  were  requested  by  the  governments  of 
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Union  of 
South  Africa.  Subsequent  bilateral  agreements  with  the  European 
nations  were  considered  as  interim  measures  pending  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency. 

A  decade  later,  nuclear  power  was  so  far  advanced  in  Europe  that 
availability  of  nuclear  fuel  to  cover  long-term  requirements  for  nu- 
clear power  programs  became  a  subject  for  negotiation.  New  bilateral 
power  agreements  were  negotiated  which  committed  the  United  States 
to  supply  nuclear  fuel  over  a  term  of  30  years  to  Switzerland  and 
Sweden,  and  for  10  years  to  the  United  Kingdom.  These  agreements 
also  reflected  an  amendment  to  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1064  76 
which  permitted  private  ownership  of  nuclear  fuel  materials,  opening 
the  way  for  wholly  commercial  transactions  between  companies  in  the 
U.S.  nuclear  industry  and  customers  abroad  in  countries  having  bi- 
lateral agreements  with  the  United  States.  These  new  agreements  also 
specified  that  the  IAEA  would  promptly  be  requested  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility for  applying  safeguards  to  the  material  transferred  under 
agreements.  In  addition,  the  agreements  committed  the  United  States 
to  supply  nuclear  fuel  materials  to  these  governments,  or  to  enrich 
uranium  supplied  by  them. 7? 

The  Bilateral  Agreement  Situation  in  1971 

At  the  end  of  1971,  the  AEC  had  in  effect  34  Agreements  for  Coop- 
eration in  Civil  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  between  the  United  States 
and  other  nations  or  groups  of  nations.  These  agreements  covered  co- 
operation and  technical  assistance  in  the  development  of  peaceful  uses 
of  atomic  energy,  and  provided  for  the  supply  of  nuclear  materials, 
the  exchange  of  scientific  and  technical  information,  and  for  the  safe- 
guarding of  U.S.-supplied  nuclear  materials.  Table  II  listing  these 
agreements  as  of  1970  is  the  latest  list  published  by  the  AEC. 

■«  Public  Law  88-489,  78  Stat.  602. 

77  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
January-December  1966  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1967), 
p.  263. 



Effective      Termination 
Scope  date  date 


Argentina Research  and  power ___ July  25,1969  July   24,1999 

Australia May  28,1957  May  27,1997 

Austria... do Jan.  24,1970  Jan.   23,2000 

Brazil Research... Nov.  9,1966  Aug.    2,1975 

Canada     .       Research  and  power July  21,1955  July   13,1980 

China,  Republic  of Research ...July  18,1955  July   17,1974 

Colombia do Mar.  29,1963  Mar.  28,1977 

Denmark do. July  25,1955  July   24,1973 

Finland Research  and  power July  7,1970  July     6,2000 

Greece           Research Aug.  4,1955  Aug.    3,1974 

India Power Oct.  25,1963  Oct.    24,1993 

Indonesia Research... Sept.  21,1960  Sept.  20, 1980 

Iran Apr.  27,1959  Apr.  26,1979 

Ireland do July  9,1958  July     8,1978 

Israel do July  12,1955  Apr.   11,1975 

Italy      . Research  and  power Apr.  15,1958  Apr.   14,1978 

Japan do July  10,1968  July     9,1998 

Korea. Research Feb.  3,1956  Feb.     2,1976 

Norway Research  and  power... June    8,1967  June    7,1997 

Philippines    July  19,1968  July    18,1998 

Portugal. Research .July  19,1969  July    18,1979 

South  Africa. Research  and  power Aug.  22,1957  Aug.  21,1977 

Spain do Feb.  12,1958  Feb.  11.1988 

Sweden do... _ Sept.  15,1966  Sept.  14, 1996 

Switzerland do Aug.  8,1966  Aug.    7,1996 

Thailand Research Mar.  13,1956  Mar.  12,1975 

Turkey    do June  10,1965  June    9,1971 

United  Kingdom..- July  21,1955  July   20.1976 

United  Kingdom.. Power July  15,1966  July   14,1976 

Venezuela.. Research  and  power .• Feb.  9,1960  Feb.     8.1980 

Vietnam Research July  1,1959  June  30.1974 

Special  arrangement: 

United  States-U.S.S.R... Memorandum  on  cooperation  on  the  peace-     Feb.  10,1970  Oec.  31,1971 

ful  uses  of  atomic  energy. 

United  States-Romania do Jan.  1,1969  Dec.  31,1970 



European    Atomic    Energy   Community    Joint  nuclear  power  program Feb.  18,1959     Dec.  31,1985 


Euratom Additional    agreement    to    joint    nuclear    July   25,1960     Dec.  31,1995 

power  program. 

International    Atomic    Energy    Agency    Supply  of  materials,  etc Aug.    7,1959    Aug.    6,1979 


Source:  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  for  1970,  Wash- 
ington, D.C.:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971,  appendix  6. 

Additional  N<  asures  to  Stimulate  Foreign  Inti  n  st  in.  Nuch  ar  Pan-,  r 
The  bilateral  power  agreements  provided  incentives  to  European, 
and  other  governments  to  push  ahead  with  use  of  nuclear  power.  I*.  S. 
measures  to  foster  this  interest  through  these  agreements  included 
allocations  of  fuel  materials,  firm  pricing  policies,  financial  aid  for 
purchase  of  nuclear  fuel,  authority  for  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  to 
deal  with  its  foreign  counterparts,  and  declassification  of  nuclear 
power  teclmology.  These  are  briefly  discussed  below. 


On  February  22,  L956,  at  the  recommendation  of  the  4EC  and  with 
the  Departments  of  State  nnd  Defense  concurring,  President  Eisen- 
hower announced  that  the  Government  would  make  available  40.000 
kilograms  of  uranium-235  t->  assist  industrial  power  development  and 
research  within  the  United  States  and  abroad.  Of  this  material,  20,000 


kilograms  were  allocated  for  foreign  bilateral  partners  of  the  United 
States.  The  President  also  committed  the  AEC  to  recommend  alloca- 
tion of  additional  supplies  as  further  projects  undertaken  by  the 
domestic  nuclear  industry  and  by  other  nations  might  require.78  AEC 
Chairman  Strauss  described  this  action  as  the  most  important  step 
toward  peaceful  use  of  atomic  energy  since  revision  of  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  in  1954.  Concurrently,  he  noted  that  the  action  affirmed 
the  United  States  intention  to  make  fuel  available  for  the  expected 
working  lifetime  of  bilateral  power  reactor  projects.79 

A  year  later,  in  July  1957,  the  President  approved  an  additional 
allocation  of  uranium-235  for  domestic  and  foreign  use,  bringing  the 
total  to  100,000  kilograms.  Of  this,  50,000  kilograms  were  allocated  for 
foreign  use.  Based  on  then  current  prices,  the  nuclear  fuel  allocated 
for  foreign  use  was  worth  about  $850  million.  The  AEC  has  been  care- 
ful to  emphasize  that  the  supplying  of  this  nuclear  material  was  not  a 
gift  and  that  payment  would  be  required. 


If  the  commercial  nuclear  power  industry  in  Europe  was  to  use  U.S. 
nuclear  fuel  and  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology,  the  European  users 
had  to  know  what  they  would  have  to  pay  for  enriched  uranium.  The 
first  U.S.  announcement  of  prices  came  at  the  opening  of  the  first 
international  conference  on  atomic  energy  in  Geneva  on  August  8, 
1955.  There  the  AEC  announced  a  price  for  enriched  uranium  and 
also  prices  for  natural  uranium  and  for  heavy  water.80 

The  Geneva  announcement,  however,  was  indefinite  on  many  details. 
To  minimize  these  uncertainties,  the  President  announced  on  Novem- 
ber 18,  1956,  detailed  terms  and  conditions  for  U.S.  supply  of  nuclear 
fuel  materials.  In  a  subsequent  amplification  of  the  President's 
announcement,  AEC  Chairman  Strauss  said  that  this  measure  to 
accelerate  foreign  use  of  nuclear  power  under  Atoms  for  Peace 
included : 81 

(1)  Establishment  of  a  schedule  of  charges  for  uranium-235 
which  were  to  be  the  same  as  those  for  the  domestic  nuclear 

(2)  Adoption  of  a  policy  of  assurances  to  bilateral  partners  of 
the  United  States  that  the  Commission  was  prepared  to  furnish 
uranium-235  in  quantities  based  on  estimated  fuel  requirements 
for  specific  nuclear  power  plants  for  periods  longer  than  10  years. 

(3)  Establishment  of  prices  that  the  Commission  would  pay 
for  plutonium  and  uranium  233  produced  in  foreign  nuclear  power 
reactors  which  used  United  States  fuel.  The  United  States  would 
use  nuclear  materials  so  acquired  only  for  peaceful  purposes. 

78  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Twentieth  Semiannual  Report  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  (Washington,  D.C  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1971),  p.  ix. 
78  Loc.  clt. 

80  The  price  set  for  uranium  enriched  up  to  20  percent  was  placed  at  $25  per  grnm  of 
uranium-235  contained  ;  natural  uranium  metal  was  priced  at'  $40  a  kilogram  ;  and  heavy 
water  at  $28  a  pound.  Cf.  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  Atomic 
Energy  Programs,  J uly-Decemher  1955  (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1056).  p.  80. 

Heavy  water  at  the  time  was  a  key  material  for  one  kind  of  nuclear  power  re.ictor 
which  offered  improved  prospects  for  using  natural  uranium  for  fuel.  This  technology 
Is  currently  being  developed  and  used  by  the  Canadian  nuclear  power  Industry. 

81  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Radiation  Safety  and  Major  Activities  in  Atomic 
Energy  Programs,  July-December  1956  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing 
Office,  1057),  p.  339. 


(4)  Reaffirmation  of  the  earlier  Commission  decision  to  pur- 
chase all  plutonium  and  uranium  233  produced  in  foreign  nuclear 
power  plants  from  fuel  supplied  by  the  United  States  through 
June  30, 1963,  subject  to  availability  of  appropriations. 


In  extending  special  incentives  to  encourage  foreign  use  of  nuclear 
power,  the  U.S.  Government  faced  a  dilemma.  On  the  one  hand  it  was 
well  established  that  the  AEC  should  treat  domestic  and  foreign  users 
of  nuclear  power  alike.  On  the  other,  special  incentives  were  seen  nec- 
essary to  induce  foreign  utilities  and  governments  to  risk  investment 
in  demonstration  nuclear  power  plants.  For  example,  it  would  have 
been  advantageous  to  lease  nuclear  fuel  to  foreign  users,  which  would 
have  offered  the  incentive  of  a  lessened  capital  outlay.  However,  at  that 
time  the  domestic  nuclear  industry  was  evolving  rapidly  toward  self- 
sufficiency  and  the  AEC  required  it  to  buy  enriched  uranium  outright 
rather  than  lease  it.  Likewise,  while  the  AEC  would  fund  research 
and  development  for  domestic  nuclear  power  demonstrations,  it  would 
not  share  in  the  requisite  capital  investment. 

The  dilemma  was  resolved  in  October  1956  by  providing  special 
assistance  to  foreign  nuclear  power  projects  through  a  different  chan- 
nel which  was  not  available  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  The  AEC 
and  the  Export-Import  Bank  agreed  upon  joint  action  to  help  finance 
the  construction  of  nuclear  power  plants  in  nations  having  bilateral 
agreements  with  the  United  States.  This  arrangement  was  judged  nec- 
essary because  of  the  still  undemonstrated  economics  of  nuclear  power 
and  the  known  higher  capital  investment  required  for  nuclear  power 
plants  in  comparison  with  conventional  fossil  fueled  power  plants.  The 
Bank  announced  its  willingness  to  consider  applications  for  loans  to 
cover  the  capital  costs  of  nuclear  power  plants  for  privately  owned,  but 
not  state  owned,  utilities  abroad.  The  announcement  indicated  that  the 
terms  for  such  loans  would  be  similar  to  those  for  the  financing  of  con- 
ventional power  plants  for  which  equipment  and  technical  services 
were  obtained  from  the  United  States.  The  Bank  indicated  that  it 
would  require  the  following  for  a  nuclear  power  project:82 

(1)  A  comprehensive  engineering  survev  : 

(2)  A  technical  report  by  the  United  States  Atomic  Energy 

(3)  An  arrangement  for  supply  of  the  nuclear  fuel  for  the 
term  of  the  loan: 

(I)  Evidence  of  overall  financial  and  economic  soundness: 

(5)  Evidence  of  availability  of  funds  to  defray  the  costs  which 
must  be  met  with  local  currency :  and 

(6)  Assurance  as  to  the  ability  of  the  country  to  service  the 
dollar  debt  involved. 

The  Bank  made  clear  that  funds  so  loaned  could  be  used  only  to  buy 
equipment,  materials,  and  technical  services  from  the  U.S.  nuclear 

-is     Atomic    Energy    Commission.    Radiation    Safety    and    Major    Activities    in    the 
Atomic  Pneryy  Programs,  July-December  J956,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 



Commercial  use  of  nuclear  energy  requires  many  auxiliary  technical 
services  and  products.  One  such  service,  the  reprocessing  of  used  nu- 
clear fuels,  received  special  attention  during  efforts  of  the  United 
States  to  stimulate  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  Since  a  key 
U.S.  incentive  was  the  offer  to  repurchase  plutonium  or  residual  ura- 
nium-235  from  European  power  reactors,  there  naturally  arose  the 
question  of  who  would  reprocess  these  fuel  materials.  The  question 
was  made  somewhat  more  complex  by  the  domestic  policy  of  the 
United  States,  which  sought  to  establish  a  self-sufficient  nuclear  in- 
dustry. During  the  1950s  one  missing  link  in  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
was  a  capability  to  reprocess  used  fuels  and  to  store  the  intensely  radio- 
active wastes  separated  from  the  used  nuclear  fuels. 

Domestic  policy  was  announced  by  the  AEC  on  February  18,  1957, 
when  it  committed  itself  to  contract  with  domestic  reactor  operators  to 
reprocess  their  fuel  through  June  30,  1967.  However,  as  the  AEC  at 
that  time  lacked  statutory  authority  to  extend  this  offer  to  foreign  re- 
actor operators,  there  remained  a  gap  in  the  technical  services  needed 
to  promote  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  In  1957  the  Commission  pro- 
posed to  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  that  the  Atomic 
Energy  Act  be  amended  to  authorize  the  Commission  to  enter  into  con- 
tracts to  reprocess  nuclear  fuels  from  foreign  power  reactors,  provided 
that  comparable  services  were  available  to  the  domestic  nuclear  in- 
dustry. The  Joint  Committee,  in  favorably  reporting  this  legislation, 
amended  it  to  require  that  the  term  of  such  reprocessing  contracts  be 
limited  to  the  term  of  the  bilateral  agreement  in  effect,  or  to  compa- 
rable periods  offered  to  the  domestic  nuclear  power  plants.  In  recom- 
mending this  action,  the  Joint  Committee  underscored  the  principle 
that  while  the  United  States  could  offer  technical  aid  and  assistance 
through  the  Commission,  it  could  not  offer  special  terms  and  conditions 
unavailable  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.83 

The  new  authority  was  not  used  until  after  nearly  5  years,  when 
the  first  return  shipment  of  used  nuclear  fuel  arrived  from  Sweden 
and  was  sent  to  the  AEC's  Idaho  Chemical  Processing  Plant.  The 
costs  of  processing  and  shipping  were  paid  by  Sweden,  which  in  turn 
received  credit  for  the  plutonium  and  residual  uranium-235  recovered 
from  the  fuel.84  The  intensely  radioactive  wastes  left  over  from  the  re- 
covery were  stored  at  the  Idaho  plant  with  similar  wastes  from  do- 
mestic fuel. 

Later,  when  commercial  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  plants  began  to 
be  built,  the  AEC  negotiated  bilateral  agreements  wherein  it  had  the 
option  to  decide  whether  the  reprocessing  would  be  done  in  its  facilities 
or  in  those  of  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  In  this  way  the  AEC 
hoped  to  expand  the  market  for  the  U.S.  fuel  reprocessors. 

While  much  was  made  of  the  arrangements  for  fuel  reprocessing 
during  the  late  1950's,  the  unexpectedly  slow  growth  of  nuclear  power 
in  Europe  and  the  high  cost  of  shipping  the  intensely  radioactive, 
used  nuclear  fuels  combined  to  limit  their  return  flow  to  the  United 

83  The  new  authority  was  given  to  the  Commission  in  Public  Law  85-681,  72  Stat.  632. 

H  U.S.   Atomic  Energv   Commission.   Annual  Report   to   Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 

Commission  for  1963   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964),  p.  236. 


States.  These  factors,  in  turn,  have  limited  the  market  of  the  U.S. 
nuclear  fuel  reprocessors  and  also  have  kept  in  Europe  the  radioactive 
wastes  associated  with  the  used  fuels. 



Under  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946,  private  firms  of  the  infant 
U.S.  nuclear  industry  could  not  deal  directly  with  potential  customers 
in  Europe  but  had  to  work  through  the  AEC.  This  cumbersome  proc- 
ess was  not  suited  to  the  promotional  attitude  of  the  U.S.  industry. 
Soon  after  revision  of  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954,  the  AEC  an- 
nounced a  general  authorization  to  American  firms  and  individuals 
to  engage  in  any  unclassified  atomic  energy  activity  with  friendly 
countries  without  having  to  obtain  prior  AEC  approval.  This  au- 
thorization greatly  simplified  cooperation  between  the  domestic  nu- 
clear industry  and  its  potential  customers.  Specific  AEC  authoriza- 
tion was  still  required,  however,  before  an  American  firm  could  do 
anything  which  directly  or  indirectly  constituted  production  of  any 
special  nuclear  material  in  countries  of  the  Soviet  bloc.85  This  re- 
straint, in  effect,  precluded  export  of  technical  assistance,  products, 
or  power  plants  to  the  Soviet  Union. 


The  essence  of  Atoms  for  Peace  was  a  commitment  to  share  the 
benefits  of  atomic  energy,  including  atomic  power,  with  friendly  na- 
tions. This  purpose  occasionally  has  come  into  conflict  with  the  prin- 
ciple that  certain  U.S.  nuclear  technologies  should  not  be  exported  be- 
cause of  potential-  threats  to  national  security  or  to  world  peace. 
Obviously  there  is  no  disagreement  over  control  of  weapons  technology, 
or  that  for  peaceful  nuclear  explosives.  But  borderline  cases  do  arise. 
One  example  is  to  be  found  in  the  export  of  unclassified  technology 
and  apparatus  for  the  reprocessing  of  used  nuclear  fuels.  Countries 
interested  in  large  scale  use  of  nuclear  power  inevitably  must  reprocess 
their  own  fuel  or  arrange  for  this  service  elsewhere.  However,  if  they 
build  their  own  reprocessing  facilities  there  arises  the  possibility  of 
unknown  or  illicit  diversion  of  recovered  nuclear  materials  to  weap- 
ons use,  or  into  a  black  market  for  stolen  nuclear  materials.  This  issue 
came  to  a  head  in  L966  when  foreign  interests  inquired  of  a  U.S.  com- 
pany about  fuel  reprocessing  technology.  The  company  provided  some 
information.  When  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  learned 
of  t  he  inquiry,  it  was  critical  of  t  he  transact  ion.  (  Jommittee  ( Ihairman 
Chet  Ilolilield  wrote  to  the  AEC  to  urge  that  no  non-nuclear  nation 
should  he  assisted  in  obtaining  information  and  technical  know-how 
on  reprocessing  technology  unless  that  nation  first  agreed  to  place  under 
IAKA  safeguards  any  fuel  reprocessing  facility  that  it  might  build.8' 

Responding  to  i  he  cril  icism,  A  E( '  <  Ihairman  Seaborg  agreed  on  the 
importance  of  bringing  reprocessing  facilities  abroad  under  IAEA 
safeguards.  He  informed  the  Joint  Committee  thai  the  AEC  was  un- 

i    S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  Atomic  Energy  Programs,  .July- 
Dec  mbt  r  1  95  5,  "p.  '-if ..  p   93. 

''  V  s.  Congress,  .Toinl  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International  Agreements 
for  Cooperation — l'jcc,  89th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1966,  p.  187. 


dertaking  a  study  to  determine  how  technical  assistance  by  private 
U.S.  firms  could  be  controlled  to  assure  that  safeguards  would  be  ap- 
plied to  the  facility  involved.  However,  such  information  was  unclas- 
sified and  AEC  regulations  for  years  had  permitted  its  export  to  coun- 
tries outside  of  the  Soviet  bloc.  He  suggested  that  the  AEC  might  find 
some  specialized  technical  items  needed  for  fuel  reprocessing  plants 
which  by  regulation  could  be  supplied  by  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
only  if  there  was  agreement  that  safeguards  would  be  applied.87 

The  most  recent  manifestation  of  this  conflict  in  purposes  came  in 
July  1972  when  the  AEC  published  new  regulations  that  forbade  U.S. 
companies  to  do  business  abroad  in  three  fields  of  nuclear  power-re- 
lated technology  unless  AEC  approved.88  The  new  rules  prohibited 
"directly  or  indirectly"  engaging  in  overseas  production  of  heavy 
water,  chemical  reprocessing  of  used  fuels,  or  enrichment  of  uranium. 
Xo  reasons  for  choosing  these  three  nuclear  technologies  were  given 
in  the  announcement. 

Safeguarding  Nuclear  Materials  Supplied  Through  Bilateral  Agree- 
U.S.  technical  assistance  for  nuclear  power  inevitably  involved  the 
supplying  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  to  foreign  countries.  Since  the 
technical  assistance  program  began  well  before  the  IAEA  came  into 
being,  there  was  the  question  of  how  the  United  States  would  assure 
itself,  and  the  world,  that  materials  it  supplied  would  be  adequately 
safeguarded  against  diversion.  The  question  was  answered  by  includ- 
ing provisions  for  U.S.-conducted  safeguards  in  the  bilateral  agree- 
ments and  also  a  provision  calling  for  consultation  with  the  United 
States  on  transferring  safeguards  of  U.S.  materials  to  an  international 
agency  when  it  was  formed.  U.S.  policy  for  control  over  U.S.  sup- 
plied nuclear  materials  was  established  by  the  AEC  in  consultation 
with  the  Department  of  State.  The  policy  provided  that : S9 

(1)  The  United  States  would  give  assistance  and  advice  to  the 
recipient  country  in  establishing  a  national  system  of  control 
over  materials  and  equipment,  including  adequate  materials  ac- 
countability and  physical  control  measures ; 

(2)  The  system  would  be  subject  to  audit,  appraisal,  and  verifi- 
cation by  United  States  personnel ; 

(3)  The  specific  measures  applied  in  auditing  and  verifying  the 
system  would  depend  upon  the  type  and  complexity  of  the  facili- 
ties involved  and  the  type  and  quality  of  the  material  involved; 

(4)  AEC  staff  would  provide  assistance  and  guidance  to  co- 
operating countries. 

To  indicate  the  range  of  U.S.  safeguards  activities  for  its  bilateral 
agreements,  the  AEC  reported  that  in  1969  it  had  made  52  inspections 
of  facilities  in  five  countries.  These  inspections  included  the  first  in- 
spection of  the  unloading  of  fuel  from  a  reactor,  witnessing  the  first 
seals  to  be  applied  to  a  power  reactor,  and  inspection  of  a  reactor  fol- 
lowing a  radiation  incident.90 

"Ibirt.,  p.  187. 

*8  Federal  Register,  vol.  37.  July  26,  1972.  pp.  14870-1. 

"■'  T'.s.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Major  Actiritics  in  the  Atomic  Energi)  Programs, 
J a nn a rp -December  1959  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  OHice,  I960), 
p.  110. 

90  U.S.  Atomic  Energv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1969    (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,   1970),  p.   60. 


In  retrospect,  negotiation  and  administration  of  the  safeguards  pro- 
visions of  the  U.S.  nuclear  bilateral  agreements  has  proven  to  be  a 
unique  and  extraordinary  achievement  in  international  relations.  The 
technological  promise  of  nuclear  power,  reinforced  bv  incentives  and 
pressures  of  foreign  policy,  gave  the  United  States  the  unusual  right 
to  send  its  own  inspectors  into  foreign  jurisdiction  to  inspect  and 
verify  the  use  and  holding  of  U.S.  supplied  nuclear  materials.  That 
no  major  confrontation  has  arisen  from  the  administration  of  the 
safeguard  provisions  of  the  bilateral  agreements  gives  reason  for  some 
optimism  in  the  future  of  international  relations.  For,  despite  the 
arguments  and  analyses  of  those  who  consider  sovereign  rights  un- 
alterable, there  can  be  pragmatic  yieldings  and  accommodations  when 
this  is  sufficiently  in  a  nation's  interest, 

The  safeguards  provisions  of  the  U.S.  bilateral  agreements  were 
notable  also  in  that  they  prepared  the  way  for  giving  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency  practical  experience  in  administration 
of  safeguards.  While  details  are  given  in  later  sections  of  this  chapter, 
it  is  worth  noting  here  that  this  IAEA  experience  was  certainly  an 
important  factor  in  the  subsequent  negotiations  of  the  Xonp  ml  itera- 
tion Treaty  with  its  provisions  for  international  safeguards  to  be 
applied  by  the  IAEA. 

Conclusion  and  Current  Issues 

One  of  the  first  assignments  resulting  from  the  effects  of  the  dis- 
covery of  nuclear  fission  for  American  diplomacy  was  to  negotiate  and 
administer  a  web  of  bilateral  agreements  for  U.S.  technical  assistance 
to  foreign  nations.  Though  of  lesser  status  than  treaties  or  executive 
agreements,  they  nonetheless  obtained  for  the  United  States  unusual 
rights  not  available  through  the  more  traditional  and  presumably 
more  potent  and  durable  instruments  of  international  relations. 

The  bilateral  agreements  were  created  to  provide  special  technical 
assistance  to  foster  civil  use  of  nuclear  energy  abroad.  These  research 
and  power  agreements  demonstrated  an  effectiveness  for  supplying 
information,  materials,  equipment,  services,  training,  and  advisers  to 
nations  that  were  interested  in  nuclear  power.  The  power  agreements 
also  were  notable  in  the  rights  they  obtained  for  the  United  States  for 
control  and  safeguarding  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  and  certain  equip- 
ment. In  the  participating  nations,  inspectors  of  the  United  States  had 
access  to  the  places  where  U.S.  nuclear  materials  were  being  used  to  in- 
spect them  and  to  verify  their  quantities.  In  addition,  because  of  fore- 
thought of  U.S.  policy  and  the  work  of  the  diplomats  and  negotiators, 
the.  bilateral  agreements  had  provisions  which  ultimately  were  to  en- 
able the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  gain  useful  experi- 
ence with  working  safeguards. 

The  success  of  the  U.S.  bilateral  agreements,  however,  worked 
against  one  major  goal  of  Atoms  for  Peace.  Because  the  agreements 
provided  many  advantages  to  the  other  countries,  and  because  this  web 
of  agreements  obtained  for  the  United  States  influence  and  leverage 
that  it  otherwise  might  not  have  had,  there  has  been  a  reluctance  to 
shift  the  channel  for  U.S.  technical  assistance  for  nuclear  power  in 
Europe  and  elsewhere,  from  country-to-country  agreements  to  the 
International  Atomic.  Energy  Agency.  From  a' global  viewpoint,  it 
might  be  seen  that  the  United  States  and  other  world  leaders  in  nuclear 
power  are  in  competition  with  the  International  Agency  when  they 


deal  directly  with  other  countries  in  supplying  technical  assistance. 
There  is  an  implied  balancing  of  advantages  to  goals  of  individual 
nations  versus  the  anticipated  advantages  of  a  strengthened  Interna- 
tional Agency. 

Assuming  that  it  is  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United  States  and 
world  peace  to  see  the  Xonproliferation  Treaty  operate  at  full  effec- 
tiveness, it  may  now  be  time  for  the  United  States  to  reexamine  the 
present  roles  of  bilateral  agreements  and  of  the  International  Agency 
as  the  means  for  furnishing  future  technical  assistance  and  incentives 
for  nuclear  power.  Channeling  more  U.S.  aid  through  the  IAEA  could 
be  expected  to  strengthen  the  agency.  However,  to  deemphasize  the 
present  network  of  bilateral  agreements  with  individual  nations  and 
with  multinational  bodies  such  as  Euratom  would  lose  for  the  United 
States  the  benefits  associated  with  direct  dealings. 

The  United  States  supplying  of  technical  assistance  in  nuclear 
energy  through  direct  agreements  between  the  United  States  and  other 
nations,  and  groups  of  nations,  has  been  successful  and  might  well 
provide  a  model  for  measures  to  accelerate  research  and  development 
for  fusion  and  other  new  sources  of  energy. 

96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1-13 

VI.  Creating  an  International  Nuclear  Organization:  The 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 

The  discovery  and  application  of  nuclear  energy  led  to  the  creation 
of  several  international  and  regional  organizations.  The  one  associated 
with  Atoms  for  Peace  is  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
(IAEA).  This  section  of  the  study  has  to  do  with  the  diplomatic 
efforts  that  culminated  in  creation  of  the  new  International  Agency, 
and  in  the  evolution  of  U.S.  support  for  its  activities. 

IAEA  was  the  offspring  of  a  Wilsonian  idealism  reflected  in  Presi- 
dent Eisenhower's  proposal.  That  the  subsequent  evolution  of  the 
Agency  in  the  real  world  of  Bismarckian  relationships  falls  short  of 
these  ideals  should  not  mask  the  fact  that  of  all  the  participating 
nations,  the  United  States  has  cared  the  most  and  worked  the  hardest 
to  create  this  new  Agency,  and  that  the  burden  of  this  effort  has  been 
carried  on  by  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  the  Department 
of  State. 

The  International  Agency  is  open  to  virtually  all  the  nations  of  the 
world,  including  the  People's  Republic  of  China.91  Tt  has  been  shaped 
by  political  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union 
as  well  sis  their  working  relationship  within  the  Agency.  These  rela- 
tions at  times  reflected  some  of  the  adversary  tensions  of  the  cold  war. 
and  fit  other  times  some  of  a  partnership  friendliness  of  "have" 
nations  in  relations  with  the  "have-not"  members  of  the  Agency. 

Still  evolving  are  the  relations  of  the  IAEA  with  the  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  of  OECD  and  with  Euratom.  The  ultimate  fate  of  these  three 
bodies  and  their  roles  vis-a-vis  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe 
remain  to  be  determined.  Certainly  the  foreign  policy  decisions  and 
actions  of  the  United  States,  whether  passive  or  active,  will  influence 
their-  futures  and  thereby  the  future  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 

The  f .  I  /-.'- 1  /  a  Brief  Description 

The  Intel-national  Atomic  Energy  Agency  was  established  July  20, 
l!>r>7.  to  promote  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy.  It  is  an  inter- 
national organization  within  the  family  of  the  United  Nations,  report- 
ing annually  to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  and.  in  appro- 
priate cases,  to  the  Security  Council  and  to  the  Economic  and  Social 
Council.  It  has  concluded  relationship  agreements  with  five  other 
specialized  agencies  of  the  United  Nations.  By  September  1!>7-_\  the 
number  of  member  states  in  IAEA  totalled  103;  they  included  all  of 
the  Common  Market  nations  and  other  nations  of  industrial  conse- 

-el  out   in  the  Statute,  the  principal  organs  of  the  Agency  are  a 
( reneral  (  inference,  t  he  Board  of  ( rovernors,  and  a  Secretariat  headed 

w  Countries  not  members  of  tlio  IAEA  are  North  Korea,  North  Vietnam,  .-ind  tlm  People's 
Republic  of  Germany,  which  are  nol  recojrnized  by  the  United  States.  A^  for  Chinn.  in 
.T un<-  1972  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  IAEA  recognized  mainland  China  as  the  definitive 
government,  thus  displacing  Taiwan.   Mainland  China   has  yet  to  apply  for  recognition. 

i  L76) 


by  a  Director  General.  The  General  Conference  includes  representa- 
tives of  all  member  states.  The  Board  of  Governors  consists  of  25  mem- 
bers designated  by  the  outgoing  board  or  elected  by  the  General 

Regular  expenses  of  the  Agency  are  met  out  of  assessed  contributions 
of  member  states.  The  revised  regular  budget  for  1972  rose  to 
$16,561,000.  There  are  also  voluntary  contributions  from  members  to 
finance  IAEA  technical  assistance.  In  1972  these  pledges  totalled 
$3,375,000.  The  United  States  furnishes  about  36  percent  of  the 
voluntary  f  imds. 

Changing  Goals  and  Situations 

President  Eisenhower's  plan  to  reduce  the  international  threat  of 
nuclear  weapons  would  divert  nuclear  explosive  materials  to  an  inter- 
national pool  of  materials  to  be  used  for  peaceful  purposes,  and  would 
create  an  international  agency  to  maintain  custody  of  that  pool  and 
to  enforce  a  credible  system  of  safeguards.  This  dramatic  and  innova- 
tive concept  of  nuclear  disarmament  did  not  long  survive.  One  observer, 
Harold  L.  Nieberg,  says  the  Atoms  for  Peace  initiative  quickly  became 
transformed  into  a  means  of  enlisting  the  support  of  the  U.S.S.R. 
to  dissuade  other  nations  from  manufacturing  their  own  nuclear 
materials  while  imposing  upon  them  (but  not  upon  the  two  principals) 
a  system  of  international  inspection  and  control  over  nuclear  power.93 

During  the  3%  years  of  diplomatic  and  legislative  effort  that  went 
into  creating  IAEA,  commercial  interest  in  nuclear  power  declined  as 
nations  realized  it  was  not  a  quick  and  easy  way  to  supply  energy  to 
Europe,  and  the  hope  of  diverting  substantial  quantities  of  nuclear 
materials  from  military  to  peaceful  uses  evaporated.  Nonetheless  in 
1957  AEC  Chairman  Lewis  Strauss  told  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  that  had  the  President  not  proposed  the  Inter- 
national Agency,  we  "should  be  at  pains  now  to  invent  it."  The  follow- 
ing excerpt  of  his  testimony  summarized  the  changes  which  had  so 
diminished  the  prospects  for  the  IAEA.  He  said : 94 

What  has  changed  in  3x/2  years  is  that  there  has  been  indefinable  improve- 
ment in  outlook,  a  revival  of  hope  for  a  future  in  which  an  atomic  cataclysm 
need  not  be  inevitable.  That  change  began  with  the  announcement  of  the  plans 
for  this  Agency.  It  is  built  upon  the  expectation  that  the  Agency  will  come  into 
being.  The  still-birth  of  the  Agency  can  plunge  the  world  back  into  darkness. 

There  is  another  change  that  has  come  about  in  the  same  period.  In  19.".°, 
uranium  was  still  a  rare  commodity.  A  few  nations  controlled  practically  all 
there  was  of  it,  so  far  as  we  then  knew.  Discoveries  of  large  new  deposits  have 
demonstrated  that  uranium  is  far  more  plentiful  and  more  widely  distributed 
than  we  ever  imagined. 

This  availability  of  fissionable  material  and  the  extraordinary  progress  i'i 
engineering  for  power  development  has  brought  other  nations  besides  the 
United  Kingdom,  Soviet  Russia  and  ourselves  into  the  atomic  power  situation 
and  will  continue  to  do  so. 

As  a  result  of  this,  I  would  submit  that,  had  the  President  never  proposed  the 
International  Agency,  we  should  be  at  pains  now  to  invent  it.  Let  me  be  spe- 
cific. With  time  the  operation  of  atomic  reactors  all  over  the  world  is  inevitable. 
It  can  no  more  be  prevented  than  one  could  restrict  or  prohibit  the  use  of  fire. 

82  In  1972  an  amendment  was  proposed  to  the  charter  to  increase  the  number  on  the 
Board  of  Governors  to  33.  The  amendment  was  awaiting  ratification  at  the  time  of 

93  Harold  I,.  Xifherjr.  Nuclear  Seereeu  and  Foreign  Pollen  (Washington,  D.C  :  The  Public 
Affairs  Press,  1964).  p.  19. 

61  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enercry,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  85th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1957,  p.  84. 


The  Fruits  of  Negotiation 

After  more  than  3  years  of  intense  U.S.  diplomatic  effort,  an  inter- 
national statute  was  produced  which  the  President  approved  on 
July  27,  1957.  This  effort  witnessed  the  unequal  interplay  between  the 
idealism  and  the  pragmatic  imperatives  of  international  relations.  The 
outcome  was  an  international  agency  that  reflected  only  modestly  the 
ambitious  and  idealistic  goals  expressed  by  some  groups  of  scientists 
for  Atoms  for  Peace.  In  December  1953  President  Eisenhower  had 
proposed  an  international  body  with  the  following  four  major  pur- 
poses : 95 

First — encourage  world-wide  investigation  into  the  most  effective  peacetime 
uses  of  fissionable  material,  and  with  the  certainty  that  they  had  ail  the  mate- 
rials needed  for  the  conduct  of  all  experiments  that  were  appropriate  ; 

Second — begin  to  diminish  the  potential  destructive  power  of  the  world's 
atomic  stockpiles ; 

Third — allow  all  peoples  of  all  nations  to  see  that,  in  this  enlightened  age,  the 
great  powers  of  the  earth,  both  of  the  East  and  of  the  West,  are  interested  in 
human  aspirations  first,  rather  than  in  building  up  the  armaments  of  war  ; 

Fourth — open  up  a  new  channel  for  peaceful  discussion  and  initiate  at  least 
a  new  approach  to  the  many  difficult  problems  that  must  be  solved  in  both  private 
and  public  conversations  if  the  world  is  to  shake  off  the  inertia  imposed  by  fear, 
and  is  to  make  positive  progress  toward  peace. 

In  1957  the  negotiations  produced  an  International  Statute  which 
specified  a  limited  goal  for  the  IAEA.  Article  II  specified  that : 

The  Agency  shall  seek  to  accelerate  and  enlarge  the  contribution  of  atomic 
energy  to  peace,  health,  and  prosperity  throughout  the  world.  It  shall  ensure, 
so  far  as  it  is  able,  that  assistance  provided  by  it  or  at  its  request  or  under  its 
supervision  or  control  is  not  used  in  such  a  way  as  to  further  any  military 

As  "military  purpose7'  is  nowhere  defined  in  the  Statute,  t  ho  mission 
of  the  International  Agency  is  general  enough  to  accomplish  as  little 
or  as  much  as  the  member  nations  might  desire. 

Arnold  Kramish,  an  observer  of  the  peaceful  atom  in  foreign  policy, 
notes  that  the  U.S.  negotiators  had  decided  early  in  the  negotiations 
to  postpone  the  idea  of  a  workable  pool  of  nuclear  materials.  De- 
emphasis  of  this  arms-control  function  of  the  Agency  also  deempha- 
sized  the  initial  safeguards  function.  Instead,  negotiators  began  to 
talk  of  a  "clearing-house"  function,  meaning  that  in  some  unspecified 
way  materials  for  future  bilateral  agreements  would  somehow  be 
channeled  through  the  International  Agency,  but  not  be  controlled  by 
it.  Ambassador  Henry  Cabot  Lodge  gave  an  economic  reason  for  this 
change  in  role.  Interviewed  at  the  United  Nations  on  Noveml>er  6, 
1954.  he  said:  "Since  the  resources  of  the  Agency  obviously  will  be 
limited,  it  seems  more  useful  to  us  to  use  the  resources  available  to 
the  Agency  for  additional  programs  than  for  expensive  custodial 
arrangements."96  At  the  same  time,  he  said  that  the  United  States 
would  proceed  independently  with  its  bilateral  agreements  with  other 
countries,  rather  than  channel  them  through  the  new  Agency. 

Despite  the  limited  goals  finally  established  for  the,  International 
Agency,  the  official  U.S.  assessment  of  the  negotiations  was  optimistic. 
Secretary  Dulles  assured  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations 
that  the  I  'nited  States  had  achieved  its  diplomatic  objective  of  obtain- 

"Dwlpht  D.  EiRenhower,  The  Atom  for  Progress  and  Pence.  Department  of  State  Publi- 
cation No.  5103  (Washington.  DC.  :  T'.S    Government  Printing  Office,  1954). 

99  The  New  York  Times,  November  6,  1054,  p.  6. 


ing  the  adoption  of  the  U.S.-originated  draft  statute  without  substan- 
tial alteration  and  with  the  widest  possible  international  support. 
Despite  the  widely  differing  political  attitudes  and  stages  of  economic 
development  of  the  negotiating  nations  and  the  need  to  reconcile  their 
divergent  interests,  U.S.  negotiators  had  "kept  intact  every  element  of 
the  President's  proposals  without  sacrifice  of  substance  or  principle."  97 
U.S.  Ambassador  James  Wadsworth,  who  had  headed  the  U.S.  nego- 
tiations, concurred  in  Secretary  Dulles'  assessment.  Speaking  of  the 
statute  produced  by  the  U.S.  negotiators,  he  said : 98 

.  .  .  Functionally,  it  will  make  possible  an  Agency  with  broad  authority  to 
assist  in  research  and  development  in  the  peaceful  uses  field ;  possess  and  dis- 
tribute nuclear  materials ;  carry  out  the  pooling  of  such  materials  at.  the  request 
of  member  states  as  proposed  by  the  President:  establish  and  operate  its  own 
facilities:  organize  and  apply  a  system  of  minimum  safeguards  on  request  to 
bilateral  or  multinational  arrangements  or  the  atomic  energy  activities  of  a  mem- 
ber state ;  conduct  its  financial  management  on  a  flexible  but  business-like  basis 
in  the  interest  of  the  entire  membership ;  establish  an  appropriate  relationship 
with  the  United  Nations  and  other  international  organizations;  and  take  into 
consideration  recognized  standards  of  international  conduct  in  connection  with 
the  admission  of  new  members. 


Although  the  International  Agency  evolved  out  of  the  discovery  of 
fission  by  scientists,  the  scientific  community  had  relatively  little  part 
in  the  negotiations.  Individual  atomic  scientists  were  members  of  dele- 
gations to  the  negotiations  and  advised  the  diplomats.  Lacking,  how- 
ever, were  substantial  organized  attempts  by  the  scientific  community 
to  shape  the  functions  and  activities  of  the  Agency.  The  European 
nuclear  scientist.  Professor  Gunnar  Banders,  complained  in  I960." 

Scientists  do  not  generally  know  what  an  enormous  effort  lies  behind  the  cre- 
ation of  a  full-fledged  international  agency.  They  also  do  not  know  what  an 
irresistible  momentum  lies  in  international  organizations.  It  may  be  difficult  to 
create  one,  but  it  is  practically  impossible  to  terminate  one  in  peacetime.  It  is 
therefore  only  a  question  of  the  degree  of  usefulness  of  these  indestructible  giants 
which  can  be  influenced.  And  here  is  a  point  of  criticism  of  ourselves,  the  scien- 
tists and  technologists  of  the  world — we  have  not  as  a  group  realized  the  potential 
power  of  the  instrument  created,  and  have  failed  to  follow  up  with  action  our 
decade  of  speaking  and  writing  about  the  duty  of  scientists. 

With  few  exceptions,  we  have  not  even  tried  to  influence  the  selection  of  rep- 
resentatives of  our  countries  for  important  positions  in  the  Agency  organs.  No 
organized  attempt  by  scientists  has  been  made  to  make  the  Agency  promote  the 
ideas  or  the  programs  about  which  we  have  talked  and  written.  Scientists  who 
have  gone  there  have  usually  done  so  without  any  knowledge  of  the  real  purpose 
of  the  Agency.  Most  scientists  do  not  know  whether  the  Agency  needs  top-notch 
scientific  specialists  or  scientific  organizers  and  administrators.  The  last  question 
would  probably  be  answered  50-50,  one  way  or  the  other,  even  by  the  present 
Board  of  Governors. 

Some  Insights  From  Congressional  Review 

President  Eisenhower  sent  the  International  Statute  for  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  Congress  on  March  21,  1957.  The 
Senate  gave  its  advice  and  consent  to  ratification  on  June  18,  1957.  The 
arguments  and  reasons  advanced  in  support  of  the  International  Stat- 

97  U.S.  Senate.  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the  Joint  Com- 
mittee on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency, 
op.  eit,  p.  4. 

9RIbid.,  p.  46. 

"°  Gunnar  Randers  "The  Scientist's  View,"  Bulletin  of  the  Atomic  Scientists  (April,  1960), 
p.  164. 


ute  gave  further  insight  into  what  was  expected  of  the  IAEA  and 
what  benefits  were  expected  by  interests  of  the  United  States.  The 
Statute  was  the  subject  of  hearings  before  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  with  the  invited  participation  of  the  Senate  Mem- 
bers of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy. 

Secretary  Dulles,  Ambassador  Wadsworth  and  Chairman  Strauss 
of  the  AEC  carried  the  burden  of  advocacy  and  defense.  Their 
testimony  gives  many  insights  into  the  diplomatic  initiatives  of  the 
United  States,  and  into  U.S.  policy  for  commercial  nuclear  power  in 
Europe,  as  illustrated  in  the  following  sampling. 

In  terms  of  foreign  policy  advantages  to  the  United  States  Chairman 
Strauss  and  Secretary  Dulles  outlined  reasons  for  congressional  ap- 
proval of  the  International  Statute.  Approval  would :  10° 

(1)  Accelerate  nuclear  progress:  The  Agency  would  provide  a 
forum  for  the  exchange  of  discovery  and  invention  among  all 

(2)  Provide  safeguards:  Provide  an  effective  system  of  safe- 
guards to  insure  the  development  of  atomic  energy  with  security. 

(3)  Enhance  nuclear  health  and  safety:  Protect,  through  in- 
ternational codes,  the  health  and  safety  of  those  increasing  num- 
bers of  persons  who  would  work  with  or  live  near  nuclear  estab- 

(4)  Improve  manpower  utilization:  Establish  a  pool  of  man- 
power resources  which  otherwise  could  be  a  limiting  factor  for 
the  peaceful  use  of  the  atom. 

(5)  Strengthen  control  of  nuclear  weapons:  Demonstrate  the 
feasibility  of  international  controls  and  safeguards  which  could 
have  a  constructive  impact  upon  negotiations  for  the  regulation 
and  reduction  of  armaments. 

(6)  Reduce  pressure  for  proliferation :  By  opening  the  develop- 
ment of  nuclear  power  to  international  scrutiny,  the  Agency  could 
reduce  internal  pressure  within  nations  to  develop  their  own  nu- 
clear weapons  because  of  suspicion  of  the  nuclear  activities  of 
their  neighbors. 

(7)  Improve  the  climate  of  international  r<  1  at  ions:  Initiate  co- 
operation with  the  Soviet  Union  which  could  have  a  favorable 
impact  upon  the  climate  of  international  relations.  "The  splitting 
of  the  atom  might  conceivably  lead  to  a  unifying  of  the  now  di- 
vided world."  1(il 

™  Ibid.,  pp.  4-5 


In  his  summation  of  these  advantages  Secretary  Dulles  described 
the  potential  of  the  proposed  Agency  : 

.  .  .  for  economic  development  of  large  areas  of  the  world  ;  for  cooperation  with 
other  nations,  including  the  Soviet  Union,  in  ways  which  will  reduce  interna- 
tional tension  and  promote  the  practice  of  peaceful  and  constructive  collabora- 
tion ;  for  encouraging  peaceful  use  of  the  atom  and  averting  the  spread  of  nu- 
clear military  potential  to  additional  countries ;  and  for  giving  the  nations  ex- 
perience with  a  system  of  international  safeguards  which  could  build  confidence 
and  further  the  prospects  of  disarmament.102 


Assurances  were  also  offered  that  U.S.  commitment  of  support  was 
small.  Secretary  Dulles  emphasized  that  the  Agency  would  not  be  a 
"giveaway  organization"  for  U.S.  nuclear  fuel  materials.  Countries 
receiving  materials  from  the  Agency  would  have  to  pay  for  them. 
Moreover,  there  was  no  U.S.  commitment  in  the  Statute  to  supply 
nuclear  materials.  The  supply  of  materials,  services,  or  equipment  was 
a  voluntary  matter,  and  the  Agency  had  no  authority  to  require  a 
member  to  supply  anything.  Also,  the  United  States  would  pay  no 
more  than  its  share  of  the  administrative  expenses  of  the  Agency. 
Neither  would  the  IAEA  become  a  giveaway  organization  for  U.S. 
atomic  secrets.  It  would  distribute  only  that  information  on  nuclear 
energy  which  was  free  of  security  restrictions.  Finally,  any  nuclear 
fuel  materials  distributed  would  be  unsuitable  for  weapons. 

As  a  gesture  of  U.S.  support  for  the  International  Statute,  Chairman 
Strauss  at  the  closing  session  of  the  United  Nations  conference  on  the 
final  draft  Statute  delivered  a  message  from  President  Eisenhower 
announcing  that  the  United  States  would  make  available  (but  not 
give)  to  the  International  Agency  5,000  kilograms  of  uranium-235, 
an  amount  sufficient  to  fuel  three  to  five  nuclear  power  plants  for  their 
working  lifetime.  Furthermore,  the  United  States  offered  to  match 
additional  allocations  of  nuclear  materials  to  the  Agency  by  all  other 
member  nations.103 

The  offers  received  close  congressional  scrutiny  to  make  sure  they 
did  not  constitute  a  subsidy  to  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 
Senator  Hickenlooper  questioned  Secretary  Dulles  pointedly,  inquir- 
ing where  the  recipient  countries  would  get  the  money  to  pay  for 
this  fuel  material.  Mr.  Dulles  speculated  that  recipients  might  find 
the  money  in  the  foreign  exchange  they  would  otherwise  have  to 
spend  to  import  fuel.  In  any  event,  there  was  nothing  in  the  Inter- 
national Statute  which  directly  or  indirectly  committed  the  United 
States  to  finance  the  costs  of  the  uranium.  The  recipient  countries 
would  have  to  pay.104  Chairman  Strauss  was  even  more  emphatic : 105 

The  United  States  has  not  offered  to  make  a  gift  of  those  materials  to  the 
Agency.  The  President's  statement  explicitly  speaks  of  "terms"  to  be  agreed 
upon.  Articles  9,  II,  and  13  of  the  Agency  statute  likewise  provide  specifically 
for  reimbursement.  In  any  event,  the  advice  and  authorization  of  Congress  would, 
of  course,  be  sought  before  any  gift  were  made  to  the  Agency,  or  to  any  nation  or 
group  of  nations,  should  such  a  gift  appear  advisable  at  some  future  date. 

182  Ibid.,  p.  6. 

103  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Radiation  Safety  and  Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic 
Energy  Programs,  July-December  1956,  op.  cit.,  p.  12. 

104  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  cit..  ».  49. 

Agency,  op.  cit..  p.  49. 
105  Ibid.,  p.  92. 



Secretary  Dulles  advised  Congress  that  failure  to  ratify  the  Inter- 
national Statute  would  be  disastrous.  The  injury  to  the  prestige  and 
influence  of  the  United  States  in  the  world  would  be  of  ''incalculable 
proportions."  106 

Failure  to  adopt  the  Statute  would  pass  the  atomic  initiative  to  the 
Soviet  Union  or,  more  likely,  destroy  the  project.  He  said : 107 

This  is  essentially  a  made-in-America  project.  It  is  one  which  has  caught  the 
imagination  of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  and  for  us  to  he  the  nation  that 
rejected  it  would  have  very  fateful  consequences  indeed. 

Whether  or  not  the  project  would  survive  that  I  douht.  The  only  nation  that 
could  make  it  survive  would  be  the  Soviet  Union  which  is  the  only  other  nation 
which  has  sufficient  quantities  of  this  material  to  make  it  a  viable  project. 

The  Soviet  Union,  recognizing  that  this  was  a  project  which  greatly  enhanced 
the  prestige  of  the  United  States,  sought  for  about  2  years  to  block  it  and 
thwart  it.  They  finally  saw  it  was  going  ahead  anyway,  and  then  apparently 
adopting  the  old  political  slogan  "If  you  can't  lick  'em,  join  'em,"  they  have 
now  become  very  active  in  trying  to  join  up  and  to  try  to  give  a  certain  leadership 
of  its  own  to  the  movement. 

I  think  however,  if  we  did  not.  ratify  the  treaty,  the  whole  effort  would 
collapse  and  the  responsibility  for  that  collapse  would  of  course  be  clearly 
pinned  on  to  us,  and  it  would  involve  a  blow  to  our  prestige  and  influence  in 
the  world  of  almost  incalculable  proportions. 

The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  Participation  Act  of  1957 

The  resolution  giving  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  to  the 
ratification  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  was  adopted 
by  the  Senate  on  June  18,  1957.  On  June  19,  a  bill  to  provide  for  the 
participation  of  the  United  States  in  the  activities  of  the  Agency  was 
introduced.  Hearings  began  on  July  2  by  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy,  which  were  held  to  complement  hearings  of  the 
Foreign  Relations  Committee  when  it  acted  on  the  resolution  recom- 
mending that  the  Senate  give  its  advice  and  consent  to  the  ratification 
of  the  statute. 

The  participation  Act,  Public  Law  85-177  (71  Stat.  453)  is  similar 
to  the  participation  Act  providing  for  representation  of  the  United 
States  at  the  United  Nations  and  also  at  other  specialized  interna- 
tional agencies.  The  Act  permits  the  President  to  name  the  repre- 
sentatives and  deputy  representatives  of  the  United  States  to  the 
IAEA  Board  of  Governors  and  the  General  Conference,  and  to  the 
other  organs  of  the  Agency.  The  representatives  and  deputy  repre- 
sentatives are  appointed  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate. 
The  represental  ives  are  to  vote  and  act  in  accordance  with  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  President.  The  Act  also  authorizes  the  payments  of  the 
United  States  share  of  the  annual  budget  of  the  Agency  and  included 
provisions  to  encourage  Federal  employees  to  go  with  the  Agency.108 

To  be  sure  that  the  nuclear  materials  distributed  to  the  Agency  are 
not  a  ''giveaway.'1  they  are  required  to  be  paid  for  at  no  less  than  the 
charges  established  for  domestic  use.  While  the  President's  offer  of 
5,(  K)0  kilograms  of  \  235,  together  with  matched  amounts  of  materials 
that  might  be  made  available  to  the  Agency  by  other  members,  was 

w»Ibid.,  pp.  14   15. 
'"■  Ibid.,  p.  i  t 

""•  Federal    employees    serving   with    tlio    IAEA    .ire    given    3-year    prntootlon    on    Civil 
Service  retirement,  life  Insurance,  and  reinstatement  r i^u < s  in  tnelr  positions. 


authorized  by  the  Act,  these  materials  must  be  distributed  to  the 
Agency  under  agreements  for  cooperation.  These  provisions  pre- 
vented the  AEC  from  furnishing  nuclear  materials  wholesale  to  IAEA 
which  might  then  act  as  ia  broker  and  finance  its  fuel  supply  function 
by  charging  a  brokerage  fee  while  still  keeping  the  price  paid  by 
the  recipient  no  more  than  would  have  been  charged  for  direct  purchase 
from  the  United  States.  There  was  one  exception.  The  AEC  could 
assist  and  encourage  research  on  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy  or 
medical  therapy  by  distributing  without  charge  during  any  year 
material  valued  at  not  more  than  $10,000  in  the  case  of  one  nation, 
or  $50,000  for  any  group  of  nations.  Foreign  distribution  of  nuclear 
materials  exceeding  the  5,000  kilograms  ottered  by  President  Eisen- 
hower would  require  congressional  approval. 

The  Act  required  the  President  to  report  annually  to  Congress  on 
the  International  Agency  and  U.S.  participation ;  the  Department  of 
State  and  the  AEC  were  directed  to  keep  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy  and  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  cur- 
rently informed.109  To  prevent  unacceptable  changes  in  the  Interna- 
tional Statute,  the  Act  required  that  in  the  event  of  an  amendment 
which  the  Senate  disapproved  by  a  formal  vote,  all  authority  for 
U.S.  participation  would  terminate. 

Bilateral  Agreements  and  the  IAEA 

When  Congress  authorized  U.S.  participation  in  the  International 
Agency,  the  AEC  had  had  almost  three  years  of  experience  with 
negotiating  and  administering  bilateral  agreements  to  foster  the  civil 
use  of  nuclear  energy.  Considering  that  the  International  Agency,  in 
its  watered-down  version,  was  to  serve  in  part  as  a  clearing  house, 
would  the  United  States  shift  its  emphasis  from  the  bilateral  agree- 
ments and  deal  with  other  countries  through  the  Agency  ?  This  the 
United  States  chose  not  to  do. 

When  Congress  approved  U.S.  participation  in  the  IAEA,  the 
United  States  already  had  bilateral  agreements  with  some  40  coun- 
tries. Most  of  these  were  for  nuclear  research  with  a  few  for  nuclear 
power.110  Secretary  Dulles  and  the  State  Department  were  inclined 
toward  channeling  U.S.  aid  through  the  International  Agency.  Sec- 
retary Dulles  advanced  three  reasons  for  this: 

(1)  Although  the  bilateral  agreements  included  adequate  pro- 
visions for  safeguards,  unless  there  was  an  international  agree- 
ment on  common  standards,  future  competition  among  supplying 
nations  for  the  nuclear  fuel  market  would  almost  certainly  erode 
the  safeguards  of  the  bilateral  agreements; 

(2)  Nations  with  bilateral  agreements  with  the  United  States 
for  development  of  nuclear  power  would  not  indefinitely  accede 
to  U.S.  inspection  of  the  nuclear  powerplants.  "They  will  accept 
international  supervision  indefinitely,  but  they  will  not,  I  think, 
indefinitely  accept  mere  inspection  by  another  nation." 11X  and. 

109  This  annual  reporting  requirement  was  terminated  In  1965  by  Public  Law  S9-34S. 
79  Stat.  1310. 

110  At  that  time,  negotiation  with  4S  nations  had  produced  44  agreements  for  cooperation 
with  42  nations.  Of  these,  34  were  in  force — 29  for  research  and  5  for  power.  The  remaining 
10  agreements  were  awaiting  completion.  Fifteen  of  the  participating  nations  were  Euro- 
pean, with  all  of  the  Common  Market  nations  represented. 

111  U.S.  Congress.  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  cit.,  p.  66. 


(3)  The  United  States  lacked  adequate  technical  personnel  to 
meet  all  potential  needs  for  inspection.  It  would  be  preferable  to 
avoid  this  drain  by  sharing  the  task  with  others. 

While  the  State  Department  testimony  indicated  that  the  United 
States  would  probably  continue  to  use  bilateral  agreements,  it  sug- 
gested also  that  bilateral  agreements  should  not  be  made  a  more  attrac- 
tive source  of  these  materials  than  the  International  Agency.  The 
United  States  had  a  moral  obligation  to  be  a  good  member  of  the 
Agency  and  to  try  not  to  undermine  it.112 

Chairman  Stra'uss  clearly  favored  use  of  bilateral  agreements.  The 
United  States,  he  testified,  should  not  abandon  these  direct  agreements 
with  other  countries  when  the  Agency  came  into  existence,  or  at  any 
time  in  the  foreseeable  future.  He  anticipated  that  the  Agency  would 
stress  activities  in  which  many  nations  had  a  direct  interest  and  in 
which  the  greatest  progress  could  be  made  by  a  multinational  ap- 
proach. At  the  same  time,  the  United  States  through  bilateral  agree- 
ments would  be  able  to  extend  to  individual  countries  nuclear  coopera- 
tion which  .  .  .  conforms  more  precisely  to  our  traditional  and  spe- 
cial relationship  with  those  particular  countries."  113  He  did  acknowl- 
edge possibilities  of  some  resistance  to  bilateral  agreements.  Some 
countries,  he  said,  had  not  responded  to  U.S.  overtures  to  enter  into 
bilateral  agreements  with  them.  However,  these  nations  had  shown 
their  willingness  to  accept  from  an  international  agency  limitations 
on  their  sovereignty  unacceptable  from  the  United  States.114 

A  Bilateral  Agreement  With  the  IAEA  and  Three  Policy  Question* 
As  authorized  by  the  IAEA  Participation  Act,  the  AEC  began  to 
negotiate  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  International  Agency.  The 
negotiations  took  almost  2  years.  An  agreement  for  cooperation  was 
finally  signed  at  Vienna  on  May  11,  1959,  and  entered  into  force  on 
August  7, 1959. 

During  the  negotiations  IAEA  became  aware  that  it  had  no  major 
role  in  the  development  of  nuclear  power.  Its  first  Director  General. 
W.  Sterling  Cole,  who  had  resigned  from  his  post  as  Chairman  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  to  take  this  post,  strove  to  carve 
out  roles  for  the  Agency  as  a  channel  for  atomic  energy  aid.  and  as  a 
proponent  of  international  safety  codes  and  standards  and  interna- 
tional controls  for  nuclear  fuel  materials.  When  the  United  States  did 
not  respond  to  his  vision  of  a  strong  International  Agency,  he  became 
a  strong  critic  of  U.S.  policy  toward  the  Agency. 

One  example  of  Mr.  Cole's  ideas  serves  to  illustrate  the  gap  between 
expectations  and  performance  for  IAEA.  On  March  9,  1959,  before  a 
conference  of  the  American  Association  for  the  United  Nations,  Direc- 
tor General  Cole  asked  three  questions  of  policy  which  indicated  both 
his  vision  of  what  the  Agency  should  Ik>,  and  the  shortfall  from  his 
hopes.  He  asked  : 115 

Shall  tlif  atomic  energy  contribution  of  the  technologically  advanced  and  ma- 
terially endowed  nations  to  other  countries  in  the  world  be  given  and  applied 
through  truly  International  channels;  or  shall  we  continue  to  channel  such  aid 

"-  Ibid.,  p.  165. 

»»  Ibid.,  p.  86. 

"*  Ibid.,  i».  116. 

118 Quoted  l>y  Senator  Clinton  Anderson,  Jn  U.S.  Oonpross,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Cooperation  Between  th<-  united  states  and  the  Inter- 
national Mnmic  Energy  Agency,  86th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1959,  pp.  8-10. 


through  networks  of  bilateral  agreements  for  selective  nation-to-nation  exchange 
without  benefit  of  the  balance  wheel  of  international  considerations? 

Shall  the  peacetime  production  and  utilization  of  nuclear  materials  around 
the  world  be  carried  out  under  international  codes  and  standards  for  health  and 
safety,  or  shall  we  permit  the  peaceful  exploitation  of  atomic  energy  under  vary- 
ing, perhaps  conflicting,  and  certainly  confusing,  and  only  partially  effective,  na- 
tionally imposed  standards  for  health  and  safety? 

Shall  the  nations  seek  in  unison  to  establish  and  maintain  uniform,  prac- 
tical rules  to  prevent  the  diversion  for  military  purposes  of  nuclear  materials 
supplied  for  peaceful  use,  or  shall  we  dangerously  and  foolishly  let  any  and  all 
supplying  countries  of  such  nuclear  materials  make  their  own  rules  and  apply 
them  as  they  deem  desirable  under  unpredictable  conditions  of  international 

In  1959  Senator  Anderson  of  the  Joint  Committee  put  these  ques- 
tions to  the  AEC  during  hearings  on  the  bilateral  agreement  with  the 
IAEA,  but  received  inconclusive  answers.  State  Department  witnesses 
addressed  only  the  issue  of  bilateral  agreements,  and  defended  their 
continued  use  because  other  countries  asked  for  them.116 

In  1972,  with  commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  and  elsewhere 
apparently  ready  for  substantial  growth,  Director  General  Cole's  sec- 
ond and  third  questions  assume  greater  relevance. 

U.S.  Participation  in  the  IAEA 

As  with  other  international  organizations  in  the  years  following 
"World  War  II,  the  United  States  has  been  the  largest  single  contribu- 
tor to  the  funding  of  the  International  Agency,  regularly  financing 
about  one-third  of  its  administrative  costs,  and  much  higher  percent- 
ages of  voluntary  operational  funding.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether 
the  present  scale  of  IAEA  operations  will  be  adequate  for  the  future 
when  its  international  safeguards  responsibilities  under  the  Nonpro- 
life ration  Treaty  become  fully  operational.  There  already  have  been 
some  signs  of  concern  that  the  United  States  will  be  expected  to  finance 
much  of  this  increase  in  costs  in  the  future,  as  it  has  many  U.N.  field 


At  the  first  IAEA  General  Conference  in  1957  AEC  Chairman 
Strauss  announced  that  the  AEC  was  preparing  a  program  of  detailed 
assistance  and  cooperation  which  might  include  offering  to  IAEA  a 
research  reactor,  an  isotopes  laboratory,  and  a  comprehensive  technical 
library.  In  addition  to  formal  restatement  of  President  Eisenhower's 
offer  of  5,000  kilograms  of  uranium-235,  Chairman  Strauss  announced 
that  the  AEC  would  match  offers  of  20  kilograms  of  U-235  made  by 
the  United  Kingdom,  50  kilograms  made  by  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
100,000  kilograms  of  normal  uranium  oxide  concentrate  made  by 
Portugal.  Subsequently,  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  IAEA  Board  of 
Governors  in  January  1958,  the  United  States  summarized  its  prof- 
fered support  as  follows : 

(1)  Cost-free  services  for  limited  periods  of  20  to  30  expert  con- 
sultants for  use  in  the  Agency's  surveys  of  programs  in  member 

116  A  State  Department  spokesman  commented  : 

When  we  get  requests  from  countries  to  enter  into  bilateral  agreements,  we  acknowledge 
those  requests  and  we  attempt  to  accommodate  them.  We  cannot  very  well  spurn  the 
Approaches  of  other  countries  when  they  come  to  us  seeking  bilateral  agreements.  So  that, 
whereas  we  continue  to  enter  into  them  when  we  are  requested,  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  it  is  not  our  policy  to  push,  so  to  speak,  bilateral  agreements  at  the  present  time. 
On  the  contrary,  we  attempt  wherever  possible  to  direct  other  countries  to  and  through 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Ibid.,  p.  9. 


(2)  Grants  matching  contributions  of  other  member  nations 
up  to  $125,000  for  an  IAEA  fellowship  fund ; 

(3)  Approximately  120  fellowships,  at  an  estimated  cost  of 
$840,000,  over  the  following  two  years,  for  education  and  training 
in  nuclear  science  in  the  United  States ; 

(4)  Two  mobile  radioisotope  training  laboratories ; 

( 5 )  A  research  reactor ; 

(6)  An  isotopes  laboratory.117 


For  the  10  calendar  years  1960  through  1970,  the  United  States 
contributed  $28  million,  or  about  one-third  of  the  IAEA's  adminis- 
trative budget,  and  $10.5  million,  or  about  one-half  of  its  voluntary, 
special  programs  budget.  Details  of  U.S.  funding  appear  in  Table  III. 

By  way  of  comparison,  the  U.S.  shares  in  the  costs  of  United  Na- 
tions operations  through  assessed  payments,  which  amount  to  31.5 
percent  of  the  total,  and  voluntary  contributions,  which  vary  from 
10  to  55  percent  of  the  total  of  individual  programs  and  agencies. 
Assessed  payments  are  authorized  and  appropriated  to  the  Department 
of  State  and  voluntary  contributions  are  authorized  by' the  Foreign 
Assistance  Act  and  are  separately  appropriated. 

At  the  time  of  writing,  the  matter  of  determining  what  is  a  "fair 
share"  of  U.S.  costs  in  international  organizations  is  a  matter  of 
congressional  debate,  both  as  to  assessed  dues  and  to  contributions. 
The  Senate  Appropriations  Committee,  for  example,  recently  ex- 
pressed its  views  that  U.S.  share  of  such  costs  should  amount  to  20 
to  :>0  percent  of  the  total.  A  sense  of  the  Senate  amendment  to  the 
Foreign  Aid  and  Assistance  Act  for  FY  1072  called  for  the  total  U.S. 
contribution  to  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  including 
in  kind  contributions,  not  to  exceed  31.5  percent  of  the  total,  world- 
wide contribution.  The  Senate  Appropriations  Committee  in  1072 
expressed  a  hope,  that  other  countries  would  increase  their  contribu- 
tions to  international  organizations  coupled  with  a  more  realistic 
effort  on  their  part  to  provide  for  their  multilateral  and  their  in- 
dividual defense.118 

The  Senate  Appropriations  Committee  while  calling  for  redis- 
tribution of  support  for  international  agencies  among  member  states, 
with  a  smaller  U.S.  share,  recognized  the  advantages  of  multi- 
lateral assistance  programs.  It  mentioned  the  following,  saying:  119 

As  justified  to  the  committee  multilateral  assistance  programs  have  a  number 
of  advantages : 

They  promote  a  wider  sharing  of  the  burden  of  development  assistance  : 

They  reduce  the  political  friction  that  can  arise  from  reliance  on  bilateral 
contacts  in  the  most  sensitive  affairs  of  nations,  such  as  population  and  family 
planning,  the  production  of  and  traffic  in  dangerous  drugs,  and  surveys  of  min- 
erals with  strategic  implications  ; 

They  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  the  world  development  effort  by  providing 
for  the  pooling  of  knowledge  and  expertise  for  solving  development  problems  : 

They  can  operate  in  areas  of  political  tension  such  as  the  Middle  East,  where 
Individual  nations  are  often  unable  to  function,  even  in  providing  essential 
humanitarian  assistance. 

117  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Research  from  Power  from  Fusion  and  Other 
Major  Activities  in  the  Atomic  Energy  Program*,  January— June  1958,  op.  cit.,  p.  25. 

•"U.S.  Congress.  Senate.  Committee  on  Appropriations,  Foreign  Assistance  and  Related 
Programs  Appropriations  Pill,  19T3,  92d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1972,  Sen.  Rept.  92    1231.  p.  42. 

119  Loc.  cit. 









































3,  374 























[In  thousands  of  dollars] 

Regular  budget  (assessed)       Special  programs  (voluntary) 







1966.... : 


1968 _ 




1972  (estimate) _ _. 

1973  (proposed). _ 


1960-70  information  from  statement  of  Samuel  de  Palma,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  International  Organization 
Affairs.  In  U.S.  Congress,  House,  Committee  on  Government  Operations,  "Economy  and  Efficiency  of  U.S.  Participation  in 
International  Organizations,"  91st  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1970,  pp.  15-17. 

1971-73  information  on  regular  budgrtfrnro  In'erns'ional  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  "The  Agency's  Programme  for  1973-78 
end  Budget  for  1973,"  IAEA  document  GC(XVI)/485,  1972,  pp.  13,  15,  203. 

Energy  Agency,  "Scale  of  Members'  Contributions  for  1973,"  1972,  IAEA  report  GC(XVI)  486,  p.  4. 

1971-73  Information  on  voluntary  contributions  from  U.S.  Congress  Senate,  Committee  on  Appropriations, 
"Foreign  Assistance  and  Related  Programs  Appropriation  Bill,  1973,"  92d  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1972,  Senate  report 
92— 12 jl ,  p.  43,  and  also  personal  inquiry  of  the  Department  of  State. 

NOTE:  Because  the  Ag3ncy  uses  a  revolving  fund,  the  budget  figures  shown  are  not  always  the  same  as 
those  in  other  IAEA  or  other  U.S.  documents. 


The  Joint  Committee's  1959  inquiry  into  the  agreement  between 
the  AEC  and  the  International  Agency  gave  the  AEC  an  opportunity 
to  enlarge  upon  its  explanation  of  the  concept  of  what  the  IAEA 
should  be  doing.  Commissioner  Harold  S.  Vance  of  the  AEC,  after 
arguing  against  a  nuclear-materials  supply  role  or  a  role  in  demon- 
stration of  nuclear  power  for  the  IAEA,  asserted  there  were  many 
other  tilings  for  it  to  do.120 

.  .  .  There  are  problems  that  do  not  respect  national  boundaries  in  the  field  of 
health,  safety,  safeguards,  waste  disposal  and  so  forth.  I  believe  that  if  the 
Agency  will  address  itself  to  those  problems  and  do  it  a  little  more  vigorously 
and  forget  this  business  of  trying  to  be  a  broker  for  fuel,  that  in  the  long  run 
they  will  be  a  lot  more  productive  than  they  would  otherwise. 

He  proposed  four  unique  services  for  IAEA : 121 

(1)  Resolution  of  problems  of  health  and  safety  which  tran- 
scend national  borders; 

(2)  Creation  of  international  security  safeguards  and  controls 
over  worldwide  usage  of  fissionable  materials ; 

(3)  Expansion  of  East-West  cooperation  in  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy;  and 

(4)  Pooling  of  resources  to  meet  the  technical  assistance  needs 
of  underdeveloped  countries. 

la  U.S.,  Congress,  Jo:nt  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearing,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  86th  Cong., 

121  Ibid.,  p.  28. 


As  for  the  first  of  these  services,  Commissioner  Vance  reported 
there  was  already  widespread  recognition  of  the  IAEA  health  and 
safety  role.  What  he  said  in  1959  has  a  contemporary  sound : 122 

Concerning  the  general  problem  of  safe  usage,  all  countries  with  atomic  energy 
programs  have  a  mutual  concern  in  minimizing  accidental  or  inadvertent  con- 
tamination of  property  and  personal  injury  through  adequate  health  and  safety 
standards.  International  transport  of  radioactive  materials,  waste  disposal  at 
sea,  and  safe  operation  of  reactors  sited  near  national  boundaries  are  examples 
of  problems  predominantly  international  in  nature  that  can  best  be  resolved 
through  a  single  technically  competent  world  organization.  The  Agency  provides 
both  a  forum  and  the  implementing  mechanism  for  fulfilling  the  common  inter- 
ests of  all  nations. 

As  for  the  second  opportunity  for  services,  Commissioner  Vance 
saw  a  strong  safeguards  function  for  the  IAEA  as  consonant  with  U.S. 
foreign  policy  objectives.  In  his  view,  the  recognition  in  U.S.  bilateral 
agreements  of  the  ultimate  desirability  of  transfer  of  safeguards  re- 
sponsibilities to  the  IAEA  was  evidence  of  U.S.  support  for  this  func- 
tion. He  did  not  elaborate  on  the  third  and  fourth  points. 

A  Stronger  Role  for  the  IAEA:  The  Smyth  Report  of  19G2 

Whether  IAEA  should  be  given  some  real  international  operating 
functions  was  a  question  before  the  State  Department,  the  AEC,  and 
the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  1962.  The  State  Department 
in  1961  had  called  for  a  competent  general  review  of  the  Agency  in 
terms  of  U.S.  foreign  policy,  technology,  administration,  and  finance. 
To  this  end  the  State  Department,  in  agreement  with  the  AEC, 
established  an  Advisory  Committee  chaired  by  Dr.  Henry  D.  Smyth  of 
Princeton  University.123  His  committee  reported  in  1962.124 

The  Advisory  Committee  concluded  that  peaceful  uses  of  atomic 
energy  ought  to  play  an  important  role  in  future  foreign  policy  and 
that  active  support  of  IAEA  would  further  this  policy.  Development 
of  nuclear  power  was  the  key  issue  in  determining  the  usefulness  of 
IAEA.  Because  nuclear  power  was  becoming  economically  attractive 
in  many  parts  of  the  world,  it  would  be  advantageous  for  the  United 
States  to  encourage  the  Agency  to  participate  in  this  development.  Five 
of  the  Smyth  Committee's  six  recommendations  were  pertinent  to  U.S. 
foreign  policy : 125 

(1)  The  United  States  [should]  reaffirm  and  constructively 
support  its  policy  for  furthering  the  utilization  of  atomic  energy 
for  peaceful  purposes  throughout  the  world. 

(2)  The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  [should]  be  rec- 
ognized as  the  most  effective  means  by  which  the  United  States 
can  carry  out  that  policy.  To  that  end,  activities  now  being  con- 
ducted under  existing  bilateral  agreements  should  be  transferred 
to  Agency  auspices  wherever  practical. 

"» Ibid.,  p.  28. 

123  Dr.  Smyth  was  the  author  of  the  notable  wartime  "Smyth  Report"  on  the  Manhattan 
Project.   A  lending  nuclear  scientist,  he  was  in  1902  the  U.S.  representative  to  the  IAEA. 

134  Report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  U.S.  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  United 
States  Policy  Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  87th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1962, 
pp.  37-62. 

128  In  the  opinion  of  the  Committee,  these  functions  should  be  to  : 

a.  Provide  the  best  attainable  assurance  against  diversion  of  material  and  equip- 
ment to  military  purposes. 

b.  Establish  uniform  health  and  safety  standards. 

c.  Provide  technical  assistance. 

(1.   Reconcile  liability  and  indemnification  practices. 

e.  Conduct  international  research  projects. 

f .  Promulgate  International  waste  management  standards. 


(3)  The  United  States  [should]  take  the  lead  in  securing  inter- 
national agreement  that  the  Agency  be  recognized  as  the  instru- 
ment most  appropriate  for  carrying  out  certain  important  func- 
tions in  the  field  of  atomic  energy. 

(4)  A  detailed  study  [should]  be  made  within  the  United  States 
Government  of  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  further  the  foreign  policy 
objectives  in  the  field  of  atomic  power.  We  believe  that  such  a 
study  will  show  that  an  effective  program  need  not  be  costly. 

(5)  The  United  States  Government  [should]  continue  to  sup- 
port actively  the  programs  of  the  Agency  in  the  fields  listed  above 
by  providing  financial  assistance,  by  supplying  experts  for  special 
assignment,  and  by  encouraging  competent  technical  men  to  serve 
upon  the  Agency  staff. 

The  Smyth  Committee  extended  its  study  to  include  two  primary 
questions  affecting  atomic  energy  and  foreign  policy : 126 

( 1 )  Did  atomic  energy  occupy  a  unique  position  in  science  and 
technology  at  that  time  ?  and, 

(2)  Did  the  past  and  present  achievements  of  the  United  States 
in  atomic  energy  give  this  country  a  unique  opportunity  and  obli- 
gation to  promote  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy  ? 

The  Committee's  answer  to  each  question  was  yes. 

As  for  the  future  of  nuclear  power  and  the  IAEA,  Professor  Smyth 
posed  three  questions  of  policy  for  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy : 

( 1 )  Did  the  United  States  wish  to  support  the  development  of 
nuclear  power  around  the  world  ? 

(2)  How  important  were  safeguards  ? 

(3)  Was  the  United  States  really  going  to  use  IAEA,  or  would 
it  continue  to  work  largely  through  bilateral  or  regional  groups  ? 


In  comment  before  the  Joint  Committee  on  the  Smyth  report,  Mr. 
Harlan  Cleveland,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  International  Or- 
ganization Affairs,  foresaw  that  expansion  of  nuclear  power  was 
likely  to  be  important  to  foreign  policy  planning  from  two  points  of 
view:  safeguards,  and  assistance  to  developing  countries.  Of  this 
he  said : 127 

First,  we  are  concerned  that  adequate  safeguards  be  maintained  to  guard 
against  military  applications  of  a  proliferating  nuclear  technology.  Second,  the 
prospect  of  increasing  use  of  nuclear  energy  for  power  as  well  as  research  makes 
it  important  to  help  the  newly  developing  nations  to  develop  the  new  technical 
people  who  can  handle  the  new  technology. 

But  he  discouraged  the  idea  that  the  IAEA  should  be  a  channel 
for  financial  aid  for  nuclear  power  or  that  the  United  States  should 
increase  its  proportional  support  of  the  Agency.128  He  anticipated 
some  undefined  third-party  role  of  the  Agency  in  relation  to  U.S. 
bilateral  agreements. 

12a  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  United  States  Policy 
Toward  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  op.  cit.,  pp.  2,  3. 

127  Ibid.,  p.  14. 

128  Elaborating  on  this  point,  he  said  :  "We  do  not,  however,  believe  that  the  IAEA  or 
any  of  the  other  technical  agencies  of  the  United  Nations  complex  should  be  used  as 
channels  for  major  inputs  of  financial  aid.  The  IAEA  is  not  a  bank.  We  continue  to  believe 
that  the  international,  regional,  and  national  financing  institutions  are  better  equipped 
for  this  purpose,"  Ibid.,  p.  14. 


As  for  the  State  Department's  ideas  about  the  future  of  the  Agency, 
it  preferred  that  IAEA  concentrate  on  technical  service  functions : 129 

We  most  explicitly  agree  that  the  Agency  is  the  most  appropriate  instrument 
for  establishing  uniform  health  and  safety  standards,  for  working  out  uniform 
rules  for  liability  and  indemnification  for  atomic  accidents;  for  developing  and 
publishing  international  standards  for  waste  management;  and  for  conducting 
research  and  calling  scientific  conferences  on  problems  which  require  interna- 
tional planning  and  coordination. 

Queried  about  Dr.  Smyth's  three  policy  questions,  Mr.  Cleveland  in 
reply  raised  questions  of  his  own.  He  said : 130 

.  .  .  Sure,  the  United  States  wants  to  support  the  development  of  nuclear  power 
around  the  world.  But  do  we  want  to  build  into  our  aid  program  a  preference 
for  nuclear  power  as  opposed  to  other  forms  of  power  in  power  development? 
This  is  a  more  complex  and  difficult  and  interesting  question  that  really  has  to 
be  looked  at  in  terms  of  the  economic  program  country  by  country. 

How  important  does  the  United  States  consider  safeguards?  Very.  This  is  in- 
deed the  most  important  single  aspect  as  we  look  into  the  future  of  the  Inter- 
national Agency's  program.  This  is  more  than  any  one  thing  the  raison  d'etre  of 
an  international  agency. 

la  the  United  States  really  going  to  use  the  Agency?  Yes,  we  are  going  to  use 
the  Agency.  But  whether  we  will  use  it  in  a  particular  case,  given  all  the  con- 
ditions in  that  case,  can  only  be  determined  when  you  look  at  the  case.  That 
is  a  complicated  answer  to  some  simple  looking  questions,  but  Dr.  Smyth  knows 
how  complicated  his  questions  are. 

Cleveland's  own  questions  went  unanswered  at  the  hearings  and  re- 
main largely  unanswered  today.  This  difference  between  Professor 
Smyth  who  wished  to  channel  U.S.  nuclear  technical  assistance  though 
the  IAEA  and  the  Department  of  State  which  saw  a  continuing  utility 
in  bilateral  as  well  as  international  channels  illustrates  the  difference 
in  approach  of  an  announced  advocate  of  an  international  agency  and 
measures  to  strengthen  it  in  contrast  with  the  pragmatic  approach  of 
U.S.  diplomacy  which  views  both  bilateral  and  international  arrange- 
ments as  useful  for  U.S.  purposes.  This  same  pattern  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral  arrangements  for  technical  assistance  and  cooperation  has 
appeared  in  the  space  program.  There  too  the  United  States  uses  bi- 
lateral and  multilateral  agreements.  Able  to  use  either  approach,  U.S. 
diplomacy  is  not  tied  to  the  success  or  failure  of  one  method  or  the 
other,  but  can  choose  the  combination  that  best  fits  its  interests. 


Commissioner  Leland  J.  Haworth  welcomed  the  Smyth  Commit- 
tee's reaffirmation  of  a  policy  of  strong  support  for  the  International 
Agency,  for  use  of  atomic  energy  as  an  element  of  U.S.  foreign  policy, 
and  for  support  of  the  Agency  as  a  means  to  advance  U.S.  policy.131 
He  agreed  that  one  way  to  develop  the  competence  of  the 
Agency  was  to  transfer  to  it  as  many  as  possible  of  the  AEC  activities 
then  being  carried  out  through  bilateral  agreements.  But  the  AEC 
was  not  ready  to  commit  itself  to  this  idea.  As  to  safeguards,  the  Com- 
mission endorsed  the  need  for  a  continued  effort  to  obtain  a  uniform, 
worldwide,  effective  system,  ideally  to  be  administered  by  the  IAEA. 
But  the  Agency's  system  could  apply  only  to  materials  received 
through  the  Agency  or  to  those  voluntarily  placed  under  its  system. 

"•Ibid.,  p.  1". 
«*>Ibld.,  pp.  1S-19. 
131  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


Thus  IAEA  safeguards  could  not  be  global  in  scope.  Nevertheless,  the 
Agency's  system  provided  a  means  to  bring  a  few  nuclear  facilities 
under  safeguards  and  could  set  a  desirable  example  of  a  workable  in- 
ternational safeguards  system  for  the  future.  "For  these  reasons", 
j>aid  Commissioner  Haworth,  "the  AEC  judged  the  Agency's  safe- 
guards function  to  be  the  most  important  of  its  activities."  132 

As  for  the  supply  function,  the  AEC  demurred.  While  any  of  the 
bilateral  partners  of  the  United  States  could  at  any  time  utilize  the 
Agency,  and  it  was  AEC  policy  to  encourage  them  to  do  so,  Commis- 
sioner Haworth  gave  assurance  that  many  countries  trusted  and  pre- 
ferred the  bilateral  code : 133 

.  .  .  Important  as  it  may  be  to  the  Agency  for  it  to  serve  as  a  supplier  of  ma- 
terials (a  question  on  which  there  have  been  different  opinions)  it  is  even  more 
important  that  Agency  safeguards  become  generally  applied.  It  is,  therefore,  of 
great  significance,  in  the  interests  of  strengthening  the  safeguards  function  of 
the  Agency,  that  greater  emphasis  be  given  to  the  voluntary  application  of  IAEA 
safeguards  to  bilateral  transactions. 

The  idea  that  the  IAEA  should  become  involved  in  financing  nuclear 
power  also  was  minimized  by  the  AEC.  There  were  other  financial  in- 
stitutions. Moreover,  a  financial  role  for  the  IAEA  could  lead  to  an 
unbalancing  of  its  functions.  It  would  not,  in  Ha  worth's  opinion,  bene- 
fit either  the  Agency  or  the  United  States  for  this  country  to  use  the 
Agency  as  a  broker  to  finance  construction  of  a  nuclear  power  plant  at 
an  expenditure  level  several  times  as  large  as  the  Agency's  entire 


The  year  following  the  Smyth  Committee  report,  one  observer  cau- 
tioned that  IAEA  remained  weak  and  lacking  in  direction.  As  seen 
by  Arnold  Kramish,  the  Agency  was  not  the  idealistic  mechanism  en- 
visioned by  the  President  in  1953  to  diminish  the  potential  destruc- 
tive power  of  the  world's  nuclear  stockpiles,  nor  had  it  provided  a  new 
channel  for  peaceful  international  discussion.  If  the  Agency's 
members  wished  to  develop  it  for  that  purpose,  they  would  have  to 
strengthen  its  support.135 

Likewise  in  1966,  Sterling  Cole  was  to  comment  that  the  IAEA  was 
still  being  avoided  or  circumvented,  and  that  "not  a  single  nuclear 
power  plant  capable  of  producing  by-product  weapon  material  has 
come  under  the  Agency  control  .  .  .,  except  for  psychological  ges- 
tures or  demonstrations.136 

The  Decline  of  the  Supply  Function 

If  the  International  Agency  was  to  have  a  viable  supply  function, 
the  appropriate  time  to  establish  it  was  in  1959  when  the  AEC  received 
legislative  authority  to  cooperate  with  the  Agency.  But  this  brokerage 
function  that  was  so  important  for  the  plans  and  hopes  of  Director 
General  Cole  was  discounted  and  minimized  by  the  AEC.  Appear- 
ing before  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  1959,  Commis- 
sioner Vance  of  the  AEC  ruled  out  the  possibility  that  the  United 
States  supplying  nuclear  materials  to  the  International  Agency  on 

132  Ibid.,  p.  20. 

133  Ibid.,  p.  20. 

134  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

133  Kramish.  op.  cit..  p.  77. 

"'Sterling  Cole.  "Needed:  A  Rebirth  of  the  IAEA,"  Nuclear  News,  vol.  9    (September 
1966) ,  p.  19. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  14 


special  terms  which  would  enable  it  to  be  a  competitive  supplier  in  the 
world  market.  As  he  analyzed  the  situation,  unless  other  governments 
volunteered  to  become  suppliers,  countries  wishing  to  obtain  uranium- 
235  had  two  options.  They  could  deal  directly  with  the  United  States, 
or  go  to  the  International  Agency.  He  anticipated  they  would  prefer 
the  former,  which  he  too  preferred  as  in  the  best  interests  of  the  United 
States.  He  said  : 137 

...  if  they  deal  with  us  under  an  individual  bilateral  agreement,  we  have 
some  control  over  where  this  material  goes  and  for  what  purpose  it  is  used,  and 
we  do  not  have  that  if  it  is  channeled  through  the  International  Agency.  There- 
fore. I  think  the  present  arrangement  is  a  good  one  from  our  standpoint. 

He  opposed  Director  General  Cole's  proposition  that  the  United 
States  supply  nuclear  materials  to  it  at  a  discount  of  3  to  5  percent : 13S 

...  I  believe  that  this  possible  function  of  the  International  Agency  which 
Mr.  Cole  laid  great  stress  on  in  his  speech  in  March  has  been  greatly  overem- 
phasized in  his  mind  and  in  the  minds  of  a  lot  of  other  people.  I  do  not  believe  that 
it  is  one  of  the  principal  functions  of  the  International  Agency  to  act  as  a  broker 
between  the  countries  who  make  U-235  or  enriched  uranium  and  the  countries 
who  require  it. 

That  same  year  AEC  Commissioner  John  Floberg  told  the  third  ses- 
sion of  the  IAEA  General  Conference  that  the  United  States  saw  for 
the  Agency  a  continuing  and  important  role  as  a  supplier  of  source  and 
special  nuclear  materials.139  Asked  why,  in  view  of  the  AEC's  attitude, 
a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  International  Agency  was  necessary  at 
all,  Commissioner  Vance  said  it  would  provide  the  machinery  for  sup- 
plying nuclear  fuel,  even  though  the  amount  to  be  delivered  might  be 
nominal.  "We  have  gone  this  far,  we  should  go  on  to  the  point  where 
nobody  can  accuse  us  of  pulling  back  the  offer  that  was  made."' 140 

So  although  Atoms  for  Peace  proposed  a  strong  supply  function  for 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  within  a  few  years  this 
function  had  atrophied.  U.S.  policy  prevented  the  Agency  from 
obtaining  nuclear  materials  from  the  United  States  at  a  wholesale  or 
discount  price  for  resale  to  other  members.  Whether  the  Agency 
would  in  fact  have  been  strengthened  by  a  more  favorable  policy  is 
now  academic,  for  other  supply  channels  are  now  well  established  and 
it  is  unlikely  that  they  would  be  abandoned  now  in  favor  of  the 
International  Agency. 

International  Standards  for  Nuclear  Safety 

One  little-developed  function  of  IAEA  which  could  have  affected 
commercial  nuclear  power  in  Europe  was  the  setting  of  international 
safety  standards  for  nuclear  power.  Commissioner  Vance  and  others 
had  called  attention  to  this  function  and  the  Department  of  Stale 
and  AEC  had  both  emphasized  the  importance  they  assigned  to  it. 
During  hearings  on  the  International  Statute,  Secretary  Dulles  justi- 

137  V  K.  Concress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enortr.v.  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Co- 
operatinn  Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atornie  Energy  Agency,  op. 
clt.,  p   -•• 

"R  IMd.,  p.  21. 

""  r  s  Atomic  Knprpy  Commission,  Major  Activities  in  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
January— December  jf>5.9,op.  clt.,  p.  104. 

'"t'S.  Congress,  Join!  Committee  on  Atomic  Kncrpy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Co- 
operation  Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  op.  clt., 
p.   25. 


fied  ratification  by  the  United  States  because  of  what  the  International 
Agency  could  do  to  control  the  dangers  of  nuclear  power.  He  said: 141 

.  .  .  people  are  becoming  more  aware  of  some  of  the  dangers  inherent  in  this 
progress.  When  power  is  produced  by  nuclear  energy  .  .  .  such  production  also 
creates  waste  products  which  could  imperil  health  and  safety.  Today,  the  need 
is  even  more  imperative  for  protection  against  the  inevitable  byproducts  of  the 
atomic  age. 

The  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  is  designed  to  fill 
this  need.  .  .  . 

Chairman  Strauss  was  quite  frank  about  the  hazards.  He  testified 
that : 142 

A  byproduct  of  reactors  is  radioactive  waste.  This  byproduct  will  probably 
some  day  be  valuable,  but  presently  and  for  the  foreseeable  future,  it  presents 
a  huge  disposal  problem.  Solution  of  the  problem  is  necessary  for  public  health 
and  safety. 

If  these  wastes  are  indiscriminately  dumped  at  sea,  they  could  spread  around 
the  world.  If  they  are  indiscriminately  buried  in  the  earth  they  may  migrate  along 
the  plunging  contours  of  subterranean  strata  with  no  regard  whatever  for  the 
political  boundaries  that  men  and  nations  have  scratched  on  the  earth's  surface. 

The  only  way  we  can  safeguard  our  own  health  and  safety  is  by  securing 
world  health  and  safety.  And  that  can  only  be  achieved  by  a  uniform  international 
agreement  on  standards  of  health  and  safety  applicable  to  atomic  energy. 

The  United  States  was  ready  to  support  the  concept  of  voluntary 
international  safety  standards.  However,  it  was  unready  to  accept 
the  application  of  such  standards  by  an  international  agency  to  its 
own  nuclear  activities.  In  1959  while  discussing  IAEA  Director 
General  Cole's  ideas  about  the  IAEA,  a  State  Department  witness, 
Chad  wick  Johnson,  Office  of  Special  Assistant  for  Disarmament  and 
Atomic  Energy,  declined  to  take  a  position  on  this  question,  as  indi- 
cated in  the  following  colloquy : 143 

Mr.  Johnson.  I,  of  course  believe  it  is  a  generally  good  thing  for  the  Inter- 
national Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  establish  rigid  standards  of  health  and 
safety  for  possible  adoption  by  other  countries  with  which  the  agency  works. 

Senator  Anderson.  For  adoption  by  other  countries.  Why  not  for  adoption  by 
the  principal  country  that  started  it,  the  United  States?  .  .  . 

Mr.  Johnson.  Being  a  member  of  the  Department  of  State,  I  believe  that  I 
cannotfully  answer  your  question  on  this  matter  of  health  and  safety. 

The  IAEA  itself  has  not  been  able  to  move  very  far  to  establish 
international  standards  for  safety  in  design,  construction  and  oper- 
ation of  nuclear  power  plants.  It  did  convene  a  Panel  on  Safe  Opera- 
tion of  Critical  Assemblies  and  Research  Reactors  which  prepared 
an  international  safety  manual  and  subsequently  assisted  in  setting 
up  safety  procedures  for  a  few  small  research  reactors.  But  the  IAEA- 
went  no  further  despite  the  fact  that  the  nuclear  power  technology 
is  potentially  dangerous,  and  effects  of  accidents  with  nuclear  power 
plants  could  cross  national  boundaries  and  affect  other  countries. 

Shortly  after  the  issuance  of  the  Smyth  report,  Arnold  Kramish 
suggested  that  adoption  and  enforcement  by  members  of  the  IAEA 
of  international  safety  standards  promulgated  and  monitored  by  that 

141  U.S.  Congress,  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Jo'nt  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  eit.,  p.  3. 

142Jbid.,p.  84. 

143  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion Between  the  United  States  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  op.  clt., 
p.  10. 


body  could  also  contribute  to  international  control  of  nuclear  mate- 
rials. Safety  procedures  for  such  hazardous  materials  and  other  safety 
concerns  are  intimately  related  to  the  measures  for  an  effective  inter- 
national safeguards  system.144 

Despite  these  statements  attesting  to  the  importance  of  a  nuclear 
safety  function  for  the  IAEA,  there  remains  a  confusing  proliferation 
and  apparent  overlap  of  radiation  safety  guides  and  standards.  In 
Europe,  there  are  standards  issued  by  the  IAEA  and  standards  pro- 
mulgated by  Euratom.  The  United  Nations  has  continued  its  Scientific 
Committee  on  the  Effects  of  Atomic  Radiation,  rather  than  transfer 
the  functions  of  that  U.N.  committee  to  IAEA.  Meanwhile,  the  role 
of  the  International  Agency  in  setting  standards  for  construction  and 
operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  is  now  dormant.  If  commercial  nu- 
clear power  expands  in  Europe,  as  optimists  are  beginning  to  antic- 
pate,  the  issue  of  international  standards  for  safety  and  to  control 
environmental  effects  can  be  expected  to  revive.  If  and  when  it  does, 
U.S.  diplomats  are  likely  to  be  faced  with  the  question  to  what  extent 
and  in  what  way  should  such  standards  apply  to  domestic  nuclear 
power  plants?  Should  the  United  States  voluntarily  agree  to  apply 
such  standards  to  the  domestic  industry?  Should  the  United  States 
voluntarily  permit  inspection  of  design,  construction,  and  operation 
of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants?  What  would  be  the  effect  on 
the  Intel-national  Agency  were  the  United  States  to  refuse  to  acknowl- 
edge the  applicability  of  these  standards?  Then  too,  what  might 
such  a  conflict  do  to  the  competitive  position  of  the  U.S.  nuclear 
industry  in  the  world  market  ? 

In  ternational  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 

Of  all  the  negotiating  issues  faced  by  the  diplomats  and  their 
scientific  advisors  in  drafting  the  IAEA  statute,  the  most  intrac- 
table was  the  safeguarding  of  nuclear  material?.  U.S.  negotiators  were 
caught  between  (a)  the  demand  for  credible  inspection  and  control 
of  nuclear  materials  to  reduce  the  chances  of  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons,  and  (b)  the  reluctance  of  the  non-nuclear  nations  to  sur- 
render any  sovereign  rights  to  permit  inspection.  In  these  negotiations, 
the  Soviet  Union  chose  to  emphasize  the  issue  of  sovereign  rights  and 
to  oppose  international  inspection.  The  final  compromise  reached  at  the 
United  Nations  Conference  Avas  to  restrict  safeguards  to  IAEA  proj- 
ects or  to  those  projects  voluntarily  placed  under  IAEA  safeguards. 
Thus  hopes  were  dashed  for  a  worldwide  safeguards  system  that 
would  apply  to  all  nuclear  materials  and  facilities  in  peaceful 

On  paper,  the  Statute  specifies  an  impressive  array  of  power  and 
responsibility  for  the  Agency  in  enforcing  safeguards  for  its  projects, 
or  projects  assigned  to  it  by  member  states.  The  International  Statute 
requires  that  such  arrangements  include  provisions  for  IAEA 
examination  of  design  of  nuclear  equipment,  including  power 
reactors:  that  IAEA  health  and  safety  measures  be  observed:  that 
records  be  maintained  for  nuclear  materials  produced  or  used;  and 

***  Kramish,  op.  clt.,  pp.  r>n-CO. 


that  the  Agency  can  send  inspectors  into  the  member  states  to  check 
nuclear  materials  that  it  supplies.145 


The  questions  of  what  safeguards  would  entail,  why  they  were 
needed,  and  how  they  would  work  were  of  continuing  interest  to  both 
the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  the  Joint  Committee 
on  Atomic  Energy.  Safeguards  offered  two  sets  of  benefits :  a  means 
to  make  disarmament  more  palatable,  and  a  means  to  improve  world 
security  in  an  area  of  nuclear  energy. 

In  sending  the  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency 
to  the  Senate,  President  Eisenhower  reassured  Congress  that  the  safe- 
guards would  be  adequate  and  that  the  security  of  the  United  States 
would  not  be  endangered  by  nuclear  materials  made  available  to  or 
through  the  IAEA.  Said  the  President: 146 

To  achieve  the  confidence  essential  to  cooperation  among  members  of  the 
International  Atomic  Agency,  great  care  has  been  exercised  to  insure  that  fis- 
sionable material  will  be  safeguarded  to  prevent  its  diversion  to  any  military 
purpose.  A  comprehensive  safeguard  system  is  provided  by  the  statute.  This 
will  apply  to  all  aspects  of  the  Agency's  activity  involving  nuclear  materials. 
A  key  part  of  this  system  is  a  plan  for  thorough  international  inspection.  The 
United  States  will  provide  fissionable  materials  for  Agency  projects  only  as 
the  safeguard  system  is  put  into  effect.  I  am  satisfied  that  the  security  of  the 
United  States  will  not  be  endangered  by  materials  made  available  to  or  through 
this  Agency. 

In  the  hearings  which  followed,  Chairman  Strauss  described  the 
International  Agency  as  prospectively  providing  a  practical,  working 
model  of  an  inspection  system  for  disarmament.  He  said : 147 

The  Agency  will  not,  of  course,  achieve  atomic  disarmament,  nor  was  it  con- 
ceived to  attempt  that.  However,  it  can  promote  United  States  objectives  in 

115  Article  XII  specifies  that  the  Agency  shall  have  the  following  rights  and  responsi- 
bilities for  safeguarding  its  own  proierts  or  those  of  member  states  : 

1.  To  examine  the  design  of  specialized  equipment  and  facilities  including  nuclear 
reactors  and  to  approve  it  only  from  the  viewpoint  of  assuring  that  it  will  not  further 
any  military  purpose,  that  it  complies  with  applicable  health  and  safety  standards, 
and  that  it  will  permit  effective  application  of  the  safeguards  provided  for  in  this 
art'c'e  ; 

2.  To  require  the  observance  of  any  health  and  safety  measures  prescribed  by  the 
Agency  ; 

3.  To  require  the  maintenance  and  production  of  operating  records  to  assist  in 
ensuring  accountability  for  source  and  special  fissionable  materials  used  or  produced 
in  the  nroi'e^t  or  arrangement : 

4.  To  call  for  and  receive  progress  reports  : 

r>.  To  approve  the  means  to  he  used  for  the  chemical  processing  of  irradiated  mate- 
rials solely  to  ensure  that  this  chemical  processing  will  not  lend  itself  to  diver- 
sion .   .   .  and  will  comply  with  anplicable  health  and  safety  standards.   .   .   .  : 

6.  To  send  into  the  territory  of  the  recipient  State  or  States  inspectors,  designated 
by  the  Agency  after  consultation  with  the  State  or  States  concerned,  who  shall  have 
access  at  all  times  to  all  places  and  data  and  to  any  person  ...  as  necessary  to 
account  for  source  and  fissionable  materials  supplied  and  fissionable  products  and  to 
determine  whether  there  is  compliance  with  the  undertaking  against  use  in  further- 
ance of  any  military  purpose  .  .  .  with  the  health  and  safety  measures  referred  to  in 
.  .  .  tbis  article,  and  with  any  other  conditions  prescribed  in  the  agreement  between 
tbe  Agency  and  the  State  or  States  concerned.  Inspectors  designated  by  the  Agency 
shall  be  accompanied  by  representatives  of  the  authorities  of  the  State  concerned,  if 
that  State  so  requests,  provided  that  the  inspectors  shall  not  thereby  be  delayed  or 
otherwise  impeded  in  the  exercise  of  their  functions  ; 

7.  In  the  event  of  non-compliance  and  failure  by  the  recipient  State  or  States  to 
take  requested  corrective  steps  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  suspend  or  terminate 
assistance  and  withdraw  any  materials  and  equipment  made  available  by  the  Agency  or 
a  member.   .   .   . 

na  •"The  State  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agencv."  Message  from  the  President 
of  tbe  United  States.  S5th  Cong..  1st  sess.,  March  21,  1957    (Senate  Executive  I),  p.  2. 

147  U.S.  Congress.  Senate,  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  and  Senate  Members  of  the 
Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Statute  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy 
Agency,  op.  cit,  p.  87. 


the  field  of  disarmament  by  creating  a  practical  working  model  of  an  inspection 
system,  and  a  climate  of  international  opinion  in  support  of  our  objectives.  This 
we  may  hope,  will  facilitate  establishment  of  the  broader  controls  needed  for 
a  successful  disarmament  agreement. 

Sterling  Cole,  then  chairman  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  strongly  supported  the  safeguards  function  of  the  IAEA  for 
its  implications  for  disarmament.  In  a  statement  to  the  Senate  Foreign 
Relations  Committee  he  cited  its  potential  for  "outstanding  accom- 
plishment." He  said : 148 

This  will  be  a  period  of  learning  about  all  of  the  problems— technical,  legal, 
psychological — of  international  inspection  and  control.  The  Agency  was  suggested 
at  a  time  when  neither  the  United  States  nor  Russia  were  able  to  agree  on  an 
inspection  and  control  plan  for  themselves  for  disarmament  purposes.  The 
Agency's  operations  can  produce  that  technology  and  that  confidence  in  inter- 
national control  which  will  lead  to  complete  international  control  of  atomic 
energy  at  an  appropriate  time  later  on.  Since  the  Soviet  Union  has  been  the 
country  principally  opposed  to  international  inspection  of  atomic  arms,  perhaps 
it  will  learn  that  international  inspection  will  not  be  as  unpalatable  as 

The  State  Department  underscored  the  importance  of  international 
safeguards.  In  reply  to  a  question  as  to  why  the  desired  safeguards 
could  not  be  had  equally  well  through  bilateral  agreements,  Secretary 
Dulles  replied : 149 

.  .  .  while  in  theory  you  could  have  the  same  degree  of  inspection  under  bi- 
laterals  as  you  have  under  the  International  Agency,  ...  in  fact  there  would  be 
competition  between  the  countries — there  is  already  evidence  of  that  now — as  to 
who  would  want  to  sell  this  material.  One  result  would  be  dropping  these 
standards  of  inspection,  so  that  in  fact  we  would  not  be  able  to  maintain  our 
own  standards  as  the  era  of  plenty  arrives  in  this  field. 

Secondly  ....  there  is  objection  to  continuing  inspection  just  by  one  nation 
as  against  an  international  system. 

Thirdly  .  .  .  ,  we  do  not  have  the  manpower  to  do  it  adequately  as  the  need 

Strauss  foresaw  that  within  a  few  years  other  nations  would  be 
offering  nuclear  materials  on  the  world  market  and  that  without  the 
International  Agency  the  United  States  could  not  then  be  sure  that 
these  other  nations  would  impose  equally  stringent  safeguards.  Accord- 
ing to  Strauss,  the  Agency  could  establish  standards  for  safeguards 
more  effectively  than  any  system  of  agreements  between  individual 
countries.  Such  standards  had  to  be  set  up  at  the  outset  of  the  growth 
of  a  world  nuclear  power  industry.  It  would  be  too  late  to  attempt  it 
"after  the  contaminants  have  been  broadcast."  150 

AEC  Commissioner  Thomas  Murray  saw  IAEA  as  the  only  means 
of  avoiding  international  nuclear  anarchy.  He  said : 151 

In  no  field  does  the  need  for  international  order  exist  more  imperatively  than 
in  the  field  of  nuclear  energy.  In  the  concept  of  order  I  include  a  whole  set 
of  notions — regulation,  control,  supervision,  commonly  accepted  standards  of 
health  and  safety,  and  above  all  the  institution  of  free  and  orderly  procedures  of 
cooperation  among  nations.  You  have  heard  statements  about  the  danger  of 
our  gradually  drifting  into  a  state  of  atomic  anarchy.  This  is  a  good  phrase  in 
which  to  describe  the  state  in  which  we  already  find  ourselves.  Surely  this  is 
true  in  the  field  of  nuclear  weapons.  Each  of  the  nations  engaged  in  their 
development  and  production  is  acting  as  a  law  unto  itself. 

14SIMd..  p.  171. 
uu  Ibid.,  p.  69. 
'  '  [bid.,  p.  87. 
161  Ibid.,  p.  175. 


There  are  no  common  norms  or  standards  binding  on  all ;  there  are  no  common 
agreements  accepted  by  all.  The  result  is  international  lawlessness  or  anarchy 
which  shows  itself  chiefly  in  the  ungoverned — and  for  the  moment  seemingly 
ungovernable — race  for  nuclear  armaments. 

This  international  situation  is  not  simply  the  road  to  anarchy.  It  is  itself  anar- 
chy. Unless  and  until  this  anarchy  is  resolved  into  some  decent  measure  of  order, 
neither  America  nor  the  world  at  large  could  enjoy  even  that  basic  security  that 
consisted  in  the  assurance  of  continued  national  existence. 


Since  U.S.  bilateral  agreements  provide  for  U.S.  safeguards,  it 
might  be  asked  what  difference  does  it  make  whether  U.S.  nuclear 
materials  are  safeguarded  under  the  bilateral  agreements  or  through 
the  International  Agency.  This  question  was  probed  by  the  Joint 
Committee  in  1964.  Dr.  Henry  Smyth,  speaking  both  as  the  U.S.  repre- 
sentative to  the  IAEA  and  as  an  adviser  to  the  State  Department  and 
the  AEC,  outlined  three  major  advantages  of  international  safe- 
guards :  credibility,  uniformity,  and  expense.  He  said : 152 

First  of  all,  we  believe  that  international  safeguards  may  be  viewed  as  more 
credible  than  bilateral  safeguards.  That  is,  if  the  U.S.  Government,  or  any 
other  government,  for  that  matter,  is  conducting  safeguards  inspections  in  the 
nuclear  installations  of  a  very  close  ally,  some  question  might  arise  in  the  minds 
of  people  at  large  as  to  the  thoroughness  and  efficacy  of  such  inspections.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  those  same  inspections  are  conducted  by  an  international 
inspectorate  in  which  a  variety  of  countries  is  represented,  no  one  in  the  world 
can  doubt  their  thoroughness  and  objectivity. 

Second,  we  believe  that  it  is  important  that  the  safeguards  applied  to  various 
countries  be  uniform.  If  10,  11,  or  more  countries  set  up  their  own  individual 
inspection  systems,  it  may  well  turn  out  that  one  country  has  a  vigorous 
system  and  that  another  country  has  a  lenient  one.  If  transferred  materials  and 
equipment,  whatever  their  source,  are  subjected  to  the  same  inspection  under  an 
international  organization,  there  will  be  complete  uniformity  -  of  safeguards 

Third,  we  believe  it  is  far  more  expensive  for  many  different  countries  to 
establish  inspection  systems  than  if  one  international  secretariat  representing 
the  governments  both  of  the  supplying  countries  and  the  receiving  countries 
undertakes  this  whole  job. 

The  AEC  itself  outlined  five  reasons  favoring  replacement  of  bi- 
lateral safeguards,  with  those  of  the  IAEA.  It  testified  that : 153 

1.  The  most  effective  safeguards,  the  United  States  believes,  are  those  carried 
out  by  an  international  organization.  While  bilateral  safeguards  provide  adequate 
assurances  to  the  supplier  against  diversion  of  materials  supplied  by  them, 
only  internationally  applied  safeguards  are  capable  of  giving  equivalent  as- 
surances to  the  world  at  large  that  nuclear  material  supplied  by  one  country 
to  another  is  not  being  diverted  to  military  uses. 

2.  Application  of  safeguards  by  an  international  organization  develops  the 
experience  and  competence  in  an  international  staff  which  can  serve  as  an  im- 
portant precedent  for  international  inspection  in  connection  with  any  future 
disarmament  agreement. 

3.  International  safeguards  would  be  uniformly  applicable  and,  therefore, 
would  minimize  tendencies  toward  discriminatory  treatment  which  might  reduce 
arrangements  to  the  level  which  the  least  strict  bilateral  arrangements  required. 

4.  Relying  upon  the  IAEA  to  carry  out  the  safeguards  function  enhances  the 
prestige  and  increases  the  responsibilities  of  the  IAEA  and  thereby  makes  it  a 
more  effective  instrument  in  all  of  its  fields  of  endeavor. 

5.  Many  supplying  countries  will  probably  find  it  difficult  if  not  impossible  to 
undertake  bilateral  safeguards  on  nuclear  materials  which  they  supply.  Effective 

102  U.S.   Congress,  Joint   Committee  on   Atomic  Energy,   Hearings,  International  Agree- 
ments tor  Cooperation,  S8th  Cong.,  1st  and  2d  Sess.,  1965,  p.  141. 
153  Ibid.,  p.  140. 


safeguards  on  these  exports  can  be  realized  only  if  an  international  organization 
has  developed  a  capability  for  applying  safeguards  and  recipient  nations  are  pre- 
pared to  accept  them. 


U.S.  support  of  IAEA  safeguards  has  been  and  is  a  curious  mixture 
of  innovation,  generosity,  and  unusual  voluntary  actions,  offset  by  a 
reluctance  to  commit  the  United  States  to  reliance  upon  IAEA  safe- 
guards and  an  unreadiness  to  obtain  for  the  International  Agency  the 
financial  and  technical  support  it  will  need  to  carry  out  its  expanded 
safeguards  responsibilities  under  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty.  The 
evolving  nature  of  U.S.  participation  is  illuminated  in  the  following 
chronology  of  developments  in  IAEA  safeguards. 

Toward  the  end  of  1957,  the  AEC  was  working  on  ways  to  help 
the  IAEA  carry  out  its  safeguards  functions.  In  addition  to  assuring 
that  U.S.  supplied  nuclear  materials  would  be  used  only  for  peaceful 
purposes,  administration  of  the  safeguards  was  expected  to  accumu- 
late technical  and  administrative  experience  that  would  be  useful  for 
future  IAEA  operations.154 

In  1959,  Director  General  Cole  attempted  to  expedite  IAEA  action 
for  a  safeguards  system.  He  pleaded  with  the  Board  of  Governors 
to  do  so.  The  nuclear  nations  represented  should  demonstrate  for  the 
"have-not"  nations  that  inspection  and  other  safeguards  were  not  an 
unreasonable  invasion  of  national  sovereignty.  But  the  Soviet  repre- 
sentatives were  not  cooperative.  They  challenged  IAEA  safeguards 
as  unacceptable  intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  sovereign 
states— a  position  U.S.S.R.  representatives  had  taken  during  negotia- 
tion of  the  International  Statute— and  argued  that  IAEA  safeguards 
would  establish  the  domination  of  the  strong  over  the  weak  states. 
Apparently  U.S.  representatives  and  their  supporters  were  able  to 
counter  the  Soviet  position,  for  during  1959  the  Board  provisionally 
approved  principles  for  drafting  a  safeguards  system.  These  principles 
were  never  published. 

In  May  1960,  the  Director  General  sent  a  draft  of  a  proposed  safe- 
guards agreement  to  70  governments.  It  provided  for  inspection  by 
IAEA  inspectors  of  facilities  using  nuclear  materials  obtained 
through  the  Agency,  IAEA  approval  of  reactor  designs,  and  Agency 
supervision  of  records  of  reactor  operations.  In  September,  this  draft 
was  debated  and  adopted  at  the  fourth  General  Conference.  In  19G0 
the  AEC  took  a  first  step  toward  providing  the  IAEA  with  practical 
working  experience  with  safeguards.  At  the  Agency's  General  Con- 
ference^ it  and  several  of  its  bilateral  partners  announced  their  will- 
ingness to  transfer  to  the  Agency  the  administration  of  safeguards 
for  U.S. -supplied  materials.  In  that  year  the  United  States  volun- 
teered to  place  four  nuclear  reactors  under  Agency  safeguards.155 
Full  IAEA  safeguards,  principles,  and  procedures  would  apply, 
including  inspection  and  verification  of  records  and  accounts.156 



V  S    Atomic  Encrev  Commission.  Proprcss  in  Peaceful  Tines  of  Atomic  Encroy.July- 
mhe'r   1957    (Washington.  DC.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office    lOr.S),  p.   196. 
The  four  reactors  Included  two  research  reactors  at  the  AECVFropkhaven  National 

Laboratory,   an   experimental   power  reactor  at   the  AEC's  Argonne  National   Laboratory. 

and  a  small  de ostration  power  plant  In  an  electric  utility  at  Plqua,  Ohio. 

•"""T'S    Atomic  Enerpv  Commission.   Annual  Heport   to   Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 

Commission  for  1960   (Washington,  DC.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  1961).  p.  205. 


In  1961  the  International  Agency  adopted  guidelines  for  a  safe- 
guards system.  The  AEC  in  turn  adopted  these  principles  and  pro- 
cedures to  be  applied  under  its  bilateral  agreements,  and  the  countries 
involved  indicated  their  willingness  to  consult  with  the  United  States 
about  future  transfer  of  safeguards  for  U.S. -supplied  materials  to  the 
IAEA.157  During  1962  the  IAEA  and  AEC  completed  negotiations 
for  application  of  Agency  safeguards  to  the  four  reactors,  and  two  trial 
inspections  were  carried  out  by  IAEA  inspectors  at  these  reactors.158 

In  1963  the  AEC  and  a  bilateral  partner  completed  an  agreement 
to  transfer  to  the  IAEA  the  function  of  safeguarding  U.S. -supplied 
material.  While  most  of  the  nuclear  power  bilateral  agreements  of  the 
United  States  were  with  European  countries,  the  first  such  agreement 
was  executed  with  Japan.  Entering  into  force  on  November  1,  1963, 
this  trilateral  agreement  of  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  the  Inter- 
national Agency  provided  for  the  Agency  to  safeguard  any  nuclear 
material,  equipment,  and  facilities  supplied  to  Japan  by  the  United 
States.  It  also  specified  that  Agency  safeguards  would  apply  to  any 
fissionable  material  produced  in  the  Japanese  facilities  upon  its 
return  to  the  United  States  for  reprocessing  unless  the  U.S.  substi- 
tuted an  equivalent  quantity  of  like  material  in  Japan.159  This  pro- 
vision was  doubly  innovative:  it  recognized  the  idea  that  IAEA 
safeguards  should  follow  the  return  flow  of  safeguarded  material  from 
a  recipient  country  to  the  country  where  it  was  processed  or  used; 
and  it  provided  a  way  for  the  supplying  nations  to  break  the  chain 
of  safeguards  simply  by  substituting  a  like  amount  of  material  at 
the  recipient  country.  By  this  device,  a  supplier  country  like  the  United 
States,  or  the  U.S.S.R.  or  the  United  Kingdom  could  avoid  IAEA 
inspection  of  nuclear  material  sent  by  a  third  party. 

The  IAEA  Board  of  Governors  in  1963  provisionally  approved  a 
system  of  safeguards  for  small  power  reactors  and  the  Seventh  General 
Conference  that  year  adopted  a. U.S. -proposed  resolution  endorsing 
the  Board's  action.  AEC  Chairman  Seaborg  recommended  to  the 
Conference  that  the  Agency  consider  extending  safeguards  to  facilities 
for  fabricating  and  for  reprocessing  nuclear  fuel ;  also  that  the  Agency 
compile  and  publish  an  international  registry  of  ocean  disposal  sites 
for  radioactive  wastes  and  undertake  the  development  of  international 
or  regional  wastes  burial  grounds.160 

In  1964  IAEA  safeguards  were  expanded  to  include  power  reactors 
of  any  size.  At  this  time,  many  members  of  the  Agency  called  for 
clarification  and  simplification  by  revising  the  whole  safeguards  sys- 
tem. A  start  was  made  in  that  year. 

In  1965  the  IAEA  Board  of  Governors  provisionally  approved  a 
clarification  and  simplification  of  the  Agency's  safeguards  system. 
The  General  Conference  that  year  adopted  a  U.S.-proposed  resolu- 
tion to  approve  this  revision  and  the  Board  of  Governors  effectuated 
the  revised  system  on  September  28,  1965.161  The  State  Department 

157  U.S.  Atomic  Unersrv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1961   (Washington,  DC.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office.  1002),  p.  2::3. 

^U.S.  Atomic  Enerjrv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1962   (Washington,  D.C.  :  TT.S.  Governmpnt  Printing  Office,  196^),  p.  296. 

1C8U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1963   (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1964),  p.  2:!4. 

160  Ibid.,  p.  233. 

161  U.S.  Atomic  Energv  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1965    (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1960),  p.  254. 


supported  the  revision  before  the  Joint  Committee,  describing  it  as 
intelligible,  comprehensive,  and  likely  to  provide  a  mechanism  for 
effective  safeguards  on  peaceful  nuclear  programs  around  the  world.162 
Also  in  1965  the  United  States  expanded  its  original  four  reactors 
offer  by  voluntarily  putting  under  IAEA  safeguards  the  175  megawatt 
Yankee  nuclear  power  plant  at  Rowe,  Massachusetts.  This  action 
provided  IAEA  inspectors  with  practical  experience  with  a  larger, 
regularly  operating,  nuclear  power  plant  and  was  expected  to  confirm 
the  U.S.  position  that  safeguards  would  not  interfere  with  efficient 
operations  of  nuclear  facilities.  During  1965  IAEA  inspectors  made 
10  inspections  of  the  reactors  under  voluntary  safeguards.163 

By  the  end  of  1965  two  other  supplying  countries  also  were  using 
trilateral  agreements  that  involved  the  IAEA.  One  was  among  the 
IAEA,  Canada,  and  Japan;  and  others  were  among  the  IAEA, 
the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan,  and  Denmark,  respectively. 

In  1966  President  Johnson  pledged  full  U.S.  support  for  the 
Agency's  safeguards  system,  which  he  characterized  as  one  of  the 
principal  instruments  for  preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons. 
In  a  message  to  the  10th  General  Conference,  he  said : 164 

.  .  .  the  Agency  has  a  crucial  responsibility  to  see  that  the  vast  beneficial 
uses  of  nuclear  energy  are  not  diverted  for  military  purposes.  I  cannot  say 
often  enough  that  the  prevention  of  the  spread  of  nuclear  weapons  is  one  of  the 
most  important  tasks  of  our  times.  We  look  on  the  Agency's  safeguards  system 
as  one  of  the  principal  instruments  for  accomplishing  this  task.  The  U.S.  Govern- 
ment fully  supports  the  Agency  system  and  we  will  do  all  in  our  power  to  support 
the  continued  growth  and  technical  effectiveness  of  the  system. 

To  show  its  support,  the  United  States  voluntarily  permitted  appli- 
cation of  safeguards  to  a  commercial  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  facil- 
ity. That  April,  at  the  18-Nation  Disarmament  Conference  in  Geneva, 
the  United  States  offered,  in  cooperation  with  the  company  con- 
cerned,165 to  make  the  fuel  reprocessing  plant  available  to  the  IAEA 
to  develop  and  test  safeguards  techniques  and  to  gain  experience  and 
training  for  its  inspectors.  During  1966,  IAEA  inspectors  made  10 
inspections  of  the  Yankee  plant,  including  4  unannounced  visits  to  test 
provisions  of  IAEA  inspection  procedures  for  access  at  all  times  to 
power  reactors. 

In  1967  the  United  States  suggested  at  the  11th  General  Conference 
of  the  IAEA  that  the  Agency's  systems  extend  to  fuel  fabrication 
plants.166  Far  more  important,  on  December  2,  1967,  President  John- 
son announced  that  when  safeguards  were  applied  under  a  nonpro- 
liferation  treaty  for  nuclear  weapons,  the  United  States  would  volun- 
tarily permit  the  International  Agency  to  apply  its  safeguards  to  all 
nuclear  activities  in  this  country,  excluding  only  those  with  direct 
national  security  significance.167 

In  1968  IAEA  safeguards  were  extended  to  cover  facilities  for  cer- 
tain chemical  processing  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  and  for  fabrication 

103  Statement  of  Charles  W.  Thomas.  Office  of  International  Scientific  Affairs,  Donart- 
iii.nt  df  State.  In  D.S.  Congress,  lolnt  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  International 
Agreements  for  Cooperation,  89th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1965,  p.  14. 

>*'<  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1965,  op.  clt.,  p.  2.r>7. 

184  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Major  Activities  in  Atomic  Energy  Programs, 
.latuinry-December  1966  (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1967), 
p.   201. 

ln"'  Nuclear  Fuel  Services,  Inc.,  of  West  Valley,  New  York. 

1MU.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  the  Congress  on  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1967    (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1968),  p.  210. 

ia,7Ibld.,  p.  216. 


of  these  materials  into  fuel  elements  for  nuclear  power  plants.  Also 
in  1968,  the  Treaty  for  Nonproliferation  of  Nuclear  Weapons  was 
opened  for  signature.  Under  Article  III  of  the  Treaty,  IAEA  would 
be  called  upon  to  provide  assurance  that  nuclear  energy  programs  in 
non-nuclear-weapons  states  adhering  to  the  Treaty  were  not  diverted 
to  the  manufacture  of  nuclear  weapons  or  other  nuclear  explosive 
devices.  To  support  IAEA  safeguards,  the  AEC  provided  the  services 
of  technical  experts,  shared  results  of  its  research  and  development, 
and  provided  safeguards  training  opportunities  for  the  Agency's 

On  March  5,  1970,  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  entered  into 
force.  In  keeping  with  Article  III  which  required  each  non-weapons 
state  to  accept  safeguards  by  agreement  with  the  International  Agency, 
representatives  of  the  United  States  and  47  other  IAEA  member 
states,  including  the  nuclear  power  states  of  Europe,  met  twice 
during  1970  to  consider  the  character  of  such  safeguards  agreements, 
the  procedures  to  be  included,  and  the  methods  of  financing  the 

The  "Four  Reactor  Agreement"  of  the  United  States  expired  on 
July  31,  1970.  To  continue  its  cooperation  with  the  IAEA  in  develop- 
ing effective  safeguards,  the  United  States  arranged  for  IAEA 
personnel  to  take  part  in  safeguards  exercises  at  certain  U.S.  facilities. 
This  was  intended  as  an  interim  arrangement  until  such  time  as 
President  Johnson's  offer  of  1967  to  submit  all  U.S.  peaceful  nuclear 
activities  to  IAEA  safeguards  was  implemented.169 

In  December  1970,  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  in  its 
annual  report  noted  that  members  and  staff  of  the  Committee  had 
visited  the  International  Agency  to  discuss  safeguard  inspection  pro- 
cedures. The  Joint  Committee  reported  that  it  was  mindful  of  the 
importance  of  safeguards,  ".  .  .  but  is  looking  very  cautiously  at  the 
growing  safeguards  program  and  what  could  develop  into  a  need  for 
increased  funding  to  support  the  numbers  of  personnel  which  may  be 
suggested  as  necessary  to  run  the  IAEA  safeguards  program."  17° 

However,  the  Joint  Committee's  report  for  1971  had  little  to  say 
about  safeguards. 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

Had  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  evolved  in  the  di- 
rection indicated  by  President  Eisenhower's  idealistic  Atoms  for 
Peace  proposal,  it  could  have  had  a  major  influence  upon  develop- 
ment of  commercial  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  as  a  channel  for 
technical  assistance  and  nuclear  materials.  However,  the  tensions  of 
the  cold  war  effectively  precluded  such  a  role.  While  the  United 
States  was  the  most  generous  contributor  to  the  IAEA,  it  chose  not 
to  promote  the  Agency  as  a  distributor  of  nuclear  materials  or  the 
custodian  of  a  pool  of  such  materials.  Nor  did  the  United  States 
support  an  international  regulatory  or  standard-setting  function  for 
the  IAEA  for  design  and  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants.  On  the 

1WU.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1968   (Washington,  D.C.  :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969>,  p.  204. 

199  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission.  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1970    (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office),  1973,  p.  129. 

170  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy.  "Activity  and  Accomplishments 
of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  During  the  Second  Session  of  the  91st  Congress," 
Congressional  Record,  vol.  lltf,  December  31,  1970,  p.  44324. 


other  hand,  the  Agency  provided  an  arena  wherein  U.S.  and  Soviet 
representatives  could  meet  in  an  atmosphere  where  political  differ- 
ences were  less  pronounced  than  for  other  cold  war  circumstances. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  IAEA,  the  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R. 
as  the  two  principal  "have"  nations  in  the  world's  nuclear  com- 
munity were  pushed  together  in  their  participation  in  the  Agency's 
activities  by  the  pressures  of  the  other  largely  "have-not"  nations. 
These  circumstances  engendered  some  mutual  interest  and  the  result- 
ing experience  demonstrated  the  possibilities  for  cooperation  between 
the  two  governments  in  diplomatic,  legal,  and  technical  matters  relat- 
ing to  nuclear  energy.  While  such  cooperation  has  become  common  in 
1972.171  it  was  most  unusual  during  the  formative  years  of  the  IAEA. 
The  IAEA  provided  a  sheltered  field  wherein  member  states  belong- 
ing to  widely  differing  world  power  blocs  could  cautiously  experiment 
with  new  relations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  variety  of  viewpoints  and 
national  desires  represented  among  the  members  of  the  Agency  on 
occasion  led  to  strained  relations  within  the  IAEA's  governing  bodies 
and  has  tended  to  limit  the  Agency  to  a  lowest  common  denominator 
of  inoffensive  activities. 

The  IAEA  has  been  a  useful  test-bed  to  demonstrate  a  limited  form 
of  international  inspection,  a  demonstration  that  can  be  important 
for  U.S.  interests  if  international  limitations  upon  armaments  are 
agreed  upon.  The  IAEA,  with  strong  U.S.  backing,  has  demonstrated 
on  a  small  scale  how  international  safeguards  for  nuclenr  materials 
can  work.  Perhaps  more  important,  it  has  done  so  without  generating 
any  insoluble  problem  of  national  sovereignty.  Whether  the  United 
States  and  other  nations  will  now  be  willing  to  provide  the  financial 
and  technical  support  required  by  the  Agency  to  expand  its  safeguards 
functions  enough  to  adequately  implement  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  remains  to  be  seen. 

Several  specific  questions  relating  to  the  IAEA  are  likely  to  con- 
front U.S.  diplomats  and  policymakers  in  the  future.  These  questions 
can  be  expected  to  bear  upon : 

(1)  Establishing  and  enforcing  international  standards  and 
guides  for  the  design,  construction,  and  operation  of  nuclear 
power  plants,  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  plants,  and  perpetual 
radioactive  waste  storage  facilities ; 

(2)  Establishing  and  enforcing  international  regulations  for 
the  shipment  of  highly  radioactive  materials ; 

(3)  Assessment  of  environmental  effects  of  nuclear  facilities 
located  so  near  to  national  boundaries  that  such  effects  could 
be  expected  to  extend  across  national  borders ; 

(4)  Supplying  nuclear  fuel  materials; 

(5)  Providing  for  the  perpetual  storage  of  radioactive  wastes 
from  nuclear  power ; 

(0)  Safeguarding  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  for  commercial 
nuclear  power; 

(7)  Possible  future  relations  with  the  regional  nuclear  energy 
agencies  of  the  Soviet  bloc  nations. 

171  The  United  States  and  the  U.S.S.R.  slimed  an  agreement  on  scientific  find  technological 
cooperation  on  May  24.  1072,  that  poos  hoyond  the  usual  eTehantre  of  Ideas  and  opens  the 
way  to  scientific  Joint  research  undertakings  and  cooperative  projects.  It  estahlished  for 
the  first  time  a  U.S. -Soviet  Joint  Commission  on  Scientific  and  Technical  Cooperation.  Cf. 
Claire  R.  Geler.  The  U.B.-Boviet  Aqrrcmcvt  in  Science  anrl  Technology  (Washington,  P.P.  : 
The  Library  of  Congress,  Congressional  Research  Service,  August  10,  1972,  report  No. 
72-179  SP. 

VII.  Creating  A  Regional  Nuclear  Organization  :  The  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community  (Euratom) 

Of  the  international  organizations  arising  out  of  the  discovery  of 
nuclear  fission,  the  most  ambitious,  but  perhaps  the  most  disappoint- 
ing, has  been  the  multinational,  regional  organization  known  as 
Euratom.  Established  in  1958,  the  purpose  of  the  European  Atomic 
Energy  Community  was  to  create  conditions  necessary  for  the  speedy 
establishment  and  growth  of  nuclear  power  within  the  European  Eco- 
nomic Community,  whose  members  then  included  Belgium,  France, 
the  German  Federal  Republic,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  Nether- 
lands. The  goal  of  Euratom  was  also  expected  to  further  the  eco- 
nomic integration  of  Europe,  which  was  a  long  standing  objective  of 
U.S.  diplomacy.  The  support  and  collaboration  of  the  United  States 
with  Euratom  has  been  directly  instrumental  in  demonstrating  U.S. 
nuclear  power  technology  in  Europe,  and,  for  a  while,  provided  U.S. 
diplomacy  with  special  leverage  in  relations  with  Euratom. 

This  section  outlines  the  origins  of  Euratom,  its  functions  and 
activities,  and  the  disappointments  of  its  research  and  development 
program.  The  nature  and  scale  of  U.S.  support  are  mentioned  and 
show  that  U.S.  participation  in  Euratom  has  been  greater  than  U.S. 
participation  in  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  or  the 
Nuclear  Energy  Agency  of  the  OECD.  The  joint  U.S.-Euratom  re- 
search and  reactor  programs  are  described  in  section  VIII. 

Origins  of  Euratom, 

The  impetus  for  European  economic  and  military  integration  that 
followed  World  War  II,172  and  problems  with  oil  supplies  were  con- 
tributing factors  to  the  idea  of  a  European  atomic  energy  community. 
There  was  the  three-year  suspension  of  Iranian  oil  production  fol- 
lowing nationalization  in  1951  and  the  closing  of  the  Suez  Canal  in 
1956-57.173  The  initial  impetus  for  Euratom  appeared  in  the  mid  1950's 
when  statesmen  took  note  of  the  expectations  of  nuclear  scientists 
and  engineers  that  economically  competitive  nuclear  power  was  close 
at  hand.  In  June  1955  the  foreign  ministers  of  the  six  members  of 
the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  met  at  Messina,  Italy  and 
decided  that  commercial  nuclear  power  could  provide  a  desired 
additional  spur  for  European  integration.  The  ministers  had  in  mind 
a  vertical  integration  of  a  new  European  nuclear  industry  which  prom- 
ised quick  returns  to  the  participating  nations,  with  negligible  in- 
terference with  established  commercial  interests.  WTith  the  European 

172  Cf .  section  III. 

173  Oil  supply  interruptions  were  to  occur  again  with  the  closing  of  the  Suez  Canal  in 
1967.  the  Libyan  embargo  and  the  Tapline  rupture  and  cutoff  in  1970.  The  interruptions 
of  the  1950's  took  place  at  a  time  when  the  United  States  was  a  relatively  modest  oil 
importer  and  still  possessed  sufficient  excess  producing  capacity  to  contribute  a  portion 
of  the  oil  to  make  up  the  interrupted  supply  of  other  major  Western  oil  consuming 
countries.  However,  of  recent  years  the  United  States  has  become  a  substantial  importer 
of  oil  and  it  appears  unlikely  that  the  United  States  could  come  to  the  rescue  for  future 
interruptions  of  European  oil  supplies. 



nuclear  industry  in  its  infancy,  vested  interests  were  few  and  still 

The  exciting  early  purpose  of  -Euratom  was  to  create  a  European 
nuclear  technology  and  a  European  nuclear  power  industry,  which,  it 
was  hoped,  would  be  able  to  compete  with  the  nuclear  industries  of 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.174 


The  foreign  ministers  decided  at  Messina  to  seek  the  advice  of  the 
technological  community.  In  November  1956  they  commissioned  three 
prominent  Europeans  to  report  on  the  early  production  of  nuclear 
power  within  the  six  member  countries.  The  three  were  Louis  Armand 
of  France,  Franz  Etzel  of  West  Germany,  and  Francesco  Giordani  of 
Italy.175  Dubbed  "the  three  wise  men"  in  the  public  press,  these  three 
were  well  versed  in  science,  technology,  administration,  and  diplomacy, 
but  their  advice  and  interests  focused  more  upon  politics  and  economics 
than  upon  science.176 


The  product  of  "the  three  wise  men"  was  a  report,  A  Target  for 
Euratom,171  delivered  May  4,  1957,  after  the  treaties  for  atomic  inte- 
gration had  been  signed.  The  substance  of  the  proposals,  however,  was 
well  known  beforehand,  for  in  January  1957,  the  authors  had  ex- 
pounded their  ideas  in  a  public  conference. 

A  Target  for  Euratom  combined  the  factors  of  energy  and  economic 
policy  into  a  compelling  argument  for  European  atomic  integration. 
With  the  Suez  crisis  still  fresh  in  mind,  they  observed  that  a  future 
stoppage  of  oil  could  be  an  economic  calamity  for  Europe,  and  that  ex- 
cessive dependence  upon  an  oil  supply  from  an  unstable  region  might 
lead  to  serious  political  trouble  throughout  the  world.  Estimating 
that  future  energy  requirements  of  the  economic  community  would 
increase  by  83  percent  between  1955  and  1975,  they  advised  that  the 
economic  growth  of  the  six  countries  was  in  danger  of  being  seriously 
hampered  by  lack  of  another  source  of  energy.  They  warned  that 
without  such  a  new  source  imports  of  fuel  would  rise  to  intolerable 
amounts,  doubling  in  the  next  decade  and  tripling  within  two  decades. 
The  authors  recommended  that  the  Common  Market  nations  install 
15,000  megawatts  of  nuclear  power  by  1967.  For  perspective,  at  that 

"*  For  more  detailed  insight  into  the  orlpins  of  Euratom,  Cf.  Rene  Foche,  Europe  and 
Technology:  A  Political  View  (Paris:  The  Atlantic  Institute,  1970),  p.  23. 

178  Louis  Armand  was  then  director  general  of  the  French  State  Railways  and  president 
of  the  Industrial  Equipment  Commission  of  the  French  Commissariat  a  l'Energle  Atomique 
(CEA).  By  profession  he  was  an  engineer  and  an  administrator.  Franz  Etzel  was  a  senior 
vice  president  of  the  Coal  Community.  A  lawyer  and  an  economist,  he  was  also  leader  of  the 
Christian  Democratic  Party  in  Germany.  Francesco  Giordani  was  president  of  the  Italian 
National  Rfs^arch  Council.  A  professor,  nuclear  scientist  and  chemist,  he  was  a  leading 
European  authority  on  nuclear  science. 

w  Professor  Warren  B.  Walsh  of  the  international  relations  program  of  the  Maxwell 
School,  University  of  Syracuse,  underscored  this  point  In  his  observation  that  : 

".  .  .  the  principal  architects  of  Euratom  were  specialists  In  politics  and  economics, 
especially  tne  former,  rather  than  scientists  ....  The  genesis  of  Euratom  owed 
more  to  the  Impact  of  politics  and  public  affairs  than  the  other  way  around." 

Cf.  Warren  B.  Walsh,  Science  and  International  Publio  Affairs  (New  York  :  Maxwell 
School  of  Syracuse  University,  1967),  p.  79. 

177  A  Target  for  Euratom.  Reprinted  in  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom  Agreements,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1958,  pp.  38-64. 


time  a  powerplant  of  250  electrical  megawatts  output  was  considered 
large,  so  the  goal  was  equivalent  to  60  new  such  powerplants.178 

The  authors  asserted  that  the  Common  Market  nations  could  not 
achieve  this  goal  without  pooling  their  resources  and  obtaining  help 
from  the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  and  Canada.  The  target 
was  admittedly  ambitious ;  of  the  six  members  of  the  Community,  at 
that  time  only  France  had  any  practical  experience  with  nuclear  power. 
In  summation,  the  authors  presented  an  optimistic  picture  of  the  bene- 
fits obtainable  from  nuclear  integration.  They  wrote : 179 

.  .  .  Euratom  will  create  new  opportunities.  It  will  pool  the  scientific  as  well 
as  the  industrial  resources  of  our  six  countries  and  their  varied  skills.  A  common 
market  for  nuclear  equipment  to  be  set  up  within  a  year  will  promote  industrial 
specialization.  Further,  Euratom  will  represent  our  nations  as  a  single  unit 
vis-a-vis  other  states,  and  will  be  far  better  placed  to  obtain  full  cooperation  from 
them  than  our  countries  separately. 

The  authors  highlighted  reasons  for  American  support  and  partici- 
pation. For  example,  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  could  expect  benefits 
from  experience  with  nuclear  power  plants  built  in  Europe.  Their 
report  stated : 180 

...  No  amount  of  research  can  be  a  substitute  for  the  practical  knowledge  to 
be  gained  by  large-scale  industrial  application  of  atomic  power.  Europe  could 
make  this  experience  available  to  the  United  States.  Our  talks  in  Washington 
convinced  us  that,  on  the  healthy  basis  of  a  two-way  traffic,  a  close  partnership 
as  equals  can  be  built  up  between  the  United  States  and  Euratom  and  their 
respective  industries. 

What  forms  could  this  cooperation  take  ?  The  advisors  had  definite 
ideas,  which  they  expressed  as  follows : m 

.  .  .  The  United  States  would  make  available  the  necessary  fissionable  mate- 
rials and  the  technical  knowledge  to  set  our  industries  going.  Once  Euratom  is 
established,  a  task  force  composed  of  some  of  America's  most  able  men  would  be 
at  our  disposal  to  continue  studying  with  European  experts  the  many  technical 
problems  posed  by  our  programme.  America  would  provide  training  facilities  for 
our  scientists  and  technicians.  Joint  projects,  for  instance  to  improve  and  adapt 
reactors,  can  be  envisaged  between  American  and  European  industries,  as  well  as 
between  the  American  and  European  Atomic  Energy  Commissions. 

U.S.  Support  for  European  Nuclear  Integration 

The  joint  communique  issued  from  the  White  House  at  the  end  of  a 
visit  by  the  three-man  Euratom  Committee  to  the  United  States  indi- 
cated strong  U.S.  support.  It  said : 182 

The  U.S.  Government  welcomes  the  initiative  taken  in  the  Committee's  proposal 
for  a  bold  and  imaginative  application  of  nuclear  energy.  .  .  .  The  United  States 
anticipates  active  association  in  the  achievement  of  the  Committee's  objective, 
and  foresees  a  fruitful  two-way  exchange  of  experience  and  technical  develop- 
ment, opening  a  new  area  for  mutually  beneficial  action  on  both  the  governmental 
and  the  industrial  level  and  reinforcing  solidarity  within  Europe  and  across  the 

But  U.S.  support  for  Euratom  was  not  unqualified.  Secretary 
Dulles  made  it  clear  that  the  United  States  wished  Euratom  to  con- 
centrate exclusively  on  development  of  nuclear  power  and  not  aspire 

178  That  this  target  was  overly  ambitions  Is  evident  In  the  situation  of  1967.  In  that 
year  the  six  Euratom  nations  had  between  them  16  nuclear  power  reactors  with  a  total 
electrical  generating  capacity  of  2.094  megawatts. 

179  A  Tarqet  for  Euratom,  op.  cit.,  p.  47. 
18°  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

181  Loc.  cit. 

183  Department  of  State  Bulletin,  vol.  36  (February  25.  1957),  p.  307. 


to  such  greater  goals  as  the  economic  welfare  of  the  European  Com- 
munity or  the  fostering  of  greater  political  unity  among  its  member 
states.  While  some  European  proponents  of  Euratom  looked  to  it  to 
restore  the  influence  of  the  six  nations  in  world  affairs,  the  Washington 
view  was  the  opposite.  The  communique  at  the  end  of  the  "wise  men's" 
visit  said  that  the  parties  agreed  that  Euratom  should  be  solely  the 
stimulus  to  realize  the  objectives  for  nuclear  power.183 

In  its  assessment  of  U.S.  policy  for  international  development  of 
nuclear  energy,  the  American  Assembly  reflected  the  optimism  of  the 
times.  It  saw  many  benefits  for  the  United  States  from  encouraging  the 
use  of  this  new  power  technology  in  Europe : 1S4 

A  major  effort  on  the  part  of  American  industry  and  government  would  provide 
the  American  atomic  power  program  with  vitality  and  purpose  and  accelerate  the 
development  of  power  at  home.  While  it  can  be  expected  that  highly  industrialized 
countries  such  as  those  in  Europe  will  ultimately  establish  their  own  facilities  for 
building  their  atomic  power  plants,  Euratom  can  provide  American  industry  with 
experience  as  well  as  a  market  for  its  products  and  technology.  Such  an  effort 
would  assist  the  aims  of  American  foreign  policy  in  developing  the  economic 
strength  of,  and  American  ties  with,  the  Western  European  community,  and  .  .  . 
would  provide  experience  in  the  operation  of  large-scale  reactors  of  great  and 
immediate  benefit  to  our  own  development  program. 

Soviet  Opposition  to  Euratom 

International  rivalries  quickly  raised  diplomatic  difficulties  for 
Euratom.  The  Soviet  Union  declared  both  Euratom  and  the  Economic 
Community  to  be  instruments  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Orga- 
nization and  labeled  Euratom  a  scheme  to  rearm  Germany  with  atomic 
weapons.  The  Soviet  Union  sent  warning  notes  to  each  of  the  six 
Common  Market  nations,  urging  them  to  accept  instead  the  Soviet 
plan  for  Pan-European  economic  and  atomic  integration.  While  this 
warning  was  abortive,  the  Soviet  Union  was  more  successful  in  block- 
ing later  Euratom  efforts  to  establish  a  close  relationship  with  the  In- 
ternational Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

An  example  of  the  Soviet  Union's  position  is  a  statement  of  the 
U.S.S.R.  Foreign  Ministry  issued  March  16,  1957.  After  agreeing  that 
economic  cooperation  in  Europe  would  help  to  restore  disrupted  trade 
and  scientific  and  technical  connections,  the  Soviet  Union  opposed  both 
the  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market  as  in  contradiction  to  those 
aims  and  likely  to  increase  the  rift  in  Europe : 185 

However,  the  plans  for  creating  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market  are  in 
manifest  contradiction  with  these  aims.  The  first  thins  that  strikes  the  eye 
is  that  all  those  taking  part  in  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market  are  members 
of  the  military  NATO  grouping.  It  is  obvious  that  the  activities  of  Euratom  and 
the  Common  Market  will  be  subjugated  to  NATO  aims,  the  aggressive  character 
of  whieh  Is  widely  known. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  creation  of  Euratom  and  the  Common  Market 
would  inevitably  lead  to  a  further  widening  of  the  rift  in  Europe,  to  an 
aggravation  of  tensions  in  Europe,  which  would  complicate  the  establishment 
of  economic  and  political  cooperation  on  a  European  basis  and  give  rise  to  fresh 
difficuties  in  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  European  security. 

Ma  For  further  discussion  of  this  point,  Cf.  Klaus  E.  Knorr.  "American  Forelcn  Policy 
and  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy."  Atoms  for  rower,  United  States  Policy  in 
Atomic  Bnergy  Development  (New  York  :  The  American  Assembly,  Columbia  University, 
1957),  pp.  100   12fl  nnd  In  particular  pp.  123-127. 

1S*  Atoms  for  Power,  op.  clt,  p.  157.  _  _  .    _ 

"■U.S.  <  onfrress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enerpy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom. 
Agreements,  op.  clt.,  p.  28. 


Three  Policy  Issues  of  Euratom 

Three  issues  in  the  final  international  negotiations  for  Euratom 
further  illustrate  the  problems  that  may  arise  out  of  a  national  decision 
to  foster  application  of  a  new  technology  for  the  benefit  of  American 
diplomacy.  While  the  U.S.  role  is  not  clearly  visible  in  the  working 
out  of  these  issues,  it  seems  plausible  that  much  encouragement  and 
influence  flowed  eastward  across  the  Atlantic. 

The  three  major  issues  central  to  establishment  of  Euratom  were : 

(1)  Whether  Euratom  should  manufacture  enriched  uranium; 

(2)  Whether  member  states  should  be  precluded  from  military 
use  of  atomic  energy ;  and 

(3)  Whether  Euratom  should  have  a  monopoly  over  nuclear 
materials.  These  questions  shared  a  common  root ;  to  what  extent 
was  Euratom  to  be  an  instrument  to  achieve  economic  inde- 
pendence and  political  and  military  independence  for  Europe  ?  1S6 


Until  January  1957,  European  proponents  of  Euratom  had  pre- 
sumed that  the  new  organization  would  give  top  priority  to  building 
facilities  to  enrich  uranium.  It  seemed  clear  that  such  a  facility  would 
be  needed  to  reduce  the  dependence  of  Euratom  states  upon  nuclear  fuel 
imported  from  the  United  States.  But  this  expectation  was  dashed 
early  in  1957  when  the  Germans  proposed  that  the  plan  be  studied 
further.  Although  the  French  pressed  for  immediate  construction 
the  forces  of  delay  prevailed. 

The  issue  impinged  directly  upon  U.  S.  interests  for  at  that  time 
the  United  States  did  not  favor  foreign  production  of  enriched 
uranium.  The  thought  of  an  enriched  uranium  facility  upon  the  Con- 
tinent near  Soviet-occupied  territories  and  the  possibilities  that  nuclear 
materials  might  be  illicitly  diverted  from  such  a  plant  moved  the 
United  States  to  assure  the  Euratom  nations  of  a  supply  of  nuclear 
fuel.  Louis  Armand  let  it  be  known  that  while  he  still  favored  the 
ultimate  construction  of  an  enrichment  plant  in  Europe,  he  rejected 
it  as  an  immediate  objective  for  Euratom.187 

The  publication  of  A  Target  for  Euratom  defused  the  issue.  Noting 
that  until  recently  the  construction  of  a  plant  had  seemed  the  only 
way  to  obtain  enriched  uranium,  the  authors  noted  a  changed  condi- 
tion :  "But  there  is  now  no  doubt  that  our  countries  can  obtain  en- 
riched uranium  from  the  United  States  in  the  necessary  quantities,  and 
at  low  published  prices."  188  They  estimated  that  enriched  uranium 
produced  in  Europe  would  probably  cost  two  to  three  times  as  much. 
Furthermore,  they  anticipated  the  early  reuse  of  plutonium  produced 
as  a  byproduct  from  other  nuclear  plants,  the  use  of  natural  uranium  as 
a  fuel,  and  the  prompt  development  of  the  breeder  reactor  would 
reduce  European  needs  for  enriched  uranium.  In  the  face  of  this 
advice,  the  proposal  to  immediately  build  an  enrichment  plant  dropped 

i8e  Tije  discussion  that  follows  draws  heavily  upon  an  analysis  of  Euratom  published 
in  1964  by  Jeroslav  G.  Polach,  a  diplomat  and  later  an  economist  with  Resources  for 
the  Future.  Inc.,  who  was  interested  in  energy  and  Euratom.  Cf.  Jeroslav  G.  Polach, 
Euratom,  Its  Background,  Tssues,  and  Economic  Implications  (Dobbs  Ferry,  New  York  : 
Oceana  Publications,  Inc.,  1964),  pp.  61-66. 

187  Cf.  Le  Monde.  February  20.  1957  :  also,  Polach,  op.  cit,  p.  62. 

188  A  Target  for  Euratom,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 

96-525  O  -  T7  -  vol.    1-15 


from  sight,  not  to  reappear  for  more  than  a  decade.  So  the  United 
States  retained  its  enrichment  monopoly. 


Central  to  Atoms  for  Peace  was  the  thought  of  dissuading  nations 
from  making  atomic  weapons.  This  concept  was  evident  in  proposals 
during  negotiation  of  the  Euratom  treaty  that  the  signatories  be 
barred  from  military  use  of  nuclear  energy.  This  proposed  restriction 
generated  strong  opposition  in  France,  which  at  that  time  was  the 
only  one  of  the  six  Euratom  states  with  the  ability  to  make  weapons. 
In  July  1956  during  debate  of  the  proposed  European  nuclear  com- 
munity in  the  French  National  Assembly,  the  Gaullists,  Radicals, 
Independents,  and  some  members  of  the  Catholic  Party  solidly  op- 
posed any  limitation  to  France's  right  to  produce  and  use  atomic 
weapons.  When  it  became  clear  to  Prime  Minister  Guy  Mollet  that 
there  was  no  chance  for  Euratom  if  he  persisted  in  his  advocacy  of 
limiting  European  use  of  nuclear  energy  to  peaceful  purposes,  he 
yielded  to  legislative  pressure.  Before  the  Assembly  would  approve 
French  participation  in  preparing  the  treaties,  he  had  to  assure  it  that 
his  Government  would  satisfy  itself  that  France's  participation  in 
Euratom  would  restrict  neither  her  national  atomic  program  nor  her 
right  to  produce  and  use  atomic  weapons  for  national  security.189  Thus 
the  idea  that  Euratom  could  serve  to  prevent  nuclear  armament  in 
Europe  was  stillborn. 


A  key  issue  of  the  international  negotiations  that  culminated  in 
Euratom  was  whether  this  multinational,  regional  organization  should 
have  title  to  all  nuclear  fuels  within  the  members  states,  or  whether 
member  states  could  individually  own  these  materials.  The  negotiators 
had  before  them  the  example  of  the  United  States  which  in  the 
Atomic  Energy  Act  of  1946  took  title  to  all  nuclear  materials  in  the 
Nation  and  forbade  their  private  ownership.  The  French  representa- 
tives argued  that  a  Euratom  monopoly  was  imperative  to  ensure  non- 
discriminatory access  of  the  members  to  nuclear  supplies.  For  them 
the  principles  of  monopoly  and  of  equal  access  were  fundamental 
to  European  atomic  integration.  The  German  representatives  opposed 
such  a  monopoly  as  incompatible  with  the  German  free-market  econ- 
omy. To  settle  the  issue,  French  Prime  Minister  Mollet  called  a  con- 
ference of  the  six  nations  in  February  1957.  The  final  communique 
from  this  Paris  meeting  announced  that  ownership  of  fissionable 
materials  would  be  vested  in  Euratom,  except  for  those  held  for 
military  purposes.100 

A  Treaty  for  Euratom 

The  treaty  establishing  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community 
was  si gned  in  Rome  on  March  25, 1957. 

Its  stated  aim  was  to  contribute  to  the  raising  of  the  standard  of 
living  in  member  states  and  to  development  of  commercial  exchanges 

1SBPolach.  op.  clt.,p.  64. 

190  For  a  discussion  of  this  meeting,  cf.  Polach,  op.  clt.,  p.  66. 


with  other  countries  by  creation  of  conditions  for  the  speedy  estab- 
lisliment  and  growth  of  nuclear  industries.191 

Article  2  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  specifies  eight  functions  of  Euratom. 
These  are  to  : 

(1)  Develop  research  and  ensure  dissemination  of  technical 

(2)  Establish,  and  ensure  the  application  of  uniform  safety 

(3)  Facilitate  investment  and  ensure,  particularly  by  encourag- 
ing business  enterprise,  and  the  construction  of  the  basic  facilities 
required  for  the  developing  of  nuclear  energy  within  the  Com- 

(4)  Ensure  a  regular  and  equitable  supply  of  ores  and  nuclear 
fuels  to  all  users  in  the  Community. 

(5)  Guarantee,  by  appropriate  measures  of  control,  that  nuclear 
materials  are  not  diverted  for  purposes  other  than  those  for  which 
they  are  intended. 

(6)  Exercise  the  property  rights  conferred  upon  it  in  respect 
to  special  fissionable  materials. 

(7)  Ensure  extensive  markets  and  access  to  the  best  technical 
means  by  the  creation  of  a  common  market  for  specialized  mate- 
rials and  equipment,  by  the  free  movement  of  capital  for  nuclear 
investment,  and  by  freedom  of  employment  for  specialists  within 
the  Community. 

(8)  Establish  with  other  countries  and  with  international  orga- 
nizations any  contacts  likely  to  promote  progress  in  the  peaceful 
uses  of  nuclear  energy. 

As  finally  approved,  Euratom's  functions  did  not  include  control  of 
military  uses  of  nuclear  energy,  thus  yielding  to  the  wishes  of  the 

The  initial  members  of  Euratom  were  Belgium,  France,  the  Federal 
German  Republic,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands.  Later 
the  United  Kingdom  applied  for  entry  but  was  excluded  by  the  posi- 
tion in  1963  of  General  de  Gaulle.  Now  that  the  United  Kingdom  is 
to  become  a  member  of  the  Common  Market,  presumably  membership 
in  Euratom  will  soon  follow. 

Establishing  the  Infrastructure  for  European  Nuclear  Power 

Much  of  Euratom's  functions  had  to  do  with  establishing  the  in- 
dustrial and  regulatory  infrastructure  for  commercial  use  of  nuclear 
energy  in  Europe.  Its  research  and  development  programs  supple- 
mented those  of  France,  Italy,  and  West  Germany.  It  created  a  nuclear 
common  market  within  the  European  Economic  Community.  It  helped 
lay  the  regulatory  groundwork  of  standards  to  regulate  the  radiologi- 
cal effects  of  nuclear  power  plants.  However,  its  functions  stopped 
short  of  financing  the  construction  of  operating  nuclear  power  plants. 

wi  jn  comparison  with  the  other  two  European  communities,  Euratom  has  the  most 
limited  aim.  The  European  Economic  Community  has  the  widest,  its  objective  being  to 
promote  harmonious  development  of  economic  activities,  a  continuous  and  balanced 
expansion,  increased  stability,  accelerated  raising  of  the  living  standards,  and  closer  rela- 
tions among  the  member  states.  Compared  with  that,  the  aims  of  the  Coal  and  Steel 
Community  are  more  restrietively  associated  with  its  contribution  to  economic  expansion, 
development  of  employment  and  raising  of  living  standards. 



The  economic  uncertainties  of  nuclear  power  in  the  1950s  and  its  high 
capital  costs  in  comparison  with  conventional  fossil-fuel  power  plants 
caused  supporters  of  Euratom  to  urge  that  it  become  directly  involved 
in  financing  and  management  of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants.  The 
concept  that  Euratom  might  become  the  European  equivalent  of  a 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority,  however,  did  not  survive  in  the  Treaty 
of  Rome.  The  Treaty  limited  Euratom's  scope  to  facilitating  invest- 
ment and  ensuring  the  construction  of  basic  facilities  for  nuclear 
power.  Euratom  is  authorized  to  collect  and  analyze  investment  in- 
formation for  its  members.  But  it  has  no  authority  over  the  decisions 
of  the  national  electricity  industries  and  their  investors.  This  limita- 
tion made  it  politically  acceptable  for  the  United  States  to  work  with 
Euratom.  For  the  United  States  Government  to  have  offered  technical 
assistance  and  other  support  to  a  foreign  body  dedicated  to  state 
generation  of  electricity  probably  would  have  raised  opposition  because 
of  the  predominance  of  private  enterprise  in  the  U.S.  electric  power 
industry.  Thus,  Euratom's  role  evolved  in  the  direction  of  a  broker 
rather  than  a  prime  mover  in  the  commercial  use  of  nuclear  energy  in 


Commercial  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  needed  an  internal  market 
large  enough  to  justify  the  requisite  investment  of  economic,  human, 
and  physical  capital.  Proponents  of  Euratom  expected  it  to  create  a 
nuclear  common  market  which  would  permit  a  more  economic  alloca- 
tion of  resources,  and  the  use  of  the  most  modern  techniques  of  special- 
ization and  mass  production.  The  resulting  increase  in  productivity 
of  capital  and  labor  was  expected  to  contribute  to  higher  living  stand- 
ards, to  general  economic  growth,  and  to  facilitation  of  social  changes 
in  Europe. 

The  Treaty  of  Rome  laid  the  basis  for  such  a  market.  It  provided  for 
the  unhindered  commerce  of  certain  goods  and  the  free  movement 
of  labor,  capital,  and  services  for  nuclear  energy.  Items  to  move  with- 
out tariffs,  taxes  or  quantitative  restrictions  included  nuclear  ores, 
fissionable  materials,  radioactive  isotopes,  and  goods  peculiar  to  the 
nuclear  industry.  Likewise,  free  movement  of  labor  seeking  employ- 
ment in  the  European  nuclear  industry  was  to  be  assured  to  properly 
qualified  nationals  of  the  six  Common  Market  nations. 


The  drafters  of  Euratom  hoped  to  create  a  nuclear  industrv  which 
could  compete  against  those  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the*  United 
States  in  world  markets.  To  avoid  the  limitations  of  fragmentation 
among  many,  relatively  small  industrial  concerns,  the  Treaty  of  Rome 
provided  for  joint  enterprises  to  carry  out  "undertakings  of  outstand- 
ing importance  to  the  development* of  the  nuclear  industry  in  the 

Community ""'Joint  Enterprise  status  confers  special  advantages 

including  recognition  as  a  legal  personality,  and  exemptions  from  cer- 
tain taxes,  duties,  and  charges.  In  return,  a  Joint  Enterprise  is  re- 

»•  Article  45. 


quired  to  provide  Euratom  with  information  on  the  construction  and 
operation  of  its  facilities.  All  non-patented  information  communicated 
to  Euratom  might  be  disseminated  by  it.  Joint  Enterprise  status  might 
be  conferred  under  varying  terms,  but  could  be  annulled  when  eco- 
nomic conditions  permit.  To  date,  four  of  the  early  nuclear  power 
plant  ventures  in  Europe  have  been  designated  as  Joint  Enterprises. 
These  include  three  nuclear  powerplants  in  "West 'Germany  and  one 
joint  Franco-Belgian  project. 

Early  Changes  in  Euratom  Objectives 

What  an  international  organization  does  and  what  it  becomes  de- 
pends in  part  upon  its  foundation  in  international  law,  and  upon  the 
perception  of  its  functions.  Euratom  soon  began  to  give  less  priority 
to  the  immediate  building  of  nuclear  power  plants  than  to  its  research 
and  service  function.  Euratom's  first  three  annual  reports  reveal  this 
trend  clearly  and  suggest  that  in  many  ways  the  work  of  diplomats 
had  only  just  begun  when  the  treaty  was  completed.  The  first  annual 
report  emphasized  an  urgent  need  for  nuclear  power  in  the  Com- 
munity and  its  optimistic  outlook  for  the  economic  competitiveness 
of  this  new  energy  source.  Other  fields  of  nuclear  activity  received 
lesser  priority.  Euratom's  role  as  a  middleman,  a  broker,  was  em- 
phasized : 193 

The  Commission  is  entrusted  by  the  Euratom  Treaty  with  the  task  of  creating 
conditions  necessary  for  the  establishment  and  growth  of  nuclear  industries.  It 
stimulates  initiative  and  encourages  cooperation,  follows  the  progress  being  made 
in  various  fields,  guides  investment  and  endeavors  in  every  sphere  and  at  all 
levels  to  achieve  its  aim  of  building  up  the  independent  nuclear  industry. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Commission  sought  to  avoid  "systematic  in- 
tervention," and  "any  semblance  of  authoritarianism"  or  of  "isolation- 
ist paths." 

Euratom's  second  annual  report,  for  1959,  marked  a  shift  away  from 
immediate  application  of  nuclear  power  toward  priority  for  nuclear 
research.  While  Euratom's  nuclear  power  program  continued,  its  sense 
of  urgency  and  immediacy  was  gone.  Top  priority  was  assigned  to  es- 
tablishment of  a  Euratom  university — a  concept  that  won  no  support. 
In  its  third  annual  report,  for  1960,  the  change  in  Euratom's  goals 
was  marked  by  a  transition  from  short  to  long  term  goals.  By  then 
Euratom  was  asserting  that  a  condition  for  its  success,  and  for  that  of 
the  whole  European  integration,  was  to  overcome  traditional  attitudes 
of  governments,  civil  servants,  and  organizations.  The  Commission 
assigned  the  highest  priority  to  ".  .  .  marshalling  all  the  resources  at 
its  command  to  foster  a  European  spirit."  194  This  goal  and  the  closely 
related  proposal  for  a  Euratom  university,  became  a  recurring  theme 
in  atomic  integration  debates. 

Research  for  Nuclear  Power 

A  principal  function  of  Euratom  was  to  coordinate  nuclear  research 
among  the  six  nations.  To  this  end,  the  Treaty  directed  Euratom  to 
invite  member  states,  persons,  or  enterprises  to  inform  it  of  their  nu- 

183  European  Atomic  Energy  Community.  First  General  Report  on  the  Activities  of  the 
Community,  1958  (Brussels-Luxembourg,  1959).  p.  55. 

1B*  European  Atomic  Energy  Communitv.  Third  General  Report  on  the  Activities  of  the 
Communities,  1969  (Brussels-Luxembourg,  February  1970),  pp.  7-14. 


clear  research.  Euratom  would  advise  on  each  program  to  avoid  un- 
necessary duplication  and  guide  research  of  member  states  toward 
subjects  receiving  insufficient  attention.  However,  the  Treaty  forbade 
Euratom  to  publish  any  such  programs  without  consent. 

The  Treaty  provided  Euratom  four  means  of  influencing  the  nuclear 
research  of  its  member  states  and  their  nuclear  establishments. 
Euratom  could : 

(1)  Furnish  financial  assistance  for  research ; 

(2)  Supply  nuclear  source  materials  and  enriched  uranium  or 
plutonium  at  its  disposal ; 

(3)  Place  facilities,  equipment,  or  expert  assistance  at  the  dis- 
posal of  member  states,  persons,  or  enterprises,  either  against  pay- 
ment or  free  of  charge ;  and 

(4)  Initiate  joint  financing  by  member  states,  persons,  or  enter- 
prises concerned. 

These  features  of  the  treaty  were  intended  to  give  Euratom  some  in- 
fluence over  research  in  the  national  establishments  of  the  member 
states.  But  Euratom  was  not  authorized  to  direct  the  nuclear  research 
establishments  of  its  members  or  their  nuclear  industries.  It  could,  of 
course,  direct  the  research  and  development  done  with  its  funds  in  its 
own  establishments  or  in  other  organizations.  Equipped  with  these 
powers,  Euratom  in  principle  could  have  greatly  influenced  the  Euro- 
pean nuclear  industry.  But  because  of  dissension  among  its  members, 
these  powers  were  not  to  be  fully  exercised. 


Euratom  is  financed  by  two  budgets :  one  for  operations,  the  other 
for  research  and  investment.  Member  states  contribute  to  each.  The 
prevailing  pattern  has  been  for  France,  Germany,  and  Italy  each  to 
fund  28  percent  of  the  operating  budget,  Belgium  and  Holland  7.9 

Sercent  each,  and  Luxembourg  0.2  percent.  As  for  the  research  and 
evelopment  budget,  the  pattern  has  been  for  France  and  West  Ger- 
many to  finance  30  percent  each,  Italy  23  percent,  Belgium  9.9  per- 
cent, the  Netherlands  6.9  percent,  and  Luxembourg  0.2  percent. 

Funds  for  Euratom  research  for  the  period  1958  through  1971 
totaled  $823.4  million.  Table  IV  shows  the  breakdown  of  this  budget 
according  to  component  programs.195 


Euratom's  facilities  perform  long-term,  basic  research  remote  from 
large  scale  commercial  application  of  nuclear  power  by  industrial 
concerns.  Euratom  also  furnishes  technological  services,  scientific  and 
technical  information,  testing,  and  standardization  of  measurements. 
The  Treaty  provided  Euratom  with  its  own  in-house  research  facil- 
ities. It  specified  establishment  of  a  Joint  Research  Center,196  which 

196  "Spondins  by  Euratom,"  Nuclear  News,  vol.  14  (April,  1971),  p.  43. 
"•  Article  8  laid  down  three  conditions  for  the  Joint  Research  Center  : 

(1)  The  Center  shall  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  research  programs  and  of 
any  other  tasks  entrusted  to  it  by  Euratom. 

(2)  The  Center  shall  also  ensure  the  establishment  of  uniform  nuclear  terminology 
and  a  standard  system  of  measurements. 

(3)  The  Center  could  be  composed  of  separate  establishments  for  geographical  or 
operational  reasons. 



[In  millions  of  units  of  account  (US$)1 

1958-68'  1969  1970  1971  Totals 

Technological  research  connected  with  reactor  de- 

Fast  reactors 97.3                1.4                1.5  1.8  102.0 

High-temperature  gas  reactors 50.5                3.2                3.2  3.7  60.6 

Heavy-water  reactors 176.2                9.4                9.9  11.4  206!  9 

Proven-type  reactors 66.2 '  66  2 

Othertypes 16.3 '."" 16  3 

Technological  problems )  97  n  (             1.6                1.7  2.6)  .„',, 

Nuclear  materials J  u.v  \             2. 3                2.6  3.0)  40- l 

Reactor  physics _)  ln  R  (               .6                  .6  .7)  ,.  - 

Direct  conversion.. ]  \               .6                  .7  .8  J  14"6 

Irradiated  fuel  recycling 6.9 6.9 

Waste  processing 3.0 _ """  3!  0 

Plutonium  and  transplutonium  elements 41.3                4.0                4.5  5.1"  54.9 

Total  technological  research 495.3               23.1               24.7  28.5  571.6 

Public  service: 

Nuclear  measurements  and  standards 22.7  2.9  3.2  3.8  32.6 

Data  processing  and  computer  center 15.8  3.3  3.9  4.3  27  3 

High-flux  irradiations 40.1  3.8  4.2  4.7  52^8 

Biology  and  health  protection 20.5  3.-5  3.8  4.1  31.9 

Radioisotope  applications 4.9  .1  —(2)  —(J)  5^0 

Training 3.9  .5  .5  .6  5.5 

Dissemination  of  information 12.2  1.7  —  Q)  —(a)  13.9 

Total,  public  service 

Oriented  basic  research : 

Fusion  and  plasma  physics 

Condensed  state  physics 

Total,  oriented  basic  research 








6.   4 




64  5 








Grand  total 671.4  47.0  49.0  56.0  823.4 

'  Two  5-year  programs. 

J  As  from  1970  the  appropriations  for  the  radioisotope  applications  program  and  the  dissemination  of  information 
program  are  not  included  in  the  research  budget. 

Source:  Nuclear  News,  vol.  14  (April  1971),  p.  43. 

•was  brought  into  instant  existence  by  transfer  of  laboratories  from 
four  of  the  member  states.197 

Dissension,  Crisis,  and  Delay  in  Euratom's  Programs 

Early  hopes  that  Euratom  would  become  the  prime  mover  for  a 
coherent,  integrated  European  approach  to  development  of  nuclear 
power  technology  were  dashed  by  dissension,  crisis,  and  delay.  Eura- 
tom's  research  and  development  has  been  threatened  with  disruption 
and  in  the  eyes  of  some  observers  has  been  weak  and  fragmented.  The 
rivalry  between  Euratom  and  national  nuclear  technology  programs 
appeared  at  an  early  stage  and  has  since  afflicted  Euratom's  program. 
Member  states  seem  to  have  acted  on  the  principle  that  a  national 
nuclear  development  effort  must  necessarily  precede  or  accompany 

197  The  Ispra  center. — The  first  and  largest  of  the  Euratom  research  centers  Is  that  at 
Ispra,  Italy.  Begun  as  an  Italian  nuclear  research  establishment  in  1959,  it  was  transferred 
to  Euratom  in  March  1961  under  a  99  year  arrangement.  Much  of  Euratom's  nuclear  tech- 
nology work  has  been  done  here.  Ispra  also  contains  a  scientific  data  processing  center  that 
performs  computer  calculations  for  the  European  community. 

The  Petten  center. — The  Petten  Nuclear  Research  Establishment  is  located  adjacent  to 
Holland's  Reactor  Centrum  Nederland  at  Petten,  on  the  North  Sea  some  36  miles  north  of 
Amsterdam.  Work  at  Petten  focuses  on  nuclear  measurements.  Ai  large  materials-testing 
reactor  that  was  built  by  the  Dutch  Government  was  transferred  to  Euratom  in  1962. 

The  Gecl  center. — A  Central  Office  for  Nuclear  Measurements  for  Euratom  Is  located 
close  to  the  Belgian  National  Nuclear  Research  Center  at  Mol,  north  of  Brussels  and  near 
the  Dutch  border. 

The  Karlsruhe  center. — A  European  Institute  for  Transuranic  Elements  is  located  adja- 
cent to  West  Germany's  Karlsruhe  Nuclear  Center.  It  is  concerned  primarily  with  research 
on  plutonium. 


multinational  technological  cooperation  in  Europe.  They  were  unwill- 
ing to  subordinate  national  development  in  a  community-wide  effort. 
Rene  Foche,  an  international  civil  servant,  describes  this  principle  as 
false  because  it  implies  that  every  European  state  has  an  equal  right 
to  develop  every  form  of  advanced  technology  within  its  own  borders, 
which  is  the  antithesis  of  the  concept  of  regional  specialization  charac- 
teristic of  a  true  common  market.198 

The  experience  of  Euratom  illustrates  a  diplomatic  reality.  The  po- 
litical cohesion  of  members  in  an  international  technological  under- 
taking is  a  prerequisite  for  success,  not  a  desirable  byproduct  from  it. 
The  troubles  of  Euratom's  research  and  development  programs  show 
also  that  the  cohesive  force  of  internationalism  in  science  was  not 
strong  enough  to  withstand  the  divisive  forces  of  national  commercial 

A  tenet  of  modern  management,  private  or  public,  is  that  an  organ- 
ization must  plan  ahead,  particularly  organizations  that  seek  to  create 
and  apply  new  technologies.  The  Treaty  of  Rome  recognized  this 
principle  by  providing  for  five-year  research  programs.  The  first 
five-year  plan  (1958-1962),  concentrated  upon  organizing  Euratom's 
research,  particularly  at  its  Joint  Research  Center.  The  second  five-year 
plan  (1963-1967)  was  soon  wracked  by  dissension  and  budget  troubles. 
The  third  five-year  plan  (1968-1972)  was  not  authorized  and  Eura- 
tom's research  is  now  funded  annually. 

THE   FIRST    5-YEAR   PLAN    (1958-1962) 

Research  programs  for  the  first  5-year  plan  were  specified  in 
detail  in  an  annex  to  the  treaty.  It  was  devoted  mainly  to  equipping 
the  establishments  of  the  Joint  Research  Center  and  to  organizing 
contract,  research.  For  the  first  5-year  plan  $215  million  was  al- 
located. This  amount  proved  to  be  more  than  enough  because  of  a 
slow  start  and  there  was  a  surplus  in  1962  to  carry  forward.  "While  the 
$215  million  spent  for  the  first  5-year  plan  was  a  considerable 
sum,  it  corresponded  approximately  to  the  amount  spent  on  nuclear 
research  in  one  year  by  the  United  Kingdom. 

Even  the  first  5-year  plan  suffered  from  dissent  arising  out  of 
divergent  national  approaches  to  nuclear  power  technology.  The 
French  argued  that  Euratom  research  should  focus  upon  reactors 
using  natural  uranium  as  a  fuel,  thus  reducing  European  dependence 
upon  imported  enriched  fuels,  while  the  Italians  preferred  research 
on  uses  of  enriched  fuels. 

THE   SECOND    5-YEAR   PLAN    (1903-1967) 

The  second  5-year  plan  started  off  ambitiously,  with  the  Euratom 
Council  unanimously  approving  a  budget  of  almost  $450  million.  In 
1965  an  additional  $5.6  million  was  allocated.  But  the  plan  soon  was 
in  difliculty.  As  interests  of  the  member  states  continued  to  diverge, 
they  jockeyed  for  the  advantage  of  having  Euratom  develop  the 
particular  nuclear  power  technology  they  favored.  Inflation  also 
became  a  strain  and  increased  the  costs  of  research,  particularly  at 

1    Foche,  op.  cit.,  p.  24. 


Ispra  in  Italy  where  about  one-third  of  Euratonrs  own  research  was 

The  French  continued  to  criticize  Euratom's  research.  They  opposed 
research  on  the  enriched  fuel  technology  favored  in  the  United  States, 
arguing  that  there  was  little  future  for  expansion  of  the  European 
nuclear  industry  if  its  power  plants  would  have  to  depend  upon  the 
United  States  for  fuel.  As  an  alternative,  France  offered  to  put  infor- 
mation and  experience  of  its  own  nuclear  power  technology  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Community.  This  was  the  first  time  such  as  offer  had 
been  made,  and  some  observers  questioned  whether  it  was  seriously 

The  issue  of  which  reactor  technology  to  choose  became  so  con- 
troversial that  it  went  to  the  Euratom  Council  for  decision  when 
Euratom  requested  a  $38  million  increase  in  funding  to  carry  out  the 
plan.  The  French  and  Belgians  lined  up  in  favor  of  a  few  projects  that 
would  concentrate  on  natural  uranium  reactors,  breeder  reactors,  and 
fusion.  Other  members  agreed  that  this  concentration  would  be  help- 
ful, but  not  at  the  expense  of  a  major  revision  of  the  ongoing  Euratom 
research.  In  a  final  compromise,  the  Council  allocated  an  additional 
$5.6  million  for  the  five-year  plan.  Research  for  "proven-type"  reactors, 
a  term  which  meant  the  U.S. -type  reactors,  was  cut  20  percent. 


Although  Euratom's  third  5-year  plan  for  research  was  scheduled 
to  start  in  1968,  by  September  1967  the  dissension  had  become  so  great 
that  Euratom  abandoned  hope  for  agreement.  Instead,  Fritz  Hellwig, 
the  Common  Market  commissioner  responsible  for  Euratom  research, 
proposed  a  one  year  "transitional  program,"  which  was  adopted  as  a 
stopgap  measure,  but  funded  at  half  the  1967  level.  As  Euratom  en- 
tered 1968  it  faced  this  severe  cut  in  research  funds,  aimed  particularly 
at  contract  research,  as  well  as  isolation  from  the  mainstream  of  nu- 
clear development  in  Europe.  The  national  nuclear  industries  did  not 
want  Euratom  working  on  technology  that  was  ripe  for  commercial 
application.  That  year  saw  repeated  debates  about  Euratom  in  the 
EEC  Council,  as  representatives  of  the  major  members  questioned  the 
practicability  of  a  true  nuclear  energy  community.  More  specifically, 
they  asked  what  kind  of  research  Euratom  should  sponsor  to  win 
support  of  member  states.  Could  Euratom  be  an  effective  future  force 
for  building  an  integrated  European  nuclear  energy  industry?  No 
clear  answers  emerged  and  the  decision  on  the  future  of  Euratom  re- 
search was  tabled.200 

The  delay  and  dissension  led  Commissioner  Hellwig  to  warn  Eura- 
tom that  its  members  either  had  to  work  out  a  joint,  long-range  pro- 
gram of  research  or  forfeit  all  hope  of  getting  into  the  nuclear  power 
race.  He  warned  too  that  prolongation  of  the  Euratom  budget  crisis 
would  jeopardize  plans  for  a  Common  Market  research  policy.201 

The  crisis  went  to  the  European  Parliament.  By  unanimous  resolu- 
tion it  observed  that  the  European  nuclear  community  needed  common 

1OT  Michael  Palmer,  John  Lambert  and  others.  A  Handbook  of  European  Organizations 
(New  York  :  Frederick  A.  Praeger,  19GS).  p.  305. 

200  Nuclear  Industry,  vol.  15  (January,  196S),  p.  20. 

201  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  9 (October  24,  196S) ,  p.  8. 


policies  for  research  and  technological  progress ;  that  it  did  not  have 
them ;  and  that  this  lack  would  condemn  Western  Europe  to  a  per- 
manent economic  and  political  inferiority  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of  the 
world.  In  a  parallel  policy  paper,  the  EEC  Commission  warned  that 
if  member  states  could  not  find  a  way  to  advance  together,  they  would 
give  up  the  hope  of  making  a  good  showing  in  the  race  for  the  nuclear. 

Through  1970  the  future  of  Euratom's  research  remained  uncertain. 
A  restructuring  which  could  have  been  affected  by  a  simple  majority 
vote  in  the  EEC  Council  was  nullified  when  the  French  objected.203 
The  situation  was  no  better  in  1971  when  initially  the  European  Par- 
liament refused  to  approve  Euratom's  draft  research  and  investment 
budget  because  it  was  likely  to  prolong  stagnation  and  absence  of 


Another  example  of  Euratom's  difficulties  in  carrying  out  a  multi- 
national program  of  nuclear  research  was  triggered  by  a  domestic 
decision  of  the  United  States.  Euratom's  early  research  emphasized 
the  breeder  reactor,  and  was  concentrated  in  France  and  West  Ger- 
many. For  the  experimental  work  to  go  forward,  plutonium  was 
needed.  Euratom  had  planned  to  borrow  this  material  from  the  United 
States  and  so  had  budgeted  only  for  use-charges.  When,  in  1967,  the 
United  States  decided  as  a  matter  of  policy  to  sell  rather  than  loan 
the  plutonium  to  Euratom,  the  price  was  set  at  $8  million.  This  cost 
caused  a  financial  crisis  in  Euratom,  which  asked  France  to  provide 
40  percent  of  the  U.S.  sales  price.  France  refused,  saying  that  it  was 
up  to  Euratom  to  supply  the  material.  Euratom  capitulated  and  ulti- 
mately took  the  funds  from  other  parts  of  its  budget.  Italy  then 
complained  that  France  was  monopolizing  the  most  commercially 
promising  work  while  the  other  partners  shared  only  in  the  costs.205 

The  Supply  and  Control  of  Nuclear  Materials 

Two  institutional  prerequisites  of  nuclear  power — supply  and  con- 
trol of  nuclear  fuel  materials — were  the  basis  for  granting  suprana- 
tional authority  to  Euratom.  The  Treaty  of  Rome  specified  Euratom's 
ownership  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  used  for  peaceful  purposes,  and 
vested  in  Euratom  supranational  rights  of  inspection  for  safeguards. 

The  supply  function  has  not  grown  as  originally  expected.  The  safe- 
guards function,  in  contrast,  has  been  performed  effectively  and  has 
demonstrated  the  practicability  of  international  inspection.  It  remains 
to  be  seen  what  will  happen  to  Euratom's  safeguards  function  with  the 
advent  of  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty  and  its  emphasis  on  the  safe- 
guards function  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency. 

203  "Call  to  Preserve  Euratom,"   Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.    14    (January, 

1  y  oH ) ,  p.  8. 

,J^"F'"r;ltom  I)lHP"te  Drags  On,"  Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.  15  (December 
1970) .  p.  064. 

sot  "Euratom  Budget  Blow,"  Nuclear  Engineering  International,  vol.  16  (Januarv/ 
February,  1971),  p.  8. 

at  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  event,  see  Daniel  Greenberg.  "Euratom  :  Atomic 
Agency  Foundering  Amidst  Squabbles  of  Its  Partners,"  Science,  vol.  163  (February  7,  1969), 



The  Treaty  of  Rome  gave  Euratom  exclusive  right  of  ownership  to 
enriched  uranium  and  plutonium  within  the  Community,  except  for 
materials  for  military  purposes,  and  also  gave  Euratom  a  first  option 
to  buy  ores  and  unprocessed  nuclear  fuel  materials.  Euratom's  exclu- 
sive ownership  extends  to  all  nuclear  fuel  materials  whether  produced 
in  the  Community  or  imported  into  it,  except  for  weapons  materials.206 
Under  the  Treaty,  Euratom  has  authority  to:  (1)  exercise  security 
control  over  the  use  of  nuclear  fuel  materials;  (2)  direct  the  appropri- 
ate storage  of  such  materials;  and  (3)  forbid  their  export  whenever 
contrary  to  Community  interests. 


If  nuclear  power  was  to  become  a  commercial  reality  in  Europe  and 
to  attain  the  goals  in  A  Target  for  Euratom,  there  had  to  be  reliable 
arrangements  for  supply  of  nuclear  fuel  materials.  To  this  end  the 
Treaty  authorized  creation  of  an  autonomous  Euratom  Supply  Agency 
under  the  control  and  direction  of  the  Euratom  Commission.207  Estab- 
lished on  June  1,  1960,  the  Supply  Agency's  primary  function  is  to  as- 
sure equal  access  to  nuclear  fuel  for  all  users  within  the  Community. 
The  Agency  is  headed  by  a  director  general  appointed  by  Euratom. 
With  an  initial  capital  investment  of  $2.4  million,  the  Agency  operates 
on  commercial  principles  as  a  public  utility.  It  has  a  right  of  option  to 
buy  all  ores  and  manufactured  fuel  materials  produced  in  the  Com- 
munity and  an  exclusive  right  to  contract  for  the  supply  of  nuclear  fuel 
materials,  whether  originating  in  the  Community  or  imported.  Prices 
for  its  products  are  expected  to  reflect  normal  supply  and  demand, 
although  the  Commission  can  propose  price  fixing  with  EEC  approval. 
Discriminatory  pricing  is  forbidden  within  the  Community.  The 
Agency  also  maintains  records  and  accounts  of  nuclear  fuel  materials 
used  or  transferred  within  the  Community. 

The  potentially  powerful  supply  functions  of  the  agency  have  not 
been  fully  exercised.  Contributing  factors  include  the  glut  of  uranium 
upon  the  world  market  of  the  1960's,  France's  independent  manufac- 
ture of  enriched  uranium  for  its  nuclear  weapons,  and  the  failure  to 
build  Euratom  facilities  to  produce  enriched  uranium.  The  effect  of 
these  factors  was  to  confine  the  Supply  Agency  to  a  middleman  func- 
tion of  negotiating  arrangements  with  non-Community  countries  to 
supply  nuclear  fuel  materials. 


Early  expectations  that  Euratom  would  build  and  operate  its  own 
enrichment  plant  to  supply  part  of  the  nuclear  fuel  for  Europe  were 
disappointing.  U.S.  policy,  which  was  to  discourage  this  venture,  ap- 
parently was  influential  at  first.  However,  by  the  later  1960s  the  Com- 
munity was  restive  over  its  dependence  upon  the  United  States  as  a 

206  Articles  84  and  86.  But  a  dispute  between  France  and  Euratom,  infra,  indicates  inter- 
pretation of  these  articles  is  not  without  ambiguity. 

207  Articles  54-76. 


sole  source  of  supply.  For  example,  the  EEC  in  its  report  for  1969,  ob- 
served that  the  setting  up  of  a  uranium  enrichment  facility  in  the 
Community  before  1980  would  help  to  achieve  an  aim  of  the  EEC, 
namely,  to  assure  secure  supplies  of  enriched  uranium  at  stable  prices.208 
But  reaching  a  policy  decision  to  build  an  enrichment  plant  was  not 
easy  for  Euratom.  The  plant  would  require  a  large  capital  investment, 
and  a  large  supply  of  electricity,  and  might  be  uneconomical  to  operate 
without  subsidy  should  the  United  States  decide  to  cut  its  prices  for 
enriching  services.  Complicating  the  decision  for  Euratom  also  were 
the  uncertain  estimates  for  future  use  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe. 
Forecasts  of  expansion  in  nuclear  capacity  ranged  from  10,000  mega- 
watts in  1970 — including  the  nuclear  power  plants  of  the  United  King- 
dom— to  100,000  megawatts  by  1980,  and  to  perhaps  twice  this  by 
1985,209  but  these  estimates  were  so  qualified  as  to  provide  a  shaky  basis 
for  raising  the  necessary  capital. 


The  monopoly  of  the  Supply  Agency  was  challenged  by  the  French 
and  Italian  Governments.  In  1965  the  Euratom  Commission  decided  to 
revise  the  charter  of  the  Supply  Agency.  A  now  text  Avas  submitted  to 
the  Euratom  Council  and  to  the  European  Parliament.  But  the  Coun- 
cil failed  to  agree  and  the  revision  was  shelved.  Five  of  Euratom's 
member  states  regarded  the  previous  Supply  Agency's  statute  as 
remaining  in  force,  but  France  did  not.  Thereafter  the  French  Govern- 
ment entered  into  bilateral  transactions  with  other  countries  and  sup- 
plied nuclear  fuel  materials  directly  to  them  as  later  did  Italy,  in  seem- 
ing violation  of  the  Supply  Agency's  charter. 

The  EEC  Commission  in  October  1970  attempted  to  reassert  the  con- 
trol of  the  Supply  Agency.  Reportedly,  it  sent  an  ultimatum  to  France 
to  respect  the  fuel  supply  provisions  of  the  Treaty.  Barring  compli- 
ance, the  Commission  would  bring  the  alleged  violations  before  the 
EEC  Court  of  Justice.  The  French  countered  with  a  proposal  to  end 
the  Agency's  control  over  nuclear  fuel  arrangements  except  in  time  of 
nuclear  fuel  scarcity.  France  was  said  to  have  West  German  support 
for  its  position  that  EEC  member  states  be  permitted  to  contract  inde- 
pendently for  their  own  nuclear  fuel  supplies.210 

1 1  ere  again  is  an  example  of  the  divisive  forces  of  nationalism. 


For  nuclear  power  to  help  resolve  Europe's  energy  problems  with- 
out, unacceptably  increasing  (lie  risk  of  proliferation  of  nuclear 
weapons,  there  had  to  be  credible  assurance  that  diversion  of  nuclear 
fuel  materials  would  be  promptly  detected.  In  assigning  a  safeguards 
functions  to  Euratom,  the  Treaty  of  Rome  made  a  notable  innovation 

*»  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  Third  General  Report  on  the  Activities  of  the 
Communities,  1969,  op.  pit.,  p.  253. 

**  Uranium  Resources,  Production  and  Demand.  A  joint  report  by  the  European  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Ajrency  (Paris:  Organization  for 
Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  September  1970) .  p.  43. 

"o  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  11  (October  29,  1970),  p.  6.  The  EEC  Commission's  ultimatum 
followed  a  scries  of  alleged  violations  by  France  which  Included  loan  of  uranium  to  the 
Italian  government,  cut-rate  purchase  of  plutonlum  from  Canada,  and  failure  to  report 
uranium  prospecting  and  marketing  plans. 


in  international  relations.  By  the  Treaty,  the  Common  Market  nations 
yielded  some  of  their  sovereignty  to  this  multi-national,  regional  orga- 
nization, and  granted  to  Euratom  supranational  rights  of  inspection 
and  independent  verification  of  holdings  of  nuclear  fuel  materials. 

The  Treaty  provided  that  the  Euratom  Commission — now  the  EEC 
Commission — shall  satisfy  itself  that  in  the  territories  of  the  member 
states : 

(a)  ores,  source  materials,  and  special  fissionable  materials  are 
not  diverted  from  their  intended  uses  as  stated  by  the  users; 

(b)  the  provisions  concerning  supplies  and  any  special  under- 
taking concerning  measures  of  control  entered  into  by  the  Com- 
munity in  an  agreement  concluded  with  a  third  country  or  an 
international  organization  are  observed. 

This  provision  was  to  cause  some  difficulty  for  the  United  States,  which 
would  have  preferred  to  send  its  own  inspectors  into  the  Euratom 
member  states  rather  than  rely  upon  Euratom's  inspectors. 

Considering  that  safeguarding  of  nuclear  materials  was  also  to  be 
a  function  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency,  it  woidd  have 
been  logical  when  establishing  Euratom  to  put  this  function  within 
the  IAEA.  However,  at  that  time  the  Soviet  Union  opposed  the 
creation  of  Euratom  and  had  used  its  influence  within  the  IAEA  to 
prevent  any  cooperative  relation  between  the  two  agencies.  Thus,  the 
negotiators  had  no  choice  but  to  equip  Euratom  with  its  own  safe- 
guards function. 

The  Treaty  provided  Euratom  with  plenary  authority  to  carry  out 
safeguards.  Any  organization  setting  up  or  using  facilities  for  the 
production,  separation,  or  use  of  nuclear  materials,  or  for  the  process- 
ing of  used  nuclear  fuels,  first  has  to  declare  to  Euratom  the  technical 
details  of  such  facilities  to  the  extent  necessary  for  safeguards.  Proce- 
dures for  the  processing  of  used  fuels  are  also  subject  to  Euratom 
approval.  Records  are  to  be  kept  to  account  for  nuclear  materials  re- 
ceived, used,  produced,  or  sent  out.  In  addition,  Euratom  requires  that 
any  excess  inventory  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  be  deposited  with  it,  or 
in  a  storage  place  controlled  by  it. 

A  vital  innovation  of  the  Treaty  is  the  right  accorded  Euratom  to 
send  its  inspectors  into  the  territories  of  member  states  to  verify  the 
accuracy  of  information  reported  to  it.  On  presentation  of  their  creden- 
tials, these  inspectors  are  to  have  access  at  all  times  to  all  places  and 
data  and  to  any  person  to  the  extent  necessary  to  "control  ores,  source 
materials,  and  special  fissionable  materials  and  to  satisfy  themselves 
concerning  the  observation  of  safeguards."  Inspectors  of  Euratom  are' 
to  be  accompanied  by  representatives  of  the  state  concerned,  if  that 
state  so  requests. 

Should  a  Euratom  inspector  be  denied  access,  the  matter  would  go 
to  the  EEC  Commission  which  could  apply  to  the  EEC  Court  of 
Justice  for  a  warrant  to  enforce  the  carrying  out  of  the  inspection. 
If  there  is  danger  in  delay,  the  Treaty  authorizes  Euratom  itself  to 
issue  a  written  order  that  the  inspection  be  carried  out.  After  serving 
of  such  a  warrant  or  decision,  the  national  authorities  of  the  state 
concerned  are  expected  ".  .  .  to  ensure  access  by  the  inspectors  to  the 
places  named  in  the  warrant  or  decision."  This  power  of  Euratom  has 
yet  to  be  tested  in  practice. 


Should  a  member  state  resist  inspection,  Euratom  is  authorized  to 
impose  sanctions.  In  order  of  severity,  possible  penalties  include : 

(1)  a  warning; 

(2)  withdrawal  of  special  advantages,  such  as  financial  or  tech- 
nical assistance; 

(3)  placing  the  enterprise  under  the  administration  of  a  person 
or  board  appointed  jointly  by  the  Commission  and  the  state  hav- 
ing jurisdiction  over  the  enterprise;  and 

(4)  complete  or  partial  withdrawal  of  nuclear  fuel  materials. 
Tadate,  no  penalties  have  been  imposed,  no  discrepancies  have  been 

detected,  and  member  governments  have  cooperated  with  inspections. 


Once  Euratom  was  established,  the  United  States  negotiated  a 
bilateral  agreement  with  it.  One  issue  was  safeguards.  The  United 
States  wanted  a  direct  voice  in  the  application  of  safeguards 
to  U.S.-supplied  materials,  including  the  right  of  inspection  by  U.S. 
inspectors.  Euratom  would  not  agree.  Ultimately  the  United  States 
and  Euratom  compromised  as  the  United  States  agreed  to  rely  upon 
Euratom's  system  and  inspectors,  but  with  the  right  to  audit  com- 
pliance with  standards  set  out  in  the  agreement.  Congressional  sen- 
sitivity on  this  compromise  is  suggested  by  the  following  exchange 
between  Senator  Anderson  of  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
and  AEC  Commissioner-John  Floberg  in  1958 : 211 

Senator  Anderson :  Mr.  Floberg,  does  the  language  of  the  agreement  as  you 
see  it  give  this  government  the  right  to  inspect  facilities  erected  by  Euratom? 

Mr.  Floberg:  I  don't  know  if  I  have  your  question  completely  in  mind,  Sen- 
ator, but  the  agreement  and  the  exchange  of  letters  explaining  the  agreement 
seem  to  give  us  the  right  to  audit,  for  want,  of  a  better  word,  the  compliance  with 
the  standards  set  forth  in  the  agreement. 

Senator  Anderson :  You  used  the  term  "audit" ;  do  you  think  it  gives  us  a  right 
to  look  at  the  books? 

Mr.  Floberg :  It  certainly  does,  and  it  gives  us  the  right  to  weigh,  assay,  and 
count  and  otherwise  verify.  I  apologize  for  that  word  "audit."  It  is  not.  a  very 
good  one.  But  I  think  it  is  comprehensive  enough  if  you  don't  take  it  too  literally. 

Euratom  and.  Nuclear  Safety 

The  generation  of  nuclear  power,  reprocessing  of  used  nuclear  fuels, 
and  perpetual  storage  of  radioactive  wastes  from  these  fuels  are  in- 
herently dangerous  activities.  This  fact  caused  the  negotiators  of  the 
Treaty  of  Rome  to  vest  another  supranational  power  in  Euratom : 
to  set  basic  standards  for  the  protection  of  workers  and  the  general 
public  from  these  hazards  of  nuclear  power.212  Signatories  of  the 
Treaty  committed  themselves  to  enact  national  legislation  to  ensure 
compliance  with  the  basic  standards  determined  by  Euratom  and  to 
take  necessary  measures  with  regard  to  instruction,  education,  and 
professional  training  for  radiological  health  hazards.  Member  states 
in  whose  territories  nuclear  experiments  of  a  particularly  dangerous 
nature  may  take  place  are  committed  to  take  additional  health  pre- 
cautions with  Euratom's  advice.  Consenting  opinion  of  Euratom  is 

111  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreements,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Seas.,  1958,  p.  200. 

n»  Articles  80-83.  The  term  "basic  standards"  Is  defined  In  the  Treaty  to  mean:  (a) 
the  maximum  radiation  doses  compntlhle  with  adequate  safety  :  (b)  the  maximum  permis- 
sible decree  of  exposure  and  contamination  ;  and  (c)  the  fundamental  principles  governing 
the  medical  supervision  of  workers. 


required  also  when  such  experiments  are  likely  to  affect  the  territories 
of  other  member  states. 

As  for  the  disposal  of  radioactive  wastes,  each  signatory  is  obligated 
to  submit  to  Euratom  "such  general  data  concerning  any  plan  for  the 
disposal  of  any  kind  of  radioactive  waste  as  will  enable  the  Commission 
to  determine  whether  the  implementation  of  such  plan  is  likely  to 
involve  radioactive  contamination  of  the  water,  soil  or  airspace  of 
such  member  states."  213 

Euratom  has  used  its  authority  to : 214 

(1)  establish  regulations  providing  for  uniform  safety  radia- 
tion standards  throughout  the  Community ; 

(2)  standardize  and  coordinate  methods  for  the  measurement 
and  control  of  environmental  radioactivity ; 

(3)  review  plans  for  reactor  installations  and  their  radioactive 
waste  disposal  systems ;  and 

(4)  study  the  movement  of  radioactive  substances  in  the  en- 
vironment and  safety  aspects  of  nuclear  marine  propulsion. 

Euratom  and  Environmental  Effects  of  Nuclear  Power 

The  Treaty  of  Rome  is  silent  on  the  issue  of  environmental  protec- 
tion, a  matter  of  growing  U.S.  and  European  concern  since  the  late 
1960s.  Euratom  has  no  statutory  functions  of  ascertaining  and  con- 
trolling the  environmental  effects  of  nuclear  power  and  fuel  reprocess- 
ing plants.  Should  the  public  in  Europe  show  the  same  interest  and 
concern  in  environmental  quality  as  has  been  shown  in  the  United 
States,  there  could  be  proposals  to  extend  Euratom's  authorkv^  accord- 
ingly. Such  a  development  could  pose  a  troublesome  issue  for  U.S. 
foreign  policy.  Recognition  of  Euratom's  authority  as  an  international 
body  to  examine  and  approve  design,  construction  and  operation  of 
nuclear  power  plants  within  its  member  states  could  set  a  precedent 
for  international  control  that  might  be  embarassing  were  continental 
neighbors  of  the  United  States  to  seek  such  review  of  U.S.  nuclear 
plants  built  near  their  common  borders  with  this  country.  For  example, 
it  could  point  the  way  for  continental  neighbors  of  the  United  States 
to  request  some  voice  in  the  siting,  design,  construction,  and  operation 
of  domestic  nuclear  power  plants  near  U.S.  national  boundaries  or  on 
rivers  and  bodies  of  water  shared  with  neighboring  countries.  Con- 
ceding such  a  voice  to  neighbor  states  would  mark  a  shift  in  U.S. 
foreign  policy,  a  shift  likely  to  be  opposed  by  those  who  attach  great 
importance  to  preserving  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  United  States. 

Duplication  and  Dilution  of  Effort 

Euratom,  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  of  the  OECD  (see  section 
IX),  and  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  overlap  in  many 
of  their  interests  and  activities.  The  Common  Market  nations  and  Eura- 
tom itself  are  members  of  the  OECD's  Nuclear  Energy  Agency.  Com- 
ing into  existence  in  1958  one  month  after  Euratom,  the  NEA  was 
organized  to  promote  international  nuclear  cooperation  rather  than 
supranational  nuclear  integration.  The  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  was 
supported  by  the  British  as  a  counter-project  to  make  atomic  integra- 
tion of  the  Six  less  attractive.  It  is  interesting,  in  this  context,  that  the 
first  European  plant  for  chemical  reprocessing  of  used  nuclear  fuels 

213  \rticle  37. 

214  Compilation  of  National  and  International  Standards.  Oak  Ridge,  Tenn. :  Oak  Ridge 
National  Laboratory,  Nuclear  Safety  Information  Center,  Report  No.  ORNL-NSIC-78, 
(October,  1970),  t>.  44. 


was  put  into  operation  by  NEA  and  not  by  Euratom,  despite  the  fact 
that  the  plant  was  built  at  Mol,  Belgium,  within  a  Euratom  state  to 
process  fuel  from  Euratom  projects.215 

Duplication  in  nuclear  activities  between  the  NEA  and  Euratom 
extends  to  many  areas  including  safety  regulations,  research,  rules  for 
third  party  liability,  and  maritime  nuclear  propulsion.  In  maritime 
nuclear  propulsion,  however,  NEA  was  not  successful  and  in  1962 
abandoned  that  field  to  Euratom.  On  the  other  hand,  NEA  became 
a  useful  direct  channel  of  communication  between  Euratom  and  other 
European  countries,  particularly  the  United  Kingdom.  The  NEA's 
international  joint  undertakings,  the  Halden  and  Dragon  projects, 
provided  Euratom  with  its  first  opportunities  for  nuclear  research. 

It  would  appear  that  Euratom's  usefulness  is  handicapped  by  the 
dispersion  of  its  member  states'  human  and  financial  resources  between 
its  own  programs  and  those  of  the  NEA  and  the  IAEA. 

Proposals  for  New  Research  Functions  for  Euratom 

As  nuclear  energy  in  Europe  has  moved  more  into  the  industrial 
sector  for  the  design  and  manufacture  of  nuclear  powerplants  and 
nuclear  fuel,  the  laboratories  of  Euratom  have  had  less  demand  for 
their  services.  Instead,  the  final  stages  of  development  of  competitive 
nuclear  power  technologies  have  occurred  in  the  laboratories  of  indus- 
trial firms  behind  barriers  of  trade  secrecy.  What  then  will  become 
of  Euratom's  laboratories  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  still  evolving, 
and  can  have  significance  for  American  diplomacy.  For  example,  a 
successful  redeployment  of  Euratom's  scientific  and  technical  assets  to 
resolve  the  problems  of  energy  supply  and  conservation  might  not 
only  reduce  Europe's  dependence  upon  uncertain  energy  imports,  but 
also  bring  European  manufacturers  into  a  world  market  which  the 
United  States  hopes  to  dominate.  Additionally,  the  success  or  failure 
of  efforts  to  redeploy  Euratom's  laboratories  may  provide  useful  in- 
sights for  the  United  States  in  dealing  with  its  own  problems  of  recon- 
version of  technological  personnel  and  facilities  from  aerospace  and 
defense  to  other  civil  functions.  One  function  for  American  diplomacy 
will  be  to  obtain  current  information  on  these  evolutionary  features  of 
Euratom  for  the  benefit  of  U.S.  policy  makers. 


An  early  proposal  that  Euratom  extend  the  scope  of  its  technologi- 
cal activities  into  non-nuclear  fields  is  to  be  found  in  the  1950  report 
of  Robert  McKinney  to  the  Joint.  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv.  Not- 
ing how  Europe's  need  for  nuclear  power  had  by  then  receded,  he 
questioned  whether  nuclear  power  for  the  sake  of  technological  pres- 
tige carried  as  much  weight  in  the  post-Sputnik  era  as  it  had  previ- 
ously. Tailing  attention  to  a  wide  and  growing  scientific  and  tech- 
nological disparity  between  Western  Europe  and  the  United  States, 
he  speculated  as  to  what  European  scientists  could  accomplish  within 
a  more  broadly  based  scientific  community.  A  new  course  of  action 
for  Euratom  might  be  to  emphasize  collective  creation  of  new  sci- 

*™  Folneh,  op.  clt,  p.  130. 


entific  and  technological  resources  by  a  regional  integration  of  the 
European  scientific  and  technological  community.216 

To  this  end,  Euratom  could  be  reconstituted  into  a  European  Sci- 
entific and  Technical  Community.  Its  laboratories  would  then  be 
open  to  all  of  the  nations  of  the  Atlantic  Alliance.  Their  function 
would  be  to  advance  science  and  technology  upon  a  broad  front.  Ac- 
cording to  McKinney,  the  United  States  should  continue  to  give  as- 
sistance including  the  funding  of  non-nuclear  research.  Although  the 
McKinney  report  produced  no  immediate  movement  in  this  direc- 
tion, it  foreshadowed  the  future  emergence  of  this  issue. 


The  idea  of  opening  Euratom's  facilities  to  non-nuclear  research 
was  revived  in  1967  when  a  resolution  of  the  EEC  Council  laid  down 
the  guideline  that  wherever  legally  possible  Euratom  research  might 
also  encompass  non-nuclear  activities.  Two  years  later,  in  December 
1969,  the  Council  elected  to  permit  use  of  the  Joint  Research  Center 
facilities  for  non-nuclear  work.217  In  this  action  the  Council  recog- 
nized that  as  nuclear  energy  moved  toward  commercial  application,  the 
research  was  shifting  from  public  institutions  to  laboratories  of  pri- 
vate nuclear  industries.  Thus  Euratom  came  face  to  face  with  the  is- 
sues of  conversion  that  were  soon  to  plague  the  Government  and  pri- 
vate laboratories  of  the  U.S.  aerospace  and  defense  industries. 

More  recently,  in  November  1970,  the  EEC  Commission  proposed 
a  transformation  of  Euratom's  research  capabilities  into  a  Research 
and  Development  Agency  for  the  Common  Market.  Euratom's  Joint 
Research  Center  would  be  merged  into  the  Agency.  By  this  proposal, 
the  EEC  Commission  sought  to  bring  new  fields  of  research  into  the 
sphere  of  community  action,  including  research  for  new  materials, 
medicine,  meteorology,  oceanography,  and  environmental  control.218 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

Now  well  into  the  second  decade  of  its  existence,  Euratom  presents 
a  mixed  picture  of  success  and  failure.  Its  various  agreements  with  the 
United  States  have  allowed  Euratom  to  supply  European  nuclear 
power  programs  with  considerable  enriched  uranium  and  plutonium 
under  its  own  safeguards  system.  The  United  States  cooperated  by 
regrouping  its  bilateral  agreements  with  Euratom  members  into  a 
single  agreement  with  Euratom.  The  Agency  has  created  an  effective 
European  research  capability  for  nuclear  energy. 

On  the  other  hand,  these  encouraging  moves  toward  European  unity 
have  been  steadily  eroded  by  a  wave  of  nuclear  nationalism.  Since 
1961,  a  marked  trend  toward  nationalism  in  the  nuclear  industries  of 

218  Robert  McKinney.  A  New  Look  at  Euratom.  Statement  to  the  Joint  Committee  on 
Atomic  Energy.  May  20,  1959.  In  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy, 
Background  Material  for  the  Review  of  the  International  Atomic  Policies  and  Programs 
of  the  United  States,  S6th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  3  960,  vol.  4,  p.  1258.   (Joint  Committee  print.) 

317  The  Council  decided  on  December  6,  1969  that  the  facilities  of  the  Joint  Research 
Center  might  be  used  for  scientific  and  technological  research  other  than  nuclear.  In 
keeping  with  this  decision,  the  Council  also  agreed  to  enter  without  delay  into  close 
cooperation  with  the  EEC  Commission  on  the  study  and  choice  of  subjects  for  such 
research.  Cf.  European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  Third  General  Report  on  the  Activities 
of  the  Communities — 1969,  op.  cit.,  p.  210. 

218  "Makings  of  a  New  Structure,"  Nature,  vol.  228,   (November  28,  1970),  p.  796. 

96-525  O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  16 


the  member  nations  has  nearly  drowned  Euratom,  leaving  it  since  1968 
without  a  5-year  program,  with  sharply  reduced  funding  and, 
perhaps  worst  of  all,  without  an  involvement  in  application  of  nuclear 
power  technology  in  Europe.  Political  difficulties  have  blocked  cooper- 
ation with  Euratom's  supply  function  for  nuclear  materials  and  with 
plans  to  develop  a  European  enrichment  capability. 

Euratom's  successes  have  come  in  activities  which  were  distantly 
linked  to  the  competitive  status  of  the  national  nuclear  industries  of 
France,  Italy,  and  West  Germany.  These  included  model  legislation 
to  encourage  uniformity  in  national  regulation  of  radiological  effects 
of  nuclear  power,  research  into  subjects  without  immediate  com- 
mercial application,  and  safeguarding  nuclear  materials.  But  Eura- 
tom has  not  been  able  to  weld  together  the  separate  national  nuclear 
industries  of  its  members.  Euratom  research  and  development  which 
approached  commercial  application  has  been  opposed  and  was  ulti- 
mately terminated.  The  differing  ideas  of  France,  Italy,  and  West 
Germany  as  to  which  kind  of  nuclear  power  technology  to  exploit 
created  tensions  that  on  several  occasions  all  but  paralyzed  Euratom's 
research  and  development  programs  and  led  to  the  charge  that  some 
member  nations  were  benefiting  disproportionately  at  the  expense  of 
others.  The  inability  to  form  a  common  European  approach  to  nu- 
clear technology  has  proved  advantageous  to  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
and  in  the  1970's  the  use  of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technologv  is  well  estab- 
lished in  Europe,  having  overmatched  the  alternative  favored  by  the 
French.  Among  the  Euratom  members  there  is  increasing  use  of  joint 
venturas  between  companies  in  the  several  national  European  nuclear 
industries  as  an  alternative  to  working  through  Euratom.  There  are 
signs  also  that  Euratom's  laboratories  may  have  outlived  their  useful- 
ness and  now  face  the  problem  of  what  to  do  with  their  human  and 
physical  resources.  Steps  to  open  Euratom's  facilities  to  non-nuclear 
research  and  development  are  one  indication  of  the  situation.  What  can 
be  learned  from  this  trend  to  convert  Euratom's  research  installations 
into  general  research  facilities  for  the  European  Economic  Com- 
munity can  be  of  interest  to  the  United  States  for  two  reasons.  First, 
a  successful  transition  of  a  substantial  part  of  Euratom's  research 
capabilities  to  non-nuclear  research  could  strengthen  the  competitive- 
ness of  European  high-technology  goods  and  services  in  the  world 
markets  vis-a-vis  those  of  the  United  States.  Second,  a  successful 
transition  might  well  provide  useful  insights  into  the  problems  of 
conversion  of  existing  scientific  and  technical  institutions  into  new 
fields  as  their  original  field  becomes  worked  out,  or  as  changes  in 
national  priorities  and  programs  make  them  redundant.  This  transi- 
tion, of  course,  is  the  problem  of  the  U.S.  defense  and  aerospace  in- 
dustries with  the  continuing  unemployment  of  highly  skilled  scientists, 
engineers,  and  technicians. 

Several  issues  for  United  States  foreign  policy  and  Euratom  that 
may  need  future  attention  include  : 

(1)  To  what  extent  should  the  United  States  encourage  Eur- 
atom to  build  and  operate  a  uranium  enrichment  plant  in  Europe? 

(2)  In  supplying  XLS.  enrichment  technology,  if  this  is  done,  to 
what  extent  should  the  United  States  attempt  to  recoup  the  do- 
mestic investment  in  developing  that  technology  through  licensing 
fees  or  royalties  ? 


(3)  Considering  forecasts  that  the  United  States  will  soon  have 
to  decide  whether  to  fund  expansion  of  its  domestic  enrichment 
plants,  what  would  be  the  effect  upon  U.S.  foreign  policy  of  a 
limitation  or  termination  of  the  longstanding  U.S.  commitment 
to  supply  enriched  uranium  to  Euratom  for  commercial  nuclear 
power  in  Europe  ? 

(4)  What  voice  should  the  United  States  seek  in  Euratom's 
setting  of  standards  governing  the  environmental  effects  of  nu- 
clear power  plants,  and  standards  for  review  and  approval  of  the 
siting,  design,  and  construction  of  nuclear  power  plants?  In  ex- 
porting nuclear  power  plants,  will  the  commercial  interests  of  the 
U.S.  nuclear  industry  be  sufficiently  protected  by  a  U.S.  policy  of 
non-intervention  ? 

(5)  Considering  the  perplexing  status  of  technology  for  long 
term  storage  of  the  intensely  radioactive  wastes  from  nuclear 
power,  in  what  ways  would  domestic  interests  of  the  United  States 
benefit  from  measures  to  stimulate  Euratom  work  in  this  field  ? 

(6)  Considering  the  priority  being  given  to  development  and 
demonstration  of  the  breeder  reactor  in  the  United  States  and  the 
considerable  interest  among  Common  Market  countries  in  breeder 
technology,  to  what  extent  should  U.S.  foreign  policy  attempt  to 
influence  European  breeder  research  in  the  direction  of  the  tech- 
nology favored  by  the  United  States?  Conversely,  considering 
criticisms  of  the  U.S.  breeder  program  for  concentrating  too  much 
on  only  one  breeder  concept,  to  what  extent  might  U.S.  foreign 
policy  attempt  to  guide  European  breeder  research  toward  other 
potentially  competing  breeder  concepts  as  insurance  against  an 
unexpected  setback  or  failure  in  the  U.S.  domestic  program? 

VIII.  Joint  United  States-Euratom  Research  and  Development 

U.S.  diplomatic  efforts  and  interest  which  helped  bring  about  the 
creation  of  Euratom  led  naturally  to  the  proposition  that  the  United 
States  should  work  closely  with  this  new  multinational  body.  As 
analyzed  in  retrospect  by  Jules  Gueron,219  the  following  was  the  ra- 
tionale for  a  10-year  period  of  direct  technical  cooperation  between 
Euratom  and  the  United  States.  Europe  had  to  import  an  ever- 
increasing  proportion  of  its  conventional  fuel ;  therefore,  atomic  power 
could  become  competitive  in  Europe  earlier  than  in  the  United  States, 
and  Europe  could  benefit  economically  and  technically  from  being  a 
testing  ground  for  United  States  atomic  technology.  At  the  same  time 
the  United  States  would  aid  European  unification.220  This  theme  is 
examined  and  confirmed  in  the  following  discussion. 

The  United  States-Euratom  program  was  launched  in  1958  and  had 
as  its  target  the  construction  by  1965  of  5,000  megawatts  of  electrical 
generating  capacity  in  nuclear  power  plants  based  on  U.S.  technology. 
It  offered  low  interest  loans  from  the  Export-Import  Bank,  lease  of 
fuel  by  the  AEC,  and  guarantees  on  supply  of  fissile  material  and  per- 
formance of  nuclear  fuel  supply  bv  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry.  In  addi- 
tion, the  United  States  agreed  to  Euratom  control  of  nuclear  fuel  ma- 
terials instead  of  direct  U.S.  control,  and  to  a  joint  program  of  research 
and  development  in  support  of  the  joint  reactor  program.  Neverthe- 
less, it  proved  impossible  to  reach  the  5,000  megawatt  target,  and  only 
with  difficulty  were  three  nuclear  power  plants  initiated  that  had  a 
combined  output  of  750  megawatts. 

In  Europe,  these  U.S.  incentives  were  supplemented  by  advantages 
provided  bv  the  Euratom  Treaty  to  "common  enterprises,''  and  bv  the 
"participation"  assistance  especially  devised  by  the  Euratom  Com- 
mission. Parenthetically,  France  opposed  the  whole  scheme  as  a  sell- 
out to  the  United  States,  while  influential  voices  in  the  United  States 
branded  the  joint  programs  as  a  giveaway.221 

The  joint  United  States-Euratom  programs  were  a  disappoint- 
ment. Their  shortfall  from  original  goals  was  the  result  in  part  of  an 
unanticipated  easing  of  the  energy  supply  crisis  in  Europe,  of  unex- 
pectedly slow  progress  in  nuclear  technology,  and  probably  an  over- 
estimation  of  the  willingness  of  European  private  utilities  to  risk  sub- 
stantial capital  investments  in  demonstration  nuclear  powerplants.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  two  joint  programs  did  culminate  in  several  work- 
ing demonstrations  of  nuclear  power;  moreover,  they  provided  10 
years  of  practical  working  experience  of  collaboration  with  a  multi- 
national organization  to  develop  and  demonstrate  a  new  technology. 

From  1959  to  1909,  the  United  States  provided  technical  and  other 
forms  of  assistance  and  incentives  through  Euratom  for  construction 
of  three  demonstration  nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe;  it  spent  some 

sl*  FormpT  rpnprnl  rltrpptor  of  rpsparph  for  Euratom. 
120  Gupron,  op.  pit.,  p.  149. 
421  Loc.  cit. 



$37  million  for  further  development  of  technology  for  these  demon- 
stration plants;  and  it  offered  many  indirect  incentives  to  stimulate 
initial  commercial  use  of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  in  Europe. 

U.S.  Interest  in  Euratom  Demonstration  of  Nuclear  Power 

Even  as  the  international  negotiations  for  creation  of  Euratom  were 
Hearing  completion,  AEC  Chairman  Strauss  was  asserting  the  tech- 
nological feasibility  of  nuclear  power.  In  1957,  five  experimental 
nuclear  power  plants  at  AEC  laboratories  successfully  provided  a 
proof  of  principle  for  five  different  technological  approaches.  But  the 
demonstrations  were  too  small  to  provide  cost  and  operational  data 
which  would  enable  the  domestic  electric  companies  to  decide  upon 
their  commercial  use.  The  next  step  for  the  U.S.  domestic  nuclear 
power  program  was  to  build  larger,  engineering  prototypes  that  would 
work  as  part  of  a  commercial  utility.222  Such  demonstration  plants 
were  needed  to  provide  reliable  engineering,  operational,  and  cost  in- 
formation for  the  designers  and  the  customers  of  commercial  nuclear 
power.  However,  the  U.S.  demonstration  power  program  was  slow  in 
starting  and  some  observers  feared  that  the  Nation's  nuclear  power 
program  would  falter  if  engineering  prototypes  were  not  quickly  built 
and  put  into  operation.  At  this  juncture,  U.S.  collaboration  with 
Euratom  offered  a  solution  because  economic  conditions  in  Europe 
were  more  favorable  for  practical  demonstration  of  nuclear  power 
than  were  those  in  the  United  States. 

AEC  Commissioner  Vance  promptly  endorsed  this  objective.  In 
1958  he  informed  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy  that  the 
AEC's  foreign  objectives  for  nuclear  power  were  twofold : 323 

To  achieve  competitive  nuclear  power  in  friendly  foreign  na- 
tions during  the  next  5  years  through  a  comprehensive  program 
of  assistance  clearly  defined  and  vigorously  pursued. 

To  fortify  the  position  of  leadership  of  the  United  States  in  the 

eyes  of  the  world  in  the  peaceful  applications  of  atomic  energy, 

particularly  with  regard  to  power. 

Also  in  1958,  the  AEC  informed  the  Joint  Committee  of  conditions 

that  would  have  to  be  achieved  in  Europe  to  demonstrate  nuclear 

power.  These  were : 224 

(1)  That  the  economic  feasibility  of  nuclear  power  be  proven, 
not  by  theory  and  calculation,  not  by  extrapolation  from  pilot 
plant  operation,  but  by  the  full-scale  operation  of  power  produc- 
ing units  on  a  scale  large  enough  to  assure  statistical  reliability  of 
the  data ; 

(2)  That  the  utilities  into  whose  grid  the  power  from  these 
nuclear  plants  must  flow  become  familiar  with  the  technical  and 
management  problems  of  operating  nuclear  stations  and  accept, 
with  confidence,  nuclear  powerplants ; 

(3)  That  European  equipment  manufacturers  gain  knowledge 
and  competence  in  the  production  of  reactor  components ;  and 

222  By  having  the  utilities  build,  own,  and  operate  demonstration  plants  with  the  AEC 
providing  research  and  development,  special  service  and  materials,  and  training  of  per- 
sonnel, the  Commission  hoped  to  avoid  further  entanglement  in  the  public  versus  private 
power  controversy.  Proposals  that  the  Commission  itself  build  and  operate  large  nuclear 
power  plants  did  not  gain  acceptance. 

223  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energv,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing  Legis- 
lation, Fiscal  Year  1959,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  195R,  p.  215. 

12i  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreements,  op.  cit.,  p.  226. 


(4)   That  the  various  service  industries,  such  as  fuel  production 
and  fabrication,  scrap  recycle,  irradiated  fuel  reprocessing,  etc., 
be  developed  as  economic  operations. 
The  AEC  recognized  that  special  incentives  would  be  needed  to  at- 
tract interest  and  participation  of  European  utilities  because  nuclear 
power  and  its  economics  were  not  then  well  enough  established  to  war- 
rant the  requisite  capital  investment  by  a  traditionally  conservative 
electric  it  v  industry.  The  Commission  informed  the  Joint  Committee 

Traditionally  conservative  and  bound  by  rate  ceilings,  tbe  utilities  are  not 
prepared  to  take  excessive  risks  or  to  invest  large  amounts  of  capital  in  plants 
in  which  the  costs  of  energy  produced  may  well  be  above  that  of  conventional 

The  fact  that  there  is  not  already  under  way  a  program  which  would  accom- 
plish the  objectives  of  the  joint  program  speaks  for  itself.  Discussions  with 
Euratom  and  European  utility  personnel  indicate  that  the  estimated  high  cost 
of  nuclear  power  from  even  proven  type  reactors  and  particularly  the  uncertain 
ties  of  these  costs  could  preclude  a  program  under  which  1  million  EKW  of 
American  type  reactors  would  be  installed  by  1963,  unless  additional  incentives 
are  provided. 

The  scale  of  the  joint  program,  said  the  Commission,  had  to  be  large 
enough  that : 227 

(1)  The  data  produced  would  come  from  a  sufficiently  large 
number  of  power  reactors  to  be  useful ; 

(2)  A  significant  number  of  European  industries  would  have 
an  opportunity  to  participate  in  construction ;  and 

(3)  A  sufficiently  large  number  of  operating  utilities  would  be 
brought  into  the  program  to  assure  that  the  management  of  this 
industry  would  be  ready  to  accept  nuclear  energy  and  enter  the 
longer  range  nuclear  program  with  enthusiasm. 

Initiation  of  the  Joint  Programs 

Within  three  months  after  creation  of  Euratom  in  1058,  a  joint 
U.S.-Euratom  working  party  was  at  work.  By  June  23,  1958.  negotia- 
tions and  arrangements  were  far  enough  along  for  President  Eisen- 
hower to  request  urgent  approval  of  Congress  for  arrangements  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Euratom,  and  to  seek  legislation  author- 
izing AEC  participation  with  Euratom  in  the  joint  programs  of 
demonstration  and  development  and  research.  The  joint  programs 
anticipated  the  building  within  the  Common  Market  nations  of  six 
nuclear  power  plants  by  1965  with  a  total  electrical  output  of  1,000 

European  sources  were  expected  to  finance  the  capital,  then  esti- 
mated at  about  $350  million,  and  operating  costs,  while  the  United 
States  would  finance  research  and  development  and  other  incentives. 

President  Eisenhower  saw  dual  benefits  for  the  United  States. 
Nuclear  power  in  Europe  would  provide  both  a  needed  new  source  of 
energy  for  those  nations  and  also  an  impetus  toward  European  unity. 
As  for  European  unity,  he  said  :  *" 

tat  Loc.  fit. 

22,1 1  million  EKW  (electric  kilowatts)  Is  megawatts  of  elc^ti-lcnl  capacity. 

a*  Ibid.,  p.  93. 

■w  By  way  of  comparison,  some  single  nuclear  power  plants  now  being  built  in  the  United 
Stntiv  nave  electrical  outputs  ereater  than  1,000  MW. 

331  U.S..  Conprcss,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreements,  op.  clt.,  p.  10. 


.  .  .  One  motivation  which  has  therefore  led  to  the  creation  of  this  new  Com- 
munity is  the  growing  sense  of  urgency  on  the  part  of  Europeans  that  their 
destiny  requires  unity  and  that  the  road  toward  this  unity  is  to  be  found  in  the 
development  of  major  common  programs  such  as  Euratom  makes  possible.  .  .  . 

As  for  other  benefits,  he  said : 

.  .  .  Another  important  motivation  is  the  present  and  growing  requirements  of 
Europe  for  a  new  source  of  energy  in -the  face  of  rapidly  increasing  requirements 
and  limited  possibilities  of  increasing  the  indigenous  supply  of  conventional 
fuels.  The  Europeans  see  atomic  energy  not  merely  as  an  alternative  source  of 
energy  but  as  something  which  they  must  develop  quickly  if  they  are  to  continue 
their  economic  growth  and  exercise  their  rightful  influence  in  world  affairs. 

To  initiate  arrangements  for  the  joint  programs  with  Euratom, 
President  Eisenhower  transmitted  to  Congress  three  documents  which 
required  congressional  assent.  These  were:  (1)  an  agreement  for  co- 
operation which  recognized  Euratom  as  a  body  with  which  the  U.S. 
Government  could  negotiate ;  (2)  a  draft  of  legislation  to  authorize  the 
AEC  participation  in  the  joint  programs  and  to  authorize  appropria- 
tions; and  (3)  a  draft  of  a  bilateral  agreement  between  the  AEC  and 


The  Agreement  for  Cooperation  between  Euratom  and  the  United 
States  was  signed  in  Brussels  on  November  8,  1958.  Congress  had  pre- 
viously approved  the  agreement  on  August  20,  1958.  The  Agreement 
proved  to  be  important  to  Euratom.  Looking  back  with  the  benefit  of 
5  years  hindsight.  Federico  Consolo,  an  advisor  to  the  Euratom 
Commission,  wrote  of  the  political  importance  of  the  agreement : 3Sl 

...  In  addition  to  its  intrinsic  value  from  the  scientific  technical,  industrial 
and  financial  standpoint,  the  Agreement  was  of  considerable  political  importance, 
since,  from  the  very  outset  Euratom  was  able  to  benefit  by  the  assistance  of  the 
world's  major  nuclear  power. 

Pierre  Kruys,  of  Euratom,  saw  this  Agreement  as :  ^ 

...  A  proof  of  U.S.  support  for  the  Community  organizations  as  the  corner- 
stone of  the  new  united  Europe.  [The  Agreement]  also  paved  the  way  for  the 
establishment  of  the  first  contacts  of  the  technical  departments  of  the  Euratom 
Commission  with  nuclear  centers  and  industrial  concerns  in  the  Community 
countries,  as  well  as  for  the  achievement  of  a  certain  number  of  concrete  aims. 

The  Agreement  provided  for  two  well-defined,  closely  related  joint 
programs  between  the  United  States  and  Euratom : 

(1)  Construction  of  power  reactors  of  a  proven  American 
type,  for  a  total  of  1,000  megawatts  electrical  capacity,  to  go  into 
operation  before  the  end  of  1963,  except  for  two  plants  sched- 
uled for  operation  before  the  end  of  1965 ;  and 

(2)  Research  and  development  on  the  types  of  reactors  ac- 
cepted under  the  power  reactor  program.  The  budget  for  the 
joint  research  program  was  specified  at  $50  million  for  each 
partner  for  the  first  five  years,  with  the  funds  to  be  spent  at  home. 

^The  text  of  these  documents  appears  In  U.S.,  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic 
Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom  Agreements,  op.  cit.,  pp.  11-18. 

431  Federico  Consolo,  "The  US/Euratom  Agreement  for  Co-operation,"  Euratom,  No.  1. 
(1963),  p.  2. 

232  Pierre  Kruys,  "The  Joint  US/Euratom  Research  and  Development  Programme,  Eura- 
tom,So.  1  (1963),  p.  8. 


The  United  States  also  agreed  to  supply  Euratom  with  30  tons  of 
contained  U-235.283  Deferred  payment  was  provided  for  the  nuclear 
fuel,  and  favorable  conditions  were  also  offered  for  the  processing  of 
irradiated  nuclear  fuel  and  for  the  repurchase  by  the  United  States 
of  the  plutonium  produced.234  Additionally,  the  U.S.  Government 
through  the  Export-Import  Bank,  extended  long-term  credit  of  $135 
million  to  Euratom,  which  Euratom  could  in  turn  loan  to  partici- 
pants in  its  power  reactor  program.  Finally,  the  U.S.  Government 
recognized  Euratom's  value  as  an  organ  of  inspection  by  conceding 
to  it  the  right  of  control  over  fissionable  materials  supplied  by  the 
United  States.  Until  then,  in  other  bilateral  agreements  the  United 
States  had  directly  exercised  such  control.  , 'u 


One  problehi  for  American  diplomacy  was  to  arrange  some  form 
of  organization  which  would  permit  a  joint  program  to  go  forward 
while  retaining  substantial  control  over  U.S.  funds.  The  climate  of 
the  late  1950's  did  not  favor  the  supplying  by  the  United  States  of 
unrestricted  funds  to  Euratom.  The  solution  Was  to  form  two  joint 
boards  wherein  the  United  States  and  Euratom  each  controlled  their 
own  funds,  rather  than  putting  them  into  a  common  pool. 

A  Joint  Reactor  Board  was  established  to  examine  proposals  sub- 
mitted for  the  construction  of  power  reactors  and  to  report  its  rec- 
ommendations to  the  Euratom  Commission  and  to  the  AEC.  The 
Board  was  presided  over  by  a  chairman  from  Euratom  235  and  a  vice- 
chairman  from  the  United  States 236  with  voting  rights,  and  an  equal 
number  of  Euratom  and  American  experts  without  voting  rights. 

A  Joint  Research  and  Development  Board,  similarly  organized, 
was  established  to  examine  proposals  for  research,  and  to  recommend 
action  to  Euratom  and  to  the  AEC.237  Despite  administrative  com- 
plications, it  appears  that  the  joint  boards  functioned  satisfactorily, 
thanks  to  the  cooperative  and  cordial  attitude  on  both  sides.238 


The  bilateral  agreement  was  negotiated  in  an  atmosphere  of  con- 
cern in  Europe  as  to  the  possible  consequences  of  the  Suez  crisis  and 
at  a  time  when  nuclear  power  was  expected  to  offer  early  competition 
with  conventional  sources  of  energy.  But  once  the  initial  upsurge  of 
enthusiasm  for  the  joint  programs  had  slackened,  and  after  the  situa- 
tion for  conventional  power  supply  in  Europe  had  returned  to  normal, 
there  were  observers  who  thought  the  Agreement  had  overreached 
itself  in  favor  of  industry,  while  at  the  same  time  being  too  limited 
for  research.  These  considerations  were  to  spark  criticisms  in  Europe 
that  the  Agreement  had  subordinated  Euratom  to  U.S.  domestic  policy 
and  had  invested  Euratom  with  excessive  powers."36 

*«  Of  this  29  tons  was  for  the  power  reactor  program  for  fuel,  and  1  ton  for  research 
add  development.  I 

»*In  comparison,  for  the  period  1958  through  1961,  the  United  States*  commitment 
to  supply  uranium  under  Atoms  for  Peace  was  a  total  of  50  tons  of  Uranlum-235. 

*«  Eurn tom'8  Director  General  for  Industry  and  Economy. 

288  The  head  of  the  nuclear  section  of  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the  Communities. 

*"  Eum  torn  s  Director  General  for  Research  and  Training,  and  the  Head  of  the  Nuclear 
Section  of  the  U.S.  Mission  to  the  Communities. 

m  Consolo,  op.  cit.  p.  3. 

■•  Ibid.,  p.  4. 


The  Eur  atom  Cooperation  Act  of  1958 

During  congressional  consideration  of  the  President's  request  for 
authority  to  enter  into  the  joint  programs  with  Euratom,  spokesmen 
for  the  administration  supported  the  proposed  Euratom  Cooperation 
Act  in  glowing  terms.  Under  Secretary  of  State  C.  Douglas  Dillon 
outlined  the  benefits  of  strengthened  European  unity,  Western  leader- 
ship in  nuclear  power,240  and  meeting  the  Soviet  challenge.241 

Leaders  of  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  supported  U.S.  cooperation 
with  Euratom.  One  executive  spoke  of  the  choice  before  the  United 
States :  either  to  let  the  European  nuclear  industry  evolve  at  a  pace 
governed  by  normal  commercial  considerations  or  to  accelerate  it. 
If  the  first  policy  were  chosen,  he  thought  it  would  be  probably  20 
years  before  nuclear  power  would  be  commercially  competitive.  Un- 
der the  second  policy  it  would  be  sooner.  The  joint  program  would 
meet  the  needs  for  acceleration,  give  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  an 
immediate  market,  and  give  European  utilities  a  ceiling  on  costs  of 
fuel  for  nuclear  power.242  Benefits  to  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  were 
cited,  although  there  was  some  doubt  that  helping  Euratom  would 
speed  the  time  when  a  European  nuclear  industry  would  compete 
with  its  U.S.  counterpart.243 

Some  doubt  about  the  joint  program  was  expressed  by  members 
of  the  Joint  Committee.  One  member  saw  it  as  a  step  to  head  off 
capture  of  the  nuclear  power  market  by  the  United  Kingdom  244  and 
warned  that  there  were  limits  to  what  the  proposed  joint  program 
could  accomplish.245 

Such  doubts  notwithstanding,  the  Joint  Committee  reported  favor- 
ably the  proposed  Euratom  Cooperation  Act,  expressing  its  belief  that 
a  vigorous  program  of  cooperation  by  the  United  States  with  foreign 

mo  "Of  strengthening  European  unity.  Under  Secretary  Dillon  said*:  The  agreement  repre- 
sents the  confluence  of  two  important  historic  developments  :  first,  the  peaceful  application 
of  atomic  energy,  a  policy  high  among  the  objectives  of  this  Government ;  second,  European 
unity,  a  result  of  European  inspiration  and  a  development  on  which  the  United  States  has 
looked  with  great  interest  and  favor.  Proposed  Euratom  Agreement,  op.  cit.,  p.  23. 

Of  the  leadership  advantages  he  said  :  .  .  .  Euratom  is  unique  in  having  a  political 
status,  including  certain  sovereign  attributes  of  the  state,  which  permits  us  to  deal  with  it 
unilaterallv.  Combined  with  this  political  status  is  the  scientific,  industrial,  and  financial 
potential  of  six  of  the  most  developed  nations  in  Europe.  The  successful  implementation  of 
the  program  will  help  maintain  Western  leadership  in  the  peaceful  uses  of  atomic  energy. 
The  continuing  attacks  on  Euratom  by  the  Soviet  Union  would  seem  to  indicate  that  they 
draw  the  same  conclusions.  Ibid.,  p.  23. 

241  On  meeting  the  Soviet  technological  challenge,  he  said  :  Recently  demonstrated  evi- 
dences of  advanced  Soviet  scientific  and  engineering  capability  have  caused  a  serious  and 
healthy  reappraisal  within  the  Atlantic  Community  of  the  extent  to  which  the  Western 
countries  have  been  exploiting  to  the  full  their  potential  scientific  strength  and  whether 
this  strength  is  being  mobilized  through  the  most  effective  cooperative  arrangements. 
Voices  in  Europe  have  queried  whether  the  historic  position  of  the  United  States  in  the 
fiel''  of  science,  engineering,  and  general  industrial  development  is  not  being  overtaken  by 
the  Soviet  Union.  Atomic  energy  is  rightfully  considered  a  bellwether  of  scientific  and 
industrial  accomplishment.  Ibid.,  p.  25. 

242  Ibid.,  p.  267. 

243  A  spokesman  for  one  company  in  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  anticipated  that  the 
proposed  program  would  be  mutually  beneficial  to  the  United  States  nuclear  industry  in 
greatly  increasing  practical  experience.  Ibid.,  p.  314.  Another  spokesman  cautioned  that 
enabling  Euratom  to  develop  its  own  industrial  capacity  more  quickly  than  would  be  the 
case  without  American  aid  would  undoubtedly  reduce  the  time  in  which  American  equip- 
ment could  be  sold  in  Europe.  Ibid.,  p.  329. 

241  At  that  time  the  United  Kingdom  was  vigorously  pursuing  its  national  program  of 
building  large  nuclear  powerplants  fueled  with  natural  uranium  and  there  was  some 
concern  lest  the  British  dominate  the  world  market  with  this  technology. 

245  Representative  Craig  Hosmer  observed  that :  In  considering  this  legislation  the 
Congress  should  be  under  no  delusion  that  it  will  capture  the  entire  European  reactors 
market  for  the  U.S.  suppliers.  Although  there  are  some  that  will  disagree  with  me  t 
is  my  personal  feeling  that  the  bill  goes  no  further  than  making  us  competitive  in  this 
market  with  the  British.  The  British  atomic  industry  can  be  loosely  described  as  a  govern- 
ment monopoly.  They  give  fuel  guarantees  and  other  incentives  that  would  prevent  us  from 
competing  in  the  European  market  at  all  without  such  legislation  as  this  before  us  today. 
Cf.  his  remarks,  Congressional  Record,  vol.  104,  August  20,  1958,  p.  187S9. 


nations  in  nuclear  power  was  desirable.246  The  Joint  Committee 
summed  up  the  anticipated  benefits  of  U.S.  participation  in  the  joint 
programs  as  follows : 247 

.  .  .  The  State  Department  has  testified  as  to  the  role  Euratoni  will  play  in  Un- 
economic integration  of  Europe,  and  this  is  recognized  as  an  important  part  of  our 
foreign  policy.  Euratom  will  become  increasingly  important  to  Europe  as  a  sup- 
plement to  its  growing  energy  requirements  in  a  period  when  its  oil  supply  from 
the  Middle  East  is  in  danger. 

Moreover,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  United  States  atomic  energy  program,  the 
proposed  Euratom  arrangements  offer  an  opportunity  to  develop  and  construct 
United  States  type  reactors  abroad.  There  has  been  a  great  deal  of  testimony  that 
it  is  possible  to  achieve  atomic  power  in  Europe  sooner  than  in  the  United  States 
because  conventional  power  costs  in  Europe  are  considerably  higher  than  in  the 
United  States. 

Perhaps  of  greatest  interest  to  the  United  States  is  the  opportunity  in  the 
Euratom  joint  program  to  demonstrate  United  States  leadership  in  atomic  energy 
development,  an  objective  which  the  Joint  Committee  considers  to  be  of  the  high- 
est importance. 

Representative  Holifield  of  the  Joint  Committee  was  not  impressed 
by  the  argument  that  nuclear  power  could  help  resolve  Europe's  energy 

On  this  point,  he  said  in  debate  on  the  bill : 248 

.  .  .  The  claim  put  forward  by  the  more  enthusiastic  proponents  of  the  original 
Euratom  sponsors,  that  this  program  would  solve  the  dependence  of  the  Euro- 
pean countries  on  Middle  East  oil,  is  of  course  unrealistic.  The  six  countries  com- 
prising the  Euratom  group  have  an  installed  kilowatt  capacity  of  some  60  million 
units.  The  pending  atomic-power  program  will  amount  to  1  million,  or  one-sixtieth 
of  the  total  capacity. 

Despite  these  misgivings  the  bill  was  passed  and  the  Euratom  Co- 
operation Act  became  law  on  August  28,  1958,  as  Public  Law  85-840 
(72  Stat.  1084). 


While  Congress  quickly  assented  to  the  initial  agreement  for  co- 
operation and  to  the  authorizing  legislation,  it  did  not  move  as  quickly 
upon  the  bilateral  agreement.  The  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
held  hearings  on  the  agreement 249  and  insisted  on  changes,  particu- 
larly for  the  safeguarding  of  nuclear  materials  to  be  furnished  by  the 
United  States.  After  these  changes  had  been  worked  out  with  Eura- 
tom, President  Eisenhower  approved  a  final  version  on  November  6, 

1958,  which  was  signed  in  Brussels  2  days  later.  On  January  14, 

1959,  the  bilateral  agreement  with  Euratom  was  laid  before  the  Joint 
Committee  25°  and  when  no  objection  was  raised,  it  took  effect  on 
February  18,  1959. 

The  only  significant  disagreement  in  the  negotiations  was  over 
U.S.  inspection  rights  and  safeguards  for  nuclear  materials  supplied 

348  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  of  1938, 
Sen.  Rept.  2370.  August  14,  195S. 

947  Loc.  clt.  Note,  the  text  of  this  report  is  also  published  in  U.S.  Code,  Congressional 
and  Administrative  News,  85th  Cong.,  2d  Sees.,  1958,  vol.  3.  The  excerpt  appears  at  p.  4307. 

M"Cf.  his  remarks.  Congrea*ional  Record,  vol.  104,  Ausrust  20,  1958.  p.  18794. 

■»•  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion with  Euratom,  8Rth  Cong:.,  l«t.  Sess.,  19>59,  150  p. 

*°  Before  submitting  the  agreement  to  the  Joint  Committee,  the  President,  as  required  by 
the  Atomic  Energy  Act,  made  a  determination  that  the  "performance  of  the  proposed 
agreement  will  promote  and  will  not  constitute  an  unreasonable  risk  to  the  common  defense 
and  security  of  the  United  States."  The  emphasis  was  upon  security,  not  upon  economic 


by  the  United  States.  The  U.S.  negotiators  sought  the  right  to  send 
inspectors  into  nuclear  facilities  of  Euratom  member  states.  The 
Euratom  negotiators  refused.  A  resulting  compromise  was  for  Eura- 
tom to  establish  a  safeguard  system  for  U.S.-supplied  materials  in 
accordance  with  principles  accepted  by  the  United  States,  and  to  allow 
U.S.  assistance  in  establishing  the  sj^stem  and  to  frequent  consulta- 
tions and  visits.  Both  parties  agreed  to  verification,  by  mutually 
approved  scientific  methods,  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  safeguard  and 
control  system.  But  the  agreement  was  silent  on  inspection  by  U.S. 
personnel.  Euratom  agreed  in  the  bilateral  agreement  to  consult  with 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  assure  that  its  system 
would  be  reasonably  compatible  with  that  of  the  IAEA.  The  agree- 
ment also  provided  that  should  the  International  Agency  establish 
an  international  safeguard  and  control  system,  the  United  States 
and  Euratom  would  consult  with  the  IAEA  regarding  its  assump- 
tion of  these  functions.251 

With  the  IAEA  now  responsible  for  such  a  safeguards  and  control 
system  under  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty,  it  will  be  interesting  to 
see  how  the  Agency's  functions  will  impact  upon  Euratom  safeguards. 

The  Joint  Power  Program 

The  initial  target  of  the  joint  power  program  was  the  construction 
of  six  nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe  with  a  combined  electrical  out- 
put of  1,000  megawatts.  These  were  to  use  U.S.  nuclear  technology. 
The  goal  was  partially  achieved.  By  the  time  the  joint  power  program 
ended,  three  nuclear  power  plants  with  a  combined  output  of  597  MW 
had  been  built  and  put  into  operation,  employing  two  different  tech- 
nological approaches. 

The  joint  program  was  put  into  motion  by  two  invitations  for  pro- 
posals. Some  details  of  these  invitations  are  pertinent  as  illustrations 
of  measures  to  promote  foreign  use  of  a  new  technologj^. 


On  April  13,  1959,  Euratom  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to  Euratom  in- 
vited proposals  from  would-be  contractors  to  build  nuclear  power 
plants  to  be  completed  by  the  end  of  1963,  and  to  operate  for  at  least 
10  years.  To  attract  the  interest  and  participation  of  the  conserva- 
tive European  electricity  industry,  the  invitations  offered  five 
inducements : 252 

(1)  Financial  guarantees  for  a  10-year  operating  period  for 
the  cost  of  fabrication  and  the  integrity  of  the  nuclear  fuel.253 

(2)  Long-term  assurance  of  an  adequate  supply  of  nuclear  fuel 
at  prices  comparable  to  those  offered  to  industry  within  the  United 
States.  The  U.S.  agreed  to  furnish  Euratom  with  up  to  30,000 
kilograms  of  U-235  on  credit  at  4  percent  interest. 

(3)  Assurance  for  10  years  of  a  defined  market  for  the  pluto- 
nium  recovered  from  the  used  fuel. 

811  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Proposed  Euratom 
Agreement,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 

262  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  Agreement  for  Coopera- 
tion with  Euratom,  op.  cit.,  p.  21. 

™  During:  the  late  1950's  the  technology  for  fabrication  of  nuclear  fuel  was  still  evolving 
rapidly  and  there  was  little  experience  to  .indicate  how  well  it  would  perform  in  practice, 
or  that  estimated  costs  of  fabrication  could  be  held  down.  For  these  reasons,  financial 
guarantees  to  the  electric  utilities  for  cost  of  fabrication  and  minimum  performance  were 
considered  to  be  important  incentives. 


(4)  Long-term  capital  loans  to  cover  part  of  the  cost  of  con- 

(5)  Long-term  assurance  by  the  United  States  that  reprocessing 
of  used  fuel  would  be  available  to  the  joint  program  reactors 
under  terms  comparable  to  those  offered  to  nuclear  power  reactor 
operators  in  the  United  States. 

Selection  among  the  proposals  was  to  be  made  by  a  U.S.-Euratom 
reactor  board  according  to  the  following  criteria : 

(1)  The  extent  to  which  the  proposed  nuclear  powerplant  was 
expected  to  approach  conventional  power  costs  at  the  time  of  its 
completion,  and  its  potential  for  subsequent  improvement. 

(2)  The  extent  to  which  the  project  would  draw  upon  the  funds, 
materials  and  services  available  for  the  joint  program. 

(3)  The  extent  to  which  the  proposal  would  contribute  to  the 
advancement  of  nuclear  power  technology  and  to  a  diversity  of 
plant  types  and  designs. 

(4)  The  extent  to  which  the  project  would  contribute  to  a  strong 
and  competitive  atomic  equipment  industry  in  the  United  States 
and  Europe. 

In  addition,  Euratom  would  consider  the  need  to  arrive  at  a  reason- 
able geographic  distribution  of  the  projects  among  the  member  states 
of  the  Community.254 

The  invitation  made  it  clear  that  information  was  expected  in  return 
for  the  inducements,  specifying  that : 255 

...  In  return  for  the  benefits  received,  the  participants  in  the  program  will  be 
required  to  make  available  information  developed  on  the  design,  plans,  and 
specifications,  constructions  and  operating  costs,  operations  and  economics. 

However,  the  participants  were  not  obliged  to  disclose  manufactur- 
ing "know-how"  or  techniques.  Subsequent  experience  indicated  that 
European  companies  tended  to  treat  as  commercially  confidential 
much  information  that  in  the  U.S.  domestic  nuclear  power  program 
would  have  been  freely  published. 

The  response  to  the  first  invitation  was  disappointing.  Although 
letters  of  interest  were  received  from  six  Euratom  utilities,  by  the 
deadline  of  the  invitation  only  one  proposal  was  in  hand.  The  Joint 
Committee  became  concerned  and  questioned  AEC  Commissioner 
Floberg,  after  his  visit  to  the  Euratom  countries  in  1959,  about  reports 
that  European  business  was  disgusted  and  worried  about  Euratom. 
In  his  reply,  Floberg  carefully  distinguished  between  Euratom  and 
the  governments  of  its  member  states  and  their  business  sector.  The 
governments  remained  optimistic.  It  was  the  utilities,  said  Floberg, 
whose  interest  had  waned.  He  attributed  this  changed  attitude  to  a 
number  of  factors : 256 

The  fact  of  50  million  tons  of  coal  on  the  surface  of  the  ground  and  the  fact 
of  a  $5  or  so  drop  in  the  price  of  coal  in  Europe,  and  the  fact  of  reduced  shipping 
rates  on  American  coal  to  Europe,  and  the  fact  of  oil  discoveries  in  the  Sahara, 
and  the  fact' of  what  they  call  stability  in  the  Middle  East  .  .  .  and  the  fact 
of  new  sources  of  natural  gas  to  Europe — have  all  accumulated  together  with  the 
failure  of  the  rate  of  power  consumption  to  increase  at  the  predicted  rate,  to 
change  the  attitude  toward  the  urgency  of  nuclear  power  in  Europe.  There  just 
is  not  any  question  about  that. 

a*  Ibid.,  p.  27. 
a*  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

**  U.S.    Congress,    Joint    Committee    on    Atomic    Energy,    Hearings,    AEC    Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1961,  86th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  I960,  p.  101. 


When  I  talk  about  the  changing  attitude  toward  urgency,  I  am  talking  about 
the  attitude  of  the  utilities.  I  believe  the  attitude  of  the  European  governments 
has  not  changed,  and  I  am  sure  the  attitude  of  the  Euratom  organization  has 
not  changed. 

...  As  far  as  the  utilities  are  concerned — the  ones  who  are  the  potential  cus- 
tomers— there  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  there  has  been  some  dilution  in  their 
feeling  of  urgency. 


Despite  the  disappointing  response  to  the  first  invitations  and  the 
criticism  of  the  Joint  Committee,  AEC  Chairman  McCone  in  1960 
decided  to  j>roceed  with  a  second  round  of  invitations.257  Accordingly, 
on  September  2,  1961,  the  AEC  and  Euratom  tried  again.  This 
time  the  invitation  solicited  construction  of  nuclear  power  plants  that 
would  come  into  operation  no  later  than  the  end  of  1965.  As  with  the 
first  invitation,  plants  were  to  be  built,  owned,  and  operated  by  orga- 
nizations of  the  electricity  industries  of  the  Community.  The  invitation 
also  stated  that  in  order  to  qualify  for  AEC  inducements,  the  nuclear 
reactors  had  to  be  of  a  type  which  had  reached  an  advanced  stage 
of  development  in  the  United  States. 


The  demonstration  power  plants  were  expected  to  require  a  greater 
capital  investment  than  corresponding  conventional  plants.  Since  Eu- 
ratom itself  had  no  funds  for  the  extra  capital  costs,  the  United  States 
arranged  for  loans  through  the  Export-Import  Bank  to  provide  $135 
million  to  finance  them.  The  basis  for  this  figure  was  explained  by 
the  Department  of  State  as  follows:258 

Assuming  a  total  cost  of  $350  million,  we  can  say  that  the  electricity  com- 
panies will  normally  be  able  to  contribute  out  of  their  own  sources  or  otherwise, 
around  $150  million,  that  is  the  cost  of  conventional  powerplants  with  the  same 
capacity.  The  loan  to  come  from  the  United  States  Government  being  estimated 
at  $135  million,  there  remains  a  gap  of  $65  million  to  be  found  from  other  sources. 

This  was  a  reasonable  estimate  of  the  dollar  value  of  the  nuclear 
equipment  and  services  to  be  purchased  from  the  United  States.259 

However,  by  the  time  the  money  was  needed,  the  interest  rate  in 
Europe  had  dropped  enough  so  that  European  capital  was  used. 


The  invitations  for  the  joint  power  program  offered  a  guarantee  on 
fuel  performance  as  an  inducement.  Authority  for  the  AEC  to 
provide  such  guarantee  was  included  in  the  Euratom  Cooperation  Act 
of  1958  because  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  was  not  then  ready  to  offer 
the  desired  guarantee.  Yet,  only  a  year  later  the  picture  had  changed 
and  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  was  offering  guarantees  of  performance 
that  met  or  exceeded  those  in  the  invitations.  Commissioner  Floberg 
attributed  this  change  to  the  Euratom  joint  program.  The  U.S.  fabrica- 
tors began  to  offer  their  own  guarantees  because  they  wished  to  avoid 
use  of  the  AEC's  authority,  which  would  have  required  private  indus- 

257  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings.  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation.  Fiscal  Year  1961.  86th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1960,  p.  101. 

sa'U.'S.   Congress,   Joint  Committee  on   Atomic   Energy,   Hearings.  Proposed   Euratom 
Agreements,  op.  cit,  p.  111. 
,   *»  Ibid.,  p.  234. 


try  to  divulge  proprietary  information  about  performance  of  its 

The  second  invitation  resulted  in  two  demonstration  projects.  One 
was  a  210-megawatt  nuclear  power  plant  for  the  Societe  d'Energie 
Nuclearire  Franco-Beige  des  Ardennes  (SENA)  built  near  Givet, 
France,  close  to  the  France-Belgian  border.  The  second  was  a  237 
megawatt  nuclear  power  plant  of  a  "West  German  firm,  Kernkraft- 
werk-RWE-Bayerwerk  (KRB)  at  Gundremmingen,  Bavaria.  For 
both  projects,  a  U.S.  firm  was  the  designer  and  supplier  for  the  nu- 
clear reactor. 

The  Joint  Research  Program 

The  joint  research  program  of  the  United  States  and  Euratom  was 
initially  planned  for  an  expenditure  of  $200  million  over  10  years. 
At  the  end  of  the  program  in  1969,  the  AEC  had  spent  about  $37  mil- 
lion and  Euratom  about  the  same.  For  the  first  5  years,  the  U.S. 
funds  were  authorized  annually  as  a  separate  item  in  the  AEC's  au- 
thorizations. For  the  second  5  years,  congressional  interest  in  the 
joint  program  had  diminished  and  AEC  funding  for  it  was  merged 
with  other  AEC  requests  for  research  and  development. 

THE  FIRST   5 -YEAR  PLAN    (1959-1964) 

The  goal  of  the  joint  research  program  was  to  improve  the  per- 
formance of  U.S.  types  of  nuclear  power  reactors.  The  joint  program 
began  on  December  23,  1958,  when  Euratom  and  the  U.S.  Mission  to 
Euratom  announced  the  formation  of  a  Joint  Research  and  Develop- 
ment Board  and  solicited  proposals  for  research  and  development.  The 
function  of  the  board  was  to  choose  among  proposals.  Criteria  for  se- 
lection included  the  potential  contribution  of  the  proposed  research  to 
the  goals  of  the  joint  program,  the  technical  competence  of  the  research, 
the  anticipated  costs,  and  the  willingness  of  the  proposer  to  participate 
in  the  exchange  of  technical  personnel.  The  chosen  proposals  were  re- 
ferred to  Euratom  or  to  the  AEC  for  negotiation  and  administra- 
tion. Proposals  from  European  organizations  went  to  Euratom,  and 
those  from  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  and  universities  went  to  the 
AEC.  In  this  way,  there  was  no  combining  of  AEC  and  Euratom 
funds  and  each  organization  was  in  control  of  the  research  funded 
by  it. 

The  response  to  the  invitation  was  enthusiastic.  By  the  end  of  1959 
more  than  340  proposals  and  letters  of  intent  had  been  received.  Of 
some  250  definitive  proposals,  half  were  from  European  and  half  were 
about  equally  divided  between  U.S.  organizations  and  joint  proposals 
of  U.S.  and  European  concerns.  But  the  selecting  among  these  pro- 
posals and  the  negotiating  of  contracts  went  slowly.  Two  years  later, 
in  1962,  only  15  had  been  authorized  for  contracts  in  the  United  States 
and  38  for  Europe. 

One  problem  was  funding.  The  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  had  au- 
thorized an  initial  appropriation  of  $3  million  and  the  AEC  re- 
?uested  an  additional  $14  million  for  fiscal  year  1960.  But  the  Joint 
Committee  cut  the  request  to  $5  million,  which  caused  Commissioner 
Floberg  to  ask  the  Committee  for  reconsideration  and  restoration.  He 

480  U.S.  ConfcreRR.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Enerpy,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Tear  1960,  op.  clt.,  p.  657. 


expressed  his  fears  that  the  cut  would  be  a  "body-blow"  to  the  future 
of  the  whole  Euratom  joint  program  and  could  even  cause  its  demise. 
At  that  time  the  AEC  had  in  hand  proposals  from  the  U.S.  nuclear 
industry  for  research  totalling  $25  million.  The  Joint  Committee  sub- 
sequently increased  the  authorization  by  another  $7-  million,  bringing 
the  total  to  $12  million. 

THE    SECOND    5 -TEAR  PLAN    (196  5-1969) 

If  the  first  5-year  program  of  joint  U.S. -Euratom  research  was  dis- 
appointing in  terms  of  research  begun,  the  second  was  even  more  so. 
Originally  planned  at  $100  million  by  both  parties,  by  the  start  of  the 
second  5-year  plan,  the  AEC  called  for  only  $15  million  each  for 
the  United  States  and  Euratom.  The  reasons  for  this  reduction  were 
twofold.  First,  the  joint  power  program  had  produced  proposals  for 
only  two  reactor  types  instead  of  the  five  or  six  originally  expected,  so 
less  research  and  development  was  needed.  Second,  there  had  been  un- 
expected technological  advance  in  the  U.S.  domestic  nuclear  power 
program.  The  AEC's  director  of  reactor  development  explained  the 
situation  to  the  Joint  Committee  as  follows : 261 

If  you  will  recall,  in  the  first  place  when  we  went  in  with  this  Euratom  pro- 
gram we  expected  to  have  five  reactors.  We  had  three  instead  of  five.  There 
were  two  types  of  reactors  that  actually  came  under  the  joint  program  and 
as  we  have  looked  at  the  type  of  progress  that  has  been  made  since,  it  just 
didn't  seem  that  we  could  carry  out  a  sensible  research  and  development  pro- 
gram of  water  reactors  because  they  have  gotten  so  far  toward  commercial- 
ity  in  the  meantime.  I  think  we  didn't  anticipate  when  we  went  into  this  pro- 
gram originally  that  water  reactors  would  have  gotten  as  far  along  during  this 
period  as  they  have. 

The  pace  of  the  second  5-year  program  slowed  so  much  that  in 
1966  the  AEC  requested  no  additional  funds.  Indeed,  in  August  of 
that  year  it  proposed  to  Euratom  that  both  parties  reduce  their  level 
of  participation  for  the  entire  10  years  to  about  $33  million  each. 
Furthermore,  the  AEC  proposed  that  Euratom  accept  certain  research 
already  funded  under  the  AEC's  domestic  reactor  program  as  ful- 
filling*the  United  States'  commitment  to  the  joint  research  program. 
The  cutback  and  financial  pressure  within  the  AEC  stemmed  from 
assigning  higher  priority  to  research  on  reactor  types  other  than  those 
of  interest  to  the  joint  program.262  The  situation  was  as  bad  in  Eura- 
tom. There,  the  General  Advisor  to  the  Euratom  Commission  for  Ke- 
searcli  stated  that  in  view  of  Euratom's  current  budget  crisis,  the 
Euratom  Commission  would  be  unable  to  consider  matching  additional 
research  proposed  by  the  United  States.  He  advised  further  that  the 
Euratom  budget  for  1968  contained  no  funds  to  start  new  projects 
under  the  joint  research  program.263  Consequently,  the  joint  research 
program  came  to  a  halt  and  ultimately  faded  away. 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

American  diplomacy  was  able  to  arrange  with  Euratom  for  joint 
programs  of  demonstration  and  research  and  development,  but  could 

201  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1965,  88th  Cong.,  2d  sess.,  1964,  p.  370. 

262  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEC  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1968,  90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1967,  p.  908. 

283  U.S.  Congress.  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,  AEG  Authorizing 
Legislation,  Fiscal  Year  1969, 90th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  1968,  p.  366. 


not  assure  the  impetus  needed  to  reach  the  desired  goals.  The  negoti- 
ators did  not  produce  a  truly  joint  undertaking,  but  rather  two  paral- 
lel, closely  coordinated  programs  in  which  each  party  controls  its 
own  funds. 

The  diplomatic  effort  did  produce  several  working  nuclear  power 
plants  in  Europe  that  demonstrated  U.S.  nuclear  technology  both  for 
European  and  domestic  U.S.  nuclear  markets.  The  joint  programs 
did  provide  experience  in  the  operation  of  joint  boards,  experience 
that  could  be  useful  for  future  multinational  ventures.  It  may  be 
worth  inquiring  how  much  of  this  experience  has  been  recorded  and 
analyzed  for  future  reference. 

The  diplomatic  effort  of  organizing  the  joint  programs  did  bene- 
fit the  US.  nuclear  industry,  which  had  the  opportunity  to  build 
several  more  working  power  plants  than  would  otherwise  have  been 
possible.  On  the  other  hand,  the  prqgram  never  measured  up  to  the 
initial  expectations  and  suffered  from  long  delays.. 

As  the  United  States  moves  into  the  mid-19  <0's  in  the  face  of  grow- 
ing national  and  international  imbalances  in  supply  and  demand  for 
energy,  it  maj  wejll^e  useful  to  inquire  what  can  be  learned  from 
the  joint  programs.  There,  was  a  working  together  of  government 
agencies,  universities,  and  industrial  organizations  in  several  countries 
and  useful  'research  wa,s  perfprjned.  Perhaps  the  experience  with  the 
joint  programs  could  point  the  way  toward  future  ventures  to  de- 
velop new  energy  sources,  such  as  large-scale  use  of  solar  energy,  or 
toward  conservation  of  energy  through  expedited  development  of 
nifignei;6h^dt6^yh4irii6'§  (JlffiD),  Both  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  the  Euratom  venture  could  he,  instructive  in  planning  such  new  de- 
velopments on  an  international  basis. 


'i         ■■' 

>  ■      • 

IX.    The    Nuclear    Energy    Agency:    Another    Regional    Ap- 
proach to  International  Organization  for  Nuclear  Energy 

Another  indication  of  the  impact  of  the  discovery  of  fission  upon 
U.S.  diplomacy  is  to  be  found  in  the  creation  of  the  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  (NEA)  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development.  With  Euratom,  NEA,  and  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency  all  having  functions  of  one  kind  or  another  relating 
to  nuclear  power  in  Europe,  it  appears  that  diplomatic  responses  of 
the  United  States  and  European  governments  have  created  a  complex 
web  of  interrelationships.  While  Euratom  during  its  early  years 
enjoyed  substantial  financial  support  of  the  United  States,  NEA  did 
not  attract  equivalent  support.  The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  de- 
scribe the  origins,  purposes  and  activities  of  the  NEA,  and  to  explore 
the  reasons  for  this  difference. 

Origins  of  the  Nuclear  Energy  Agency 

As  was  the  case  for  Euratom,  the  initial  impetus  for  the  creation  of 
the  NEA  came  from  European  fears  of  a  fuel  shortage.  The  then 
Organisation  for  European  Economic  Co-operation  (OECC)  re- 
quested Louis  Armand  of  France  to  survey  the  situation.  Armand 
was  one  of  the  "three  wise  men"  who  were  so  instrumental  in  the  crea- 
tion of  Euratom  and  who  had  argued  for  Euratom  as  a  way  to  ease 
foreseen  increases  in  costs  and  growing  shortages  of  energy  for  the 
economy  of  Europe.  Armand's  report  to  OEEC  reflected  this  theme  of 
anticipated  energy  shortage,  which  was  repeated  in  1955  by  a  com- 
mittee of  experts  led  by  Sir  Harold  Hartley.  The  latter  committee 
observed  that  Europe's  energy  deficit,  which  then  amounted  to  about 
20  percent  of  the  energy  used,  was  expected  to  exceed  one-third  of  its 
energy  demand  by  the  year  1975.  These  predictions  led  to  two  OEEC 
responses:  The  promotion  of  an  overall  energy  policy  for  member 
nations:  and  the  organization  of  joint  European  action  to  develop  the 
production  and  use  of  nuclear  energy.  The  Nuclear  Energy  Agency 
was  the  outcome  of  the  latter. 

NEA  Functions 

The  Nuclear  Energy  Agency  was  established  in  1957  by  an  inter-, 
national  statute  which  entered  into  force  on  February  1,  1958.  NEA's 
assigned  objective  is  to  "  .  .  .  further  the  development  of  the  produc- 
tion and  uses  of  nuclear  energy  for  peaceful  purposes  by  the  partic- 
ipating countries."  NEA's  scientific  and  technological  activities 
include : 

(1)  Promotion  of  nuclear  technological  developments; 

(2)  Interchange   of   specialist   knowledge   and   provision   of 
specialist  information  services ;  and 

(3)  Studies  of  reactor  characteristics,  fuel  supplies,  and  other 
factors  affecting  the  future  of  nuclear  power. 


96-525   O  -  77  -  vol.    1  -  17 


Other  NEA  functions  concern  the  administrative  and  regulatory 
aspects  of  nuclear  energy  and  the  development  of  a  uniform  legal 
system  in  Europe  governing  such  matters  as  compensation  for  damages 
from  a  nuclear  accident. 

Member  states  in  the  NEA  include  the  European  members  of  the 
OEEC — which  later  became  the  OECD — plus  Canada,  Japan,  and 
the  United  States.  Originally  named  the  European  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  (ENEA),  the  Agency  was  renamed  the  Nuclear  Energy 
Agency  to  reflect  the  participation  of  non-European  members. 

Like  its  parent  organization,  the  OECD,  the  NEA  is  a  forum 
rather  than  an  operational  agency.  Within  the  functions  outlined 
above,  its  strong  point  has  been  coordination  and  program  confronta- 
tion rather  than  direct  operation.  The  Agency  has  led  its  members  into 
agreements  on  radiation  health  and  safety  standards,  and  on  nuclear 
insurance.  By  contrast,  Euratom  is  an  operating  organization  as  well 
as  an  agency  involved  in  establishing  an  industrial  structure  for 
nuclear  power  in  Europe. 

Some  NEA  Innovations  in  Organization  of  International  Projects 

In  carrying  out  research  and  development  in  nuclear  energy  for  its 
member  states,  the  NEA  has  made  several  noteworthy  innovations 
in  organization.  The  Agency  has  three  international  projects :  an  ex- 
perimental nuclear  reactor  in  Norway,  one  in  England,  and  a  nuclear 
fuel  reprocessing  plant  in  Belgium.  The  innovations  of  NEA  in 
organizing  these  projects  are  instructive  for  future  international 
ventures  of  limited  scale  and  specific  scope  and  purpose. 


In  the  early  1950s  the  Norwegian  Institute  for  Atomic  Energy  built 
an  experimental  power  reactor  in  southwest  Norway  at  the  town  of  Hal- 
den.  While  this  reactor  does  not  produce  electricity,  it  produces  about  25 
megawatts  of  heat  output  which  can  be  used  to  make  process  steam  for 
an  adjoining  paper  factory.  In  1958.  through  a  trilateral  arrangement 
involving  the  Institute,  NEA  and  Euratom,  the  project  became  an 
NEA  undertaking:,  with  the  Institute  acting  as  an  operating  con- 
tractor. The  AEC  subsequently  entered  into  a  bilateral  agreement 
with  the  Institute  for  exchange  of  technical  information. 

The  Halden  Project  is  modest  in  comparison  with  nuclear  projects 
in  the  United  States.  At  the  end  of  1969  its  professional  staff  totalled 
43,  of  whom  13  were  seconded  by  signatories  other  than  Norway.  Its 
research  program  for  1967-69  was  about  $5.3  million,  and  its  budp-et 
for  1970-72  a  bit  less.  By  the  end  of  1972  the  total  financing  of  the 
project  is  expected  to  amount  to  $14.5  million.264  The  Institute  owns, 
manages,  and  operates  the  project  for  the  signatories  with  the  gui- 
dance of  a  board  of  management  and  an  operating  committee.265 

«•  Eurona  Yearbook,  1970   < London  :  Europa  Publications,  Ltd..  1070),  p.  309. 

•*  The  Halden  Board  of  Management  consists  of  one  member  designated  by  each  signa- 
tory. Its  principal  functions  are  annually  to  approve  the  joint  progrnm  of  research  and 
experiments  and  the  budget  for  the  program.  The  Board  designates  Its  own  chairman 
and  vice-chairman.  It  is  reaulred  to  meet  at  least  twice  yearly.  A  representative  of  the 
NEA  mny  attf-nd  In  an  advisory  capacity. 

The  Operating  Committee  is  composed  of  one  senior  technical  specialist  designated  by 
each  signatory.  It  assists  the  Board  in  formulating  the  joint  program,  and  supervises 
the  carrying  out  of  the  joint  program  by  the  Institute.  The  committee  approves  large 
contracts  and  approves  the  conditions  for  the  scientific  and  technical  personnel,  who 
are  paid  from  the  common  budget. 



The  second  experimental  nuclear  power  reactor  is  the  high  tem- 
perature reactor  project  at  the  Winfrith  establishment  of  the  United 
Kingdom  Atomic  Energy  Authority  (UKAEA)  in  Dorset.  Known  as 
the  Dragon  Project,  this  reactor,  which  was  originally  built  by  the 
UKAEA  as  part  of  its  reactor  program,  became  an  international 
project  of  the  NEA  through  an  agreement  of  March  23, 1959.  While  the 
initial  charter  of  the  project  emphasized  research,  development,  and 
demonstration,  its  objectives  were  modified  in  1969  to  permit  the 
project  to  assist  the  nuclear  industries  of  participating  countries  in 
their  exploitation  of  this  particular  nuclear  power  technology. 

As  with  the  Halden  Project,  the  Dragon  Project  is  modest  in  size. 
At  the  end  of  March  1970,  its  staff  included  ill  secured  from  the 
signatory  countries.  Project  expenditures  for  the  year  ending  March  31, 

1970  were   about   $5.6   million,   while  the   budget   for   fiscal    years 

1971  through  1973  was  projected  at  about  $17.3  million.  Over  the  14 
years  of  its  operation,  the  total  funding  of  the  project  amounted  to 
$95  million. 

The  administrative  arrangements  of  the  Drasron  Project  are 
characterized  by  flexibility  in  professional  staffing.  The  UKAEA  acts 
as  operating  contractor  to  the  NEA.  The  international  character  of 
the  project  is  emphasized  by  selection  of  staff  from  all  participating 
countries.  Only  minor  difficulties  have  been  experienced  in  assembling 
the  research  team,  and  the  working  relations  between  persons  of  very 
different  backgrounds  is  reported  to  be  good.  The  administrative  sys- 
tem enjoys  the  advantage  that  new  persons  with  new  ideas  can  readily 
join  the  project,  but  it  suffers  from  a  comparatively  high  turnover  rate 
in  its  staff.266 

Overall  control  of  the  project  is  exercised  by  a  Board  of  Manage- 
ment 267  which  determines  the  work  program  and  budget  for  each 
year.  Day-to-day  operation  of  the  project  is  entrusted  to  a  Chief 
Executive  who  together  with  other  senior  staff,  is  appointed  by  the 
Board.  The  arrangement  whereby  the  UKAEA  acts  as  the  legal 
agent  for  the  project  seems  compatible  with  control  of  the  project's 
affairs  by  the  signatories  and  the  arrangement  has  been  found  to 
be  an  entirely  workable  solution  to  a  difficult  problem.268 

The  United  States  is  involved  in  the  Dragon  Project  through  an 
Agreement  for  Cooperation  between  the  AEC  and  NEA  under  which 
information  from  the  project  is  made  available  to  the  United  States 
in  exchange  for  information  arising  from  the  AEC's  research  on  this 
type  of  reactor. 

Results  from  the  project  are  distributed  to  the  signatories  who  may 
disclose  the  information  to  persons  and  undertakings  in  their  own 
territories,  but  not  to  others  except  with  the  agreement  of  all  the 

The  international  character  of  the  Dragon  Project  has  been  em- 
phasized in  its  staffing,  in  the  policies  for  carrying  out  its  tasks,  and 
in  its  arrangements  for  the  placing  of  contracts.  As  an  international 

283  C.  A.  Ronnie.  G.  E.  Loekett  and  R.  E.  Reynolds.  "The  Dragon  Project."  Proceed- 
ings of  the  Third  International  Conference  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  (New 
York  :  United  Nations.  196.rO.  vol.  1.  p.  319. 

287  The  Board  consists  of  representatives  from  all  the  signatories  and  from  the  NEA. 

2S8Rennie.  Loekett  and  Reynolds,  op.  clt,  p.  318. 


organization,  the  project  has  enabled  the  participants,  some  of  whom 
could  not  readily  afford  so  large  an  effort,  to  take  an  active  part  in  a 
major  investigation  of  a  potentially  important  type  of  power  reactor. 
It  has  also  enabled  the  project  to  benefit  from  the  knowledge  and 
specialist  facilities  available  throughout  a  large  part  of  Europe.  An 
optimistic  assessment  by  several  of  the  Dragon  staff  asserts  the  proj- 
ect's experience  has  shown  that : 269 

.  .  .  cooperation  between  individuals,  firms  and  other  organizations  in  a 
number  of  countries  can  be  established  to  mutual  benefits,  and  that  the  coordina- 
tion of  the  efforts  of  many  and  widespread  contractors  in  both  research  pro- 
grams and  in  complex  engineering  tasks  can  be  achieved.  The  creation  of  an 
integrated  scientific,  technical  and  administrative  staff  with  clearly  defined 
objectives,  within  a  fixed  time  scale  and  within  a  fixed  budget,  has  engendered 
the  necessary  feeling  of  unity  of  purpose  and  concern  for  the  early  achievement 
of  the  tasks  on  an  economical  basis. 


Of  the  three  international  nuclear  energy  agencies,  only  the  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  has  a  working  fuel  reprocessing  plant.  This  facility, 
may,  however,  be  shut  down  in  the  face  of  competition  from  France, 
the  United  Kingdom,  and  West  Germany,  who  have  banded  together 
in  a  trilateral  arrangement  to  use  their  own  reprocessing  capacity. 
The  implications  of  this  change  for  commercial  nuclear  energy  in 
Europe  and  for  American  policy  vis-a-vis  the  European  nuclear  power 
industry  are  not  yet  apparent. 

The  NEA  fuel  reprocessing  plant  is  located  at  Mol  in  Belgium.  It 
is  owned  and  operated  by  Eurochemic,  an  international  company  with 
a  $38  million  paid  capital  whose  shares  are  held  by  governments, 
public  or  semi-public  bodies,  and  private  industry  of  NEA  countries. 
Eurochemic  was  established  in  July  1959  under  a  Diplomatic  Con- 
vention signed  in  December  1957.  At  the  time  its  reprocessing  plant 
came  into  service  in  1966,  it  was  probably  one  of  the  most  versatile  in 
the  world,  designed  to  accept  nuclear  fuels  of  virtually  any  composition 
and  manufacture.  It  has  made  substantial  contributions  to  the  tech- 
nology for  reprocessing  used  nuclear  fuels.270 

In  1971,  it  was  reported  that  France  and  Germany,  who  dominate 
Eurochemic,  had  decided  to  cut  off  their  financial  support  for  its 
commercial  reprocessing  after  1974.271  Then  in  mid-October  1971,  it 
was  further  reported  that  the  French  and  British  Government  nuclear 
organizations  had  agreed  with  a  West  German  consortium  to  set  up 
Europe's  first  multinational  nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  company — 
United  Reprocessors  GmbH— in  Frankfurt.  Deprived  of  its  market  by 
this  venture,  Eurochemic  is  tentatively  scheduled  to  stop  commercial 
reprocessing  in  1974  except  to  service  small  research  reactors,  and 
possibly  to  carry  on  some  new  research. 

Building  the  Infrastructure  for  Nuclear  Power 

In  addition  to  its  research  and  development  functions,  NEA  has 
worked  to  create  the  infrastructure  of  regulations  and  other  arrange- 
ments required  for  the  commercial  deployment  of  nuclear  energy  in 
Europe.  It  has  been  active  in  development  of  regulations  for  nuclear 

«*  Ih1<1..  p.  323. 

*">  "Work  of  the  European  Nuclear  Energy  Agency,"  Science  Policy  Newt,  vol.  2  (Sep- 
tember 1970).  p.  18. 

•"  Nucleonics  Week,  vol.  12  (September  16,  1971),  p.  10. 


health  and  safety,  and  for  transport  of  radioactive  materials.  NEA 
has  also  been  a  prime  mover  in  defining  and  limiting  liabilities  in  case 
of  a  major  nuclear  accident. 

Basic  norms  developed  by  the  Agency  for  protection  against  ioniz- 
ing radiations  were  developed  by  an  NEA  Health  and  Safety  Com- 
mittee in  liasion  with  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  These 
were  adopted  by  NEA  member  countries  in  1959.  Application  of  these 
norms  to  specific  circumstances  are  subject  to  separate  recommenda- 
tions by  the  Agency,  usually  in  collaboration  with  the  IAEA  and  other 
international  bodies  such  as  the  World  Health  Organisation.  A  deci- 
sion to  establish  an  emergency  warning  system  in  case  of  an  increased 
environmental  radioactivity  was  adopted  November  23, 1963. 

As  for  limitation  of  liability  on  the  part  of  the  owners  of  nuclear 
power  plants,  in  1960  an  OECD  Convention  on  Third  Party  Liability, 
was  developed  in  Paris  under  the  auspices  of  the  Agency.  Signed  by 
most  NEA  members,  the  convention  came  into  force  in  April  1968.  It 
defines  the  underlying  principles  of  all  international  agreements  on 
nuclear  liability,  and  is  the  basis  for  most  national  legislation  in 
Europe  for  this  purpose. 

NEA  and  Safeguards  for  Nuclear  Materials 

An  NEA  Convention  on  Security  Control,  which  took  effect  on 
July  22,  1959,  established  a  safeguards  system  of  inspection  and  con- 
trol for  the  movement  and  use  of  nuclear  fuel  materials  within  the 
Agency's  jurisdiction.  A  Control  Bureau  adopted  rules  applicable 
to  nuclear  facilities  using  nuclear  materials  recovered  or  obtained  in  an 
NEA  venture.  The  rules  cover  materials  from  all  NEA  undertakings. 
The  future  of  this  NEA  function  after  the  Nonproliferation  Treaty 
takes  effect  remains  to  be  seen. 

United  States  Participation  in  NEA  Activities 

U.S.  participation  in  NEA  activities  has  been  much  closer  to  tradi- 
tional types  of  international  cooperation  in  scientific  ventures  than 
has  been  its  participation  in  Euratom.  AEC's  annual  reports  since 
1960  describes  U.S.  participation  in  terms  of  information  exchange, 
cooperation,  and  participation  in  special  projects — but  with  no 
mention  of  U.S.  funding  of  such  projects.  A  typical  description  ap- 
pears in  the  AEC's  annual  report  for  1968,  which  said : 272 

The  AEC  continued  its  participation  in  joint  projects  with  the  European 
Xuclear  Energy  Agency  (ENEA),  including  the  Halden  Heavy  Boiling  Water 
Reactor  in  Norway,  the  Dragon  High  Temperature  Reactor  Project  in  England, 
Eurochemic  in  Belgium,  and  the  International  Food  Irradition  Project  at  Seibers- 
dorf,  Austria.  Information  exchanges  on  the  peaceful  uses  of  nuclear  energy 
and  participation  in  related  study  groups  and  symposia  continued. 

An  earlier  annual  report,  that  for  1963,  gives  more  detail  about 
U.S.  participation  in  the  Dragon  Project,  which  began  in  1959  under 
an  exchange  agreement  between  the  Dragon  Project  signatories  and 
the  AEC.  It  reported  that  AEC  cooperation  with  the  Dragon  Project 
had  been  carried  out  through  exchanges  of  technical  reports  and 
correspondence,  semiannual  conferences,  visits,  long-term  personnel 
exchanges  and  a  cooperative  materials  testing  program.273 

272  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  1968,  op.  clt.,  p.  205. 

273  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  for  196S,  op.  cit.,  p.  239. 


Since  both  the  NEA  and  Euratom  were  created  to  foster  commercial 
use  of  nuclear  energy  in  Europe,  and  since  the  membership  of  NEA 
represented  until  recently  a  larger  potential  market  for  the  U.S.  nu- 
clear power  industry  than  the  six  Euiatom  members,  it  seems  curious 
that  U.S.  support  to  Euratom  has  so  exceeded  that  for  NEA.  For  the 
latter  there  are  no  joint  undertakings  with  U.S.  funding.  One  signif- 
icant difference  between  the  two  multinational  organizations  may 
explain  the  difference  in  U.S.  suppoit.  This,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
writer,  was  the  presence  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  NEA  but  not  in 
Euratom.  During  the  mid-1950s  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry  was  con- 
cerned that  the  United  Kingdom  with  its  strongly  backed  government 
program  for  development  and  application  of  nuclear  power  would  be 
able  to  capture  much  of  the  world's  nuclear  power  market.  For  the 
United  States  to  have  funded  NEA  projects  may  well  have  seemed  to 
give  a  principal  competitor  in  the  international  nuclear  market  still 
greater  advantage.  In  these  circumstances,  U.S.  suppoit  could  not 
appear  to  benefit  nuclear  power  research  and  development  of  interest 
to  the  United  Kingdom. 

Conclusions  and  Current  Issues 

The  comparative  freedom  from  crises  of  the  OECD's  Nuclear 
Energy  Agency  provides  a  marked  contrast  to  the  trials  and  difficulties 
of  Euratom.  What  accounts  for  this  difference?  It  may  well  be  that 
the  fundamental  differences  between  the  organiaztions  provide  an 
answer.  NEA  appears  as  the  traditional  kind  of  international  under- 
taking, being  more  of  a  confederation  of  member  states  than  a  separate, 
supernational  organization.  Perhaps  relations  with  the  NEA  have  been 
easier  in  that  the  Agency  is  clearly  a  working  tool  of  the  members 
rather  than  a  form  of  international  government.  Perhaps,  also,  less  was 
expected  of  the  NEA.  For  example,  its  charter  was  not  to  create  a 
European  nuclear  industry  but  rather  to  help  with  technical  assistance. 
Whatever  the  reasons,  the  history  of  the  NEA  has  shown  more  co- 
operation and  less  friction  among  participating  members  than  was 
the  case  with  Euratom.  Future  planners  of  international  technological 
ventures  may  benefit  from  an  identification  and  analysis  of  the  factors 
that  have  caused  this  difference. 

The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  NEA  on  one  hand 
and  the  United  States  and  Euratom  on  the  other  are  also  different.  The 
United  States  cooperated  substantially  with  Euiatom  in  an  ambitious 
joint  research  program,  but  has  preferred  a  more  conventional  role  in 
its  relations  to  the  NEA,  limiting  its  participation  largely  to  exchange 
of  information  about  projects  of  mutual  interest.  That  the  United 
Kingdom  was  a  member  of  NEA  but  not  of  Euratom  may  have  been  a 
factor  in  the  difference  in  U.S.  participation.  In  the  formative  period 
of  the  NEA,  the  United  States  was  concerned  with  nuclear  competi- 
tion from  the  United  Kingdom,  which  had  begun  a  large-scale  deploy- 
ment of  nuclear  power  well  before  the  United  States  and  appeared  to 
be  a  formidable  future  competitor  in  the  world  nuclear  market.  U.S. 
financial  support  to  NEA  could  have  been  seen  as  fostering  a  competi- 
tive British  nuclear  technology,  while  U.S.  finaneial  support  to  Eura- 
tom enjoyed  the  advantage  of  being  earmarked  for  projects  explicitly 
beneficial  to  U.S.  nuclear  technology. 

With  the  United  Kingdom  and  other  European  nations  now  joining 
the  Common  Market,  the  membership  of  NEA  and  Euratom  will 
further  overlap.  In  turn,  this  raises  the  question  about  the  separate 


functions  of  these  organizations,  and  also  their  relationship  to  the 
International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Should  all  three  continue  as 
now  constituted?  Should  the  NEA  be  combined  into  Euratom?  Should 
Euratom  be  permitted  to  fade  away  and  its  scientific  resources  be 
transformed  into  a  general  European  scientific  capability,  leaving 
nuclear  technology  to  the  NEA  ?  How  would  such  changes  affect  U.S. 
interests  ?  These  are  some  questions  that  seem  likely  to  occur  if  nuclear 
power  in  Europe  is  to  fulfill  the  role  projected  for  it. 

X  U.S.  Fuel  for  European  Nuclear  Power 

Another  effect  of  the  scientific  discovery  of  fission  was  to  engage  the 
United  States  Government  in  the  enrichment  of  uranium,  a  large  scale 
industrial  process  that  until  now  has  provided  the  United  States 
with  a  strong  bargaining  position  in  international  nuclear  affairs.  As 
the  United  States  enters  the  1970's,  it  enjoys  a  virtual  monopoly  in  the 
non-Communist  world  market  for  the  supply  of  enriched  unranium  or 
enrichment  services.  Within  the  next  few  years,  however,  interacting 
decisions  of  domestic  and  foreign  policy  will  have  to  be  made  that  will 
affect  this  U.S.  predominance,  thereby  influencing  the  foreign  policy 
leverage  conferred  by  this  position  in  the  nuclear  fuel  market. 

The  1970's  are  likely  to  see  new  diplomatic,  economic,  and  technologi- 
cal initiatives  by  European  and  other  nations  to  reduce  their  depend- 
ence upon  U.S.  supply  of  enriched  uranium,  while  the  United  States, 
in  turn,  appears  inclined  to  preserve  its  competitive  position.  As  the 
U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission  sees  the  situation,  supplying  uranium 
enrichment  services  offers  the  possibility  for  a  great  expansion  in 
international  cooperation  between  the  United  States  and  Europe,  even 
though  the  supply  function  is  attended  by  many  complex  problems 
for  U.S.  foreign  policy.274  Whatever  the  outcome  of  still-changing  U.S. 
policy,  the  results  inevitably  will  affect  the  future  of  commercial  nu- 
clear power  in  Europe. 

The  Enriched  Uranium  Business 

When  Congress  revised  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  in  1954,  it.  retained 
the  original  government  monopoly  of  enriched  uranium;  there  were 
no  private  facilities  to  produce  nuclear  fuel.  Accordingly,  the  develop- 
ing nuclear  industries  at  home  and  abroad  leased  these  materials  from 
the  AEC.  When  the  Act  was  later  revised  to  permit  private  owner- 
ship of  enriched  uranium,  the  AEC  changed  its  policies  to  permit 
customers  to  supply  their  own  normal  uranium  which  the  Commission 
would  then  enrich.  Enrichment  service,  rather  than  sale  of  enriched 
uranium,  is  now  the  predominant  pattern  of  AEC  operation  in 
nuclear  fuel  supply. 

Today  in  the  United  States  all  but  two  industrial  services  required 
for  the  construction  and  operation  of  commercial  nuclear  power  plants 
are  available  from  domestic  nuclear  industry.  The  two  exceptions  are 
the  enrichment  of  uranium  and  the  indefinite  storage  of  radioactive 
products  from  the  used  nuclear  fuel.  The  administration's  policy  is  to 
t  ransfer  these  two  functions  to  the  private  nuclear  industry,  but  when 
and  how  this  will  be  done  is  still  uncertain.  Of  the  two,  the  enrichment 
of  uranium  is  by  far  the  larger  industrial  activity  in  terms  of  capital 

271  This  idea  was  developed  by  Myron  B.  Kratzer.  then  Assistant  Ocneral  Manager  of 
the  AEC  for  International  Activities,  In  his  testimony  before  the  House  Committee  on 
Science  and  Astronautics,  May  1971.  Of.  U.S.  Congress,  House.  Committee  on  Science  and 
Astronautics.  Hearings,  A  General  Revietc  of  International  Conjuration  in  Science  and 
Space,  92d  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1971,  p.  £35. 



investment,  costs  of  operation,  and  demand  for  electricity.  It  also 
appears  to  have  the  most  far-reaching  implications  for  foreign  policy. 

Provision  of  uranium  enriching  services  by  the  United  States  to 
domestic  and  to  foreign  customers  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with  the 
development  and  marketing  of  U.S.  nuclear  power  technology  by 
the  private  nuclear  power  industry.  Through  1970  more  than  40  nuclear 
power  reactors  of  U.S.  design  and  technology  were  in  foreign  operation, 
being  built  or  on  order  from  abroad.275  While  other  major  industrial 
nations,  particularly  in  Europe,  are  competing  with  the  U.S.  in  the 
world  market  for  nuclear  power  plants,  the  U.S.  nuclear  industry 
appears  to  hold  a  dominant  position.  United  States  nuclear  reactor 
sale**  abroad;  already  have  totaled  more  than  $1  billion,  mostly  financed 
by  the  Export-Import  Bank.  These  sales  are  expected  to  increase 
several  fold  in  the  future  *76  Adding  to  these  sales  of  nuclear  power 
plants  will  be  sales  of  U.S.  enriching  services. 

The  cost  of  enrichment  of  uranium  accounts  for  about  a  third  of  the 
cost  Of  nuclear  fuel,  which  makes  enrichment  the  single  largest  item  of 
cost  in  the  whole  fuel  cycle  and  an  important  determinant  of  the 
ultimate  cost  of  nuclear  power.  In  the  eyes  of  the  AEC,  the  importance 
of  having  an  adequate  supply  of  enriching  capacity  available  when 
needed  and  at  a  reasonable  cost,  coupled  with  the  high  cost  of  process 
development  and  construction  for  enrichment  facilities  justifies  the 
closest  possible  cooperation  and  communications  among  the  users  and 
suppliers  of  enrichment  services.277 

At  present,  the  three  enrichment  plants  owned  by  the  AEC  constitute 
virtually  the  sole  source  of  enrichment  services  to  non-Communist 
countries.278  A  similar  facility  exists  in  the  Soviet  Union,  a  compara- 
tively small  plant  at  Capenhurst  in  England,  a  small  facility  at  Pierre- 
latte,  France,  and  one  of  unknown  size  in  China.  The  Union  of  South 
Africa  is  reported  to  be  building  an  enrichment  plant  based  upon  a 
secret  process.  The  facilities  in  the  U.S.S.R.,  England,  and  France 
were  built  to  manufacture  highly  enriched  uranium  for  military 

Requirements  for  Enriched  Uranium  and  Enrichment  Services 

To  remain  the  major  supplier  of  uranium  enrichment  service  for 
commercial  nuclear  power  in  the  non-Communist  world,  the  United 
States  must  be  prepared  to  supply  this  service  for  domestic  and  foreign 
orders.  For  the  foreign  market,  U.S.  readiness  and  ability  to  supply 
this  service  must  be  credible  to  foreign  officials  who  are  responsible  for 
their  countries'  nuclear  power  programs. 

The  demand  for  enrichment  services  is  expected  to  grow  substan- 
tially over  the  next  few  decades  as  commercial  use  of  nuclear  power 
expands.  For  the  United  States  alone,  nuclear  power  plants  are  ex- 
pected to  increase  in  total  electrical  generating  capacity  from  5,000 
megawatts  in  1970  to  15,000  megawatts  in  1980  and  to  300,000  mega- 
watts by  1985.  The  AEC  estimates  that  by  1980,  29  percent  of  the 

875  Kratzer,  op.  cit.,  p.  335. 

276  Loc.  cit. 

277  Remarks  of  ABC  Commissioner  Wilfrid  E.  Johnson  in  U.S.  Papers  for  the  Fourth 
United  Nations  International  Conference  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of  Atomic  Energy  (Wash- 
ington, D.C  :  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  1971),  vol.  I,  p.  2.5-2. 

278  These  production  plants  for  enriched  uranium  are  located  at  Oak  Ridge,  Tennessee ; 
Paducah,  Kentucky ;  and  Portsmouth,  Ohio.  Together  they  represent  a  U.S.  capital  invest- 
ment of  over  $2.3  billion. 


electricity  generated  in  the  United  States  will  come  from  nuclear 
power  plants,  and  in  the  1990s  about  half.  As  for  foreign  nuclear 
power,  the  AEC  estimates  that  nuclear  power  plants  in  foreign  mar- 
kets accessible  to  the  United  States  will  represent  a  total  electrical 
generating  capacity  of  from  70,000  to  100,000  megawatts  by  1980. 
Taking  into  account  that  some  enriching  services  will  be  furnished  from 
foreign  sources,  the  AEC  projects  that  foreign  and  domestic  nuclear 
powerplants  requiring  U.S.  enrichment  services  will  total  about  225,- 
000  megawatts  in  1980.279 

The  value  of  the  enrichment  market  is  estimated  to  be  about  $1  bil- 
lion annually  by  1980,  and  $1.5  billion  by  1985.  The  AEC  already  has 
signed  long-term  contracts  for  enriching  services  of  30  years  dura- 
tion. These  contracts  have  an  aggregate  potential  demand  of  about 
$3  billion,  including  some  $800  million  from  abroad.280 

United  States  Supply  Policy 

To  foster  foreign  interest  in  its  nuclear  power  technology,  the 
United  States  has  assured  foreign  users  of  a  reliable  supply  of  enriched 
uranium.  This  assurance  is  necessary  because  other  nations  would  not 
be  willing  to  make  large  capital  investments  in  nuclear  power  plants 
fueled  from  an  external  monopoly  without  strong  assurance  of  the 
long-term  availability  of  enriched  uranium.  Thus,  the  cornerstone  of 
U.S.  supply  policies  has  been  a  long-term  assurance  of  supply,  com- 
mensurate with  the  reasonable  economic  life  of  foreign  nuclear  power 
plants,  on  non-discriminatory  terms  and  conditions,  and  including 
charges  comparable  to  those  for  the  domestic  nuclear  industry.  U.S. 
supply  policy  has  been  characterized  by  repeated  assurances  of  the 
dependability  of  nuclear  fuel  supply  through  export  allocations  of 
enriched  uranium  to  signatories  of  bilateral  agreements,  and  through 
enrichment  services  contracts. 

The  sucesss  of  this  policy  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  most  nuclear 
power  reactors  sold  in  international  trade  to  date  have  been  of  U.S. 
design,  using  enriched  uranium.  For  the  period  of  July  1962  through 
December  30, 1970,  the  revenues  from  the  sale  of  enriching  services  and 
nuclear  materials  to  foreign  users  came  to  $207  million.281 


Supplying  fuel  to  nuclear  power  plants  in  Europe  offers  advantages 
to  the  United  States.  The  AEC  identifies  them  as  follows:282 

National  security :  U.S.  supply  of  enriched  uranium  for  civil  pur- 
poses abroad  under  safeguards  assures  that  the  plutonium  produced 
in  these  reactors  will  not  be  available  for  military  use.  The  avail- 
ability of  enriched  uranium  from  the  United  States  on  attractive 
terms  also  serves  U.S.  non-proliferation  objectives  by  reducing  the 
incentive  for  other  countries  to  develop  their  own  enriching  capacity. 

Strong  international  ties:  By  supplying  enriched  uranium,  the 
United  Slates  encourages  the  formation  of  strong  and  mutually  bene- 
ficial economic  ties. 

^"Johnson,  op.  clt.,  p.  2.5   2. 

280  U.S.    Congress.    Joint    Committee    on    Atomic    Energy,    Hearings,    AEC    Authorizing 
Legislation,  Firsal  Year  1072,  op.  clt.,  p.  22'M. 

281  U.S.  Concress.   Joint  Committee  on   Atomic  Energy,  Hearings,   Uranium   Enrichment 
Pricing  Criteria,  92d  Cong.,  1st  SeSS.,  1971.  part  2.  p.  29. 

*8=U.S.    Congress,    Joint    Committee    on    Atomic    Energy,    Hearings.    Future    Ownership 
the  AEC's  Gaseous  Diffusion  Plant",  91st  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1969,  p.  48. 


Economic  benefits:  Important  economic  benefits  are  realized  from 
the  sale  of  enriched  uranium  abroad.  While  prices  charged  by  the 
United  States  do  not  include  profit,  they  are  calculated  to  recover  all 
costs  of  production  including  amortization,  interest  on  the  govern- 
ment's investment,  and  a  factor  for  contingencies.  The  foreign  sales 
have  helped  to  provide  a  cash  benefit  to  the  U.S.  Treasury  and  to 
amortize  facilities  built  initially  for  defense  purposes. 

Foreign  exchange:  Foreign  sales  provide  an  important  source  of 
foreign  exchange.  To  help  redress  a  serious  balance-of-payments 
deficit,  the  United  States  must  look  to  the  export  of  products  based 
on  advanced  technology  and  heavy  capital  investment  where  U.S. 
superiority  cannot  be  easily  offset  by  labor  cost  differentials  and  other 
factors  favoring  foreign  products. 


.:  ■      .■•■:■■  ;  v  .    :  '  -      -      .  -  '.  ;  •  :-,..;• ■•  •:■:  o*  *■ 

Supplying  enrichment  services  to  foreign  customers  also  has  several 
dra  wfoacks :  ' 

Commitment  of  public  capital:  Enrichment  technology  is  very  ex- 
pensive in  capital  -investment.' A  policy  of  long  terni  commitfnertt  to 
supply  enrichment  services  to  foreign  customers  carries  with  it  an 
implied  obligation  to  make  whatever  future  public  or  private  invest-' 
ment  will  be  necessary  to  expand  or  build  new  enrichment  plants. 

Commitment  of  fossil  fuel:  Enrichment  plants  in  the  U.S.  require 
large  amounts  of  electricity,  most  of  which  is  generated  in  conven- 
tional powerplants  that  burn  fossil  fuels.283  Not  only  is  this  fuel  in 
essence  exported,  but  additional  land  is  strip  mined  in  the  United 
States  for  the  benefit  of  electricity  users  abroad. 

Implied  responsibility  for  misuse  of  exported  fuel:  Although  en- 
riched uranium  suitable  for  fuel  for  most  contemporary  commercial 
nuclear  power  plants  cannot  be  used  directly  to  fabricate  an  atomic 
explosive,  it  would  be  a  very  desirable  material  for  clandestine  enrich- 
ment facilities  to  process  into  weapons  grade  materials.  If  the  United 
States  freely  supplies  enrichment  services  in  the  world  market,  what 
would  be  its  responsibilities  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  were  some  of  that 
material  to  be  illicitly  diverted  to  weapons  manufacture  ?  In  Section  V 
it  was  noted  that  materials  were  supplied  according  to  the  terms  of 
bilateral  agreements  which  initially  gave  the  United  States  unusual 
authority  to  inspect  use  of  materials  supplied  by  it.  Later  this  author- 
ity was  transferred  through  trilateral  agreements  to  the  Interna- 
tional Atomic  Energy  Agency.  Presumably,  once  the  Nonproliferation 
Treaty  is  fully  implemented,  the  IAEA  will  have  full  responsibility 
for  safeguarding  nuclear  fuel  materials,  including  enriched  uranium, 
as  discussed  in  Section  XI.  Nonetheless,  if  enriched  uranium  supplied 
by  the  United  States  does  find  its  way  into  wrong  hands,  will  it  be 
sufficient  for  the  U.S.  to  simply  shift  the  responsibility  to  the  IAEA  ? 


A  point  of  departure  for  the  U.S.  nuclear  fuel  supply  policy  was 
established  on  August  8, 1955.  On  that  date,  the  opening  day  in  Geneva 

283  Admiral  Rickover,  who  heads  the  AEC's  nuclear  power  program  for  naval  propulsion, 
estimates  that  the  enrichment  services  required  for  a  nuclear  fuel  loading  requires  about 
600  million  kilowatt  hours  of  electricity,  which  would  require  about  500,000  tons  of  coal 
to  generate. 


of  the  first  United  Nation's  Conference  on  the  Peaceful  Uses  of 
Nuclear  Energy,  the  AEC  announced  a  price  for  enriched  uranium 
to  nations  which  had  bilateral  agreements  with  the  United  States. 
"Within  the  year,  on  February  22,  1956,  at  the  recommendation  of  the 
AEC  and  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Departments  of  State  and 
Defense,  President  Eisenhower  announced  that  the  United  States 
would  make  available  40,000  kilograms  of  uranium-235  to  assist  in- 
dustrial nuclear  power  development  and  research  within  the  United 
States  and  to  enable  friendly  countries  to  develop  the  peaceful  uses  of 
atomic  energy.  Of  the  uranium-235  thus  allocated,  20,000  kilograms 
was  for  domestic  use  and  20,000  for  cooperating  countries.284  By  im- 
plication, as  additional  nuclear  projects  were  undertaken,  additional 
supplies  of  nuclear  fuel  would  be  made  available.  In  a  parallel  state- 
ment, Chairman  Strauss  added  that  the  AEC  would  provide  uranium- 
235  to  support  nuclear  power  development  for  the  expected  life  of 
nuclear  power  projects  abroad. 

Although  these  announcements  committed  the  United  States  to 
supply  nuclear  fuels,  there  remained  uncertainty  as  to  terms  and  con- 
ditions of  supply.  To  minimize  these  uncertainties,  the  President  on 
November  18, 1956,  announced  details  of  terms  and  conditions  of  sup- 
ply. His  announcement  permitted  nuclear  power  plant  operators 
abroad  to  estimate  more  accurately  the  costs  of  nuclear  power.  The 
announcement  also  emphasized  the  U.S.  desire  to  sell  rather  than  lease 
nuclear  fuel  for  foreign  nuclear  power  plants,  and  set  out  the  formal 
criteria  under  which  it  would  receive  and  enrich  foreign  owned 

To  reassure  foreign  users  of  a  reliable  supply,  the  AEC  in  1968  an- 
nounced that  it  would  deliver  supplies  of  enriched  uranium  for  periods 
as  long  as  five  years  in  advance  of  actual  use  so  that  the  users  could 
have  an  inventory  in  hand.  Furthermore,  proposals  for  foreign  inven- 
tories of  enriched  uranium  for  even  longer  periods  would  be 


When  the  Atomic  Energy  Act  was  revised  in  1954,  a  special  limita- 
tion was  included  to  control  distribution  of  special  nuclear  materials 
to  any  group  of  nations.  Section  54  required  specific  authorization  by 
the  Congress  for  such  distribution.  The  Euratom  Cooperation  Act  of 
1958  subsequently  authorized  the  transfer  of  specified  amounts  of 
uranium-235  and  plutonium.  This  initial  authorization  has  subse- 
quently increased  from  time  to  time  by  legislation.  The  latest  increase 
occurred  in  1967  by  Public  Law  90-190,  which  authorized  transfer 
of  up  to  215,000  kilograms  of  contained  uranium-235.  In  reporting 

"•D.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Twentieth  Semiannual  Report  of  Atomic  Energy 
Gomminnion   (Washington,  D.C. :  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,   1956),   p.   vlll. 

""U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  the  Congress  of  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  January-December  1966,  op.  clt.,  p.  274. 

"•U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  Annual  Report  to  Congress  of  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission,  1968   (Washington,  D.C:  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1969),  p.  210. 


this  legislation  to  Congress,  the  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy 
underscored  the  need  to  assure  Europe  of  an  adequate  fuel  supply  for 
its  nuclear  power  plants.  According  to  the  Joint  Committee,  a  survey 
of  uranium-235  needs  for  the  Community  had  indicated  that  the 
earlier  ceiling  would  be  insufficient  to  meet  the  long-term  fuel 
requirements  for  nuclear  power  plants  which  were  expected  to  be 
in  operation  or  under  construction  in  the  near  future.  Additional  ura- 
nium-235 would  be  necessary  to  fuel  an  installed  nuclear  power  plant 
capacity  of  13,000  electrical  megawatts  (Mwe)  that  Euratom  ex- 
pected to  have  in  operation  or  under  construction  by  1972.  The  Joint 
Committee  observed  that  this  increase  represented  a  logical  continua- 
tion of  the  U.S  Government's  previous  uranium  supply  policies. 
Assuming  that  all  of  the  additional  uranium-235  was  supplied  to 
Euratom  through  U.S  uranium  enrichment  services,  the  revenues  to 
the  United  States  would  be  about  $500  million.  There  could  also  be 
additional  revenue  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry  through  sale  of 
uranium  concentrates,  conversion  services,  and  reactor  equipment.287 


Beginning  January  1,  1969,  the  industrial  role  of  the  AEC  changed 
when  the  United  States  began  to  offer  "toll  enrichment"  to  European 
users  of  nuclear  power.288  The  AJEC  processes  customer-supplied 
uranium  in  its  diffusion  plants  to  increase  the  U-235  content  and 
returns  to  the  consumer  the  desired  enriched  fuel,  plus  the  residual 
uranium  that  has  been  depleted  of  its  normal  U-235  content.  For  this 
enriching  service,  the  AEC  charges  a  toll  based  on  the  amount  of 
separative  work  needed  to  produce  the  desired  enrichment. 

To  provide  toll  enriching  service  to  Euratom,  the  Atomic  Energy 
Commission  needed  special  legislative  authorization.  This  was  pro- 
vided in  1967  through  Public  L&w  90-190  (81  Stat.  575). 

Through  November  1970,  the  AEC  had  signed  31  contracts  with 
foreign  customers  to  supply  enrichment  services  worth  $688  million, 
based  on  a  charge  of  $26  per  separate  work  unit.  In  comparison,  at  that 
time  AEC's  enrichment  commitments  to  the  domestic  nuclear  industry 
totaled  $1.6  billion.  Of  the  foreign  commitments,  those  with  Euratom 
totaled  $124  million.  Table  V  gives  the  details  of  the  United  States 
foreign  commitments. 

In  estimating  enrichment  requirements,  each  nuclear  power  plant  of 
1,000  Mwe  generating  capacity  represents  a  demand  of  over  a  30- 
year  working  life  of  about  $110  million,  based  on  AEC  prices  in  effect 
in  November  1970.  OECD  estimates  that  the  nuclear  power  market  of 
the  non-Communist  world  may  reach  610,000  installed  megawatts  by 
1985.  If  so,  the  market  for  toll  enrichment  could  approach  §2.5  billion 

*"  U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Atomic  Energy,  Atomic  Energy  Acta — Amend- 
ments, 90th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  1967.  Sen.  Kept.  No.  743. . 

888  With  toll  enrichment,  the  customer  furnishes  his  own  natural  uranium  and  thus  can 
sav»  the  initial  dollar  cost  of  this  material. 

288  Robert  L.  Loftness.  "Nuclear  Power  Abroad  :  A  Time  of  Change,"  Combustion,  vol.  113 
(August  1971),  p.  13. 



Value  of 

Number  of  contracts 

Customer  contracts  (millions) 

Euratom - If  $124.3 

Japan - —  8  335.3 

Switzerland. - 2  83.3 

Sweden 2  139.1 

Spain , -  1  •» 

Total - 31  688.4 

Source:  U.S.  Atomic  Energy  Commission,  press  release  N-206,  Nov.  24,  1970. 


Throughout  the  later  1950s,  one  question  for  U.S.  foreign  nuclear 
policy  was  what  financial  assistance,  if  any,  should  be  given  to  foreign 
countries  purchasing  U.S.  nuclear  fuel  materials.  Shouldthe^ U.S.  sell 
them,  lease  them,  or  loan  money  to  buy  them?  The  final  decision  was 
in  favor  of  direct  sale  for  the  following  reasons :  290 

(1)  The  cost  of  the  fuel  inventory  was  considered  part  of  the 
capital  cost  of  the  facility  and  hence  one  that  should  be  borne 
by  the  owner  of  the  facility. 

(2)  The  material  was  expensive  and  the  total  value  of  the  fuel 
inventory  in  the  aggregate  could  reach  billions  of  dollars  when 
atomic  power  came  into  general  use ;  and 

(3)  It  would  be  unwise  for  the  Commission  to  establish  a  prece- 
dent that  might  lead  to  its  financing  very  large  sums  of  money 
overseas  (which  more  appropriately  was  a  banking  function). 


AEC  policy  of  sale  rather  than  lease  had  its  drawbacks,  partic- 
ularly for  cooperation  with  Eurotom.  The  initial  heavy  capital  outlay 
for  enriched  fuel  could  be  an  obstacle  in  financing  nuclear  power 
projects  of  interest  to  the  United  States.  To  reduce  this  obstacle,  the 
AEC  announced  on  February  2,  1959,  that  it  would  supply  enriched 
uranium  fuel  on  a  deferred  payment  basis  to  countries  and  interna- 
tional organizations  that  had  bilateral  agreements  of  cooperation  with 
the  United  States. 

Under  this  arrangement,  a  foreign  reactor  operator  could  use  the 
fuel  for  ten  years  before  beginning  payments  on  principal,  which